

Rapid Evidence Review
Livelihoods and Markets in Protracted Conflict: A Review of Evidence and Practice
Annexes

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Annex A Compendium of country studies

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Afghanistan

Conflict has been a normal part of life in Afghanistan since time immemorial, and an almost permanent feature of life for the past 50 years. There were two coups d'état in the 70s, the second of which (1978) led to huge upheaval in the rural economy and was followed by the Soviet invasion and war 1979-89. The impact on the rural economy and society was profound from a policy of depopulating rural areas viewed as hostile¹ and a mass refugee exodus of about one third of the total Afghanistan population. Following the end of the war against the Soviet forces with their withdrawal in 1989, fighting continued as a civil war (1989-92) until the collapse of the Communist government. This was immediately followed by a second civil war between factions (and their international backers) fighting for control of Kabul (1992-1996) that ended with the ascent to power of the Pakistan-backed Taliban movement. A third civil war (1996-2001) immediately followed, which continued until the US-led invasion (2001). Since then there has been a continued conflict (war or 'insurgency') until the present day, with shifting degrees of intensity in different parts of the country over the past two decades. Conflict has taken different forms: sometimes territory is more clearly held by one side or other, often there is an intermediate status of no overall control.

The Western forces behind the invasion invested hugely in a reconstruction effort, signed not only to rebuild Afghanistan physically but to create a new and democratic State with a Western-style civil service. The resultant state is in fact a hybrid, combining centralised authority (at least formally) with subnational authority wielded by a variety of local power brokers, who collectively have both shared and competing interests. It is a state where scholars have warned not to confuse the outward signs of institutional authority with genuine function or power. Afghanistan is the archetypal case of "isomorphic mimicry", where "state institutions...[are] largely constructed as a vacant space. This isomorphic mimicry – the adoption of organisational or institutional forms in weak states that simulate the appearance of institutions in strong, stable states –

¹ Note the comparison with Government policy in N Uganda. See country report in this study

enables legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and camouflages the fact that these institutions do not function as they were intended to".²

Until 2002, international aid was at fairly low levels in Afghanistan and much less literature is available on livelihoods in the conflict or on the impacts of assistance. This paper deals mainly with the decade following the fall of the Taliban regime.

Impact of conflict on livelihoods

Livelihood crises did not begin with the war in 2001. One researcher has traced causes of current poverty in one part of the country to the severe long, cold drought (1970-73). In 70/1 alone 75% of the country's livestock wiped out, a shock from which the rural economy has never recovered, and 80,000 died from hunger-related causes. By 1973, famine was widespread. This description seems to fit recent events:

"Although massive ...aid programmes have done much to improve roads, power supplies, irrigation, and other essential elements of an economic substructure on which future progress could be based, the gap that divides Kabul from the outlying and backward areas shows little signs of closing. In those parts of the country the authority of the central government remains minimal, and small notice is taken of the men selected for parliament. Thus, the capital tends to be a world of its own, where governments change, where unrest is chronic, and where the country finds almost its only link with the outside world"

In fact, this is the Wikipedia description of Afghanistan in 1973.

Afghanistan then faced its longest and most severe drought from 1995-2003. This brought a severe food security crisis, but as with famines in Ethiopia (1984) or Somalia (2011), natural disaster only resulted in a crisis because years of conflict had exhausted people's coping reserves. As so often, conflict is not seen as a livelihood *shock* so much as a massive livelihood *stress*, which leaves people vulnerable to natural or other shocks. One observer believes that the biggest shock which Afghanistan has faced was the global food price shock/ global financial crisis of 2008-9.³

² Jackson 2016

³ key informant interviews

Afghanistan is a food deficit country which relies on imports, and there is very high landless and land-poor population who depend upon markets for the food. They were particularly vulnerable in 2008.

Because Afghanistan has been in near constant upheaval for so long, it is not helpful to think of some notional “normal” economic life which has been disturbed by conflict. It is perhaps more useful to think of the whole economy having been shaped by its history and power balances, including decades of conflicts and other shocks. The term ‘political economy’ is probably more correctly used about Afghan livelihoods than those of most countries – politics and power has shaped almost everything about the economy for everyone. This can be seen clearly, for example, in looking at regional differences in the interplay of power, resources and livelihood opportunities within the country. In the irrigated lowlands, for example, there are higher concentrations of land ownership and more monolithic power structures. The highlands are often seen as poorer, but they have more dispersed centres of authority and less extreme concentration of resources.

The direct effects of conflict were first and foremost seen in mass emigration. Millions fled to Pakistan and Iran in the recent war, though the numbers were lower than the refugee outflows during the Soviet war. Emigration also to be seen in context: it has been a constant livelihood strategy for over a century, as people move away from areas that become inhospitable (including from increasing population pressure).

A second survival strategy in rural areas is to respond to instability by changing agricultural production, looking for crops which are low-risk, high-value and easily marketable. In Afghanistan they found the perfect conflict crop, growing poppies to produce opium (see also below for its competitive advantage against currently promoted cropping systems).

As in other countries, conflict has brought a change in local governance, with new rulers imposing different restrictions on production and trade. Since 2002, the US backed government has tried to impose

restrictions on poppy cultivation with huge livelihood consequences in some parts of the country.

The study of livelihoods and the trajectories, though, shows that conflict has not been the determinant of people stories, but rather the context within which their livelihoods play out. The most serious shocks which people face remain either local or idiosyncratic, especially episodes of ill-health, which often leads to loss of land and debt from which families do not recover.

As in most other conflicts, markets continued to function. Throughout the wars and the droughts, most people accessed much of their staple food from the market, with imports from Pakistan particularly important.⁴

Food Security and Livelihood interventions

In many ways, the aid effort in Afghanistan has been fundamentally different from that in any of the other case studies. From the fall of the Taliban regime, there has been a massive investment aimed at rebuilding the national economy, recreating state and other institutions – indeed, there has been a vision of the complete creation of a new country. Livelihood interventions have not simply been intended to improve the economic security of particular beneficiaries all population groups, but there been vehicles for an economic transformation including of the agrarian economy. The political imperative to rebuild a country has been comparable only to the aid efforts to Bosnia and to Iraq. This makes Afghanistan somewhat of an outlier and means that much of the analysis of the aid effort will have restricted applicability elsewhere. (One can imagine that the lessons might have had some relevance for a massive reconstruction aid which might have gone to Syria, had the course of the war been otherwise.)

The difference in aid flows from the other studies can be seen in a) the volume of aid b) its sources and c) the channels used.⁵

- a. Overall levels of ODA to Afghanistan (from countries reporting to OECD) was second only to aid to Iraq until 2007, and were then the largest in the world.

⁴ FEWSNET 2007a

⁵ All figures on aid flows are from Poole 2011

- b. The vast majority of aid to Afghanistan has come from development funds, with humanitarian assistance only constituting around a quarter of ODA (excluding spending classified as on security). Humanitarian assistance has been significant, at over \$850 m in both 2002 and in 2008 (after the global food price shock), and never falling below \$325 m in the decade after the war. However, even at its peak this was only two thirds of assistance per capita to Somalia (2008) and less even than humanitarian assistance to Iraq at its peak.
- c. A relatively small percentage of the aid has been channelled through UN organisations/ICRC/IFRC or international NGOs. This was less than \$1 bn per year until 2008 (approx.. \$1.15 bn). The UN-OCHA office was only established in Kabul in 2009, before which the humanitarian community 'lacked a platform from which to advocate for humanitarian funding amidst the powerful reconstruction, state-building and stabilisation priorities of many of the major donors.'⁶

It is worth putting these aid flows in context.

Estimates of money flowing into the country from opium trade are several times higher than total assistance flowing through the traditional aid sector (UN, INGOs) at \$2.8 bn to per annum since 2004. Remittances grew rapidly from an estimated \$1.4bn in 2004 to reach similar levels of around \$4 bn in 2008, before dropping back with the world financial crash in 2009. Foreign direct investment into Afghanistan has remained negligible.⁷

Apart from the military and security aid, interventions fall into three categories: humanitarian interventions (though, as is typical in countries with protracted crises, the scope of these interventions goes beyond the provision of emergency relief); development support; and political assistance. In fact, though, these categories are blurred. An analysis of US aid spending in Afghanistan found that the targeting of design of development assistance was often dictated by security needs (i.e. projects had the goal of supporting the fight against the insurgency) rather than directing aid to where needs were greatest or using it to promote sustainable development.⁸ Significant funds for supporting agriculture have been designed with the objective of combating opium production, and this

has variously been classed as development or as political/security spending.

Humanitarian relief

Humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan has been triggered by three distinct kinds of crisis. Since many donors assistance was already being given before 2001 because of the long drought, and relief aid continued to be given for another three years. Other humanitarian assistance has been targeted at needs created by the conflict, in particular for IDPs and returnees. A third food security crisis was faced following the global food price crisis of 2008 and the subsequent global financial crisis. Whatever the differences between these crises, the same humanitarian interventions were used each time, drawn from the usual toolkit:

- Cash or vouchers for food assistance;
- food aid, including FFW for asset creation
- Vocational training
- Mother/child health nutrition (MCHN)
- school feeding

These interventions have been used to address different kinds of problems over the past two decades, making it difficult to draw general conclusions about the effectiveness, even where good evidence of impact has been documented. The most acute emergency in the immediate post-war period was the drought – the worst drought in living memory, according to most. The war, and the change in regime, provided the opportunity and the funding for a huge scale up in humanitarian operations, but the crisis was not itself caused by the war. Food assistance has since been provided to IDPs, often aiming to give them food before the harsh winter months; for returning IDPs and refugees; and for various population groups deemed as vulnerable.

There is little doubt that food assistance (whether cash or in-kind) has often made an enormous difference to people in extreme circumstances. This has particularly been the case in responding to the last years of the 1995-2003 drought. Food aid was found to have reduced stress migration, distress asset sales and debt.

⁶ Poole 2011

⁷ All figures from Poole 2011

⁸ Lutz and Desai 2015

They have been attempts to maintain a rapid response mechanism capable of distributing emergency relief quickly in the event of a sudden shock (most notably displacement). This has been seen as 'in many ways a preparedness framework, where beneficiary targets per area or partner are not set in advance, but instead partners pre-position capacity (in the form of staff, tools, knowledge, processes and financial resources) to respond very rapidly to acute needs'. Although the principle of a rapid response capacity seems sensible, questions have been raised about this strategic choice for using humanitarian funds. On the one hand, it has proved extremely expensive to maintain such a capacity across the country which results in emergency support to relatively few people. On the other hand, the level of assistance given is quite small, around \$160 per household to meet food and non-food needs for one month. This has been found to be disproportionate to the high level of need. (See the analysis of a similar mechanism in the DR Congo country summary for this study.) As with much food assistance to Afghanistan (and indeed other countries in protracted crisis), no clear and viable exit strategy has been formulated.⁹

The advantages of food or cash have sometimes been finely balanced. On the whole, food markets have continued to function. Afghanistan is a permanent importer of food, much from Pakistan, and despite some difficulties, these trade flows have continued. In more remote areas, in-kind food aid was found to have reduced local food prices. In surplus producing areas, this may be regarded as a negative distortion the market, reducing income and incentives for producers. In net deficit areas, it may be a positive distortion in the market, spreading the benefits of food aid even beyond direct recipients. There have been some questions about the use of cash for meeting emergency needs in other sectors for the ERM, whether fundamental design of the programme not include options for other interventions (e.g. in WASH).

There are though significant doubts about the scale of the use of food assistance over the past two decades. Targeting has been found to be frequently poor.¹⁰

Worryingly for an analysis of interventions for supporting people in conflict, inclusion and exclusion errors have been most severe precisely in places most affected by conflict.¹¹

Given that food markets have continued to function and that food has been available, it is a question of judgement how often the absence of food assistance would have led to high levels of hunger. One key informant has argued that this would rarely have been the case – just as the frequent provision food assistance has not led to improvements in general welfare.

Criteria for identifying the extremely vulnerable for targeting emergency relief are the same as those commonly used globally: unaccompanied minors, the chronically ill, women who have suffered from GBV, disability, FHHs (the absence of a breadwinner). A substantial degree of re-targeting has occurred after distributions. (It is quite common in some societies for communities to share or distribute food assistance.) It is not clear from the documentation how far this is a question of communities being able to correct mis-targeting as a result of their familiarity with who is genuinely in greater need; whether this represents the more powerful able to exert pressure to share in emergency assistance, or even a degree of elite capture.

The use of monetary transfers for food assistance only took off in Afghanistan from 2012 (presumably influenced by its successes in Somalia in 2011). Cash has been particularly favoured for the short term emergency response mechanism (ERM) giving very short-term transfers to displaced people, where needs are various and where markets can easily cope with any additional demand.

Corruption has been a big question in food assistance, as it has with aid generally. Because of the particular context of Afghanistan, and the huge role of aid in the national economy, this issue is largely beyond the relevance of this study.

Public works/food for work

Food assistance has been used as a vehicle for asset creation, as in most other crises and conflicts. The

⁹ CaLP 2017

¹⁰ Bennett et al 2012

¹¹ Bennett et al 2012

usual problems have been raised about the quality of the assets created and their sustainability. The prioritisation of assets has also sometimes been in doubt. In one FFW project, in an area where people did not own vehicles and where traders had no pattern of visiting some villages, the only vehicle ever to use the rehabilitated road as found to be the agency's own vehicle.¹²

A broader question that has been raised about food assistance interventions such as PWP/FFW is about broader objectives and their place in a broader development strategy. Over time, many households have become more food insecure in Afghanistan, because the bigger picture of broad-based economic development has not worked (see below). Livelihoods in many parts of Afghanistan have long been unviable without some of the population leaving to seek a livelihood elsewhere, and sending back remittances. Food assistance may help maintain people *in situ* with their unviable livelihoods, but it is not a credible part of a strategy for making those livelihoods viable. When food assistance is given through PWP/FFW/CFW, a rhetoric of resilience building enters the programme discourse: the use of food or cash for purely emergency purposes we have this place, but this discourse of creating a viable livelihood is arguably problematic.

School feeding

It is often unclear whether school feeding is best classified as food security or an educational intervention, as it is justified on different grounds in different situations. In Afghanistan, school feeding was usually *targeted on a mixture of these two sets of criteria: to food-insecure districts and to districts which had poor education indicators* and high gender gaps in enrolment ratios. School feeding had the explicit objective of encouraging the return of children – especially girls – to school after a period of conflict. School attendance rose by 600% from 2002 to 2009 to over 85% of school-age children, reaching around leaving only an estimated and the gender gap was closing in primary school (girls made up nearly 40% of primary pupils in 2009).¹³ The importance of school feeding's contribution to this success story is

questionable. WFP's evaluation found that its use was had become inapplicable 'in a country where demand for education now outstrips supply'.¹⁴ No assessment of the impact on food security is available. This highlights the challenge in assessing the appropriateness or the design of school feeding, whether it should be seen through food security terms or evaluated against the overall educational context – which would include an assessment about the degree to school feeding is the best use of resources for improving educational outcomes.

Livelihoods (development) interventions

The fundamental make-over that has been attempted of Afghanistan led to interventions on a huge scale in many domains. These have included:

- Infrastructure construction and rehabilitation (roads, irrigation, market infrastructure, etc.)
- Agric development (agricultural extension, seed distributions, establishing orchards, feed mills, grants for livestock, establishing a seed certification system, national animal health services, watershed management etc.)
- Land tenure reform (privatisation and titling)
- Enterprise development (providing machinery and equipment, and technical support).
- Vocational training (conducted both as a national development programme and using food assistance funds as "food for training")
- On-budget support/direct budgetary assistance for regular government spending

Investments in education, health and macroeconomic policy/governance also have obvious links to livelihoods, but are not discussed in this study.

Vocational training

Vocational training programmes are commonly found as a response to protracted crises in chronic poverty. As elsewhere, in Afghanistan it is difficult to find evidence of their impact.

Some vocational training was run through food assistance programs, as "food for training". This was said to be "in demand", but no evidence has been documented about any impact for trainees.

¹² Crawford and Harvey 2002

¹³ There were an estimated 1 million children out of school and school enrolment of 6.2 m.

¹⁴ Bennett et al 2012

One programme concentrating on women's vocational training also paid women to attend training, and, as is normal give them a toolkit at the close of the training (for making bags, clothes and carpets). The evaluation found that there was no evidence of any sustainability. Tellingly, *"interviews with stakeholders did not indicate if any of these women were still doing this work"*. Together with the lack of reporting on impact from the project, this suggests that vocational training programs are paying insufficient attention to whether or not trainees eventually find work and, if so, what the impact is on their well-being.

A large state programme (SALMA) was also planned for vocational training through the Ministry of Labour and social affairs (MoLSA), with \$120m over five years. In the end, lack of funds reduced it to a three-year programme with \$6m. Just over 1,000 people were trained, but again, there is little evidence of the impact on trainees. An evaluation found that *"Instead of job creation activities, the project focused more on making a select group of people job ready."*¹⁵ This is a useful distinction and one that should be applied more widely. (Several programmes working with refugees in the Middle East speak of improving their 'employability', which is not necessarily entail focusing on ensuring that they find employment.) The lack of success of SALMA has also been attributed to the strategic choice of financing it through MoLSA. This was presumably seen as part of state building (with links to stabilisation, state legitimacy, social contract, etc.) but ignored the fact that *"employment generation is not the mandate of MoLSA"*. This was an error on several levels: understanding the responsibilities and competencies of state institutions; encouraging a Ministry to take on responsibilities outside its mandate and its competency; and seeing employment generation as something which can be engineered by government, rather than the outcome of the political economy as a whole.

Integrated agricultural development

Many different activities have been involved in supporting agricultural development in Afghanistan, and evidence of their impact at project level is mixed.

Support for the supply of high quality certified wheat and groundnut seed, accompanied by fertiliser

vouchers, was found to increase farmers income by \$350 / year. Investments in promoting horticulture protected very high returns on investment. Project investment was under \$3,000 per hectare, and would then involve farmers moving to a production system that would cost them \$1,500 p.a. in inputs. This was projected to give them a net income of \$6,300 p.a. – a higher return than for opium production. There have been problems with some other components. Chilli production was promoted, for which there was no market; livestock feed was provided, but about half of it ended up for sale in the market.

In some cases there is simply no evidence either way of impact. Some studies of irrigation found it impossible even to establish the number of hectares newly brought under irrigation with investments.¹⁶ Returns to irrigation can clearly be high, but the distribution of benefits must also be examined. As noted above, the parts of Afghanistan where irrigated farming is practised are those where concentration of land ownership is highest and, there is the greatest centralisation of local power - both of which are ideal conditions for elite capture of benefits. Unless impact assessments can demonstrate the share of benefits that poor farming households enjoy (e.g. in improved annual income), there is a need for caution in deciding how far irrigation support has been successful.

Some positive stories at project level needs, though, to be set against analyses looking at the bigger picture.¹⁷ It is hard to describe the massive investments generally made in agriculture as a success. Most of the agricultural development investments were intended to combat opium production by offering substitutes. Opium production rose steadily at the same time. This is hardly surprising, as the opium value chain offers producers something which the value chains do not. There are often local quasi-monopolies in the trade. This enables traders to offer farmers credit and any necessary inputs with security against the future production. Farmers do not have to worry about marketing or transport of produce, and opium can be stored easily, example to wait for prices to rise or for when money is most needed. Apart from simple calculations of profitability, where the per unit of

¹⁵ Madhava Rao 2020

¹⁶ Eg Crawford and Harvey 2004, Phillips et al 2010

¹⁷ For example Minoia and Schrade 2018, Huot et al 2016, Pain and Huot 2017

labour or per hectare, other crops promoted by development programmes have not created such a complete and secure package for producers. (One evaluation study was sanguine about expectations: *“The opium economy represents approximately 2.7 billion dollars in annual revenue for the project’s 3 provinces of operation Comparing this to the project’s budget of just over \$40 million dollars per year, it is very difficult for ADP/S to have had a major impact on the opium economy”* .)

Various other studies of rural livelihoods in Afghanistan have also found that poverty is not decreasing and livelihood resilience is not being built.¹⁸ Food production in Afghanistan grew by just 14% from 2005 to 2018 at the same time as the population rose by 33%.¹⁹ Food production per capita has thus fallen by 14% despite billions in aid.

Credit/microfinance

Huge donor support was given for credit and microfinance facilities in Afghanistan. As in so many sectors, the objective of building a national social/economic infrastructure (rather than only payment a particular beneficiaries) meant that a national institution was created, the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), through which resources were channelled. MISFA established Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) to be financially sustainable. By 2007, it had already provided credit and savings services to approximately 300,000 people (72% of whom were women)²⁰ Such an investment faced competing pressures. On the one hand, as with many similar MFI programs, more attention was put on the number of loans made and repaid, rather than on the use which people made of the loans. Kantor (2009) found that the microanalysis showed that many people took out loans in order to repay other debts. Formal credit through MFIs was not replacing pre-existing informal credit relationships, but often depending on them. At this level of analysis, there was clearly a greater need to understand better existing informal credit relationships and to find ways to create financial

packages which would complement what was already there.

On the other hand, it is natural to the programme would also face pressure to expand coverage as rapidly as possible. The achievement of MISFA was estimated to be reaching only 8% of existing demand for credit (in 2009) and there was an outstanding unmet demand of almost \$1 bn for rural credit alone.²¹ Here too the study identified gaps not only in the volume of credit, but also in the variety of packages available. However, MISFA it thus caught between demands to be more contextually aware and to support the development of more tailored credit packages at the same time as it needs to expand its reach rapidly. Unsurprisingly, the reach of MFIs created was limited beyond Kabul and other urban areas.

More recently, access to informal credit has been found to be shrinking in some rural areas. This has been attributed to decreased labour opportunities and remittances from Iran.²² This is yet another example of the need to appreciate wider economic forces – possibly in this case also influenced by political choices made by the same donors investing in micro-finance in Afghanistan.

Social Protection

Social protection hardly existed in Afghanistan in any form. Basic services were largely absent; very little employment was in the formal sector; and there were no social safety nets (mechanisms for making cash payments to eligible individuals or households). There were some attempts to establish the beginnings of a social safety net by WFP with what it called an “urban safety net” programme. However, this was found to be confusing the different faces of chronic poverty with emergency needs, which require quite different protection mechanisms.

The government did initiate a social protection strategy in 2007, and a pilot program was begun in 2010. However, even by 2014 the study found social protection in Afghanistan to be “quasi-inexistent”.²³ The longer-term merits of prioritising investments for

¹⁸ E.g. Kantor and Pain, 2011, Huot et al 2016

¹⁹ data on food production index from WorldBank.org

²⁰ Thivierge and Mitchell all (2007)

²¹ Hussein 2009

²² Shaw and Ghafoori 2019

²³ Samuel Hall 2014

social protection in Afghanistan in safety cash transfer systems is not the subject of this study. Despite the attractions of social safety nets for advancing the cause of stabilisation and/or improving the legitimacy of government and the social contract in a post-conflict society, the minimum conditions for establishing such a system may still not exist 20 years later. There is no obvious match between the timeframes of the demand for state provision and the timeframe within which its supply is possible.

Key lessons

Poverty has not decreased despite aid investments with few parallels. In general, people's lives are not at risk and famine is not a likely outcome either from conflict or a climate shock, as long as trade functions. Many people, though, are fundamentally living with unviable livelihoods and have been doing so for decades. Aid can be used to sustain them in poverty in those livelihoods. It is much harder for aid to help them out of poverty and into more viable livelihoods.

The discourse of the aid sector does not seem to recognise history. (Several project documents have used the illustration of a time line to chart change. They all start in 2001.)

It was estimated in 2004 that "to make Afghanistan secure and enable its people to live in a typically underdeveloped country, US\$ 27.6 billion dollars would need to be committed over seven years".²⁴ In fact, \$26.7m was committed over seven years (2002-9). Overall, the finance was roughly met, but the goal is still far from being met over 10 years later. The aid industry has repeatedly been unrealistic in its expectations of what it can achieve. This is in large measure because of an inadequate appreciation of what the problems really are, a difficult base on which to design effective interventions.

Many studies have shown that the failure of development investments to transform the economy has rested on two mistakes. One has been the inability to come to terms with the role and functioning of power and politics. Project documents, including with proposals and evaluations, have thought solutions in technical improvements, e.g. *"X should place greater emphasis on the issue of investment in agriculture, including an integrated*

"value chain" approach to agriculture that addresses issues of land, water, credit management and labour" or "[t]he long-term development solution lies in improving infrastructure, landownership, watershed management and technology for increasing productivity." These are just two examples of aid actors diagnosing a technical problem which has a technical solution. This approach has no way of suggesting realistic ways of addressing "issues of land, water, credit management and labour" because it fails to recognise that they are actually the outcomes of power inequalities. These same power inequalities have successfully dealt with many external interventions and change in such fundamentals is unlikely until analysis can show why this time would be different.

A second reason why investment in regenerative agriculture has failed is because many of the poorest do not earn their livelihood from autonomous agricultural production. Landlessness and land poverty resulted in livelihoods that are highly diversified. One recent study livelihood trajectories found that only one household out of 25 had managed to improve their situation through income from agriculture. The only other three had managed to improve the agriculture had done so with investments financed from agricultural sources. Everyone else had stagnated or worse. Villages in Afghanistan have always needed exit, and population growth means that more people need to seek livelihoods outside the village and outside of the agricultural economy. Investment that will bring employment opportunities, especially perhaps in market towns and rural areas, is critical. Such urban growth is more likely to stimulate agricultural development than vice versa.

The inability to appreciate the political dimensions to poverty is disappointing because the critique has been made many times and over many years, including reports in the aid sector. To give two examples.

"Patronage, corruption, impunity and over- emphasis on short-term goals rather than targeted long-term development are exacerbating a situation of dire poverty that is the condition of an overwhelming majority of Afghans"

²⁴ Singh 2007

UNHCHR (2010)

and from a project evaluation

“The language of poverty reduction in Afghanistan often assumes that the correlates of poverty—few assets, poor health and low income, for example — are the causes of poverty. This can sometimes overlook the structures that give rise to poverty differences — within the village, between villages, between districts and between provinces. ... The starting point for any useful contextual analysis of Afghanistan’s predominantly rural society is the immediate environment of the village and the social and power relations within it”.

Investment may bring new employment opportunities: training has not.

Many evaluations have drawn attention to the role which massive aid flows have played in fuelling corruption. Elite capture of resources increases inequalities and has fed resentment and grievance. Afghanistan is not alone in this. It is only to be expected that if resources are poured into conflict arenas where there are strong centres of power and huge power inequalities than those power inequalities and centres of power will be used to capture those resources. Bureaucratic systems for financial control have not proved adequate to control resources because the political economy provides multiple places where resources can be captured.

Ultimately, the success of interventions has depended much less on their technical merits as project types (“best-buys”) but rather on how well designed and implemented they were in the light of the political economy they were trying to change.

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Darfur conflict 2003–present

Nature of conflict: causes and consequences

Causes

The Darfur conflict began in April 2003 when armed resistance groups the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – drawn from the largely non-Arab Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa tribal groups – launched attacks on government property in the capital of North Darfur, El Fasher (Human Rights Watch, 2004). The assault was a response to the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) failure to meet rebel groups’ demands to end the marginalisation of Darfur’s non-Arab population, and cease hostilities from tribal Arab militia group, the Janjaweed.²⁵

The origins of the conflict date back to the nineteenth century where perceived social inequalities at the inextricably linked local, regional and national level provoked resentment both among Darfurians and towards the central government (Young and Osman, 2005).

Since Sudan’s independence from Great Britain in 1956, a small group of Arab-speaking Sudanese elites has continued to hold power and systematically disregard non-Arab communities in the country’s peripheries, with the arid and largely remote region of Darfur being no exception (Sikainga, 2009). Social, economic and political marginalisation led to failing institutions, including judicial systems and police services, while limited development interventions saw Darfur lag behind in economic progress, education and health services.

Pressure on the already neglected population worsened amid widespread drought and desertification in the early 1980s, leaving many nomadic Arab pastoralists impoverished and deprived of a sustainable livelihood base. This drove them to migrate from north to south in search of water

²⁵ A long history of internal migration, mixing, and intermarriage in Darfur have created remarkable ethnic fluidity: ethnic labels are often used only as a matter of convenience.

²⁶ Fur is the largest ethnic group in Darfur.

sources and grazing land (Young et al., 2005). Scarce resources saw them occupy land inhabited by farmers, stealing their livestock and destroying their crops. This resulted in localised clashes between the two groups.

Previously resolved through negotiations between traditional leaders on both sides, these low-level disputes became more violent in the late 1980s when the government began arming Arab pastoralists. Arab tribes felt they were not sufficiently represented in the Fur-dominated local administration²⁶, prompting them to set up an Arab alliance aimed at gaining political ascendancy. At the same time, there was a growing mistrust among the Fur tribe of the federal government’s tendency to favour Arabs (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Ethnicity and race quickly became a key factor in these violent clashes, spurring the emergence of SLM/A and JEM, and setting the stage for a full-blown conflict in 2003.

The conflict escalated when several ethnic groups not previously involved in the conflict began aligning themselves with one side or the other, since staying neutral was proving difficult.²⁷ However, in contrast to common belief, allegiances were not purely based on race or ethnicity. Clashes frequently took place between black–black, black-Arabs and Arabs–Arabs depending on ethnic rivalries in that traditional society.

Contributing to this was the instability plaguing neighbouring Chad and Libya. A number of Darfur ethnic groups such as the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Mahiriyya also live in these countries, making it easier for conflicts to spread across the region’s porous border (Young and Osman, 2006).

Nature and conduct of conflict

Since armed resistance groups SLA/M and JEM mounted their first attack on government in April 2003, the GoS and the Arab “Janjaweed” militias which it arms and supports have committed violent attacks on largely non-Arab communities (Fur, Masalit

²⁷ Arabs have been made into symbols of the Janjaweed and depicted as “murderers” even if they have not taken part in any atrocities, and despite many of them having been neutral, or even sympathetic toward the rebels.

and Zaghawa groups) based on their ethnic and racial origin.

The Janjaweed is made up of armed groups of Arabs comprising the Abbala (camel herder) and the Baggara (cattle herder) people. The Janjaweed militia originated in the mid-1980s as a means to cope with the collapse of law and order following the region's chronic neglect and marginalisation by Khartoum. According to an academic source specialising in the Darfur conflict²⁸ "when the government put out a call to tribal leaders to support the government's counter insurgency efforts, it was only the pro-government tribes [who now make up the Janjaweed] that responded." It is widely understood that the Janjaweed has been promised the land of settled farming communities in return for their services in the war (Flint and de Waal, 2008; Polloni, 2005; Tanner, 2005).²⁹

By July 2003, the government had retaliated to rebel attacks. They dismissed African tribal groups from government positions; increased military presence in Darfur; and launched offensives against SLA/M and JEM in West and North Darfur, where the fighting was concentrated. Attacks varied in nature depending on their location. In North Darfur they consisted mostly of heavy aerial bombardment, followed by ground attacks by Sudanese army troops and the Janjaweed militia. Contrarily in South and West Darfur, Janjaweed forces played the most significant role in ground attacks.

The government and the Janjaweed used two broad tactics to mount their offensive during the Darfur conflict.

1. Attacks on mostly non-Arab civilians, along with scorched earth destruction of their property and assets (e.g., livestock, crops and farms). This was intended to cut off their food supply and livelihood strategies.

2. Forced movement of any potential support base for SLA and JEM, without warning (Human Rights Watch, 2004). This aimed to push rural communities into larger towns in Darfur or into neighbouring Chad, where they struggled to transition toward urban livelihoods.

2003-2005 marked the worst years of the conflict. Following rebel forces' first attack, the GoS and SLM/A signed a six-week ceasefire mediated by President Idriss Deby of Chad, where they agreed to allow free and impeded humanitarian access within Darfur. Unbeknownst to Chad and SLM/A, the GoS was using this time to bolster its military apparatus to mount an even stronger attack in June 2003 in Um Barou, Tine, and Karnoi, North Darfur. The assault forced hundreds and thousands of civilians to flee to Chad, which by August 2003 was hosting 65,000 Sudanese refugees. Attacks between both sides became more frequent and violent thereafter, reaching its peak in 2005.

The conflict turned a corner in 2006 amid improved flow of humanitarian assistance³⁰; deployment of UN-AU peacekeeping forces; and various attempts by GoS and rebel groups to reach a peace agreement to end the conflict. However, despite peace agreements signed between the GoS and various rebel groups in 2006, 2011 and 2020, and the formation of a transitional military-civilian government following a popular uprising ousting long time autocratic president Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, inter-ethnic violence continued unabated, with localised clashes commonplace even today (see Appendix 1 for Darfur conflict timeline).

Several international agencies refrained from calling the conflict a genocide, stating that the weight of the term risked limiting their ability to provide adequate humanitarian assistance (owing to increased obstruction from GoS) and complicating peace talks.³¹ Others did not share this sentiment, including former U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who when

²⁸ 30-minute interview with Helen Young on 11 March 2021.

³⁰ Though humanitarian aid was still obstructed all the way until a transitional military-civilian government was put in place.

³¹ The United Nations determined in 2005 that the Sudanese government wasn't committing genocide in Darfur. Human Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders avoid the G-word too.

referring to the conflict as a genocide, triggered a USD 1-billion-a-year international aid effort.

Consequences for food security and livelihoods

Direct

Asset stripping: In the first two years of the conflict, the destruction of assets by government led forces rendered them useless for the survival of the civilian population. Financial assets such as crops were ruined, and livestock, killed and looted. Physical assets including farms, homes and possessions (blankets, clothes etc.) were also stolen or destroyed.

Forced displacement: Protracted insecurity led to the displacement of the almost entire rural population of Darfur. Civilians were either forced into IDP camps in cities, or along the border of the Darfur into Chad. Forced displacement by the GoS was intended to prevent the return of the region's original inhabitants (see Appendix 2 for map of conflict and displacement in Darfur, Sudan 2017).

Displacement was not just a direct consequence of insecurity. Low cultivation of farms and poor harvests diminished rural people's coping strategies, forcing many to move to camps in order to access food and services. This was the case in South Darfur in 2008, where UN officials estimated that approximately 50 percent of new arrivals were 'harvest-' rather than 'conflict'- affected.

IDPs were in most instances completely cut off from their original livelihoods. This increased competition for limited resources such as firewood (to either sell or use for fuel), which often resulted in inter-ethnic clashes between pastoralists and IDPs, deepening divisions at the local level.

Attacks on civilians and humanitarian staff: Targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians – including murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence – were used as a weapon of war. Violence was not only used as a tool to displace and kill civilians, it was used to create a fearful environment in IDP camps, where civilians had fled to seek safety.

Meanwhile, journeying to collect firewood, cultivate land or access markets (to carry out livelihood strategies) has to this day left IDPs vulnerable to beatings, rape and theft.

Humanitarian staff was also susceptible to attacks. In 2007, direct targeting of humanitarian staff and assets resulted in the deaths of 13 aid workers; the disappearance of 28 World Food Programme contracted drivers; the hijacking of 181 humanitarian vehicles; and 93 attacks on humanitarian facilities and compounds. A decrease in WFP convoys caused by banditry resulted in reduced general food rations of more than 40 percent from May to December 2008 (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008).

Destruction of food supply: The Janjaweed went to great lengths to cut off the food supply of Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa communities. They destroyed underground sites holding food stocks; launched attacks on wadis, a key water source for both livestock and civilian consumption; cut down mango trees from which fruit could be picked; and trampled over crops with their camels (Young *et al*, 2005). Such strategies not only reduced civilians' access to food for consumption, but also diminished the livelihoods of those selling them as cash crops.

Destruction and looting in and en-route to Chad: The Janjaweed looted livestock – along with blankets, food, and other items distributed to the displaced by humanitarian agencies – from civilians en-route to Chad, and once they reached IDP camps.

Armed groups of bandits and other opportunists seeking to profit from the collapse in law and order looted goods, cattle and other livestock from IDPs in Chad.

Protection payments: Some non-Arab communities came to an arrangement with the controlling militias to continue pursuing their rural livelihoods. For example in 2003, farmers in Trej and Orokum³², West Darfur paid money to a 'protection force' formed

³² In Trej and Orokum, villagers and damra Arabs co-existed fairly peacefully until the start of the conflict. There was inter-marriage between the two groups, and people used to invite each other for ceremonies.

from the Arab members of the former reconciliation committee³³, and provided food for their protectors.

Meanwhile in Abata, Urdi and Waro, West Darfur, protection arrangements were more coercive, with payments demanded by both local Arabs and 'outsiders' closely associated with the Janjaweed. Villagers were forcibly stopped from fleeing, and movement outside the town was strictly controlled. Villagers in Abata reported that Arabs acted as 'protectors' by day, but would loot them at night (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008).

Indirect

Government restrictions on food purchases and movements: Access to markets by rural residents and IDPs was in some cases controlled by the offices of the military intelligence and security. In Kutum, North Darfur, people had to apply for a permit, which allowed them to buy a limited quota of goods and transport them beyond the town boundary. The permit cost SP 2,000 (USD 0.78) and was only valid for one day. Only the items listed on the permit could be bought, and only in the specified amounts. Purchased goods were then inspected at the military checkpoints, with any additional items found confiscated.

Labour migration: Protracted insecurity has restricted the mobility of Darfurian labour migrants to Libya and Khartoum, both of which have a long tradition of attracting men and women from rural communities. The on and off closure of the Sudan-Libya border has prevented labour migration into Libya, while migrants travelling to Khartoum have been displaced and forced into IDP camps where there is limited access to employment.

Remittances: For those able to resume work, remittances which are typically transferred by hand via the *Hawala* network have been severely interrupted. Meanwhile locating recipient family

members displaced by the conflict has been near impossible, owing to poor reception on mobile devices outside of major towns and cities.

Livestock production and trade: Livestock production provides livelihoods for some 20 per cent of the population and remains one of the major resource bases in Sudan. Protracted insecurity has displaced people integral to livestock production and the livestock economy (in terms of ownership, production, marketing and trade) putting hundreds and thousands of livelihoods at risk.

For example, closure of the Libyan border due to insecurity in 2003 led to at least 300 lead drovers and 1,280 assistant drovers losing their jobs, with livestock traders previously trading across the border no longer able to do so (Young et al, 2005). Meanwhile, both the Janjaweed and rebel forces systematically targeted livestock on their way to markets for sale and export, either killing or looting them.

Livestock migration: Violence in Darfur has limited the movement of semi-nomadic groups for seasonal migration in search of pasture. Occupation by rebel groups along key livestock migration routes has had a disastrous impact on livestock health due to limited access to pasture and water resources, increasing the risk of disease.

Maladaptive livelihood practices by IDPs in camps: Based on a study of IDPs in two towns in West Darfur³⁴, civilians forced into IDP camps are often limited to maladaptive livelihood strategies in response to the need for food and income in the short term (Young and Jacobsen, 2013). For example firewood collection has proved dangerous for IDPs (women risk being raped, while men are often beaten). In contrast, IDPs living among the residential population have gained better access to employment opportunities, owing to their proximity to local markets and shops.

³³ A reconciliation committee was previously established to resolve disputes, and was composed of both villagers and Arabs.

³⁴ The authors examine how people in conflict zones adapt their livelihoods after migrating to urban areas. They conducted two case studies using surveys and qualitative research. One was of the five IDP camps outside the town

of Zalingei (West Darfur), and the other was of mixed IDPs and residents in the town of Kebkabiya in North Darfur.

Rising basic commodities prices: Rising transport costs and looting along key trade routes by both government led forces and rebel groups have contributed to reduced supply of basic food commodities, pushing up their prices.

Effects on national economy and human development

Very few research papers and articles have provided details on the economic cost of the Darfur conflict, which is unsurprising given its enormity and duration. However, according to one source³⁵, the GoS has incurred costs totalling USD 30.5 billion – equivalent to 171 percent of GDP in 2003 – on the war in Darfur. This includes USD 10.1 billion in direct military expenses; USD 7.2 billion in lost productivity of internally displaced persons; USD 2.6 billion in foregone lifetime earnings of the dead; USD 4.1 billion in infrastructure damage; and USD 6.5 billion in war impacts on GDP.

Against this backdrop, and despite South Sudanese oil being critical to the survival of al-Bashir's presidency – with booming oil sales enabling the rich in the Khartoum to line their pockets and fund weapons for the war – the government spent only 1.3 percent of its budget on public health and less than 1 percent on education during the majority of the crisis (Ali, 2012). Very little if none of this already minute figure reached Darfur to repair the schools, hospitals and water sources destroyed by the war.

This is unsurprising given Darfur has always been cut off from Khartoum, with the region's under development and poverty the reason for the uprising of the non-Arab population against Khartoum in the first instance. As a result, in 2004, more than two thirds of the population in North Darfur where fighting was concentrated were below the poverty line (The Guardian, 2014).

With economic activity in Darfur severely hampered by weak infrastructure facilities such as roads and power lines, and restricted access to basic services for conflict-affected non-camp rural populations, human

development remains an ongoing issue. Around 70 percent of the population in North Darfur and 61 percent of people in South Darfur are living in poverty in 2020. This has been aggravated by the on and off closure of borders with key trading partner Libya, which many Darfurians rely on for their employment, whether it be through livestock trade or labour migration.

There is hope that both the economy and poverty will improve with the new transitional government. In 2021, it is expected to increase spending by about 60 percent to 1.02 trillion pounds (USD 18.6 billion) to boost growth. Social support programmes will be allocated 259.2 billion pounds, nearly a quarter of total expenditure. Meanwhile, 137 billion pounds, or 12.4 percent of spending is earmarked for education (Bloomberg, 2021).

Response

In 2004, the international community made up of around thirteen UN agencies and 84 NGOs began facilitating a massive aid expansion effort in Darfur. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) along with its implementing partners³⁶ set up 11 new refugee camps along the Sudan-Chad border in West Darfur, where an estimated 716,000 people had (at the time) been uprooted and were seeking refuge (UNHCR, 2006). It also distributed approximately USD 239 million worth of food rations supplied by WFP in 2006. By 2009, Sudan was the WFP's largest operation in the world, with a budget of USD 868.7 million.

The Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur have obstructed humanitarian access since 2003, delaying, limiting, and denying humanitarian agencies access to civilians in need of assistance. Flight bans, denials or massive delays in the processing of travel permits; limitations on the numbers of staff travelling; and unnecessarily bureaucratic or arbitrary procedures for importing and transporting relief

worked in close collaboration with the Government of Sudan, local and international NGOs, IOM and ICRC, as well as UN agencies and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). UNHCR's main governmental counterparts were the Humanitarian Affairs Commission and the Commissioner for Refugees.

³⁵ Ali, H. (2012) Estimate of the Economic Cost of Armed Conflict: A Case Study from Darfur. Defence and Peace Economics Vol 24, No. 6.

³⁶ UNHCR worked with 13 implementing partners (11 international, one national and one governmental). It also

materials have all been “classic” Sudanese government tactics to restrict aid to civilian populations (Human Rights Watch, 2006). At the same time, movement in and out of the country by neighbouring states for meetings (for example to discuss peace deals) was also restricted.

Harassment and intimidation toward international agency staff seeking to bring humanitarian aid have also been widely reported (see direct impacts section for examples).

Humanitarian agencies had little if no engagement with the national government about aid distribution, with our source specialising in the Darfur conflict describing it as “unheard of”. Instead, they relied solely on Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) – whose effectiveness was widely questioned owing to its close-knit relationship to military intelligence (NISS) – and local ministries with limited capacity.³⁷ Because of this, aid was slow to reach its intended recipients, with its impact felt only a year later in 2005. The scaling up of international organisations’ programmes such as blanket feeding and cash transfers were also delayed in the years that followed.

Rising insecurity in the region and interruptions to humanitarian assistance also negatively impacted aid budgets. In March 2006, UNHCR was forced to slash assistance for Darfur by 44 percent, owing to the erosion of security severely limiting its operations and access in Darfur.³⁸ Its revised budget for 2006 was USD 18.5 million, down from the previously planned USD 33 million. Meanwhile, WFP announced in March 2006 that cash shortages forced it to cut food rations to more than 6 million people in Sudan.

As insecurity in the region continued unceasingly, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeping mission was deployed in 2007. Their aim was to protect civilians; contribute to security for humanitarian assistance; and uphold human rights and the rule of law while peace talks continued.

According to the aforementioned source³⁹, UNAMID coupled with the large presence of aid workers

³⁷ 30-minute interview with Helen Young on 11 March 2021.

³⁸ UNHCR is mainly operational in West Darfur.

created somewhat of a parallel government, given civilians’ reliance on them for their survival and protection. Opinions of UNAMID’s effectiveness are mixed. While some civilians complained they have done little to prevent direct attacks, others have reported a safer environment in the towns in which the peacekeepers reside.

“When it comes to UNAMID, I saw their deployment in late 2007. The first 2-3 years were alright in terms of protection of some of the big IDP camps such as Abshouk and Zamzam, plus some of the villages. As time passed there were fewer liaison officers; the government of Sudan started to treat them as spies and started to put UNAMID forces under monitoring. This was the start of the deterioration. The reporting from UNAMID started to be infrequent and the protection factor reduced as the force itself was under attack by the government militias.

Nonetheless, UNAMID’s presence was and is still regarded as a deterrent, and persons from the villages that live nearby still seek their help when they know an attack by the Janjaweed or government militia is imminent. They go to where UNAMID is residing and stay there until they feel it is safe to manoeuvre.”

A teacher from North Darfur⁴⁰

Peace agreements were signed by the GoS and the rebel groups in 2006, 2011 and 2020, however in each instance key rebel factions were absent/boycotted amid failure to agree on mutually beneficial terms. And while the formation of a transitional military-civilian government following the ousting of long time autocratic President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 is encouraging, ethnic violence at the local level continues to this day, with its vulnerability to manipulation to stir up a larger scale conflict an ever-present possibility. Meanwhile, the UN has reported continuous pressure from the government to relocate IDPs/press them to return to their areas of origin

³⁹ 30-minute interview with Helen Young on 11 March 2021.

⁴⁰ UNA-UK <<https://una.org.uk/peacekeeping-cuts-%E2%80%93-decision-darfur>>

without consideration of the security situation in these areas.

Darfurians directly impacted by the conflict dealt with hardship in various different ways. A common strategy was to split families, both to minimise risk and to maximise access to as many livelihood opportunities as possible. This could range from labour migration to cities and neighbouring states; travelling to IDP camps to gain access to food rations and other basic amenities such as blankets; and staying in their villages in an attempt to continue their rural livelihood strategies. This was a sensible solution because even if one felt safe relying on their traditional livelihood (for example farming), it was never 100 percent infallible, owing to the constant threat of drought, pests and insecurity etc. on production.

In contrast, Arab nomad pastoralists, who received limited humanitarian assistance, remained very much reliant on their kin as their support networks.

Outcomes and effectiveness

The outcomes and effectiveness to the humanitarian response in Darfur has varied. Because of the significant delay in expediting aid, and the sheer scale of what was required, many donor agencies and NGOs, including the UN conducted thorough impact assessments.⁴¹

Every effort was made to expedite food aid, with our source specialising in the Darfur conflict stating that the WFP's USD 800m food aid reached its intended beneficiaries. However, several of these international agencies including the UN admitted to internal issues/missteps that slowed aid distribution in Darfur, especially in the first few years of the conflict.

They include lack of an authoritative voice in engagement with the government, namely to insist that the GoS facilitate the full, safe, and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need in Darfur. Meanwhile, camp management was

haphazard owing to the absence of a leadership presence. This was due to lengthy negotiations between different agencies about roles and responsibilities, and a lack of expertise and capacity by individuals responsible for the process.

Humanitarian assistance was also heavily skewed toward supporting mostly non-Arab communities, with nomadic Arab pastoralist communities not affiliated with the Janjaweed relying on their families as their support networks.⁴² During the conflict, many were forced to leave their dwelling amid fear of attack for being mistaken for Arab militia. Frequently on the move, they were more exposed to the elements. In the Riziegat's case – one of the larger groups of Arab pastoralists in Darfur – malaria and pneumonia were major causes of child mortality since children had to sleep outside without blankets (The New Humanitarian, 2005).

The desperation of some nomadic communities saw humanitarian workers threatened for access to blankets and other household items. It also left non-Arab beneficiaries vulnerable to attack, either out of frustration, or to loot these items from them.

In 2006 and 2007, poor harvests crushed rural people's remaining coping strategies, forcing them into camps to access food and services. This was the case in South Darfur, where UN officials estimate that approximately 50 percent of new arrivals were 'harvest-' rather than 'conflict'- affected. However, during this time, only conflict-affected individuals were considered eligible for assistance as IDPs, leaving harvest-affected individuals with limited access to much needed food rations (Jaspars and Sorcha O'Callaghan, 2008).

Humanitarian assistance is not designed to last years. Extended periods of aid can lead to diminished returns, which is arguably the case for Darfurian IDPs. Those spending years in IDP camps aren't necessarily better off for doing so. In most cases, they have lost their land; they are poor; they are heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance; and they are more

⁴¹ OCHA (2005) Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis, as well as ICRC, Oxfam and many more.

⁴² This has been the case of the Riziegat ethnic community who are a number of clan-based communities such as the Mahadia, Maharia, and Mahami, who are composed of families. When the nomads are on the move, a group of close families usually travel together under the leadership of a clan head.

susceptible to political manipulation, owing to the alignment of some camps with certain political groups.

They have also become accustomed to the IDP narrative, which has allowed them to learn over time how to leverage the aid system. While this enables them access to their wants and needs, they risk being stuck in the humanitarian assistance cycle, with potentially less incentive to return home.

In contrast, while returnee communities faced a host of challenges back home – e.g., the Manzola community has returned to its village in El Geneina West Darfur, but has a limited area to cultivate due to occupation of some parts of the land by nomadic tribes – in general returnees want to get on their lives and live peacefully among their neighbours (Young and Ismail, 2019).

Key lessons

Nature of conflict

The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the predominantly Arab Janjaweed militia which it arms mounted a campaign to murder, rape and forcibly displace largely non-Arab communities (Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa tribal groups) in Darfur, Western Sudan, based on their ethnic and racial origin.

The Darfur conflict began in 2003, but its origins date back to the nineteenth century where perceived social inequalities – which have played out at the inextricably linked local, regional and national level – have provoked resentment both among Darfurians and towards the central government.

Since Sudan's independence from Great Britain in 1956, Darfur has been socially, politically and economically marginalised by Khartoum because of its remote and arid nature. This has caused Darfur to lag behind in economic progress, education and health services. Meanwhile, widespread drought and desertification in the early 1980s led predominantly nomadic Arab pastoralists and non-Arab farmers to compete for scarce resources, becoming a major source of localised clashes between the two groups.

These low-level disputes escalated in the late 1980s when Arab tribes felt they were not being sufficiently represented in the Fur-dominated local administration. At the same time, there was growing mistrust among the Fur tribe of the federal

government's tendency to favour Arabs. Ethnicity and race quickly became a key factor in these violent clashes.

A full-blown conflict ensued in 2003 with the emergence of rebel groups Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), drawn from largely non-Arab Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa communities. Their demands included socio-economic development for the region; an end to tribal militias; and a power share with the central government.

The government and the Janjaweed used two broad tactics to mount their offensive during the Darfur conflict:

1. Attacks on mostly non-Arab civilians, and scorched earth destruction of their property and assets (e.g. livestock, crops and farms). This was intended to cut off their food supply and livelihood strategies.
2. Forced movement of any potential support base for SLA and JEM, without warning. This pushed largely rural communities into larger towns in Darfur or into neighbouring Chad, where they struggled to transition toward urban livelihood strategies.

While 2003–2005 were the most violent years of the conflict, inter-ethnic violence has continued to this day. This is despite a popular uprising led by the military to overthrow long time autocratic President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, and peace agreements signed by the Government of Sudan and various rebel groups in 2006, 2011 and 2020, intended to end the conflict.

Impacts

Rural communities were the most affected by the conflict. Protracted insecurity forced whole families and villages out of their homes into cities, where they were completely cut off from their original livelihoods, or displaced and forced into IDP camps along the Sudan-Chad border. Below are some of the effects of the conflict on livelihoods and food security.

Destruction of food supply: The Janjaweed went to great lengths to cut off the food supply of Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa communities, whether it involved destroying underground sites holding food

stocks; destroying wadis, a key water source for both livestock and civilian consumption; cutting down mango trees from which fruit could be picked; or trampling over crops with their camels.

Government restrictions on food purchases and movements: Access to markets by rural residents and IDPs is often carefully controlled by the offices of the military intelligence and security. In Kutum, North Darfur for example, people must apply for a permit, which allows them to buy a limited quota of goods and transport them beyond the town boundary.

Labour migration: Protracted insecurity has restricted the mobility of Darfurian labour migrants to Libya and Khartoum, both of which have a long tradition of attracting men and women from rural communities. The on and off closure of the Sudan-Libya border has prevented labour migration into Libya, while migrants travelling to Khartoum have been displaced and forced into IDP camps where there is limited access to employment.

Remittances: For those able to resume work, remittances, which are typically transferred by hand via the *Hawala* network, have been severely interrupted. Meanwhile locating recipient family members displaced by the conflict has been near impossible owing to poor reception on mobile devices outside of major towns and cities.

Livestock production and trade: Livestock production provides livelihoods for some 20 per cent of the population and remains one of the major resource bases in Sudan. Protracted insecurity has displaced people integral to livestock production and the livestock economy (in terms of ownership, production, marketing and trade), putting hundreds and thousands of livelihoods at risk.

Livestock migration: Violence in Darfur has limited the movement of semi-nomadic groups for seasonal migration in search of pasture. Occupation by rebel groups along key livestock migration routes has had a disastrous impact on livestock health due to limited access to pasture and water resources, increasing the risk of disease.

Maladaptive livelihood practices by IDPs: Civilians forced into IDP camps are often limited to maladaptive livelihood strategies in response to the need for food and income in the short term. For example firewood collection has proved dangerous

for IDPs (women risk being raped, while men are often beaten).

Rising basic commodities prices: Rising transport costs and looting along key trade routes by both government led forces and rebel groups have contributed to reduced supply of basic food commodities, pushing up their prices.

Response

In 2004, the international community – which consisted of around thirteen UN agencies and 80+ NGOs – began facilitating a massive aid expansion effort in Darfur, which included setting up IDP camps along the Sudan-Chad border and distribution of food rations and other necessities.

However, obstruction of local and international humanitarian aid and assistance slowed distribution. Since 2003, the Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur have delayed, limited, and denied access to humanitarian agencies, often by refusing entry permits and restricting movement of international aid workers into and around the region.

As insecurity in the region continued unabated, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeping mission was deployed in 2007. Response to their presence has been mixed, with sources deeming the first three years of their presence the most effective. After this, interference by government militia in the form of attacks and constant monitoring reportedly encumbered their ability to protect.

Outcomes and effectiveness

The outcomes and effectiveness to the humanitarian response and programmes in Darfur vary. Because of the significant delay in expediting aid, and the sheer scale of what was required, many donor agencies and NGOs conducted thorough impact assessments.

While every effort was made to expedite food aid to IDPs, several of these international agencies including the UN admitted to internal issues/missteps, which hampered aid distribution in Darfur, especially in the first few years of the conflict.

Their findings show that the humanitarian response was slow and inadequate. It took them almost a year to respond to humanitarian needs, owing to inexperienced and untrained key staff; lack of coordination among the large number of agencies

offering assistance, with lengthy negotiations around roles and responsibilities causing delays; and absence of an assertive leader to direct the response.

Humanitarian assistance was also heavily skewed toward supporting mostly non-Arab communities, with Arab nomadic communities not affiliated with the Janjaweed relying on their kin as their support networks. The absence of shelter and basic necessities such as blankets often left them vulnerable to attack by rebel forces, and susceptible to malaria and pneumonia.

The extended period of aid in Darfur has arguably led to diminishing returns. Those spending years in IDP camps aren't necessarily better off for doing so. In many cases, they have lost their land; they are poor; they are heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance; and more vulnerable to political manipulation owing to the alignment of some camps with certain political groups.

They have also become accustomed to the IDP narrative, which has allowed them to learn over time how to leverage the aid system. While this enables them access to their wants and needs, they risk being stuck in the humanitarian assistance cycle, with little incentive to return home.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: a timeline of Darfur conflict

Box A: A timeline of Darfur conflict⁴³⁴⁴

2003, Feb: Two anti-government groups Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rise up, saying Khartoum neglects arid region and arms Arab militia against civilians.

2003, April: SLM/A and JEM launch attacks on government property in the capital of North Darfur, El Fasher

2004, Jan: The army moves to quell uprising in western region of Darfur forcing hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee to neighbouring Chad.

2004, Mar: UN says pro-government Janjaweed militias are carrying out systematic killings of African villagers in Darfur.

2004, April: Government, and SLA and JEM fighters agree on ceasefire.

2004, Sept: UN says Sudan had not met targets for disarming pro-government militias and must accept outside help to protect civilians. Colin Powell, US secretary of state, describes Darfur killings as genocide.

2005, Jan: UN report accuses the government and militias of systematic abuses in Darfur, but stops short of calling the violence genocide.

2005, Mar: UN Security Council authorises sanctions against those who violate ceasefire in Darfur. Council also votes to refer those accused of war crimes in Darfur to International Criminal Court.

2006, May: Khartoum government and the main anti-government faction in Darfur, SLA, sign a peace accord.

Rival SLA faction and the smaller JEM reject the deal. Fighting continues.

2006, Aug: Sudan rejects UN Resolution 1706 calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, saying it would compromise Sudanese sovereignty.

2006, Sept: Sudan says African Union troops must leave Darfur when their mandate expires at the end of the month, raising fears that the region would descend into full-blown war.

Activists rally in major cities around the world calling on Sudan to allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur.

2006, Oct: Jan Pronk, the UN's most senior official in Sudan, is expelled for speaking out against reported killings, rapes and other atrocities in Darfur.

2006, Nov: African Union extends mandate of its peacekeeping force in Darfur for another six months.

2006, Dec: Sudan agrees in principle to accept the deployment of UN troops in Darfur as part of an expanded peacekeeping force.

2007, Feb: International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor names first two war crimes suspects in Darfur - a Sudanese minister and a militia commander. Sudan says the ICC has no jurisdiction and rejects arrest warrants.

2007, May: George Bush, US president, imposes new US sanctions on Sudan and asks for support for an international arms embargo to end what he calls genocide in Darfur.

2007, Aug: UN Security Council authorises 26,000 troops and police for Darfur's hybrid mission and approves the use of force to protect civilians.

2007, Oct: Darfur peace talks open in Libya and the government declares an immediate unilateral ceasefire, but SLA and JEM are absent after boycotting meeting.

2008, May: Tension increases between Sudan and Chad after JEM mounts raid on Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city across the Nile. Sudan accuses Chad of involvement and breaks off diplomatic relations.

2008, July: Luis Moreno-Ocampo, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), asks judges for an

⁴³ Al Jazeera (2010) Timeline: Darfur Crisis <
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/2/23/timeline-darfur-crisis>>

⁴⁴ BBC (2019) Sudan profile – Timeline <
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14095300>>

arrest warrant for al-Bashir on crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.

2008, Oct: Al-Bashir pledges more co-operation with Unamid to secure the passage of aid convoys, along with up to USD 350m of spending on development in the region.

The UN says up to 300,000 people have died in Darfur and some 2.5 million have fled their homes since 2003.

2008, Nov: Al-Bashir announces a ceasefire in the region but JEM says the announcement is not serious and vows to fight on.

2008, Dec: Sudan government sends more troops to Darfur border as a preventive measure against rebel threat.

The Darfur Consortium of over 50 African charities releases report saying hundreds of non-Arabic speaking civilians have been made slaves to militias and government troops.

2009, Feb: Sudanese army declares the capture of a town in Darfur after three weeks of clashes with JEM fighters.

Qatar hosts first peace talks in nearly two years between Sudanese government and JEM rebels with the two sides agreeing to undertake "good faith" measures.

2009, Mar: ICC order the arrest of al-Bashir on seven charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, the first warrant issued for a sitting head of state.

Al-Bashir expels 13 international aid organisations accusing them of working with the ICC on the arrest warrant. Three local groups are also shut down.

JEM rebels pull out of second round of peace talks scheduled to be held in Doha in April and demand that the aid groups are allowed to return.

2010, Feb-Mar: Appeals chamber of the ICC directs judges to rethink their decision to omit genocide from the warrant out for al-Bashir's arrest.

Idriss Deby, Chad's president, makes landmark trip to Khartoum. He and al-Bashir announce intention to normalise ties.

JEM and SLA sign a peace accord with the government, prompting President Bashir to declare the Darfur war over. But failure to agree specifics and continuing clashes with smaller rebel groups endanger the deal.

April, 2010: President Bashir gains new term in first contested presidential polls since 1986.

Jul, 2010: International Criminal Court issues second arrest warrant for President al-Bashir - this time on charges of genocide.

Aug, 2010: President Bashir tests ICC arrest warrant by visiting Kenya, an ICC signatory. The Kenyan government refuses to enforce the warrant. He later ignores South African court order not to leave country in 2015.

Dec, 2010: The mediators of the Doha peace process presented the government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) with a range of compromise proposals to advance negotiations.

The government of Sudan delegation rejected the mediators compromise proposals and walked out of the Doha peace process negotiations.

July, 2011: The 2011 Darfur Peace Agreement, also known as the Doha Agreement, was signed between the government of Sudan and a coalition of minor rebel movements.

The Council adopted resolution 2003, extending UNAMID for another year.

Dec, 2011: Government forces kill key Darfur rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim.

Dec, 2014: The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court halts investigations into war crimes in Darfur for lack of support from the UN Security Council.

April, 2015: President Bashir is re-elected for another five year term. He wins nearly 95 percent of the vote in a poll marked by low turnout and boycotted by most opposition parties.

Feb, 2019: President Bashir declares state of emergency and sacks cabinet and regional governors in bid to end weeks of protests against his rule, in which up to 40 people died.

Apr, 2019: Military topples President Bashir in a coup, begins talks with opposition on transition to democracy.


Sept, 2019: A new government takes office under Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok as part of a three-year power-sharing agreement between the military, civilian representatives and protest groups.

Oct, 2020 - Sudan's transitional government and a coalition of armed groups called the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) signed a peace agreement. The Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA) faction led by Abdelwahid Mohamed al-Nour and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu did not sign.

Appendix 2: Map of conflict and displacement in Darfur, Sudan 2017

Map: Conflict and displacement in Darfur, Sudan 2017

Conflict and displacement in Darfur, Sudan in 2017



Democratic Republic of Congo

The nature of conflict in eastern DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country of huge natural resource wealth, yet it suffers from massive underdevelopment, very high levels of chronic poverty and high malnutrition across the country. This is despite the country enjoying fertile soils and a very favourable climate for agriculture on top of its huge mineral wealth.

DRC has been in near constant conflict since independence, with a series of internal civil wars over the past sixty years in different parts of the country, but mainly across the east, from Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele Provinces (formerly Orientale) in the north to Lualaba and Haut-Katanga Provinces (formerly Katanga) in the South. From the beginning, DR Congo has been a predatory state, with a deliberate abdication of responsibility for governing the country by the central state authority under former President Mobutu in favour of a quasi-feudal rule by local elites in return for allegiance. After the collapse of the regime following the war in Rwanda, rebels quickly took over country in 1997, but, despite cease-fires and peace agreements, civil war has continued especially in the east of the country.

Since independence, civil wars in DRC have been driven by a mixture of internal politics, external influences, internal tribal competition and the self-interest of the powerful. The current conflict is largely the continuation of what is called the 'second Congo war' (1998-2003). Despite support for disarmament and reintegration of combatants in 2003, the war segued into the so-called 'Kivu conflict, 2004-09', but in fact in North and South Kivu, conflict and insecurity have been more or less continuous since 1998, despite the largest peacekeeping force in the world. Instability has been fuelled also by external neighbours, particularly Rwanda and Uganda,

attracted by DRC's mineral wealth in the east.⁴⁵ (Uganda smuggled gold alone from DRC worth about 1% of its total GDP in 2006, and the illegal plundering of resources has continued since.)⁴⁶

Conflict in DRC currently has a highly ethnic nature, though it is more the case that conflict has been ethnicised rather than that it was a cause of conflict. Armed groups have increasingly recruited along ethnic lines and ethnic identity has become the main claim to land and a place in the local economy. Neighbouring countries have also fostered ethnic conflicts as way of maintaining their control of the areas of the east. The various causes of the war (above) thus interact and have created a war economy with its own self-sustaining momentum.⁴⁷

The number of fault lines in the conflict, partly as a result of the number of different ethnic groups present, means that there are several armed actors and a fragmented war. Conflict is not simply between armed groups with any form or political or even ethnic agenda. The larger conflict, what could be called 'conflict with a capital 'C'', has created a context of instability and lawlessness in which smaller actors can use violence and extortion to advance personal agendas through individual banditry, score settling, armed crime, etc. – what we can call 'conflict with a small 'c''. If the (capital-C) Conflict created the conditions for (small-c) conflicts to thrive, these small-c conflicts in turn create conditions in which it is very hard to discern a capital-C conflict or to bring it to an end – hence the self-sustaining momentum of a war economy.

The nature of the conflict is relevant to understanding livelihoods in eastern DRC. Violence in DRC is sporadic and can break out in different places at different times. Millions of people have been displaced, but unlike many of the other cases in this study, displacement is often local and fairly short-lived – relatively small numbers of people fleeing local violence and then returning home.

⁴⁵ UN Panel of Experts 2003

⁴⁶ Figures for quantity of smuggled gold from Mthemba-Salter 2015. Calculation by author using figures on gold price from <https://sdbullion.com/gold-prices-2006> and on GDP from <https://data.worldbank.org>

⁴⁷ See for example Carpenter 2012. Vlassenroot and Huggins 2004 and 2005 have comprehensive analyses of the creation and nature of the war economy.

DRC has been described as “the epitome of an ‘economy of war’ ” (Jackson 2003). It is impossible to describe the conflict without looking at how it is fought out in the economy – and just as impossible to understand the economy and livelihoods without understanding how they are so shaped by the conflict in almost every aspect.

Impact of conflict on livelihoods in eastern DRC

The starting point for the livelihoods in eastern DRC was already problematic before armed conflict began. Across DRC, poverty was already rife, the state largely absent (except as to seek rents) and there was a huge trust deficit affecting society at all levels. Indeed, these problems continue throughout the country. Despite reasonable GDP growth rates, poverty is not declining even in more peaceful parts of DRC, and two-thirds of the population remains below the poverty line.⁴⁸

It is probably more accurate to say that livelihoods have now been completely shaped by conflict rather than merely affected. Almost all local relations and institutions have been remade by the war. The fabric of relations between communities, often of different ethnicities living in close proximity has been damaged, in large part by the ethnicisation of the conflict(s).⁴⁹ Intra-community trust has been eroded and such widespread and deep poverty over so many years has reduced the support that people can find in their communities, so that the destitute may not be left to die of starvation but may not be able to expect much more.⁵⁰ Family ties have been weakened because so many young people have left their villages, variously to join up with armed militia (to be sure of food or to gain protection for their family in the village), to seek their wealth in the mines for gold, diamonds, cassiterite, etc., or to move to town, either to seek some minimal livelihood opportunities or to escape from forced recruitment by militias.

Customary authorities have either been replaced or have become subservient to armed power. These authorities do not just govern access to land and

resolve disputes: the functioning of markets is now determined by a symbiotic relationship between traders and the armed groups that they have had to align with in order to progress commercially. The war has also shaped the current political institutions – not just who has power, but power they have and which voices they have to be responsive to.

In some parts of the country land is so concentrated in very few hands that the majority of households farm well under half a hectare. Looting has deprived many of assets: the collapse of the rural economy over the last two decades have left farmers massively undercapitalised and with few economic opportunities, except by leaving the village. The infrastructure is among the worst in the world. There is a lack of electricity and mobile phone coverage is limited, making mobile money transfers impossible in many areas (even in some suburbs of Kinshasa).⁵¹ Roads are few and in very poor condition and the price of transport is high. The costs of transport are a useful illustration of the war economy at work. Roads are in poor condition because of lack of maintenance and investment despite the huge levels of wealth generated in the east – in part because those in power have no incentive to be responsive to the demands of the rural poor or traders who want roads. The poor infrastructure makes it harder to run a transport business, favouring conditions for reduced competition that is also a natural outcome of the way in which traders have to work together with the power of armed groups. This in turn creates cartel conditions where high transport prices are maintained by monopoly/cartel power over supply and by the high additional costs of rent-seeking by power holders (also called extortion or ‘informal taxes’) e.g. at check points in or charges for which there are no services rendered. By the end, the poor condition of the road is no longer the determining factor behind the high transport charges, as is revealed only when donor investment in roads fails to bring down costs (see below).

State services were already poor before the wars, but have further deteriorated. Health care is of unreliable

⁴⁸ Thontwa et al 2017, Marivoet et al 2019

⁴⁹ Mararo 1997 describes how conflict created inter-ethnic tensions in one administrative area in Masisi, laying the conditions for the current wars.

⁵⁰ Gray et al 2018

⁵¹ Key informant interview

quality and ill-health rampant: in parts of South Kivu, a median household suffered an episode of ill-health requiring treatment almost once a month, over 20% of households had at least one adult who was chronically sick.⁵² The provision of state education has been practically non-existent for many years. The demand for education is high, but the quality is poor and the costs are high. The President announced a new policy of free primary education in 2019, but it remains to be seen how far this will bring free, quality education to all.

Other Government services are similarly lacking. DR Congo was among several countries in the region that was badly hit by a virulent strain of cassava virus in the 1990s. Research quickly led to the development of resistant varieties but decades after these had been made available to farmers in neighbouring Uganda, they were still unknown to farmers in eastern DRC with catastrophic impact on their food production. A disease of another staple crop, bananas is also lacking control.

Displacement is a particularly severe shock that had already affected around 20% of the population of South Kivu by 2013 – many more have been displaced since.⁵³ Displacement brings short-term acute hardship and contributes to longer term destitution as assets can be lost in looting, costs are incurred, income is lost and farm production is usually disturbed, especially when displacement includes planting or harvesting seasons.

It is hard to appreciate the scale of impoverishment that wars have added. GDP per capita was just \$250 in the early 90s. It halved to \$125 before the 1998 war, and then dropped to just \$100 – but was estimated at just \$32 in 2002 in the east.⁵⁴ Calculations from a more recent detailed HEA study suggests that median income in 2016 – a good agricultural year – in parts of North and South Kivu was around \$750 per household of six or seven persons, or just over a third of the international poverty line (IPL), including the value of food produced and consumed.⁵⁵ This is supported by a

more recent study in North Kivu which estimated annual household income for an average of six persons at \$750 in a rural area (\$125/pp) and \$950 in a peri-urban area (\$160 pp).⁵⁶ After paying to access health care, households were typically living on just one quarter of the IPL.

Despite everything, most people survive. A favourable climate with two annual (and relatively reliable) rainy seasons means that people do not starve. Stunting is high, but not far above prevalence levels also seen in more peaceful countries like Malawi or Madagascar and in non-conflict areas in DRC. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) is stubbornly high, but below emergency thresholds, and rates in N and S Kivu are actually lower than most of DRC.

Households have adapted to insecurity by a variety of strategies that have reduced a number of risks but at a high price: most people are in “*a vicious circle whereby they have to forsake food security in the long run in order to avoid acute destitution*”⁵⁷, another illustration of Wood’s (2003) ‘Faustian bargain’ whereby short-term security is traded for long-term vulnerability. Among these adaptation strategies identified by Lecoutere et al are: reducing investment in order to maintain a minimum level of savings to cope with shocks; choosing crops that promise quicker returns and harvesting prematurely (to avoid the risks of losing harvests in the event of a shock;); reducing risk of land confiscation by not leaving land fallow (at a price of its long-term fertility); sharecropping rather than land rental (as a form of risk-sharing); and youth joining militia.

Food security and livelihood Interventions in eastern DRC

Relief interventions

As is clear from the previous section, state development interventions have been few and the international aid community has taken a much larger role than is normal even in conflicts. In the east of DRC this appears to be mainly through humanitarian

Midland Savannah Agriculture Livelihood Zones. Figures for exchange rate at LCU from <https://data.worldbank.org/>

⁵² Levine and Kusnierek 2019

⁵³ Milliano et al 2015

⁵⁴ AFDB/OECD, 2005; Lecoutere et al 2009.

⁵⁵ Figures for cash income and food production are from Noura et al 2017 and refer to Mountain Agro-pastoral and

⁵⁶ Levine and Kusnierek 2019

⁵⁷ Lecoutere et al 2009, p43

rather than development resources, but it is hard to know the relative proportions of aid fund flows because of the difficulties in tracing where much development spending goes.⁵⁸ The reliance on humanitarian funding is significant. Until recently, this funding has rarely worked off cycles longer than one year, with major implications for the kinds of assistance that could be provided or their predictability. A recent development of multi-year humanitarian funding, led by DFID in 2016, may offer new opportunities for different forms of engagement, but Levine et al 2019 found that the donor's changed bureaucratic structures around funding did not immediately lead to significant changes on the ground. (In the case of UN organisations, this was partly because they continued to use internal budgeting cycles of one year.)

Food assistance

Food assistance takes up a large part of the humanitarian aid budget. This is still predominantly given in kind, despite a number of documented experiments testing different modalities such as monetary transfers (in cash and through mobile phones) and vouchers.⁵⁹ Cash was found to be quicker, more cost-effective and preferred by recipients, and it had particular advantages where poor roads made in-kind distributions difficult and expensive.⁶⁰ There are reports that around 20% of food aid received is re-sold (a similar figure to that found in N Uganda, *see N Uganda report in this study*). Since 2005, some agencies have used vouchers and organised food markets where the vouchers could be spent. These entail significantly more work for agencies than allowing recipients to spend money freely. According to market surveys, traders were able to meet increased demand for food given some warning: they could increase their trade volume by 50% in one week and by 100% in two weeks.

Bailey 2014 found that recipient preference was fairly evenly divided between cash and the vouchers/food fairs, with in-kind assistance consistently ranked in last place. Preference was influenced by three factors – risk, flexibility and the type assistance that people

were accustomed to receiving.⁶¹ A review of DFID's ARCC 2 programme found a preference for vouchers that could be spent in normal markets rather than in organised fairs. One agency found that vouchers were being exchanged for cash at a discount in the fairs.⁶² There have been some reports of insecurity related to cash transfers where the lack of mobile connectivity meant that money was distributed in cash and that this might have attracted attacks on villages by armed groups who knew that households had just received money.⁶³ Mobile money has proved difficult in DRC because of the lack of connectivity in many places, the limited number of agents where credit can be withdrawn in cash (related to the chronically depressed economy) and the time taken to set up the systems. The findings of Murray and Hove (2014) on the different technologies for transferring money are likely to have changed by 2021 and to change further in the coming years, so categorical lessons for DRC should not be inferred. Most food assistance has been short term. Deep chronic poverty is so widespread that the humanitarian community cannot realistically look to use food assistance to address it in normal circumstances, and food assistance is often used for those suffering from displacement.

There have been attempts to set up rapid mechanisms for distributing food assistance to support people's immediate needs on displacement. These have not generally been successful and assistance has arrived months after people have been displaced. It is possible though that the assistance is still timely, if households had been able to use their own coping mechanisms – including debt – to tide them over for the initial weeks, and if assistance then helped them repay debt and to cope when their savings were exhausted. However, detailed studies of impact are impossible to find: in part, any attempt to run a comparative study which involved deliberately helping only some of the displaced populations would face ethical challenges. Because displacement is highly unpredictable and usually involves relatively small numbers of people in any one place, it has also proved expensive to deliver assistance.

⁵⁸ Bailey 2011

⁵⁹ Aker, 2013. See also WFP 2018.

⁶⁰ WFP 2018

⁶¹ Bailey 2014

⁶² Bonilla et al 2017

⁶³ Key informant interview.

Evaluation of WFP operations pointed to difficulties in maintaining humanitarian principles, in particular that assistance should be prioritised based on need. In practice, geographical targeting was found to deviate from targeting on need, particularly because it often involved prioritising easy to access places and areas where partners were operational. Questions were also raised about the degree to which military escorts undermined neutrality and the perception of neutrality in the conflict. It is extremely difficult to manage the tension between the need to maintain security and the desire to maintain a clear distance from an armed party to a conflict.

Studies have shown that the impacts of food assistance are significant on food, education and health.⁶⁴ However, impacts are short-lived.⁶⁵ The typical three month cycles succeed in improving people's diet and other indicators whilst they are receiving assistance but they quickly fall back afterwards. Attempts to increase the cycle to six months in order to help people to kick start their recovery has not succeeded, with the same return to the status quo ante after the end of the assistance. This should not be surprising. The levels of poverty are so great and the economic (understood here as the war-economic) situation so difficult that the scale of assistance offered has been far too small.

Social protection is not available in DRC. A social protection policy and strategy exist since 2016⁶⁶, which include a policy for support to household income and to the destitute. However, few people believe that a country which has often failed to pay its health staff and its teachers for many years is likely to find the capacity and political will to introduce widespread social assistance payments to the very poor. Some international agencies (notably WFP/UNICEF in the outskirts of Kinshasa and the World Bank in eastern DRC⁶⁷) have begun to make household transfers under the label of a nascent social protection system but these are likely to remain as humanitarian-type food assistance in the near- and medium term.

A fundamental challenge facing all such assistance programming is targeting. How to reconcile the fact that the vast majority of the population are in need of

assistance and will remain in need of assistance for some time, with the lack of resources to help all but a few and for a short time?

Public Works/cash or food for work

Labour-intensive public works have been widely used in eastern DRC as a way of making a food (or cash) transfer and also creating public assets from the labour conditionality. Rural access roads have been a frequent way of using such labour. Evaluations consistently show the poor quality of assets constructed through projects that are designed as vehicles for making a cash or food transfer. Roads in DRC have been no exception. The impact of this programming is hard to assess. There are no studies showing the medium term contribution of assets created and little about the contribution to household income: studies showing the net benefit of participation have not been found, given that the work conditionality presumably competes with other productive activities that recipients would have engaged in.

Nutrition and feeding programmes

Several agencies have run therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes (for those with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) respectively). Therapeutic feeding is usually seen as a medical rather than a food security intervention and is thus outside of the TOR for this study. Supplementary feeding has shown reasonably good outcomes, i.e. 'cure' rates, but it is difficult to know exactly what these figures, or what the concept of 'cure', mean for supplementary feeding. It is hard to see any impacts on MAM prevalence, and there is no data available on recrudescence. Claims on coverage may be exaggerated. For example, UNOCHA 2012 claimed coverage for U5 MAM of up to 23%, but this was based on figures drawn from a snapshot of malnutrition in a survey. The number of children U5 who fall into malnutrition at some point during a year could be very much higher.

The WFP evaluation found that nutritional interventions were generally not based on analysis of malnutrition.

⁶⁴ E.g. WFP 2018

⁶⁵ Ibid; Bailey 2014

⁶⁶ RDC 2016 a and 2016 b

⁶⁷ The STEP 2 programme

Livelihood support interventions

Humanitarian agencies have been running livelihood support programmes for many years. The following section captures the wide range of programming used.

Promotion of vegetable gardens

This has been a regular part of many food security programmes in the region for many years. It is often targeted on mothers, in particular mothers of children who have suffered from malnutrition.⁶⁸ Technical instruction is given usually alongside watering cans, hoes and supplies of vegetable seeds (though typically these are vegetables common in the west and not indigenous or local traditional vegetables). According to one evaluation, these were 'well received' but there were no signs of any replication beyond the immediate beneficiaries.⁶⁹ No studies have been found showing the impact in terms of how much food or income were derived from the activity or how much it increased consumption of vegetables and vitamins or other nutrients. No reports have been found showing how many people continued the practice in the following years when not supported. Given that a sustainable vegetable intervention would only promote plants which multiply easily in DRC, the continued perceived need to maintain distributions of vegetable seeds and watering cans after decades of similar interventions does suggest that this interventions type has not brought lasting change and thus probably lacks impact. (If people had felt the benefit, would they not have found some way of improvising a watering can?)

Provision of virus-resistant cassava cuttings

Several aid programmes have supported the distribution of cuttings of cassava varieties that are resistant to the cassava virus. Because cassava is multiplied vegetatively by planting stems, rather than (edible) seeds, onward multiplication would be expected to be sustainable. These projects have consistently been reported as highly successful, with (highly plausible) claims of yields doubling. Several in agricultural extension programmes have made claims of significant success, but a more detailed look invariably shows that the majority of the impact has

been due to the introduction of virus-resistant cassava cuttings.

The importance of the intervention is undisputed. It is less easy to know the overall contribution to agricultural production as whole because no evidence could be found about the scale on which cuttings have been provided and what percentage of farmers now have the new varieties, or what percentage of the total area planted was with resistant varieties. No information can be found giving a projection for the year in which variety replacement would be complete. It is not clear whether intra-community mechanisms have been established to ensure supply to more people in future years, or whether techniques of rapid multiplication have been taught to farmers.

The main worry about these programmes is that they were being conducted in the last decade, rather than having been completed twenty years ago. The criticism is thus not of these projects but that they were not higher up on the agenda of the aid community at a time when the problem and the solutions were both regionally very well known. The biggest lesson is surely that such support for production has proved many, many times more effective at improving food security, and surely orders of magnitude more cost-effective, than food assistance.

Direct distributions of seeds and tools (S&T)

(Note: this refers to projects that provided seeds for production, not those introducing new crops or new varieties.)

S&T still has a large place in standard humanitarian programming in DRC, as it has for decades. The targeting usually consists of IDPs, returnees, families of malnourished children, victims of sexual violence and victims of natural disasters. A more logical targeting might have been to give to people who cannot access seeds or tools for themselves but otherwise have land and labour for agricultural production. No evidence can be found that any seed needs assessments have been conducted to know who this latter group would be, or on which to base either this programming type or its targeting.

⁶⁸ See also Levine and Chastre 2004

⁶⁹ Rossi et al 2005

Huge claims continued to be made about the impact of S&T, e.g. FAO 2018 claiming handing out 90 tonnes of seed is equal to 10 million meals and was worth \$100 per month per household. (This alone would almost certainly be considerably greater than the median total annual household income in rural eastern DRC, see above.) However no study can be found assessing the impact, i.e. including some assessment of what farmers do when they are not given seeds by humanitarian organisations. The claims of impact would appear to presume that recipients would have sat idle without the seeds, and that their labour and their land had zero opportunity cost. It is difficult to find a justification for the continued practice of S&T.

The use of seeds voucher and organised fairs has been limited in DRC.

Integrated support to production

Several programmes have used multi-component projects for food security. These have typically included several of the following components: providing seeds of new varieties (distinguished from S&T, above), agricultural extension (often through farmer field schools), creating village savings and loan associations (VSLA), rehabilitating irrigation and roads (most often through FFW, see above), livestock grants, group formation (e.g. local development committees) and training on marketing. One such programme as linked to WFP's Purchase of Progress (P4P) programme and also linked project beneficiaries to WFP who could purchase their increased production.

Several evaluations have been conducted which contain many useful lessons, but the overall evidence on impact is patchy. This is sometimes because of methodological problems, such as using quantitative methodologies, rather than (for example) theory-based impact assessment, but without any control or counterfactual. The combination of activities sometimes makes it hard to ascribe impact to any particular component. In some cases the evidence is simply confusing. For example, an evaluation of the P4P programme showed that the project significantly increased yields and increased sales, but had no impact on overall household income – and there is no explanation available for this apparent paradox.

Another study showed that a project has positive benefit according to one indicator of food security ("Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning (MAHFP)", but has a negative impact on another indicator of food security (HDDS).⁷⁰ (It is unclear whether the baseline and endline were in the same season: the endline was conducted just after harvest when MAHFP would be at its highest.) The evaluation also concludes that MAHFP may have increased because of the 'prominent role of food aid'. The same study found that one programme of agricultural extension caused the practice of composting to go down: another project caused the yields of some crops to double, and yet the yields of others to halve, but with no explanation.

Support to marketing

Marketing interventions do not show clear results. Aid agencies appear not to understand farmers' marketing strategies well enough. Among P4P beneficiaries, two-thirds still preferred to sell to middlemen rather than to WFP, which the project (and the evaluation) considered meant losing potential income. The creation of marketing associations and training has been less successful, but where a project contributed warehousing for onions for large group, income was increased. The sustainability of this impact is not clear.

Some agencies have provided price information, e.g. on radio. This is reported to have been much appreciated, but no evidence of impact on prices obtained marketing behaviour or household income appears to have been collected, making it impossible to know whether or not the interventions was worthwhile or should be replicated.

The various development planning committees and early warning systems do not seem to have been helpful. One evaluation found that they had unclear purposes, weak functioning and weak legitimacy.⁷¹ Although this finding coheres well with what we know about the social and political organisation of rural life as a result of the conflict (see above), such activities to create a new institutional architecture in communities remain popular among aid agencies, who appear to underestimate the challenges of remaking social relations in eastern DRC.

⁷⁰ Hedley 2011

⁷¹ Mitchell Group 2016

Conflict remains an implementation challenge for agencies engaged in this work which requires a continued presence over some time. One programme (RISE) had to scale down or pull out of the most insecure area.

There is little evidence that projects were based on a sound understanding of what farmers were trying to do. There is no mention of farmers' agricultural adaptations to insecurity (see above) but rather a replication of the standard extension messages seen across the continent regardless of conflict or context, e.g. the importance of sowing seeds in straight lines. Farmer field schools are intended to create a participatory learning environment where farmers ought to have been able to set their own learning agenda. This does not seem to have been the case. For example, the staff of one programme commented that FFSs were not helping farmers because they were based entirely on class-room based theoretical teaching.

There is repeated evidence that replication of changes fostered by projects is low, i.e. People who were not direct project beneficiaries did not copy people who were following the project. This appears to be because the main motivation for the adoption of project messages was to access material aid. As one evaluation found, second-line training [i.e. passing the messages on] didn't happen 'because communities perceive material handouts to be a central component of the programme'. Since there were no free inputs for '2nd line trainees', there was no incentive to follow the training.

It could even be argued that unsustainability and lack of replicability have been built into project design. Projects which have provided seeds, empty sacks, agricultural tools and equipment, bicycles, wheelbarrows and carts to the project participants 'to ease the problem of transportation' are clearly designed to achieve results in the sense of reportable outputs. They cannot be intended to have brought about sustainable change that could ever be replicable.

A number of programme evaluations exist which have made an effort to quantify impact. However evaluations of multi-component programmes appear to have been commissioned for accountability rather than for learning. Much more would be learnt by following the same component across a number of projects rather than by combining many components

in one project. (The study of the impacts of road rehabilitation by Ferf et al (2014) is an example of studies badly needed for different elements of agricultural support.)

Livestock interventions

One programme of animal traction involved the centralised training of oxen traction and grants of \$800 to purchase bullocks, intended both for tillage and for transport by cart on bad roads 'to ease the working load of women'. Given that most people farm well under half a hectare of their own land, it remains unclear how much time it would actually save. No evidence is available from evaluation or impact assessment. A report from the voice of America wrote of broken carts lying visible, and quoted an anecdotal report that carts had fallen into disrepair which no one knew how to repair. Bullocks purchased had apparently not been strong enough, because recipients only used half the money for the intended purpose and bought cheaper animals.

It is hard to see that this should be a parody intervention for the poor. The cost would be very high if animals were provided, and judging from the behaviour of previous recipients, their priority livestock purchases are elsewhere. Livestock theft is also a significant problem in conflict area. If promotion of animal traction is indeed needed, it probably needs a different approach, helping farmers know how to train their own cattle.

Some humanitarian funds were used for distribution of small livestock, but the scale was very small, amounting to around just 1,000 goats in a year. No information is available on survival rates, multiplication rates or the impact on livelihoods, and project information available did not indicate any assessment of the expected contribution of the animals to meeting people's food security gap.

Credit/micro-finance

Many food security programmes have included a component of credit/micro-finance, e.g. supporting the formation of VSLAs. Many include a support fund (i.e. free grant as cash injection). Evaluations comment that they are very useful. One report found that after a year, average savings were \$40, and the

average loan value was \$56.⁷² However there was limited evidence on how credit was used or its impact on household income. Another study found that household income rose by over 200%.⁷³ It is not clear what investments were able to generate this transformation, particularly because it was found that borrowed money was often used for emergencies (consumption smoothing). This would certainly allow for better household financial planning, but it will be surprising that this alone allowed income to be three times higher. The findings on income were based only on self-reporting, not on any financial examination of household income and the possibility of informant pro-project bias needs to be borne in mind. The use of a start-up grant for VSLA is understandable amidst widespread deep poverty, but it was reported to have created some jealousy among those who were not members and did not receive the cash support grant. It will be interesting to see some documentation of an analysis on how to find the degree of start-up assistance that strikes the right balance.

The terms and conditions of loans also need to be designed with care. These are often designed with short term loans in mind, including conditions for a first repayment to be made within a month of the loan. This does not always match investment needs for agriculture, and it has been reported that many found the loans too expensive to take on. It is not clear whether this relates solely to the interest rate or to the T&C more broadly.

VSLA do not represent conflict-proof development. A project in an area which had been hit by 23 rebels suffered default from the majority of borrowers.⁷⁴ This does not necessarily invalidate VSLA as an appropriate tool for conflicts, but a realistic assessment should be made of the risks of large-scale default, and the programme would have to be designed with this risk appetite in mind. The concept of sustainability is hard to maintain in an active conflict. But what would be a realistic and a worthwhile lifespan of loan capital before it was lost to conflict?

⁷² Mercy Corps 2014

⁷³ Flynn 2014

⁷⁴ Mercy Corps op. cit.

No evidence could be found on how VSLA were functioning several years later.

Rural road construction/rehabilitation

One study is available which documents the impacts of road rehabilitation in S Kivu, though it has been a common intervention in other provinces in East.⁷⁵ Although repair itself Kivu was undertaken with international donor money. The state did not invest in road maintenance or rehabilitation.

Many programmes have invested in road construction and rehabilitation over several decades. The emphasis was mainly on feeder roads, with works often being organised through FFW. This intervention would appear to be one promising high-impact. Many food security assessments highlighted how far road infrastructure was a significant cause of food insecurity. The poor state of roads was causing low farm-gate prices because of a lack of traders, higher expenditure prices in rural areas because of the costs of transporting goods and also marginalisation from services. Actual evidence that improving the roads solved any of these problems is harder to find.

One evaluation did find significant positive impact, quoting rural inhabitants saying that “the price [of a sack of cassava] went up when roads allowed us to get to more buyers” and finding that the improved roads “proved to be critical in facilitating access to markets and the movement of goods”.⁷⁶

The sectoral study not linked to a project in any way found that most roads were “barely passable” just a few years after rehabilitation, which is perhaps not surprising. Some evaluations had claimed that sustainability of road improvements was built in because committees had been formed and training given for local maintenance. This appears to be at best highly naïve.

It is more surprising to read that road rehabilitation had increased transport frequency, but it had not reduced transport prices. (The extent of the increase in transport frequency was ascribed to the low capitalisation of local traders, who worked on very small stocks and this had to make frequent trips. No

⁷⁵ Ferf et al 2014

⁷⁶ Mitchell Group 2016

impact was found on prices of goods in rural areas, contradicting the findings of project evaluation.

It is clear that villagers want roads and they want road reconstruction projects. Roads bring employment (FFW), NGOs, projects and potentially some trade opportunities, selling alongside road. The infidel conclude that despite this, they do not contribute to rural reconstruction, because the causal chain has been misdiagnosed. The poor condition of roads is not the cause of poverty: rather, poverty is the limiting factor in the lack of transport, and this is one reason why roads are so bad. This is a difficult conclusion to maintain in the face of many voices calling for investment in feeder roads, but in any case, maintenance is an unresolved issue, without which investment is in any case unlikely to achieve change. The state of roads, in other words, is the outcome of a political situation. Unless that is changed, the status quo ante will return very quickly.

Land interventions

Although everyone is agreed on the diagnosis that unequal access to land, insecure tenure and land disputes are one of the most pressing problems facing the poor in Eastern DRC, very few development or humanitarian organisations have tried to intervene in this area. The reasons for this are obvious: the problem is highly political, huge vested interests are at stake (including those of powerful elites), engagement in land issues requires in-depth understanding of land law and land administration (both of which function to rules other than those formally written down), and disputes frequently involve ethnic conflicts which aid agencies understandably hesitates to engage in. Despite this, a few interventions have been attempted in this field.

UNHCR/UN-Habitat supported mediation, formal land administration and land reform. Mediation included supporting returnees to reclaim land which had been overall, it was estimated that there were over 27,000 beneficiaries from mediation, but no further details were available on what outcomes had been or even family disputes were involved.⁷⁷ (For example, mediation often involves compromise: it is not clear how far people were helped to maintain their rights through mediation or whether mediation involved them compromising on their rights with illegitimate

claims.) At societal level, the evaluation after 2 ½ years of the programme found that it was “too early to measure the impact of land conflict management on the daily life and livelihoods of the program beneficiaries”.

This information is available about support to land administration, specifically to land registry and cadastre in 3 conflict Provinces. The programme presentation claimed that “with an improved cadastre system, corruption is reduced and easier access to land for the poor is made possible.... Peaceful cohabitation between communities is possible with mediation and a transparent land administration system”. No other evidence of impact can be found. Little in the experience of DRC, or other similar conflicts, suggests that technical support to land administration is likely to lead to much change in the actual land rights of the rural poor, much less to before cohabitation. The mid-term review made it clear just how difficult this work is. It found that UN Habitat had faced incredibly difficult circumstances in every respect (security, political will, existing technical knowledge, et cetera) and yet had built a “rock solid program that responds to the initial objectives for which it was created”. On the other hand “it is highly unlikely that the external driven models of Nord Kivu can be replicated outside a project context.”

Two local NGOs were also working on land rights, one promoting mediation combining the engagement of customary chiefs and legal authorities; the other was promoting information sharing.⁷⁸ No details were available about the impact of the outputs of either.

There is no doubt about the huge need for a massive investment in land reform, in land administration and in the functioning of customary land institutions especially around dispute resolution. It is far from clear what is the best way to go about this, and there are fundamental disagreements of principle on how to approach land administration and dispute resolution on customary tenure in countries where the problems are far less intractable. Given the political economy of DRC (see above) and the situation of an active conflict so closely linked to land, ethnic claims of land and inequalities in land ownership, it is difficult to draw any simple lessons about the way forward. Fundamentally, it is hard to imagine state institutions

⁷⁷ Aime 2018

⁷⁸ Raymond 2013

of land administration being helpful for the poor in the near future in DRC. None of these questions should be inferred as undermining the case for aid agencies working on land issues, people's most pressing problem: they just point to the need for much experimentation and learning before we can say what actually works.

Health care

(Note: support for Ebola control is not considered here).

Investment in healthcare is not usually seen as a livelihood intervention. It is beyond the scope of this RER to assess effectiveness or VFM of different health interventions (e.g. support for vaccination, malaria control, support for primary health care, provision of healthcare in health centres/hospitals). However, the evidence on the cost of ill-health makes it clear that improving the health status of the population is a huge contribution to livelihood security, and is probably deserving of far more attention in the livelihood sector.

Donors and medical NGOs have been supporting the provision of free or subsidised healthcare through health centres. This has clearly been much appreciated, and it has reduced household expenditure on healthcare where it was provided free. It is hard to quantify the saving, but a comparison between the direct health costs in parts of S Kivu with and without subsidised healthcare suggests that savings may be around \$80/household per year.⁷⁹ there is no documentation of any assessment of improved health outcomes (e.g. shorter time sick, reduction in chronic illness), much less any evidence about the impact on livelihoods. ?

Supporting plant and animal health.

Given the absence of state services for plant and animal health, the need for investment is enormous. Aid spending in this area small, with the budget for plant and animal health comprising just 2.5% of the overall budget for food security sector and targeting only around 75,000 households. No reports could be found detailing activities, outputs or impact.

Key Lessons

Much livelihood support in DRC, as elsewhere, is based on the model whereby building up household assets helps to generate greater income flows which in turn can be used to maintain or increase household assets. It is troubling, then, to read a finding from the SLRC longitudinal survey that no variables could be found that were consistently associated with food security on the one hand and also with asset ownership. In other words, nothing could be found which helped improve food security and also helped support assets. Does this small statistical finding undermine the standard model assets are the key to better food security and resilience?

There is very little literature on the impact of assistance. It is harder to find evaluations of development assistance than of humanitarian assistance. Few of these evaluations attempted to follow the program theory of the interventions, i.e. to learn *how* the interventions played out in practice. The lack of such learning has been commented on frequently. It is impossible not to repeat the comment again here.

Annual humanitarian plans talk about supporting early recovery and addressing 'underlying causes of poverty and conflict'. There is increasing pressure from donors to move away from purely humanitarian aid, which is seen to have no lasting benefit, and instead to invest in building resilience, which guarantees a reduction in future humanitarian needs by addressing the underlying causes of the problems. The discourse may be seductive, but it is far from clear in the complex war economy of DRC which underlying causes of poverty and conflict aid is supposed to address, and how it is supposed to address them. It is even less clear whether it would be realistic to believe that they can even try. Interventions in the aid sector have shown some successes, but there is little to suggest that there is a deeper appreciation of the complex political causes of conflict and poverty, let alone any clear roadmap about how to address them.

It is probably true that short-term funding cycles have not helped agencies to grapple with the deeper problems of DRC. On the other hand, almost all the agencies have maintained continuous presence for

⁷⁹ Levine and Kusnierek 2019

decades by managing annual funding in support of a multi-annual engagement. This is far from ideal and multi-year humanitarian financing (MYHF) has the potential to be beneficial. On the other hand, it sometimes seems to be seen as a panacea for limited contextual understanding, long-term thinking and strategic approaches. Early use of MYHF did not bring about significant changes in programme quality, because such improvements do not come automatically with a change in funding mechanisms. Mechanisms have to be found to make agencies *accountable* for being more flexible, investing more in learning and in using the learning and developing close links with affected communities.

Humanitarian interventions in the food security sector have had little clear strategy beyond providing short-term material assistance to a limited number of households. If this sounds like a damning critique, it is not. The problems in DRC are so big and their causes so entrenched that it is incredibly difficult to see a different way of approaching assistance, one with any real promise of affecting meaningful and sustainable change the application of aid resources. Even if anybody had such a plan, operational conditions are very difficult and expensive, transport infrastructure is poor, relations of trust with government, with staff and with local institutions are all problematic. Relations of trust also difficult with and between affected populations. There is deep-seated culture of aid-capture at all levels. It is unsurprising that a review of interventions in DRC cannot point to examples of interventions that clearly and simply promise good value for money in terms of future impacts.

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Mali

Nature of conflict: causes and consequences

Causes

The conflict in Mali has its roots in a long-standing grievance: that the end of colonial occupation (1891-1960) did not see creation of an independent nation covering the northern desert areas of Mali and Niger and southern Algeria. A first Tuareg-led armed uprising (1962-1964) was quickly defeated but in 1900, after decades of economic and political marginalisation compounded by severe drought⁸⁰, a second armed uprising broke out (1990-1996) led by the Tuareg-led, *Mouvement de Liberation de l'Azawad* (MNLA). Their demands for regional autonomy were reflected in a vast programme of political and administrative reform introduced by Mali's first democratically elected government led by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002) and the end of the conflict was symbolised by a "Flame of Peace" ceremony in Timbuktu (1996). However, a build-up of resentment about delays in the decentralisation process, poor economic growth and persistent local violence led to a third Tuareg-led uprising (2007-2009) just as Konaré's successor, President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) was re-elected for a second term. By this time, elements of the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as well as smugglers and criminal gangs were operating in northern Mali.

Meanwhile, in the Inland Delta area of central Mali, a Fulani Muslim preacher called Hamadoun Kouffa (later to emerge as leader of *Katibat Macina*⁸¹, the Macina Liberation Front) was becoming known for his criticism of State corruption and for contesting the privileges of traditional aristocracies controlling access to valuable pastures (*bourgou*). His discourse of equality gained him support amongst less well-educated and economically marginalised groups, in particular young Fulani men. Many who later joined armed groups describe their principal motivation as protecting their livelihoods suggesting that conflict in central Mali is as much, if not more, driven by grievances than by questions of faith⁸². The name *Katibat Macina*, invokes folk memories of the Fulani Empire of Macina led by Cheikou Amadou (1818 - 1853); a period marked by huge social and political upheaval (raids, forced Islamisation, sharia law...) and by conflict with the Toucouleur of El Hadj Oumar Tall, which had severe impacts on the mainly Dogon communities in the modern day districts of Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro.⁸³

A key trigger for renewed rebellion in the North was the death of Gaddafi in 2011 and the return of Touareg rebels who had fled to Libya after their previous defeat. They came home trained, armed and still frustrated by the lack of significant progress towards regional autonomy. Mali was further weakened at this time by drought related food security crises (2005, 2008, 2010) and by the 2011 crisis in Ivory Coast (return of migrants, loss of remittances).

Nature and conduct of conflict

⁸⁰ <http://www.environmentandsociety.org/tools/keywords/sahel-drought-and-famine-1968-1985>


⁸¹ https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/katibat_macina

⁸² Pastoral Resource Conflict in the Context of Sudano-Sahelian Security Crises: A Critical Review of Research Leif V. Brottem Global Development Studies, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, USA

Article in African Security · January 2021
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2020.1871291>

⁸³ Analyse locale des dynamiques de conflit et de résilience dans la zone de Koro-Bankass Portraits Croisés Région de Mopti, Mali Juin 2017 IMRAP et Interpeace 2017 ; <https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-Interpeace-IMRAP-Portraits-Crois%C3%A9s-Koro-Bankass.pdf>

Figure 1. Reported fatalities in Mali



The conflict can be divided into three principal phases⁸⁴

- Tuareg-Jihadist insurgency (2012)
- Military pacification (2013-2015)
- Resurgence of conflict (2015 – present)

Tuareg-Jihadist insurgency (2012): In January 2012, fighting broke out in Menaka between the Touareg led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Malian military. Jihadist groups (linked to AQIM) formed an alliance with the MNLA and fighting spread to other towns in the North. Reports that more than 70 Malian soldiers⁸⁵ had been captured and massacred in the town of Aguelhok, fuelled suspicions that President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) was prolonging conflict in order to

postpone April elections and extend his term in office. Large-scale protests in the capital, Bamako, escalated into a *coup d'état* on 22nd March. Taking advantage of the chaos in Bamako, the MNLA and jihadist groups moved quickly to win control of regional towns in the North (Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal) and, on April 6th, the MNLA declared independence for the three northern regions of Mali, under the name Azawad. Almost immediately the alliance fell apart, as the jihadist groups made clear their ambition for an Islamic State in Mali. They took control of the northern regional towns, imposing strict sharia law and harsh

⁸⁴ <https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/133273/filename/133482.pdf>

⁸⁵ between 70 and 153 depending on the source according to an report by the International Court of Justice dated January 2013

punishments on the population⁸⁶, and largely displacing the MNLA. The jihadist groups pushed southwards, gradually occupying towns on the Gao-Mopti road and areas in the district of Douentza (Mopti region).


Military pacification (2013-2015): On 8th January 2013, jihadist groups reach the town of Konna, just 70 km north of Mopti and its strategically critical airport; the last where military planes can land before the capital, Bamako, 600km to the south. France launches Operation Serval and Malian forces with support from France are able to recapture Konna. ECOWAS sends troops. Malian and French forces continue to battle to take and maintain control of northern Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional

Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) takes over from ECOWAS in July. Fighting continues between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels, who in early 2014 briefly retake Kidal and smaller towns near the borders with Algeria and Niger. In May 2014 a cease-fire agreement is signed and peace negotiations get underway in Algeria. Operation Serval is replaced by Operation Barkhane, an anti-insurgent operation covering five Sahel countries: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. In June 2015, after numerous rounds of talks and under pressure from the international community, the Tuareg-led alliance (*Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad - CMA*) finally signs the peace agreement reached in Algiers.

Resurgence of conflict (2015 to present):

⁸⁶ Documented using actual news bulletins and interviews with affected people in the film "They Will Have To Kill Us First"
<https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4333662/>

Figure 2. Civilian fatalities in Mali



While attention is focussed on the north, a locally based group, *Katibat Macina*, carries out attacks against security forces in central Mali. Another group, affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), claims responsibility⁸⁷ for an attack on the Radisson hotel Bamako in November 2015, in which 20 people are killed. A State of Emergency is declared. Through 2016, violence in central Mali continues to escalate. 2017 sees the creation of a coalition of jihadist groups in Mali, the Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), including *Katibat Macina* and other armed groups in the Mopti region. This links them to the

international jihadi movement and strengthens their capacity, as testified by the multiplication of attacks against MIMUSMA and Malian armed forces⁸⁸. The rhetoric of the JNIM remains nevertheless, firmly rooted in Mali as they call on different communities, Fulani in particular, to take part in deadly attacks. Attacks against villages are used as a tactic to isolate and subjugate farming communities notably in the Mopti region but also around the Office du Niger irrigation perimeters (north Segou). Civilians are killed; standing crops are burnt; productive assets are destroyed or stolen. The situation is rendered

⁸⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36115322>

⁸⁸ https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/sipriinsight_1712_mali_3_fra_1.pdf

considerably more complex by equally deadly attacks perpetrated against Fulani individuals and villages, by government forces⁸⁹ and by Dogon community-based militia⁹⁰. Total deaths have soared since 2018 (ACLED figure 1) with more than 800 civilians killed each year (ACLED figure 2). 2020 was the deadliest year ever for Malian civilians. Civilian deaths are predominately in the Mopti region.

Failure to reduce conflict, compounded by longstanding grievances over governance and corruption fuelled a socio-political crisis culminating in coup d'état (August 2020). President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita resigned and an 18-month transitional government was established. Current levels of conflict are thought unlikely to improve⁹¹ and may get worse⁹², in the run-up to Presidential elections (2022). Alongside restoration of peace, delivery of actions to support livelihoods and improve access to basic services is considered crucial to restoring confidence in national government⁹³.

Consequences for lives and livelihoods

Direct effects in affected rural areas

The areas most affected by the current conflict are the regions of Menaka, Gao and Mopti (see map on previous page) and in particular the areas near the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. This is sometimes

⁸⁹ <https://www.dw.com/en/amnesty-accuses-west-african-forces-of-human-rights-abuses-in-sahel-region/a-53755405>

⁹⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/18/mali-army-un-fail-stop-massacre>

⁹¹ <https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news/europe-news/frances-eternal-war-in-the-sahel-7796296>

⁹² A March 2021 news report (LePoint) interviews Dogon militia leaders who say they have no quarrel with the Fulani as such, but will not sign peace agreements with Jihadist armed groups "They are funded and we have nothing" https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/voyage-en-pays-dogon-au-coeur-de-dan-na-ambassagou-11-03-2021-2417325_3826.php

⁹³ Achieving peace and development in Central Mali: Looking back on one year of SIPRI's work - 23 June 2020 - Dr Grégory Chauzal (web article) <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2020/achieving-peace-and-development-central-mali-looking-back-one-year-sipri-work>

⁹⁴ Evaluation de la situation humanitaire dans la zone Trois Frontières Mali - Région de Mopti (Septembre 2020) <https://www.impact->

referred to as the three-border zone⁹⁴ or the Liptako Gourma⁹⁵. The direct effects on people living the affected areas include:

Food and nutritional insecurity: During the first five years of the conflict, households in the Mopti region experienced continued food insecurity, as well as decreases in overall food consumption and micronutrient availability, in a context that was already highly food insecure. 1 in 5 households were exposed to violence and 16% of villages surveyed were still experiencing the presence of armed groups in 2017⁹⁶.

Reduced mobility: Fear of mines, hold ups and theft led to

"a widespread fear of traveling in conflict-affected villages, which affected more than 78 percent of households. This translated into fewer trips to the market, the health centre, job fairs, and so on, as well as in reduced trips to school for children"⁹⁷.

Reduced access to basic services: Teachers in central Mali were threatened with death if they did not close schools. Government employees fled. Already low levels of access to basic health services for pregnant women, infants and young children, fell even further. In northern regions, the conflict reduced household access to safe water and toilets which, combined with

[repositorio.org/document/reach/ece8b483/REACH_MLI_Humanitarian-Situation-Monitoring_Mopti_Septembre_2020-1.pdf](https://www.repositorio.org/document/reach/ece8b483/REACH_MLI_Humanitarian-Situation-Monitoring_Mopti_Septembre_2020-1.pdf)

⁹⁵ The Agency for Integrated Development of the Liptako Gourma Region (ALG) was established in 1970 by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to provide a common framework for exploitation of the rich mineral, energy, water, agro-pastoral and fishery resources in their border regions. In 2018, the geographical scope of the ALG was extended to cover all three member states and the development of a joint security strategy was added to its objectives. <https://www.liptakogourma.org/#>

⁹⁶ Gelli, A, Tranchant, J-P, Bliznashka, L, Diallo, AS, Sacko, M, Siegel, E, Aurino, E and Masset, E, 2018. The impact of food assistance on food insecure populations during conflict in Mali 3ie Grantee Final Report. New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c533515e5274a492912eb7b/GFR-TW6.1039-food-insecure-population-mali.pdf>

⁹⁷ IFPRI 2018 Book Chapter: The impact of humanitarian food assistance on household food security during conflict in Mali, AULO GELLI, JEAN-PIERRE TRANCHANT <https://www.ifpri.org/publication/impact-humanitarian-food-assistance-household-food-security-during-conflict-mali>

loss of durable assets, posed “a serious threat to people’s capacity to handle subsequent shocks”⁹⁸.

Displacement: The number of internally displaced people (IDP) in Mali has risen steadily since 2017 reaching 346,864 in January 2021⁹⁹. Highest concentrations by district are found in the regions of Mopti, Gao, Menaka and Segou (see Figure 3). Around half of IDPs live in host families and communities; about a third live in informal camps, often in extremely precarious conditions¹⁰⁰; the rest are in community sites (schools, churches...) and government buildings¹⁰¹. There are approximately 149,000 Malian refugees in camps in Mauritania,

Niger and Burkina Faso¹⁰² and 48,500 refugees from these three countries, in Mali.

While all forms of displacement have considerable knock-on effects on the lives and livelihoods of the people affected and their host communities, we focus in the following sections on the response to IDPs and people remaining in their communities. In pastoral areas the presence of IDPs in significant numbers, adds to intercommunity tensions over access to water and grazing¹⁰³. In the south, host communities foresee potential for future tensions over access to land, water and other natural resources, should IDPs households settle permanently¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ FAO 2017, The 2012 crisis in Mali and its implications on resilience and food security FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 17-04 July 2017 <http://www.fao.org/resilience/resources/resources-detail/en/c/1026374/>

⁹⁹ UNHCR 2021 Dashboard Mali 15/03/2021 (IDP data updated 31/01/2021) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/mli>

¹⁰⁰ DIIS 2020, POLICY BRIEF Internally displaced people in Mali's capital city When a crisis turns chronic Boukary Sangaré & Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/internally-displaced-people-in-malis-capital-city>


¹⁰¹ IOM 2020, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Mali — Rapport sur les déplacements (Décembre 2020) <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mali-%E2%80%94-rapport-sur-les-d%C3%A9placements-d%C3%A9cembre-2020>

¹⁰² UNHCR 2021, Mali Country dashboard 15/03/2021 (refugee data updated 31/01/2021) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/countries/>

¹⁰³ KI#4, Key informant number 4, Community activist & local NGO founder, Menaka

¹⁰⁴ KI#1, Key informant number 1, Retired civil servant and rice farmer, Ké Macina/Tengele

Figure 3. Internally Displaced Persons in Mali



Reduction in area farmed: Striking evidence of the effects of conflict in central Mali comes from a World Food Programme study that analysed satellite images from the Mopti region, over a four-year period (2016 to 2019)¹⁰⁵. 25% of settlements showed a decrease in the area of land cultivated in 2019 compared to 2016 and 2017. The areas most affected by medium and severe reductions in cropland were: Koro, Bankass, Bandiagara and Douentza. An analysis of violent events between April and October 2019 overlapped with the results of the satellite analysis, illustrating how peaks in insecurity in 2019 heavily affected agriculture in these districts. No evident change in the area of crops was detected in most localities bordering or within the Inland Delta (Youwarou, Mopti, Tenenkou and Djénné).

Other effects on the agricultural sector include:

Productive assets destroyed or stolen: during attacks on villages e.g. food stocks, local seed, ploughs, traction animals and other livestock¹⁰⁶. Armed men destroyed 13 motor-pumps in the Niger Inland delta (Djenné) during the 2017-2018 seasons that had been used to irrigate 180 hectares (980 farmers). Livestock, including 112 traction animals (oxen), were also stolen¹⁰⁷.

Inputs in short supply or more expensive: in 2020 rice seed in the *Office du Niger* rose to twice its pre-conflict price (KI#1). In Bandiagara formerly the centre of shallot production in Mali, stores that were built to hold local production, are now used by traders who are buying seed onions from other areas (e.g. Office

¹⁰⁵ World Food Program 2020, Case Study, Satellite imagery in conflict-affected areas: How Technology Can Support WFP Emergency Response <https://www.wfp.org/publications/wfp-mali-satellite-imagery>

¹⁰⁶ KI#1, KI#4 and KI#3 Key Informant 3: Textile artist & former tour guide, Bandiagara

¹⁰⁷ ROPPA 2018, Rapport 2017-2018 de l'Observatoire régional des exploitations familiales du ROPPA; Résultats du suivi paysan de la campagne agro-sylvo-pastorale et halieutique 2017 - 2018 dans 13 pays en Afrique de l'Ouest https://www.roppa-afrique.org/IMG/pdf/roppa_rapport_observation-francv4.pdf

du Niger) to sell to local producers. *“The value chain is turned on its head”* (KI#3).

Standing crops destroyed or not harvested: Setting fire to standing crops is a tactic used by armed groups to intimidate farming communities in the Mopti region and the Office du Niger rice fields¹⁰⁸. In February 2021, it was announced that farmers who lost their crops in this way would be exempted from water fees¹⁰⁹. Refusal to grant this exemption had resulted in violent protests in Ke Macina in the early years of the crisis (KI#1). When seasonal workers (mainly Dogon) stayed away from the Sukala plantation (Office du Niger) out of fear of attacks, a whole field of sugar cane could not be harvested (KI#1).

Some off-farm livelihoods are heavily affected: for example livelihoods linked to tourism in Mopti (guides, hotel staff, artisans...). In Dogon villages, textile production (indigo cotton) is a skill passed from mother to daughter. With no tourists, the village women’s potential to earn income is severely reduced (KI#3). However, *“livelihoods don’t stop, they evolve”*¹¹⁰. Former tourist guides have become motor-taxi drivers; others work with MINUSMA (KI#3). Some have joined armed gangs to rob travellers and steal

livestock, using tactics similar to those of jihadist groups and Fulani community militia, creating confusion over who exactly is to blame (KI#1). Delivery in conflict affected areas is supported through flexible funding and adaptive management.

Markets are disrupted, but on the whole have found ways to continue to function: monitoring by FEWSNET found price fluctuations for staple cereals (millet, rice) on regional markets in 2019-20 that were similar to 5-year averages. The Food security outlook for 2021 is *“conducive to sufficient market supply despite the security disruptions observed in the Centre, the North and the northern regions of Ségou”*¹¹¹. In Menaka, despite it being more dangerous to travel, *“goods, money and people continue to flow in between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger”* (KI#4). In Ké Macina (Office du Niger) sacks of charcoal quadrupled in price after local producers were attacked and robbed on way to the District market. The price of locally caught fish, on the other hand, fell because many urban buyers stayed away (KI#1). Despite the impact of Covid and insecurity, sales of livestock (Figure 4, red line) remained the main source of income in 2020 for the agro-pastoral households tracked by the association APEES in 8 countries¹¹².

¹⁰⁸ KI#1, KI#3 and KI#2 Key information 4: senior employee of partner NGO working in Douentza, Mopti, Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro


¹⁰⁹ Maliweb news report of fields burnt in the village of Dogofry: <https://www.maliweb.net/insecurite/commune-de-dogofry-des-champs-brules-par-des-hommes-armes-2912089.html>

¹¹⁰ KI#5, Key informant number 5: INGO Director, Food Security Cluster Member

¹¹¹ FEWSNET 2021, West Africa Mali Key Message Update January 2021 : Insecurity and COVID-19 increase poor households' vulnerability to food insecurity <https://fews.net/west-africa/mali/key-message-update/january-2021>

¹¹² APESS 2020, Monthly Monitoring Bulletin of the Vulnerability of Agro-pastoral Households members of APESS <https://www.apess.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/N-8-Bulletin-APESS.pdf>

Figure 4 Trends in sources of income of agro-pastoralist households in eight Sahelian countries, 2020



Source: Figure 3, APSS 2020, Monthly Monitoring Bulletin of the Vulnerability of Agro-pastoral Households members of APSS <https://www.apess.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/N-8-Bulletin-APSS.pdf>

Note: AGR = income-generating activities [activités génératrices de revenus]

National Economy Affected: In 2015, the National Observatory of Employment and Training reported that the crisis had led to a contraction of the formal sector, an increase in informal, precarious and multiple jobs and an increase in unemployment—especially for young people and women in urban areas¹¹³. A study by the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Technical Unit (CLSP), assessed growth in GDP as "good" in 2017 (5.3%) while noting that it was below target and lower than the previous two years. A further fall was predicted for 2018 (to 5%). Progress in the Education sector was affected by the closure of numerous schools in the centre and north. Access to drinking water (national average) fell during the first 4 years of the conflict; from 68.5% in 2012 to 66.9% in 2016. Governance was found to a major concern of

Malian citizens, second only to food security. The CLSP situation report concluded: "terrorism and violent extremism are profoundly changing Malian society"¹¹⁴.

Responses

The Food Security, Humanitarian Sector Response Scaled Up

When the conflict began in 2012, Mali already had a well-established food security system in place to assess needs and target emergency response to vulnerable communities exposed to climate related and other agricultural risks (seasonal droughts or floods, pests and disease etc.). In the North the system was also already used to target humanitarian and development support to communities affected by insecurity due to presence of armed groups (Tuareg

¹¹³ EMPLOI ET POLITIQUE DE L'EMPLOI AU MALI, Yves Bourdet*, Boubacar Diallo** et Adama Andé Togo**23 décembre 2015, Observatoire national de l'emploi et de la formation, Ministère de l'emploi, de la formation professionnelle, de la jeunesse et de la construction citoyenne <http://onef-mali.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Politique-Emploi-Mali.pdf>

¹¹⁴ CLSP (2018) Elaboration du Cadre stratégique pour la relance économique et le développement durable (CREDD) 2019-2023. Rapport de Diagnostic Stratégique <https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/MLI/RAPPORT%20FINAL%20DU%20DIAGNOSTIC%20STRATEGIQUE%20CREDD%202019%202023.doc>

separatists, jihadists and organised crime). As the effects of the conflict moved southwards the response of the FS Cluster expanded in both size and geographical reach. New humanitarian actors began working in Mali. Some like Mercy Corps and ACTED¹¹⁵, were experienced in delivering humanitarian responses in conflict settings. Others, such as Interpeace¹¹⁶ and Search for Common Ground¹¹⁷, specialise in conflict analysis and peacebuilding. The response of the UN organisations and international partners is coordinated via the Food Security Cluster¹¹⁸. The main tool used to target response in Mali is the *Cadre Harmonise* (CH)¹¹⁹, an analytical framework adopted across West and Central Africa, to synthesize indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and enable regular assessments (e.g. March and November) of the nature and severity of food security and nutrition crises. This process is led by the national Food Security Commission Early Warning System (CSA/SAP). About 80% of the evidence for the CH is provided by the National Food Security and Nutrition Survey (ENSAN)¹²⁰, implemented by the CSA/SAP with donor support¹²¹. Targeting is based on the results of the CH, with additional evidence from the national *Enquête de conjuncture agricole* (agricultural situation survey) and Household Economic Analysis (HEA)¹²². The skills and experience of the CSA/SAP mean there is good capacity for both geographic and household targeting in Mali (KI#6).

The Food Security (FS) cluster in Mali has two objectives. The first is to deliver an emergency response to immediate food security needs through seasonal food aid/assistance for settled communities and displaced people. For example in 2020 they

delivered food assistance to around 2 million vulnerable people including 314,000 IDPs (end November¹²³). About 90% of the response was delivered as cash or vouchers and 10% in-kind (cereals, oil...).

The second objective of the FS Cluster is to coordinate complementary livelihood and resilience building activities. The focus is on maintaining access to means of production and markets and the response is predominately delivered in-kind (small ruminants, animal feed, vaccinations, seeds, tools, training, market gardens...). In 2020 about 1 million people in Mali were reached with livelihood support.

Approximately 70% of the livelihood response (crops and livestock support) is delivered during the agro-pastoral hungry season (April – Oct). Many humanitarian organisations target the household level but some work with livestock producer organisations e.g. to support distribution of supplementary animal feed. Cash transfers delivered as part of livelihood support may be used to purchase inputs but can also help to ensure there is sufficient labour to cultivate (family or other). Relatively few Cluster members provide support for income generating activities (value chain development, food processing etc.) in the context of humanitarian actions (KI#6).

Within the framework of the Cluster objectives and reporting framework, each of the more than 25 actors has their own organisational focus and approach. Below we briefly describe four of these.

- The World Food Programme (WFP) in its **Resilient Sahel initiative** (2019-2023) is moving towards an integrated package measures, delivered over a number of years to the same target areas. The

¹¹⁵ Both working in Mali since 2012
<https://www.acted.org/fr/pays/mali-2/> ;
<https://www.mercycorps.org/where-we-work/mali>

¹¹⁶ In 2013 Interpeace launched a national initiative for peace and reconciliation <https://www.interpeace.org/2013/12/mali-2/>

¹¹⁷ Started working on Mali in 2014 https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Sahel_Strategy.pdf

¹¹⁸ <https://fscluster.org/mali>

¹¹⁹ <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cadre-harmonise> Food Security Data in West & Central Africa: Cadre Harmonise (CH) and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) data

¹²⁰ The ENSAN February 2020 Report for Mali is here <https://fscluster.org/mali/document/sap-rapport-definitif-de-lenquete>

¹²¹ KI#6 Key informant 6: group discussion with Food Security Cluster Coordination and representatives of WFP and Welthungerhilfe

¹²² RAPPORT TECHNIQUE D'ANALYSE DES RESULTATS (HEA Outcome Analysis) PAYS : MALI March 2020 https://zd1.hea-sahel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Rapport_technique_OA_Mali_Mars-2020.pdf

¹²³ FSC-Mali 2020, Mali Food Security Cluster Dashboard 5W Présence des partenaires Janvier-Novembre 2020 https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/fsc_mali_-_dashbaord_novembre_2020.pdf

package includes actions to strengthen resilience at household level (school feeding, nutritional packages, seasonal safety nets), community level (food assistance for assets, smallholder agriculture market support (SAMS), community-based participatory planning) and at food system level (technical services, systems knowledge, emergency preparedness and adaptive shock response mechanisms)¹²⁴. IFAD, WFP and FAO have recently announced a 6-year \$180 million, joint regional programme to strengthen the resilience of 1 million rural people affected by conflict, covid19 and climate the G5 Sahel countries plus Senegal (3D3C/G5Sahel+1).¹²⁵

- In February 2015 the FAO began using their Resilience Fund (**Caisses de Résilience**) approach in the Mopti region; an integrated set of productive, social, nutritional and financial interventions to improve nutrition, support women's empowerment, and strengthen livelihood resilience of vulnerable agro-pastoral households¹²⁶. In 2017 they piloted a productive transfers approach (**CASH+**) in the Kayes regions, aimed at supporting the transition of vulnerable households away from a position of poverty and dependence on seasonal assistance. The pilot CASH+ initiative combined unconditional cash transfers with in-kind livestock inputs (goats and animal feed). The vast majority (99%) of the direct recipients of transfers were women¹²⁷. FAO support for income generation may also be combined with construction/ rehabilitation of community assets that support livelihoods (**Food for Assets**) and with activities aimed at

strengthening community conflict resolution mechanisms (**Dimitra Clubs**)¹²⁸.

- **The Kisili (Saving lives) project** was launched in 2016 to provide an Emergency Rapid Response Mechanism (ERRM) to rapid onset crises (displacement). Funded by the USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace, *Kisili* is implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), local NGO partners and the national Social Development Service. Kisili undertakes rapid assessments and if no other organisation is positioned to respond quickly, delivers life-saving assistance to the affected communities. Since 2016, Kisili has provided multi-sectorial emergency assistance to over 234,000 IDPs across 155 sites in the main conflict affected regions of Segou Mopti Timbuktu and Gao¹²⁹.
- **Building Resilience of communities, households and individuals vulnerable to food and nutritional insecurity** is a 3-year €25 million initiative (2017-2020) funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund and implemented by the consortium SOS Sahel, Humanity & Inclusion and Oxfam in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu. This initiative aligns itself clearly with Mali's National Resilience Priorities and commits to working with and strengthening central and local government structures in particular the Commission for the Rehabilitation of post-conflict zones (CRZPC) and decentralised local government bodies. Actions include food security assistance, nutritional support, access to basic

¹²⁴ WFP 2018, Scaling up for resilient individuals, communities and systems in the Sahel, Operational Reference Note <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000110294/download/>

¹²⁵ <https://www.ifad.org/fr/web/latest/news-detail/asset/42450213> Investir davantage dans le Sahel pour stimuler le développement et la résilience des populations rurales:

¹²⁶ <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6440e.pdf> Promoting women's empowerment and improving nutrition for vulnerable households through an integrated approach"

¹²⁷ <http://www.fao.org/resilience/resources/resources-detail/en/c/463032/> Innovative "Productive Transfers" (CASH+) in Mali

¹²⁸ ÉVALUATION DU PROJET IRF 217: PEERS FOR PEACE BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION IN MOPTI AND SEGOU REGIONS <https://www.wfp.org/publications/mali-evaluation-joint-project-peers-peace-building-social-cohesion-mopti-and-segou>

¹²⁹ CRS 2020, Les Conditions de Vie et Moyens de Subsistance des Personnes Déplacées Internes Bénéficiaires du ERRM-Kisili, REGION DE SEGOU, MOPTI, TOMBOUCTOU, GAO ET MENAKA: USAID and Catholic Relief Services, 2020

services (water supply in particular) and support to develop income generating activities¹³⁰.

Some development initiatives adapted their approach to respond to emergency needs

An example of this is *Harande*, a 4-year food security, nutrition and economic development initiative targeting vulnerable household members in four districts of Mopti: Bandiagara, Douentza, Tenenkou, and Youwarou. It was funded by USAID’s Office for Food for Peace (FFP) and implemented by a consortium of international and national NGOs led by CARE from 2015 to 2020. At baseline, target communities had not had significant exposure to conflict and drought was the main shock to food security and livelihoods reported by households¹³¹. Nevertheless as the security situation worsened, USAID approved the consortium request in 2016 to adapt the project aims and approach to the evolving context. New activities included: **Cash Transfers** to vulnerable households for food and for income generating activities (about 50,000 FCFA per quarter) ; **Food Ration Coupons** to be exchanged at local traders for oil cereals and other food items and; **Recapitalisation grants** to groups in settled communities that self-organised by professional activity (women tailors, male traders etc.). No household livelihood support was provided beyond the cash transfers (sufficient to help buy seed, but not to restock large livestock). The consortium used local partner staff already, working in target villages, to collect information on target households then passed it to the Social Protection services for validation and inclusion in the national safety net register, thus integrating the Food Security system and Cluster monitoring processes (KI#2).

Some were unable to adapt

Dryland Development (DRYDEV), a research-action initiative implemented led by ICRAF worked in Mali

¹³⁰ <http://www.food-security.net/projet/renforcement-de-la-resilience-des-communautes-des-menages-et-des-individus-vulnerables-a-linsecurite-alimentaire-et-nutritionnelle/>

¹³¹ CARE 2016 FINAL REPORT Baseline Study of the Food for Peace (FFP) Development Food Assistance Project in Mali <https://www.careevaluations.org/evaluation/baseline-study-of-the-food-for-peace-development-food-assistance-project-in-mali-final/>

¹³² MDF 2018, Drylands Development External Programme Review Authors Frans van Gerwen (team leader) Joost Nelen, Mark

from 2013 to 2019 in a range of locations including several in the central, conflict affected area. Key areas of work were: natural resource management, agro-pastoral production and access to markets and financial services. As the impact of the conflict escalated, field staff found it increasing difficult to deliver the planned activities whilst becoming frustrated at not being able to offer any response to the immediate needs of the affected communities, that they knew well (KI#2). Management inflexibility could have been at consortium and/or donor level. An external evaluation in 2018 noted that while the DRYDEV consortium in Mali was working well together and showed substantial progress and results overall “*areas in Bandiagara, Bankass and, more recently, in northern Tominian are affected by violent conflicts which hamper project implementation*”¹³².

Some relocated

An example of this is **Protos**, an international organisation specialised in community water supply and sanitation (WASH) that was working in the Mopti region prior to the conflict. As insecurity increased, they closed their offices, relocated staff and redirected funding to their WASH programmes with communities in and around Bamako and in southern Mali.

Others adjusted their ways of working, but remained outside Food Security Cluster processes

PSEL, the Local Economy Development Programme in the Niger Inland Delta, is a Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) funded initiative, implemented by HELVETAS Swiss Interco-operation and their local partner AFAR¹³³ from 2015-2019 in the districts of Youwarou, Tenenkou, Mopti and Niafunké (Mopti region) i.e. including areas under control of the group *Katiba Macina*. Key areas of work included: development of profitable local value chains (crops, livestock and fishery products); supporting inter-

Hopkins, Ochieng Adimo, Aboubacar Souley, Nadine Bergmann (Research Assistant), MDF Training & Consultancy, Ede, July 2018 <https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/reports/2018/07/01/drylands-development-external-programme-review/BHOS+2.1+25548+Drylands+Development+External+Programme+Review+20180701.pdf>

¹³³ Association pour la Formation et l’Auto-promotion Rurale; Association for Rural Training and Self-Promotion

community, climate sensitive, land use planning and development (e.g. agro-pastoral and irrigation infrastructure with accompanying environmental and social management plans); strengthening local mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts linked to natural resources (intercommunity dialogue, local conventions, public communication). PSEL was able to continue in a context marked by: persistent threats from armed jihad and criminal groups that put market traders and livestock herders at risk (violent theft); ongoing intimidation of political leaders and traditional chiefs; and targeted attacks against forestry service agents and security forces. The NGOs however were not directly targeted and were permitted to continue working, which they did despite the risk of collateral damage and criminality¹³⁴. While no explanation is available for this it is perhaps of note that Helvetas and AFAR both have a long history of community development in the Inland Delta area and of working in partnership with local government structures and grassroots agro-pastoralist producer organisations, members of the National Coordination of Farmer Organisations (CNOP).

A similar example is **PASARC**, an initiative to strengthen the food security and resilience of people affected by climate change and social crises in the Mopti region funded by the Dutch Ministry of Overseas Affairs and implemented by the Near East Foundation (NEF) and partner organisations. PASARC started during the initial phase of the conflict and Phase 2 is currently underway (2018 – 2023)¹³⁵. Faced with risk of violence (offices ransacked, theft of vehicles...) NEF relocated their main country office from Douentza, where it had been since 1984, to the relative safety of the regional town, Mopti. Nevertheless programme implementation continued in the conflict affected districts of Bankass, Bandiagara, Douentza, Djenné, Mopti and Youwarou. Activities in Phase I included: support for locally identified community initiatives (80) and income generating projects (200) to strengthen food security and resilience; building capacity of community leaders

to manage conflicts related to natural resources; improving livestock access to water.

Not every response is captured

While the Mali FS Cluster plays a key role in coordinating and tracking the emergency and livelihood response in the conflict affected areas, it cannot capture the livelihood support delivered by programs like PSEL and PASARC implemented by HELVETAS, NEF and other **development organisations that choose not to participate in Cluster processes**. Many of these organisations have a long-standing presence in specific districts, trusted relationships with different communities and, considerable expertise in delivery of livelihood and resilience support including market development and inter-community management of natural resources.

Cluster monitoring also misses the many **bi-lateral and private initiatives** that offer support to specific conflict-affected livelihoods or communities.

Some of these take the form of **small grants programmes**, enabling affected people themselves to design an appropriate response. The EU small grants programme «*Culture for Peace, United in Diversity*»¹³⁶ for example has a twice-yearly call for proposals for actions in the cultural sector (e.g. regular and one-off cultural events, festivals, audio-visual productions, professional training...) that promote peace and social cohesion or have the potential to create decent and sustainable jobs in the cultural sector (including traditional arts and crafts). One of the 8 small grants awarded in 2020 is being used by a community-based association to help Dogon women to access new international markets for their indigo cotton textiles following the collapse of the tourist industry in Mali (KI#3).

Other private or ad hoc responses are typically delivered via **diaspora associations, concerned individuals and politicians**. While their overall contribution may be small, this support can make a significant difference to the people assisted. When an informal IDP camp in Bamako (Faladie) burnt down in

¹³⁴ SDC 2018, CASE STUDY <https://www.maliapd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ETUDE-DE-CAS-Helvetas-PSEL-Delta.pdf>

¹³⁵ Programme d'Appui a la sécurité alimentaire et a la résilience des populations aux crises climatiques et sociales dans la région

de Mopti, Phase II PASARC-II
[/https://rsr.akvo.org/fr/project/7693/?page=2#summary](https://rsr.akvo.org/fr/project/7693/?page=2#summary)

¹³⁶ La culture pour la paix – Unis dans la diversité <https://www.cooperation-ue-mali.ml/beneficier-de-financement/>

2020¹³⁷, many people in Bamako and internationally rallied round to raise funds to help the destitute residents. One person interviewed the course of this study recalled that IDP households, hosted by a village in southern Mali had been helped by their member of parliament to obtain a borehole and pump thus reducing their distance to collect clean water and the risk of tensions with the host community over access (KI#1). In January 2021 the Government of Mali in collaboration with a local NGO (ID-Sahel) donated 600 tonnes of supplementary animal feed to herders in the district of Ke Macina that had been “hardest hit by the security crisis.”¹³⁸

Government Safety Net Programme expanding

Mali’s **Safety Net** programme - *Jigisemeyiri* - began operation in August 2013 with technical and financial support of the World Bank. A second 4-year phase was launched in February 2019¹³⁹ aimed at extending cover to 100,000 vulnerable households. Resilience research indicates that stronger formal and informal safety nets are associated with greater household resilience to shocks¹⁴⁰. The first of Mali’s National Resilience Priorities (NRP) identified under the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) regional process is to “restore, enhance, and secure livelihoods and improve social protection of communities and vulnerable households”¹⁴¹. *Jigisemeyiri* is built around a national database or Unique Social Register (RSE, *registre social unique*) which includes records from FS Cluster cash transfer and livelihood activities and from the National Agency for Medical Insurance (ANAM).

In parallel with the development of national safety nets, the World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Programme (SASPP) launched in 2014, is piloting measures aimed at making social protection systems

more shock responsive. In addition to cash transfers, SASPP offers households a series of **productive inclusion and accompanying measures**, typically a mix of coaching, community savings and loans groups, training (life-skills, micro-entrepreneurship and market access) and cash grants (\$150 - \$250)¹⁴². Mali is one of six West Africa countries participating in this programme.

During its first five years *Jigisemeyiri* provided quarterly cash transfers to more than 79,000 families (in all regions of Mali) reaching nearly 450,000 individuals of which 45% were women. Despite the conflict it was able to maintain its presence in northern Mali and to extend coverage to new areas in Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu. By February 2019 an estimated 95% of beneficiaries had attended information sessions promoting behaviour change in areas of nutrition, health, education and family economy. 10,000 households had benefitted from the SASPP programme of productive inclusion. Most income generating activities were related to petty trade, livestock, poultry, agriculture and crafts¹⁴³.

Jigisemeyiri also provides social protection through labour-intensive public works (LIPW) and reported a total of 60 LIPW completed and 113 ongoing at the end of 2019. While the vast majority of LIPW are in areas not affected by conflict, one (completed in 2021) rebuilt the port in the village of Konna (a key livelihood asset for local fishers) that was damaged in 2013 when Malian armed forces and Operation Serval drove out jihadist groups¹⁴⁴.

Government- Donor Coordination increasing

Cooperation between the Government of Mali and multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, known collectively

¹³⁷ <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200429-mali-principaux-camps-d%C3%A9plac%C3%A9s-bamako-d%C3%A9ruit-incendie>

¹³⁸ <https://www.studiotamani.org/index.php/themes/breves/25716-macina-don-de-600-tonnes-d-aliments-betails-aux-populations-vulnerables>

¹³⁹ <https://www.meguetaninfos.com/archives/26847>

¹⁴⁰ TANGO International. 2018. Mali Resilience Research Report. Produced as part of the Resilience, Evaluation, Analysis and Learning (REAL) Associate Award <https://www.resiliencelinks.org/system/files/download-count/documents/2019-08/pa00tmdd.pdf>

¹⁴¹ AGIR (2015) "Alliance Globale pour la Résilience au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest (AGIR) Priorités Résilience Pays Plan Stratégique 2015-2035 MALI " http://www.food-security.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PRP-AGIR_Mali.pdf

¹⁴² <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sahel-adaptive-social-protection-program-trust-fund>

¹⁴³ <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/414211561752166476/pdf/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-Emergency-Safety-Nets-project-Jigis-m-jiri-P127328-Sequence-No-11.pdf>

¹⁴⁴ Le306Afrique (2021)Mali: Glimmer of hope in Konna <https://afrique.le360.ma/mali/politique/2021/03/21/33907-mali-lueur-despoir-konna-ville-martyrisee-du-centre-du-pays-33907>

as the PTF (Technical and Financial Partners) is organised through the Executive Coordination Group (GEC) for PTF Cooperation (GEC)¹⁴⁵. To further strengthen communication, coordination and management of aid, they contracted Forex-Afrique in 2019, to run a Secretariat (SEG-PTF) providing information management and other support services to the GEC and the lead PTFs. The SEG-PTF shares premises with two national structures established around 15 years ago under initiatives to improve the efficacy of aid: the Secretariat for the Harmonisation of Aid and; the technical coordination unit of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (CSLP).

Repairs to port infrastructure in Konna, referred to above, took place in parallel with construction of a brand new army base, replacing the one destroyed when jihadists took control of the village in 2013. This represents the model of collaboration between the Malian Government and the PTF: creating synergy between security support (State and UN) and development projects funded by the PTF. Konna is the first of nine **Secure Development and Governance Zones (PSDG)** that are planned for central Mali, each with a military base. At the inauguration ceremony in Konna the Regional Governor Colonel-Major Abass Dembele declared: *"The triptych - Security, Peace and development –is a reality in Konna"*¹⁴⁶

The Stabilization & Recovery (S&R) section of MINUSMA manages three main financing mechanisms providing support for initiatives that aim to improve the security situation, strengthen social cohesion, restart productive activities and restore basic services: (i) Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), (ii) the UN Trust Fund for peace and security in Mali (TF) and (iii) the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The S&R section contributes to donor coordination through the PTF Executive Coordination Group and the Commission for Post Conflict Rehabilitation (CRZPC). It is facilitating the elaboration of Regional Stabilization & Recovery Plans for Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

In the period 2014-2018 the Peace Building Fund (PKF) invested some US\$ 35.7m through 20 projects

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.maliapd.org/> Maliapd - Harmonisation of Aid in Mali

¹⁴⁶ <https://afrique.le360.ma/mali/politique/2021/03/21/33907-mali-lueur-despoir-konna-ville-martyrisee-du-centre-du-pays-33907>

implemented in two phases, plus a substantial number of ad-hoc projects. Projects were implemented by 13 UN agencies, funds and programmes, and 3 civil society organizations (Mercy Corps, Interpeace, Accord) in close collaboration with MINUSMA. 12 out of the 20 projects contained elements of livelihood support such as: income-generating activities, training and financial support for entrepreneurs, and labour intensive public works (Cash for work). The first phase started in 2014 in the northern regions of Gao and Timbuktu and the second in 2017 in the central regions Mopti and Ségou)

Quick Impact Projects (QIP) are funded through a small grants programme up to a maximum of US\$ 50,000. They must be completed in 6 months or less and must combine both short and longer term effects: meeting immediate community needs while building confidence towards the peace process and the role of MINUSMA. Any legally recognised not-for-profit structure is eligible to apply including: national and international NGOs, elected local government bodies and State institutions and services. Projects are implemented through local partners and businesses (building contractors, entrepreneurs...). 616 QIP were funded from 2013 to June 2020 for a total value of approximately \$US 23.9 million. An additional US\$ 4.8 million are committed to June 2021 (120 QIP). As of September 2020, some 30% of the QIP budget was allocated to sectors directly linked to livelihoods: agriculture 8%; water supply and sanitation 13%; and local economy 9%. The remaining budget was largely spent on QIP in the areas of security, public facilities, education health and governance and democracy. Projects benefit mainly the three northern regions (63%) followed by Mopti (25%) and Bamako (12%).¹⁴⁷

But not everyone is happy with this

Many humanitarian organisations are very reticent to engage in what is known as the triple-nexus: Humanitarian- Development - Peace, particularly since "peace keeping" can be seen as implying use of armed force (militarisation of aid in the context of an integrated mission). In 2018 the PTF reached a


¹⁴⁷ https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2013-2020_qips_overview_en_0.pdf

consensus around the dual objective: Humanitarian-Development. Actions can include support to reinforce social cohesion and strengthen local

mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, but this cannot be the primary objective¹⁴⁸.

It's becoming a very crowded space

As this diagram from a case study by MSF shows, it is not easy to establish a clear distinction between humanitarian-development actors and political-military actors in Mali ¹⁴⁹



Outcomes and effectiveness

No studies look systematically at the outcomes and effectiveness of different types of emergency and livelihood responses to the crisis in Mali. Where evidence exists it is found in a multitude of individual agency or programme reports. The examples below, taken from reports and evaluations of specific measures or interventions and from talking to a small number of key informants, are far from exhaustive.

The Mali food security (FS) cluster has good capacity to deliver emergency response to immediate food

security needs (cash/vouchers and in-find). It was able to meet and then exceeded its overall targets in 2020, due to the additional Covid response (KI#6). Data from the Cluster dashboard for January to November 2020¹⁵⁰ indicates that vast majority of the response (88%) went to the three regions most affected by conflict: Mopti (34%), Gao (30%) and Timbuktu (23%). However, a more detailed examination of coverage rates indicates a shortfall in the emergency response in some districts of Mopti compared to Gao and Timbuktu. This is probably due to lower capacity (field

¹⁴⁸ CPPNM (2020) Évaluation du processus Nexus au Mali et appui technique à sa mise en œuvre. Rapport synthèse de la phase 2 Juillet 2020, Comité de Pilotage du Processus Nexus au Mali https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/mli_rapport_synthese-phase_2_nexus_au_mali_vf.pdf

https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/MSF_Case-Study-Mali-march2017.pdf

¹⁵⁰ Cluster SA : Dashboard 5W Présence des partenaires Janvier-Novembre 2020 <https://fscluster.org/mali/document/cluster-sa-dashboard-5w-presence-des>

¹⁴⁹ MSF 2017 Case Study Perilous terrain: Humanitarian action at risk in Mali Alejandro Pozo Marín March 2017

presence, finance...) and/or greater insecurity in these areas.

The FS cluster has weaker capacity to deliver livelihood support. The 1 million people reached in 2020, represent less than half the identified needs. Moreover the ICRC accounts for more than 50% of these beneficiary numbers (livestock vaccinations) (KI#6). Data from the dashboard for January to November 2020 indicates that the livelihood support response was significantly below target in parts of the Mopti region, notably Koro (13%), Bandiagara (19%), Douentza (25%) and Tenekou (27%). Livelihood support for IDPs (e.g. training, support and cash grants of 180,000 FCFA) can be effective but the numbers reached is “a drop in the bucket” compared to total numbers of IDP (KI#5). Constraints that limit the livelihood response include: too few actors working on relevant income generating and market development activities; insufficient capacity to respond at scale and to standard (best practices); a lack of skills and experience working with producer organisations to create a larger dynamic; short term (annual) funding cycles with no automatic carry over of year-end balance; insufficient funding. The FAO appears to have lost some of its leadership role on this response in Mali. Actors would like to adopt multi-annual approaches, like the WFP is doing in its Resilient Sahel Initiative, enabling them to deliver market development/value chain support over 2-3 years or respond to more structural issues, providing access to means of production (market gardens with solar pumping, small dams etc.). More partnerships with producer organisations might help to scale up the response (KI#6).

The WFP emergency response typically combines **school feeding** (SF) programmes (daily hot lunches) and **general food distribution** (GFD) including basics such as cereals and oil. A study published in 2018¹⁵¹ compared the impact of SF and GFD programmes in Mopti in the period 2012-2017, on children’s school enrolment, attendance and attainment. It found that school feeding led to a significant reduction in time spent on livelihood activities (farming and animal-

rearing) but only for girls. For boys there was no significant impact. Moreover, boys living in high conflict areas and in households receiving GFD spent more time on all work related activities. GFD had no effect on school attendance in villages where there were no armed groups. The findings highlight the importance of labour constraints when households take decisions about allocating time of household members, between schooling and productive activities.

Supplementary animal feed is a common component of the livelihood support response to pastoral and agro-pastoral households in northern and central Mali. It is a popular with beneficiaries (hence its use by politicians too), helping to maintain the condition of livestock and reduce pressure on grazing whenever herds are displaced and more concentrated due to insecurity and other restrictions on mobility. Indeed supplementary animal feed is a valuable agro-pastoral input even in non-conflict, non-drought years. It is used by farmers to ensure traction animals are in peak condition at the start of the ploughing season. Donations are typically of seedcake, a by-product of the cotton industry, but animal feed also includes cereals, dried leaves (peanut, cowpea, sweet potato...) and cut grasses. While providing supplementary animal feed is an accepted practice as part of the humanitarian response, multi-year programmes would provide opportunities to implement more market oriented interventions in collaboration with producer organisations and the private sector¹⁵².

Cash+ packages are specifically designed to fit to each context, and generally include three main components: unconditional cash transfers, productive inputs or assets, and technical training and extension services. FAO cash+ initiatives in Mali (2015-2017) distributed small ruminants and cash transfers reinforced with nutrition and other family related education. Based on evaluation findings, FAO report that amongst beneficiary households, food security improved by about 23 percent, dietary diversity increased among children (aged 6-59 months) and

¹⁵¹ Aurino, E., Tranchant, J., Diallo, A., S., & Gelli, A. (2018). School Feeding or General Food Distribution? Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Educational Impacts of Emergency Food Assistance during Conflict in Mali. UNICEF Office of Research: Innocenti Working Paper, <https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/Aurino%20et%20al%20for%20WEB.pdf>

¹⁵² API-Mali Investir dans le secteur des aliments bétail au Mali <https://apimali.gov.ml/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ALIMENT-BETAL.pdf> (presentation)

income generation improved (the proportion of beneficiaries having an above average income increased from 41 percent before the intervention to 61 percent after). Similar lessons from an FAO CASH+ programme in Burkina Faso showed increases in revenue (by 27 percent), savings and asset ownership, food security and dietary diversity. Furthermore it showed that cash plus additional support (inputs or poultry or small ruminants) increased revenue faster than input distribution or cash transfers alone¹⁵³.

The effectiveness of livelihood and resilience actions in a humanitarian context is likely to be closely linked to project design and delivery (e.g. timeliness and quality of inputs). The joint FAO/WFP project «Supporting Resilience of vulnerable populations (2019) in North Mali delivered support in the areas of: crop production (rice, cowpea and market garden crops); nutritional education; integrated livestock production; fishing and fish farming. A joint evaluation made specific recommendations to respond more rapidly, consult available local actors and prioritise them for certain orders e.g. plan to buy back locally produced seed from the cooperatives supported. Other evidence indicating that the “how” of livelihood support delivery requires improvement, rather than the “what”, can be inferred from other recommendations including: submit project proposals to expert review; ensure gender sensitive project design; work more on market development, improve coordination with decentralised local government and government agencies; improve and contract out M&E.¹⁵⁴

An evaluation of the **FAO Caisses de Resilience** approach in the Sahel, published in 2020,¹⁵⁵ noted that programme beneficiaries in Mali included people from three highly affected communes in the Mopti region (Dogani-bére, Ségué Iré and Dourou in Bandiagara district) and four less highly affected communes in the Segou region (Bramadougou, Niamana, Somo and Djéguena in San district). Programme activities included support for village savings and loans associations, agro-pastoral farmer

field schools (FFS) and Dimitra Clubs, with beneficiaries typically participating in at least two of the three groups. Key findings include:

- The targeting process was participatory and judged as adequate (based on FAO vulnerability criteria plus subsidiary criteria validated by the communities).
- The organisation of target households in **FFS groups** achieved its expected results in terms of knowledge, crop and livestock production and income. It was also a useful entry point to the other two components.
- **FFS in combination with productive cash transfers** were found to have helped poor and very poor households during the dry season for example to purchase inputs for crop and short-cycle livestock production. However some households remained too poor to make the investment required. Implementation challenges included late delivery of inputs (livestock, veterinary kits....) and inadequate monitoring. The shift from payments by micro-finance institutions to mobile money payments because of insecurity caused some issues for poor and very poor households (no phone, difficulty to sign up to mobile money and to get where the cash could be obtained).
- The **village savings and loan component** were considered successful by all stakeholders. Some of target households interviewed had obtained loans for income generating activities including: small livestock, poultry, cereal trade and food processing. In addition each FFS group was given a 1.2 million FCFA (euro 1,830) grant to support a collective activity. However only two FFS used the grant as intended to develop a group activity, and in one case this was alongside support to individual activities. Most FFS groups had used the grant only to support individual activities.
- The objective of the **Dimitra clubs** - social cohesion and inclusive dialogue - was relevant but the groups were considered unlikely to continue. It might be preferable to work with existing community structures, applying the Dimitra

¹⁵³ FAO News from the Field Innovative productive transfers <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6544e.pdf> ; CASH+ FAO Approach: <http://www.fao.org/3/i7864e/i7864e.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ FAO/PAM 2019, "Évaluation conjointe FAO/PAM du projet «Appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables, FAO/PAM Rome, 2019 <http://www.fao.org/3/ca5186fr/ca5186fr.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ FAO 2020 Évaluation finale du projet «Réduire la vulnérabilité des moyens d'existence agricoles à travers l'approche "Caisses de résilience" au Sahel». Série évaluation de projet, 09/2020. Rome <http://www.fao.org/3/cb0851fr/CB0851FR.pdf>

“approach” rather than systematically create new organisations.

FAO itself drew the following lessons from its experiences with Cash+

- lump sum unconditional cash transfers with regular, small transfers can increase productive potential, enabling households to make larger purchases (investing in productive assets) while they use the smaller amounts to smooth consumption
- ensure beneficiary input into defining the content, value and timing (very important) of support to different livelihood categories so that the components (inputs, assets, activities, training etc.) are relevant and meet their needs
- Prioritise voucher systems (inputs/assets supplied by local producer or trader) where possible so that beneficiaries have more choice and flexibility and to trigger a greater impact on local economies. They also have potential to be more cost-effective than direct distribution.

CARE drew similar lessons from the experience of *Harande*; using a system digital voucher payments to provide food assistance to displaced, and flood-affected households in 2018/19. Not only did it contribute to development local markets, but it was also efficient, transparent, accessible to women and operational in areas not covered by mobile networks. In 2020 digital voucher payments helped to keep agricultural input value chains operational during the Covid pandemic¹⁵⁶

An evaluation of the Kisili project that provided **emergency response to IDPs** in Mali from 2016 to 2019¹⁵⁷, looked at the current food security situation, livelihoods, and household economic activities of IDP households in a sample of 21 of the 155 sites where the project had provided a response. The aim was in part to assess project outcomes, but also identify ongoing needs and orient new responses. A total of 639 households were surveyed and complementary information was collected during 65 individual

interviews and 14 focus group discussions (youth, men and women) from the IDP and host communities. Key evaluation findings include:

- When the emergency assistance ended IDP households could not meet their needs. 92% contracted debts to buy food. 93% said displacement had a substantial impact on their livelihoods: 75% had no access to farmland and 69% no livestock. The situation was worse for female headed households.
- 98% of households reported earning income from at least one source (daily wage labour, aid) and spent on average, 50% on food. Only 12% had developed their own economic activities (selling vegetables or wood, hairdressing, building, transport, petty trade...) and only 8% of these had received help to do this. 57% of IDP households were in debt at time of survey. Debts were mainly (92%) for food.
- IDPs households had received some additional assistance after the emergency support from Kisili, but none had received support to develop livelihood activities. In Timbuktu and Mopti almost all households had received cash or in-kind food assistance from family members.
- Only a third (31%) of all IDP households expressed a wish to return home but in the Mopti region, a majority (86%) said they wanted to go back to their village to harvest crops.
- Overall the evaluation concluded that IDP households were still in a precarious situation and that there were livelihood opportunities at the sites. Specific recommendations to help IDP to take advantage of these livelihood opportunities were:
 - in the short term to provide cash assistance to allow households to rebuild their productive assets and promote market development;
 - in the medium term to prioritise support for agricultural and pastoral livelihoods; develop income generating activities; build capacity of individuals and community

¹⁵⁶ CARE 2020, Food and Water Systems, Solutions to Keep Agricultural Inputs Flowing in Crisis, Program Learning During COVID-19 https://www.care.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/keeping_agricultural_inputs_flowin_g_uring_covid-19_care.pdf

¹⁵⁷ CRS 2019 Les Conditions de Vie et Moyens de Subsistance des Personnes Déplacées Internes Bénéficiaires du ERRM-Kisili, Régions de Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao et Ménaka, Catholic Relief Services October 2019 (not available online)

organisations and in general facilitate a rapid transition from emergency to development

There is evidence that some actors are taking these sorts of lessons into account when designing new initiatives. Nearly all Mercy Corps food support for example is now voucher-based and delivered in collaboration with local traders. Furthermore support lasts for 6 months and is designed to cover a significant proportion of needs (\$75 /43,000 XOF per month). A humanitarian initiative in the Mopti region was followed-up by a 2-year grant (same donor, same communities) to support recovery and stabilisation i.e. developing agro-pastoral livelihoods and the local economy and building community assets such as water points, market gardens etc... (KI#5)

Field experience suggests that livelihood support can be delivered in a context of insecurity but that activities need to be adapted. Agricultural support can be focused within the confines of the shrunken farm perimeter e.g. market garden cultivation, sustainable intensification (more with less), food vouchers to prevent households selling livestock during the hungry season, fodder production within the safe perimeter. Support for IDPs can focus on “portable” livelihoods i.e. income generating activities that can be transferred to a new location or continued when it is safe to return home (KI#5). When insecurity (or Covid) makes it difficult to reach farmers, local radio and other digital services (podcasts, WhatsApp groups etc...) can provide information and advisory services (CARE 2020). However, farmers also need to feel safe to go out to their fields for all 4 months to harvest. To keep seed for next season, they need to believe they will be able to cultivate again in 6-8 months’ time. These two conditions (access to farmland and belief in stability) are not met yet, in much of central Mali (KI#5).

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the *Institut de Recherche pour le Développement* (IRD) undertook a rigorous impact evaluation of Phase 1 of **the national safety net programme, Jigisemejiri** (2014-2018) using data

collected during baseline, midline and endline studies¹⁵⁸. The evaluation found that overall, Jigisemejiri had met its objective to reduce the vulnerability of poor households. Comparing different randomly assigned treatment groups at midline the beneficiaries of cash transfer (CT) and accompanying measures (AM) interventions showed significantly improved household food security, dietary diversity, savings and investments. There was little impact on child nutrition. The end-line evaluation made the following key recommendations

- make transfers more frequent rather than quarterly
- target CT exclusively to the household head or (at minimum) target both the household head and spouse and encourage household heads to engage other household members in order to involve women more and reduce confusion about who should attend
- Reduce barriers to attending AM sessions and improve communication about AM sessions to all household members
- combine the AM sessions with the nutrition component and strengthen their impact by implementing a nutritional behaviour change intervention (communication, interpersonal and group counselling, and community mobilization)

IFPRI used the same data to investigate the impacts of Jigisemejiri on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in a context where nearly 40 percent of households are polygamous¹⁵⁹. They found that the CT program, which primary targets male heads of household, was associated with significant decreases in IPV in polygamous households (physical violence decreased by 7%, emotional violence by 12% and controlling behaviours by 16%) but had limited effects in non-polygamous households. Evidence about possible causes indicated a significant reduction in men’s levels of stress and anxiety in polygamous households, and larger reductions in disputes in polygamous

¹⁵⁸ Evidence from Mali’s Social Safety Net Program(Jigisémèjiri) Melissa Hidrobo, Lieven Huybregts, Naureen Karachiwalla, and Shalini Roy <https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/133601>

¹⁵⁹ IFPRI 2018 Cash transfers, polygamy, and intimate partner violence: Experimental evidence from Mali, Rachel Heath, Melissa Hidrobo, Shalini Roy <https://www.ifpri.org/publication/cash-transfers-polygamy-and-intimate-partner-violence-experimental-evidence-mali>

households compared to non-polygamous households. The findings suggest that when transfers given to the households of women in polygamous marriages their lives get better, even though they largely do not receive the transfer themselves, do not have a say in how it is spent, and do not show improvements in mobility or economic empowerment. In terms of policy implications, the study concluded that the lives of vulnerable women can improve if their husbands are made better off, but that these effects may depend on household structure and are likely not sustained after programs end.

The World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP) is working with safety-net programmes in four Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal) to evaluate how different “productive packages” impact the wellbeing and economic stability of beneficiaries¹⁶⁰. Findings are expected to have implications for the design and scale-up of productive inclusion interventions and their use in building resilience within the Sahel and globally. Trickle Up supports SASPP with programme design, delivery. Evidence from their work in Burkina Faso found that after 6 months of coaching, more participants were practicing income generating activities (increased to 77% from 33%) and 95% met minimum savings targets of about US \$6.70 per month¹⁶¹. Early lessons from the multi-country evaluation include

- Coaching is critical but quality varies: coaching ties all the components together but there are big variations in the profile of coaches (experience, literacy, gender...) and some confusion about the distinction between the roles of group coaching and savings facilitation
- Women are empowered: evidence is anecdotal but overwhelming: village savings and loans

groups create a safe space and foster group dynamics and peer learning.

- Sequencing matters: while the exact order of activities may vary, the full program should be condensed and aligned with the agricultural season¹⁶²

An independent evaluation of the **Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)** in Mali from 2014 to 2018¹⁶³ assessed the portfolio of initiatives for their relevance to the aims of the fund. It recommended that future investments be used more strategically to support actions that explicitly address the socio-political root causes of conflict, in preference to those taking a “peace-dividend” approach addressing the socio-economic consequences of the conflict. This recommendation implies that livelihood support is unlikely to be eligible for PBF funding in the future (NB 12 out of the 20 substantive projects in the portfolio had some element of livelihood support)

FAO and WFP jointly evaluated “**Peers for Peace**” an 18-month initiative funded by the Peacebuilding Fund to strengthening social cohesion in conflict affected areas of Segou and Mopti regions. Peers for Peace combined **livelihood support** (for income generating activities and community assets) with work to strengthen local conflict management mechanisms (**Dimitra Clubs**). The evaluation found that:

- the bottom-up, participatory process ensured that livelihood activities (focusing on women and market gardens) were relevant at village and household level and helped to overcome the initial reticence of the communities to engage with project.
- It was totally unrealistic to attempt to significantly impact peace dynamics in a complex context, with a limited budget and timeframe (18 months) and

¹⁶⁰ Promoting Productive Inclusion and Resilience in National Safety Nets: A Four-Country Evaluation in the Sahel (web article) <https://www.poverty-action.org/study/promoting-productive-inclusion-and-resilience-national-safety-nets-four-country-evaluation>

¹⁶¹ <https://trickleup.org/adaptive-social-protection/>

¹⁶² Webinar Summary of Presentations : Adaptive Social Protection Programme in Sahel productive economic inclusion, Thomas Bossuroy (World Bank) Yéréfelo Mallé (Trickle Up)

<https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/webinar-presentation-adaptive-social-protection-program-sahel>

¹⁶³ MINUSMA 2019 Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Mali 2014-2018 Final Report 30 July 2019 Salif Nimaga (Team Leader), Amagoïn Keita (National Expert), Charles Petrie (Strategic Advisor) https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/190806_final_report_eng_mali_0.pdf

very low coverage (500 Peers for Peace, in 20 villages across 6 communes/6 districts). Moreover, focusing on conflict dynamics only within the targeted villages indicated poor understanding of the socio-cultural realities and drivers conflict in the area. The local partner was frustrated that, just as community mobilisation efforts began to show results, the project ended and there was no follow-on funding for livelihood support.

- Challenges caused by the presence of armed groups in the villages were mentioned in project documents but never raised in strategic discussions. The local implementing partner was given no guidance on the modalities for dialogue (or not) with these actors, yet in practice it was something they had to confront daily. The evaluation quotes one field agent saying *“Dialogue has in practice started with the djihadists. They are in village meetings; they are in the Clubs Dimitra. They follow closely what happens in the communities. We act as if we are unaware. We speak of the project in meetings, in front of these armed people. If we had taken sides, they would certainly have intervened”*¹⁶⁴

The Central Mali Project for Security and Development implemented by SIPRI and its partner Point Sud is collecting evidence and creating up-to-date knowledge governance, security and socio-economic development in the Segou and Mopti regions. The aim is to inform the various other actors engaged in these regions and to support political decision-making processes. Key lessons from the first year of research¹⁶⁵ point to the need for:

- **Inclusive processes** : for disarmament, reintegration and, more importantly, community reconciliation;

- **Restoration of public services:** above all people expect the state to deliver quality public goods and services;
- **Concrete, visible and contextualised measures** in the areas of employment and economic development
- **Dedicated programmes for women, young girls and young people under 35** who suffer disproportionately from insecurity, and from loss of access to services such as judicial systems, healthcare, education and food.

Evidence that NGO and other agencies are becoming more aware of the need to make their activities sensitive to conflict and more able to meet the priority needs identified by SIPRI, can be found in the following selection of recent and pipeline interventions :

The integrated development programme for the Sourou River basin launched in February 2021¹⁶⁶ is a land management and climate resilience initiative spanning 29 communes in the conflict affected districts of Bankass, Koro and Douentza. Since design the programme has adjusted its approach to include a mediation commission (*commission de bon office*) made up of community leaders whose role is to negotiate approval for project actions with all interested parties (KI#2)

In Oct 2020 the (as yet unconfirmed) winning consortium for a five-year USAID-funded Development Food Security Activity (DFSA) launched recruitment for a Chief of Part describing the initiative as *“an integrated food and nutrition security intervention that works at the nexus of humanitarian and development programming”*. Conflict sensitivity is specifically mentioned as a cross-cutting issue in all technical areas of the project approach¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁴ FAO 2019 ÉVALUATION DU PROJET "IRF 217 PEERS FOR PEACE BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION IN MOPTI AND SEGOU REGIONS" <https://www.wfp.org/publications/mali-evaluation-joint-project-peers-peace-building-social-cohesion-mopti-and-sego>

¹⁶⁵ Achieving peace and development in Central Mali: Looking back on one year of SIPRI's work - 23 June 2020 - Dr Grégory Chauzal (web article) <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical->

[backgrounder/2020/achieving-peace-and-development-central-mali-looking-back-one-year-sipri-work](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2020/achieving-peace-and-development-central-mali-looking-back-one-year-sipri-work)

¹⁶⁶ <http://bamada.net/mopti-le-programme-de-developpement-integre-et-durable-du-sourou-lance>

¹⁶⁷ UNJOBS 2020 <https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1599250254243> Job Recruitment Oct 2020 for Save the Children Fund

The second phase of the World Bank Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project¹⁶⁸, PRAPS II, proposes a mixed resilience approach in pastoral areas affected by the “*serious security and humanitarian crisis which thrives on and reinforces pre-existing institutional vulnerabilities and inter-communal tensions*”. The project document identifies drivers of conflict (social and political unrest, a breakdown in the social contract, growing competition over resources, discontent over inclusiveness and quality of public service delivery, weak institutions, inequality and underlying social tensions...) and recognises the important role played by traditional and religious authorities in the prevention and management of conflicts linked to competition over natural resources. Programme components include: Animal health; Sustainable landscape management and governance; Access to and management of natural resources (land, water, grazing, fodder); Livestock market development; Social and economic inclusion of women and youth

A review of Dutch aid policy for improved water management in Mali concluded: “The highest priority should be given to support for enhanced water and land management, linked to increased production and food security, in the inland delta of the Niger. It is essential ... that sustainable livelihoods are promoted for current land and water users and the much larger young generation – all in a stable community and institutional environment”¹⁶⁹. The review recommended that aid should strive to optimise the achievements of the three current Dutch supported projects linked to this zone, and aim to intensify and improve their assistance to these targets in the years to come.

One of the Dutch supported projects is Phase 2 of PASARC (2018 -2023) implemented by the Near East Foundation (NEF)¹⁷⁰ with the aim to strengthen the

food security and resilience of rural people in Mopti region to shocks linked to climate change and social crises. The approach combines integrated (inter-community) natural resource management with work to sustainably increase productivity within key value chains. Faced with recurrent conflicts and drawing lessons from Phase I evaluations and previous experiences NEF has introduced several new orientations to the programme for Phase 2. Key components of these include: developing agricultural and non-agricultural value chains with focus on markets and demand; promoting integrated water and natural resource management as a lever for food security; greater focus on empowerment of women and youth

The Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) is continuing support to the “Programme of Support to Local Economies in the Niger Inland Delta (PSEL Delta)” implemented by Helvetas and their local partner (AFAR) under Phase 4 (2021 -24) of the SDC programme to sustainably improve food security, nutrition and incomes from smallholder agriculture and agricultural enterprises in regions of Sikasso, Mopti and Timbuktu.¹⁷¹ PSEL Delta works in the districts of Youwarou, Tenenkou, Mopti and Niafunké (i.e. including areas controlled by *Katiba Macina*). Key project components are: development of market systems (crop, livestock and fishery products); support to local government bodies to build and maintain infrastructure for climate sensitive local development; support for local and regional actors to establish a functional mechanism for the prevention and management of conflicts linked to natural resources. This programme builds on work in southern Mali by the National Coordinating Body of Peasant Organizations in Mali (CNOP) and Helvetas in collaboration with the Land Tenure facility, to pioneer innovative approaches and tools for resolving tenure

¹⁶⁸ The World Bank Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project II (P173197) Project Information Document (PID) Appraisal Stage Updated Feb 2021 Report No: PIDA30655 <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/680801612992283056/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Regional-Sahel-Pastoralism-Support-Project-II-P173197.pdf>

¹⁶⁹ IOB Evaluation (2017) Policy review of Dutch aid policy for improved water management, 2006-2016, Mali country study Dr Stephen Turner December 2017 <https://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/binaries/iob-evaluatie/documenten/deelstudies/2017/12/01/verbeterd-waterbeheer-in-bangladesh-indonesie-mali-en->

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¹⁷⁰ <https://rsr.akvo.org/fr/project/7693/?page=2#summary> and <http://www.food-security.net/projet/appui-a-la-securite-alimentaire-et-a-la-resilience-des-populations-aux-crises-climatiques-et-sociales-dans-la-region-de-mopti-phase-ii-pasarc-ii/>

¹⁷¹<https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/de/home/laender/mali.html/content/dezaprojects/SDC/en/2004/7F04043/phase4?oldPagePath=/content/deza/de/home/laender/mali.html>

conflicts and encourage collaborative, inter-community, natural resource management. This includes support to COFO, local land tenure commissions¹⁷².

The BREAKWATER project, “Bolstering Rural Economies and Knowledge of Workable Actions to Enable Reconciliation in Central and Southern Mali, is a four year initiative (Jan 2020 - Dec 2023) funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and implemented by Mercy Corps, International Alert and Humanity & Inclusion. The project aims to strengthen local capacity to address issues that contribute to insecurity of communities in Mali including: inter- and intra-community relationships, economic and environmental factors and, governance affecting relationships between citizens and the State¹⁷³. While firmly positioned with a peacebuilding programme the Mercy Corps approach is similar to that of NEF and Helvetas described above: combining local mechanisms for conflict prevention and management with resilience programming; supporting crop and livestock production systems and broader market-based economic development¹⁷⁴. Live Helvetas, the project is working to strengthen COFO (local land tenure commissions) and supporting agricultural intensification, to increase production from the same or smaller size farms and reduce encroachment on livestock corridors and grazing areas. As part of the inception phase of a new programme Position, Refine & Operate for Peace (PROP) in the Segou region, Mercy Corps has recently completed a series of detailed assessment reports looking at conflict, markets, citizens-state relations, gender age and disability and natural resource management (KI#5).

The World Food Programme, in its 5-year strategy for Mali (2020-2024)¹⁷⁵ makes a commitment to increased working with decentralised local government structures to plan, budget and implement future resilience/livelihood activities (transfer of

authority to elected local government bodies being a key component of the Algiers peace agreement)

Key lessons

Nature of the conflict

While the current, 9-year old conflict in Mali is part of a sub-regional insurgency in the Sahel driven by jihadi militant groups, the situation on the ground, particularly in central Mali, is rendered considerably more complex by equally deadly attacks perpetrated by community-based militias and government forces. Grievances against the State and local hierarchies, competition over access to land water and the need to protect livelihoods, are as much if not more the drivers of conflict, than questions of faith. Current levels of conflict and unrest are unlikely to improve and may get worse, in the run-up to Presidential elections (2022).

Impacts

Jihad militant groups and community militia use attacks against villages, fields and livestock to isolate and subjugate communities notably in the Mopti region but also in the Office du Niger irrigation perimeters (north Segou). Civilians are killed; standing crops are burnt; productive assets destroyed or stolen. The impact on livelihoods is most vividly illustrated by the drastic reduction the farmed area around villages in the Mopti region, due to displacement or fear of attack. Both food security and income are affected. Already inadequate levels of access to basic services (health, education, water and sanitation ...) fall even further. The number of IDPs has risen steadily since 2017 reaching over 322,900 by Jan 2021. Some off-farm livelihoods, like those based on tourism in Mopti (guides, hotel staff, artisans...), have been particularly badly hit.

Markets have been disrupted, but on the whole have continued to function; it is more dangerous to travel but goods, money and people continue to flow in within Mali and between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Price fluctuations for staple cereals (millet, rice)

¹⁷² <https://thetenurefacility.org/projects/land-and-forest-tenure-support-project-benefiting-local-communities-in-mali/>

¹⁷³

https://m.facebook.com/SwedeninML/posts/1460380477457025?locale2=it_IT

¹⁷⁴ https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/BREAKWATER%20Mali%20Market%20Analysis%20SOW_External_0.docx

¹⁷⁵ WFP 2019, Plan stratégique de pays – Mali (2020-2024), 12 novembre 2019 <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000108632/download/>

on regional markets in 2019-20 remained similar to 5-year averages. The food security outlook for 2021 is “conducive to sufficient market supply despite the security disruptions observed in the Centre, the North and the northern regions of Ségou” (FEWSNET).

Responses

The Food Security sector in Mali has well-established systems in place to assess, target and deliver an emergency response. In 2020 the exceeded targets due to the additional Covid response. About 90% of emergency assistance is delivered as cash and 10% in-kind. The vast majority (88%) in 2020 went to the three regions most affected by conflict but coverage rates indicate a shortfall in some districts of Mopti compared to Gao and Timbuktu.

The Food Security sector has weaker capacity to deliver livelihood support. In 2020 they met less than half the identified needs and, one agency CICR livestock vaccinations accounted for more than 50% of the beneficiary numbers. The livelihood support response was significantly below target (<30 % of needs) in some areas of the Mopti region. Livelihood support for IDPs was insignificant compared to total numbers. Constraints include: too few actors working on relevant livelihood activities; insufficient capacity to deliver a quality response at scale; inflexible short term funding mechanism; shortage of multi-year funding.

Efforts to improve delivery and effectiveness of livelihood support include the WFP Resilient Sahel, integrated package of measures delivered to the same people over a number of years. IFAD, WFP and FAO have recently announced a 6-year \$180 million, joint regional programme to strengthen the resilience of 1 million rural people affected by conflict, covid19 and climate in the G5 Sahel countries plus Senegal (3D3C/G5Sahel+1).

Development organisations already working in central Mali when the conflict exalted, have reacted in different ways. Some pulled out completely. Some redesigned their interventions, adding emergency response and support for conflict affected livelihoods and integrating Cluster processes. Others adjusted their ways of working to reduce the risk to staff and assets, but otherwise continued with ongoing programmes as best they could.

Many bi-lateral and private initiatives that provide emergency response and livelihoods support to

conflict affected communities, go unrecorded. These include development organisations that do not join Cluster processes; small grants programmes supporting community-led initiatives; responses led by diaspora associations, concerned individuals and politicians.

The Government Safety Net programme *Jigisemeyiri* was able to establish, maintain and expand its presence in northern and central regions of Mali despite increasing insecurity, providing quarterly cash transfers to more than 79,000 families in its first five years of operation. Mali is working with the World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP) to explore ways to make the national safety net more responsive to shocks by combining cash transfers with productive inclusion and accompanying measures (coaching, community savings and loans groups, training, cash grants). The findings of an on-going multi-country impact evaluation will be used to improve the design and scale-up of adaptive social protection interventions and their effectiveness in building resilience

Government- Donor Coordination is increasing in line with national strategies for the harmonisation of aid and poverty reduction but with the integration of new actors (MINUSMA) and new objectives, to create synergy between security support (State and UN) and development projects funded by the PTF. Konna is the first of nine **Secure Development and Governance Zones (PSDG)** that are planned for central Mali, each of which will have a new military base built alongside other infrastructure investments. MINUSMA manages a range of financing mechanisms that have been used in part to restart productive activities and restore basic services alongside objectives to strengthening social cohesion and build confidence in the peace process and the role of MINUSMA

Many humanitarian and development organisations are reluctant to engage in peace-keeping initiatives where this implies the presence of armed forces (joint missions). Consensus was reached with the donors in 2018 on dual objective Humanitarian-Development initiatives, in which actions to reinforce social cohesion and strengthen local mechanisms for conflict prevention and management can be integrated, but are not the primary objective

Outcomes and effectiveness

The capacity of the food security sector delivers a livelihood response in conflict affected areas is limited by a shortage of actors able to deliver relevant income generating and market development activities at scale and to standard compounded by short term, inflexible funding cycles. Actors would like to adopt multi-annual approaches (like the WFP Resilient Sahel Initiative) delivering market development support and addressing structural issues that limit access to means of production. New types of partnerships, with producer organisations, may help to scale up the response

Specific mechanisms to deliver emergency and livelihood responses (school, feeding, general food distribution, cash transfers, cash transfer plus accompanying measures, FFS groups, village savings and loans, grants, inputs, training, mentorship, productive assets etc.) are generally relevant and many are effective at helping the poorest households. Nevertheless specific outcomes can be nuanced: school feeding improves girls' school attendance but not boys; cash transfers reduce intimate partner violence but only in polygamous households. Effectiveness is also affected by project design and delivery including the timeliness and quality of inputs; the skills and the experience of field staff. Improved and coordinated monitoring, evaluation and in particular learning processes could enable implementing partners to draw lessons from their own and other experiences and develop the capacity, at all levels, to deliver ever more effective responses at scale.

Field experience indicates that livelihood support can be delivered in a context of insecurity but that activities and approached need to be adapted to each locality. It is unrealistic to expect short term initiatives to significantly impact the dynamics of local conflicts in central Mali or to address structural constraints to market systems. The design and delivery of multi-year interventions must be founded on sound understanding of the socio-cultural realities and drivers of conflict in the project areas. Delivery in conflict affected areas is supported by flexible funding and adaptive management. Small grants programmes (stand alone or as part of a larger programme) can foster innovation and appropriate, locally led actions. Training for young people and women should lead to

professional qualifications where possible and be linked to support to develop an economic activity.

International NGOs and their local partners including producer organisations that were already working in central Mali before 2012, have skills and experience in the delivery of multi-year of food security, livelihoods and resilience initiatives in the conflict affected areas. They already combine agro-pastoral production and market-based approaches with development of inter-community mechanisms for natural resource management and conflict prevention. Many operate outside Cluster processes and there is an opportunity to both learn from their experiences and leverage their expertise to scale up capacity to deliver appropriate livelihood responses in the central Mali

There is evidence from descriptions of recent and pipeline interventions that NGOs and other agencies are becoming more aware of the need to make their activities sensitive to conflict and more able to meet the priority needs identified by SIPRI including: inclusive processes in particular for community reconciliation; concrete, visible and contextualised measures for employment and economic development; dedicated programmes for women, young girls and young people under 35.

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Nepal civil war 1996–2006

Nature of conflict: causes and consequences

Causes

The conflict began in 1996. It stemmed, according to most sources¹⁷⁶, from deep inequalities in Nepal between rich and poor, urban and rural, between privileged Hindu castes and those of low caste or Dalits ('untouchables'), between Hindu and those following other religions, between Nepali and Tibeto-Burman languages speakers.

Differences had long existed. When in the early 1950s the Ranas were replaced by the monarchy, it was hoped that things might improve for those long suffering discrimination and subordination: hopes that were not realised. Again, when in 1989/90 multi-party democracy replaced Panchayati Raj, expectations rose that government would at last start to work for the interests of the majority. Those hopes evaporated in the early 1990s as it became clear that democracy still allowed the ruling elites, most of them in the Kathmandu valley, to capture the lions' share of the resources of the state while the rural majority continued to live for the most part in poverty.

By the 1990s, villagers in the hills and mountains of Nepal who had long lived remote from the towns and cities became more aware of their deprivation, owing to more travel as roads were constructed; to the migration of young men to India, the Gulf and southeast Asia; and to radio and television. That awareness turned their deprivation into grievance.¹⁷⁷

If the tinder was dry, it needed a spark. Sections of the long-established and active communist parties of Nepal that took a Maoist line to class struggle provided that. The Maoist party (CPN-M) had since the 1950s active cadres in the deprived hills of Rukum and Rolpa Districts (Map A) in Nepal's remote mid-west. It was here where the party prepared for a people's war that finally broke out in 1996 when police stations in the two Districts were attacked.

The conflict was not confined to just two (out of 75) Districts. Cadres were active in the mid- and far-west of Nepal, and in parts of the lowland Terai. The conflict spread across these zones, and indeed, after a few years, few rural areas had not seen some guerrilla activity (Map A).

Box A timeline of Nepal civil war

Antecedents

1990: Parliamentary democracy (re)introduced. Jana Andolan (People's Movement) agitation leads to acceptance by monarchy of multi-party parliament

1991, May: first elections held in nearly 50 years.

1992 onwards: discontent grows over failure to reform government and institutions, including to reform land tenure. Communist Party splits with a Maoist faction created.

Conflict

1996, Feb: Maoists launch people's war with attacks on police stations

1996 to 2001: low-level conflict between Maoists opposed by police sees areas affected by conflict spread from bases in the hills of the mid- and far-west across much of the country

¹⁷⁶ For example, Gersony 2003, Seddon & Hussein 2002, Vaux 2002 for qualitative analysis; Nepal et al. 2011 and Schiffmann et al. 2011 for quantitative testing of hypotheses of the determinants of conflict across different locations.

¹⁷⁷ In the Maoist heartland of the Rapti Hills, Gersony (2003) records how some key sources of income, such as gathering wild hashish, had been closed down; and how a series of affronts and broken promises by government had stoked simmering resentment.

2001, April: massacre in the Palace sees death of King Birendra soon to be replaced by King Gyanendra

2001, July: government and Maoists declare ceasefire, begin peace talks. These fail.

2001, Nov: Maoists return to field, attack barracks in Dang and another 42 locations

State of Emergency declared, lasts until Jan 2003. Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) deployed against guerrillas. Political and human rights suspended and infringed. US declares Maoists to be terrorists, starts military assistance to RNA. Other western powers follow suit

2001, Nov to 2003, Jan: Conflict intensifies — most deaths incurred.

2002: King suspends planned elections, dismisses elected government. Elected local officials replaced by nominees.

2003, Jan: ceasefire

2003, Aug: talks fail, Maoists return to arms

2004, Aug: Maoists extend struggle to urban areas

2005, Feb: King Gyanendra suspends parliament, institutes direct rule

2005, May: Seven parties ally, demand end to absolute monarchy, call for elections to a constituent assembly

2005, Nov: 12-point resolution issued by Alliance, backed by Maoists and Indian government, states demands, calls for peace

2006: violence subsides, but mass civil protests against King's government

2006, April: King agrees to reinstate parliament

2006, August: government and Maoists agree to let UN monitor peace and laying down of arms

2006, Nov: Comprehensive Peace Accord signed by government, Alliance and Maoists to bring war to an end

Postscript

2006: King stripped of most of powers.

2007, Dec: seven parties, including Maoists, agree to abolish monarchy

2008, April: Elections. Maoists with 33% top the poll, single largest party in parliament, form coalition government

2008, May: Republic proclaimed. King leaves Palace next month. Federal system intended with seven provinces

2012: new constitution still not drafted

2012, May: Constituent Assembly dissolved, interim government formed under Chief Justice

2013, Nov: Election won by Nepali Congress, with Maoist votes down to 18%

2015, April: worst earthquake since 1934 followed by heavy aftershock in May kills more than 9,000, leaves many more homeless, major damage to physical infrastructure.

2015, Sep: new (federal) constitution adopted

2017, Nov/Dec: elections see left-wing coalition win, including Maoists now down to 15% of vote

Nature and conduct of conflict

The war can be divided into two phases (Box A). The first ran from 1996 to 2001. During that time, Maoists guerrillas imposed their order on rural areas where they had presence, opposed by the police alone. While the police could control towns and District

headquarters,¹⁷⁸ much of the rest of the countryside came either under direct control of the Maoists or else was much affected by their presence. Violence and confrontations between guerrillas and police were intermittent with relatively little loss of life, infrastructure, or property.

In the cities of Nepal, the conflict was little evident: to urban elites and much of the government it seemed more a nuisance than open war. Government tried to administer rural areas and provide (scant) services as before. Tourism continued. Trekking, for example, proceeded even though this took tourists into areas where Maoists could have attacked them. The hope that conflict could be ended by negotiation was real, so much so that a cease-fire to allow for talks was respected in 2001. Talks failed and in late 2001 war renewed. Sparked in part by the United States declaring a war on terror, the government deployed the army to fight the guerrillas, seeking military victory. Violence intensified, human rights abuses multiplied — by both parties, but with most deaths attributed to the army and police. Government suspended the planned elections of 2002 and nominated representatives to the village development areas, thereby handing a propaganda coup to the insurgents. In 2005 the King dismissed the government to impose direct rule. Political freedoms of all kinds were curtailed. This only stoked the flames

of revolt. Maoists were increasingly able to foment discontent in urban protests and strikes.

Mounting protests against the absolute monarchy, in which Maoists were joined by most parties, led to demands for a settlement with constitutional reform and a negotiated peace. A peace agreement was forged in 2006 that included a reconfiguration of the constitution and opened the way to new elections. In subsequent elections of 2008, and to some people's surprise, the Maoists led the count and were able to form a coalition government.

Subsequently Nepal has held two general elections and agreed a new constitution for a federal republic, with power delegated to seven new provinces with elected assemblies.


Consequences for lives and livelihoods

Direct effects in affected rural areas

At the height of the war most rural areas across the country were heavily affected by conflict (see Map A: areas in yellow). Impacts were generally proportional to the degree of conflict. Some 55% of village development committees (VDC) — the lowest level of administration — were highly or severely affected by conflict. (WFO/OCHA 2007).

Map A Displaced local government owing to conflict

¹⁷⁸ Maoists were unable to attack and hold any of the towns.



The main direct effects of conflict were:

- Restrictions were imposed on the movement of rural population by insurgents, police, and army. Most people, however, could move around in the village, and could visit markets, albeit subject to passing checkpoints and being limited in what they could carry.
- Limits to amount of produce to be carried when going to and from markets, imposed by army after 2002.
- Maoists raised local taxes on salaries, businesses, and trade — and asked for contributions from development projects. They also demanded grain payments from farmers, plus feeding of guerrillas. Although the amounts demanded — 20–40 kg a year—were comparatively small, they were onerous for most smallholders who could barely self-provision in any case.
- Young men and women were liable for conscription by Maoists, one person household. This led to flight of young to towns and to India, Farms lost labour to both conscription and flight, leaving extra work for women and old people remaining in the village.
- The work of local government was halted in most rural areas: administration officials were displaced from villages to District headquarters.
- Some class enemies —exploitative landlords, moneylenders, rich business owners were effectively expelled from villages — many fled to towns.
- State banks in rural areas were looted, prevented from operating in conflict zones, with farmers instructed not to repay loans.
- Water supplies, irrigation, etc. — were less or not maintained, leading to breakdowns.

- Fewer construction projects took place, so less work was available for those depending on day labouring.
- Maoists destroyed some transport and communication facilities — bridges, pylons, radio towers, airfields, etc. — seen as aiding the government, police and army.; and,
- Collection of produce from forests became difficult: the army treated anyone found in forests as guerrillas.

Some public services continued to function in large part, including schools¹⁷⁹ and health posts — the latter because the Maoists needed these to attend their wounded.

The Maoists made few attempts to change either production — hardly any land was redistributed, no collective production — or markets, with only rare and limited attempts to control them. They did change some things. They:

- Banned alcohol and gambling. The latter welcomed by most of local population; the former had more ambiguous effects since some people, women especially, on low incomes depended on brewing and distilling;
- Controlled interest rates charged by moneylenders. In a few instances they also set up collective funds at low interest; and,
- Prohibited practices that marked women, lower castes, Dalits and ethnic minorities as second-class citizens.¹⁸⁰

Most rural households found it harder to pursue their livelihoods. Farmers had less family labour to till the land when young fled or were conscripted, it was harder for them to sell crops and buy in supplies, while some irrigation systems were rendered dysfunctional. Off-farm work was notably affected by fewer construction jobs and by weaker links to urban areas.

¹⁷⁹ A longitudinal study found no effect on schooling outcomes caused by conflict, once other confounding variables were taken into account. (Pivovarova & Swee 2015)

How hard the impact was for most rural households can be debated. Clearly the median household was worse off, but the village economies mostly affected relied heavily on local production for food and handicrafts and so were not as badly affected as might be feared. Bumper harvests in 2002 helped swell local grain supplies. Those most affected were rural elites who engaged with markets. The poorest depended much less on them.

Moreover, the exit of the young meant more remittances for affected households. Given loss of labour farm wages rose, from the equivalent of 3kg of rice to 4kg. (Chapman et al. 2007)

Effects on national economy, poverty and health

The national economy suffered from less investment as investors lost confidence. Yet over the ten years, Nepal's economy did grow, and quite quickly. Moreover, rates of poverty fell. Chapman et al. (2007) report results from the Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2003–04:

'Between 1995-96 and 2003-04 the Nepalese economy performed well, with real GDP growing at almost 5% per year. Annual agricultural growth accelerated to 3.7% in the second half of the 1990s. Growth also accelerated in manufacturing (led by exports), in services, and especially in tourism'.

...

'Poverty incidence in the country declined appreciably, from 42% in 1995–96 to 31% in 2003–04, ... On the other hand, as a result of unequal growth in per capita consumption across different income groups and geographic regions, inequality increased substantially.'

[Poverty Trends in Nepal 1995-96 – 2003-04, National Planning Commission / Central Bureau of Statistics, Sept. 2005]

Infant mortality fell from the first half of the 1990s to the first half of the 2000s, from 79 to 51 per 1,000 live births, owing in part to more vaccination and more births delivered by health professionals. Some small improvements in child nutrition were also registered. (DFD 2007)

¹⁸⁰ For example, higher castes were not allowed to purify vessels that came into contact with untouchables. Or at least they were no longer allowed to do so publicly and ostentatiously.

... these results represent a surprising picture of the resilience of the Nepalese people against the backdrop of failing state institutions.

(Chapman et al. 2007)

In the absence of conflict no doubt these indicators would have improved even more, but this was certainly not a case where the whole country was knocked backwards.

Progress may be explained in large part by vigorous growth in the urban economy, aided by increased migration from areas affected by conflict — the share of the population in urban areas rose from 7% to 15% during the war. Remittances from abroad almost quadrupled between 1995–96 and 2003–04 by which time they were worth 12.4% of GDP. (Chapman et al. 2007)

Responses

During the first phase of conflict from 1996 to 2001, government, donors and NGOs tried to continue to provide their usual services, programmes, and projects. In (the few) areas completely under Maoist control, much of this activity was heavily restricted.

The Maoists have blocked implementation of hundreds of village development projects, including farm-to-market roads, financed by the US\$6,500 annual block grants by the central government to the local VDCs.

[Gersony 2003]

Even so, school and health facilities continued.

Maoists closed down anything they saw as giving advantages to the security forces — hence destruction of some transport and communications facilities. Any projects seen as funded from the USA were also stopped.¹⁸¹ For other initiatives in rural areas, whether they continued depended largely on:

- a) How the Maoists perceived the activity — was it honest and transparent, socially inclusive?
- b) What local people thought of the project — Maoists were reluctant to antagonise local

populations by closing down popular services and projects; and,

- c) Whether the activity could be implemented in conflict zones while ensuring reasonable safety for agency staff and security for finance.

The first two conditions overlapped. Moreover, what Maoists demanded of development initiatives was in line with the stated objectives of many development agencies. Consequently, many of the NGOs working in rural areas, often contracted by international donors or NGOs, had to step up their procedures to make them transparent. For example, CARE carried out public audits in the villages where it operated. It forced some programmes to focus clearly and directly on disadvantaged groups.

It also meant that agencies tried to make sure that they delivered concrete, tangible benefits in the field, benefits that could readily be seen in the short run. That meant that former initiatives that were focused on empowerment and governance, that might have expected to deliver over the medium term, and which produced intangible gains in the short run, were sidelined or refocused on more direct delivery. These activities could be seen as boutique, small-scale endeavours, vulnerable to the jibe of ‘chicken, goat and advocacy’ projects (Gersony 2003).

Some NGOs working conflict zones were able to work because (at least some of) their philosophy and activity was congruent with those of the Maoists. For example, Action Aid Nepal in the west of Nepal saw the rural areas as arenas of conflict and violence before the war broke out, where the powerful coerced the vulnerable as they liked. An armed struggle was merely another dimension to these longstanding conflicts. In activity, for example, Action Aid was particularly concerned to end bonded (kamaiya) labour, in some cases directly freeing those in servitude. (Seddon & Hussein 2002)

The third condition was met by working under humanitarian principle of impartiality. Chapman et al. promoted Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG) for their contracted partners in the countryside, a code that was adopted by many other agencies and endorsed by

¹⁸¹ Partly because the US was seen as imperialist, partly after the war on terror was declared and the Maoists listed as terrorists.

the United Nations. To impartiality, the code added transparency, accountability and inclusion as its watchwords. The BOG consisted of one page of 14 clauses, that was translated into Nepali and widely disseminated so that all those they came into contact with could see what was being attempted.

What did this look like in practice? For Action Aid, practice meant:

- Avoidance of any kind of political or party affiliation or activities;
- Maintaining political neutrality, not voicing any opinions or passing on information;
- Refraining from talking about politics in public;
- Avoiding disagreements, and maintaining good relations within the community;
- Keeping to a simple lifestyle, showing no evidence of wealth or privilege;
- Working with poor, freed kamaiya and women's groups.

Seddon & Hussein (2002)

It took time for such principles and practices to emerge. Most donors did not pay that much attention to conflict during the early years of the insurgency, but after 2001 and the escalation of violence, they became intensely aware of the need to tailor what they were doing to the conflict.

Some of their responses were criticised because making their programmes 'conflict sensitive' tended to begin with workshops and training sessions in Kathmandu, rather than more delivery in villages. (Vaux 2002) Moreover, there were frequent calls to ensure that programming was politically informed, thereby prompting yet more studies — studies that given the changing conditions in the field were rapidly redundant (Chapman et al. 2007). Paradoxically, then, the need to deliver in remote villages could lead to even more of the funding being trapped in the Kathmandu valley. (Vaux 2002)

Some initiatives may have tried for too much: it was easy to try and claim that a rural development programme was not just helping people with their livelihoods but that it was also addressing the root causes of conflict and building peace. As the Chapman et al. evaluation (2007) states, working **in** conflict and working **on** conflict are not the same thing.

The Maoists themselves did rather little by way of development. They were concerned with military advantage and controlling the villages where they operated for political ends. As described, they tried to change social norms — apparently with some success, if only because as one anthropologist has argued, they changed habits and with that people changed their views, not necessarily because they had absorbed a political creed (Zharkevich 2017).

There were some isolated instances of setting up cooperative financial services. Otherwise, they favoured getting local communities to use their collective labour to create public works. For example,

According to the Maoist Party's Western Region Bureau, in Rukum alone by early 2001, they had built a 26 km long road with the labour contribution of 2,000 people, 16 drinking water supply schemes, four wooden bridges, ten village roads, nine water wells, four irrigation canals, five drinking water tanks, 13 public parks and squares, 89 sports fields, and six martyrs statues (Karki, 2001: 201).

[Seddon & Hussein 2002]

It's not clear how much this applied in other areas where the Maoists had lesser control than in Rukum, in the heart of the Red Zone. Other reports do not mention such activity.

Outcomes and effectiveness

It was possible to run formal development programmes in conflict areas. DFID, for example, were able to record running some quite large programmes in rural areas. For example, their Livelihoods & Forestry Programme worked with almost 4,000 forestry user groups with a combined membership of more than 4540,000 households. The Micro Enterprise Development Programme worked in 20 Districts and reached 14,000 entrepreneurs, most of them drawn from low-income or disadvantaged groups. DFID funded almost 1,800 road building groups, employing more than 35,000 workers. A food-for-work programme in rural areas employs about 50,000 workers. An agricultural support funds operated in 10 Districts and reached 54,000 households. In the mid- and far-west, the community

support programmes reached 300,000 persons — 19% Dalit and 32% Janajati [ethnic minorities¹⁸²].

Helvetas has been funded to work with more than 2,000 communities on building bridges, providing clean drinking water, and providing seeds and other support for vegetable farming, amongst other similar activities.

(Chapman et al. 2007, Box 3)

While it is possible to get reports of numbers of activities, locations and persons directly engaged, impact evaluations seem almost entirely absent. This is hardly surprising. Finding ways to work in difficult circumstances was already challenging, without expecting staff to run baseline and endline surveys and assessments.

Moreover, the nature of such programmes makes them difficult to assess formally. Most make contributions to a range of activities, that are affected by other factors, more important than the interventions themselves. [If you provide a farmer with a packet of vegetable seeds, then the farmer makes US\$200 from the tomatoes sown, then how much of that can be attributed to the seed?] Attribution becomes difficult.

Hence, for the literature seen, little can be said about impact. Much commendable activity was undertaken to the great credit of the field staff and the communities they worked with: but how much of difference this made to people's lives is hard to say. Almost certainly much of what was done was welcome, but how different would things have been in their absence? We don't know.

Key lessons

Causes and nature of conflict

Conflict arose from deep and pervasive inequality between elites and those subordinated by gender, caste, and ethnicity — injustice which became increasingly apparent to the subordinated as they travelled and listened to the radio. The reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1990 raised their hopes but led to little improvement in their lot. Their grievances provided the stimulus and fuel for Maoists

to mount an armed struggle against the government in 1996.

During the first five years of the conflict, violence and disruption were relatively low level, and took place in remote rural areas; so much so that central government and donors treated events more as nuisance than war. After 2001, however, the conflict became more intense as a state of emergency was declared, the army was deployed, and government tried — unsuccessfully — to conclude it with military victory. Deaths and abuses multiplied.

The King took back power from parliament becoming an absolute monarchy. Protests mounted from across society demanding reforms and a negotiated end to conflict. That came with Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006.

Impacts of conflict on livelihoods

Households in rural areas, above all in the half or more of the country that was heavily or severely affected, were directly hit. Restrictions on movement made it harder to market produce, or to obtain inputs and other supplies. Conscripted young adults by Maoists led to many young fleeing to the cities and India. With less household labour, women who remained had to work harder on the farm. On the other hand, remittances boomed.

While times became harder for many rural households and feeding some households would have been an increasing struggle, no informed sources talk of serious and widespread food insecurity. The remote villages had long been semi-autarkic and households were used to self-provisioning.

Nepal's economy grew surprisingly well during the conflict — much owing to urbanisation and urban growth. Poverty fell as well, as did infant mortality.

Responses

Many government services and programmes were closed down by Maoists, but not schools and health posts that continued to function.

It was possible for NGOs and aid partners to operate projects in areas of conflict, so long as programmes:

¹⁸² Minorities nationally that is: at District level they can be the majority.

- Operated to the semi-humanitarian principles of the UN-backed Basic Operating Guidelines — impartiality, transparency, accountability, and social inclusion. [The 14 guidelines were translated into Nepali, printed and widely distributed and displayed in conflict zones];
- Were implemented through local NGOs, and implemented transparently and fairly — with public audits, for example, in villages; and
- Services and projects benefitted ordinary people and the disadvantaged, and could be seen to do so by insurgents and the local population. In effect, the Maoists had a veto on development activity in the (wide) areas they could (intermittently) control.

What did this amount to in practice? Here for example is what Action Aid did in western Nepal:

- Avoidance of any kind of political or party affiliation or activities;
- Maintaining political neutrality, not voicing any opinions or passing on information;
- Refraining from talking about politics in public;
- Avoiding disagreements, and maintaining good relations within the community;
- [Field staff] Keeping to a simple lifestyle, showing no evidence of wealth or privilege;
- Working with poor, freed kamaiya [bonded labourers] and women's groups.

In some respects, conflict forced many development agencies to improve their offer: to operate more openly, to account to communities, and to ensure that they included subordinated and disadvantaged groups. Dedicated field staff made this happen: they worked hard in difficult and risky conditions.

Donor agencies, however, in trying to make their work conflict sensitive were sometimes guilty of:

- Imposing too many objectives on programmes that were meant to deliver short-term and tangible benefits, but might also be expected to address the causes of conflict and help build peace — an impossible ask;
- Taking 'conflict sensitivity' as yet another development nostrum, as an opportunity to indulge in endless workshops and training sessions in the capital, Kathmandu;

- Taking the advice to think politically as yet another opportunity to commission studies that were often out of date as soon as they were drafted, given the changing field conditions; and,
- Imposing impossible demands on field staff — such as strictly no payments to the Maoists which meant in some cases the staff had to pay out of their own pockets. [Needless to say, agency heads were rarely if ever seen in the field.]

All that said, much was done to keep schools and health posts running, and rural development programmes were undertaken — generally focused on

- building works, sometimes with food-for-work;
- funding small-scale entrepreneurs from disadvantaged groups; and
- working with farmers, etc.

Impacts

Impressively large numbers of households were reached in the circumstances.

Impacts, however, are not known. Formal evaluations seem to have been few and far between. In any case, attributing impact where so many interventions were but one (small) element among many others that influenced outcomes would be difficult.

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Nigeria

Nature of conflict: causes and consequences

Boko Haram insurgency impacting on north-eastern Nigeria for over a decade (Yobe, Adamawa, Borno and Gombe states especially). Herder-farmer conflict in the middle-belt (and increasingly so) northern regions); and banditry violence impacting the north-western states (this began as a farmer- herder conflict in 2011 and intensified by 2018 to include cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence and killings, with the discovery of gold mines intensified criminal activity)¹⁸³. There is a feeling amongst those consulted that the herder-farmer conflict and banditry activities are having greatest impact on people and operation of agencies than the Boko Haram crisis (though data less comprehensive regarding former which makes this difficult to demonstrate). The herder-farmer conflict is likely to only get worse as environmental conditions deteriorate and slow government response to the economic drivers of the herder-farmer conflict. Cross-border communities and economies have been particularly impacted and restrictions from Covid-19 have intensified this¹⁸⁴.

Consequences for food security and livelihoods

- **Displacement:** over 2.1 million people are internally displaced as a result of Boko Haram insurgency, banditry violence, and the herder-farmer conflict.¹⁸⁵
- **Infrastructure:** Poor quality roads emerged as a serious issue that affects a farmer's ability to get goods to market and further weakens the distribution network for agricultural inputs.
- **Market infrastructure:** Market infrastructure was destroyed by insurgent attacks including marketplaces and storage facilities. Such

infrastructures are now largely non-functional and in urgent need of rehabilitation.¹⁸⁶

- **Savings:** Savings mechanisms have been undermined through the dissolution of savings groups (when people became IDPs) and through the closure of many banks due to threats and insecurity.
- **Agricultural inputs:** While the network supplying agricultural inputs to farmers was thin prior to the insurgency, and is in need of updated products and technologies, it has proven resilient during insurgency. Input suppliers and transporters have found ways to continue trade despite increased restrictions on the movement of goods and poor or insecure roads.¹⁸⁷
- **Cross-border trade and impact on income generating opportunities:** Prior to the insurgency, Northeast Nigeria did more trade across national borders than it did with the rest of Nigeria. Although these relationships remain in place, there is little to no trade now as borders remain closed. Finding ways to restore these trade linkages will increase income-generating opportunities and food security for the area.
- **Cash and vouchers:** Cash and voucher programming is successfully taking place in several areas of the Northeast. However, in-kind aid distribution also continues to take place and traders report that it has a neutral to negative impact on their businesses.
- **Restrictions imposed by security actors' impact on agricultural production and movement of people in the North East –** including ban on use of fertilisers and certain high-growing crops which reduce military visibility, and movement outside a 3km radius of household.
- **Impacts of Covid-19 on the market operations in the North-East:** isolation and disconnection between market actors, beginning with the closure of offices and shifts towards remote working. Restrictions on movement between and within states cut ties

¹⁸³ <https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/crisis/complex-crisis>

¹⁸⁴ MercyCorp (August 2020), Market Impacts of Covid-19 on North-East Nigeria:

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AUGUST 2020

¹⁸⁵ <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/nigeria-emergency.html>

¹⁸⁶ NORTHEAST NIGERIA JOINT LIVELIHOOD AND MARKET RECOVERY ASSESSMENT

<https://europe.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Northeast%20Nigeria%20Joint%20LMRA%202017.pdf>

¹⁸⁶ <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/nigeria-emergency.htm>

¹⁸⁷ NORTHEAST NIGERIA JOINT LIVELIHOOD AND MARKET RECOVERY ASSESSMENT

<https://europe.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Northeast%20Nigeria%20Joint%20LMRA%202017.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/nigeria-emergency.html>

between input suppliers and their customers, and between off-takers and local farmers¹⁸⁸. From the household perspective, COVID-19 drastically reduced their ability to work, as well as their income and expenditure, and female-headed households most vulnerable.

- Impacts of farmer-herder conflict in Middle Belt on economy: Pastoralists tend to cope with conflict by altering their movement patterns, which can reduce their ability to earn a living. State revenues suffered significant losses due to farmer-herder conflict, particularly after intense and sustained bouts of violence. Four states study in the Middle Belt (Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau) have lost 22-47% of their potential revenue collection, or roughly \$719,000 to \$2.3 million (₦109-347 million) due to the conflict.¹⁸⁹ States affected by farmer-pastoralist conflicts lost an average of 47% of taxes (Internally Generated Revenue)

Response

Life-saving assistance

- *In-kind humanitarian assistance* (predominantly targeting IDP camps) as well as vouchers in some cases (e.g. FAO livelihoods programming). Use of cash transfers in humanitarian settings generally limited.

Support to livelihoods, income generation and access to employment

- *Efforts to sustain agriculture as the main source of livelihoods* through supply of agriculture inputs and mechanisation (fertilisers, vaccinations, seeds, livestock kits, tractors), grants for irrigation pumps, trainings/farmer schools, provision of extension services, storage facilities and finance. Primarily targeting returnees and host communities.
- *Linking large businesses to farmers who may be able to supply their raw materials* (sorghum to breweries, etc.). Operating at a larger scale in areas not directly impacted by regular violence/insurgent attacks.

- *Training in business/vocational skills*, some grants for business investments/start-up for youth/women
- *Cash for work/public works*: Supporting employment of local workers in infrastructural development or rehabilitation projects
- *Cash transfers for vulnerable people* such as IDPs, mothers, those on low incomes, as well as conditional cash transfers (e.g. to keep girls at school).
- *Cash plus programming*: Supporting behavioural change in health/nutrition through complimentary programming and/or livelihoods (though cases of the latter less developed/operating at much smaller scale and evidence limited)
- *Support in establishing/building capacity of existing community committees/mechanisms* such as community agricultural cooperatives or Village Savings and Loans Associations
- *Livelihood programmes targeting non-conflict affected regions adapting to target IDPs* through in-built programmatic flexible financing mechanisms

Rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure

- *Restoring destroyed infrastructure for basic services* (schools and WASH facilities) – often including a cash for work element
- *Supporting state and non-state delivery of school/health services* through training, strengthening governance mechanisms and remote or mobile education programmes

Factors outside of interventions which determine success/failure (what we can't control)

- *Politics, war economies*, corruption, lack of accountability
- *Role of government in conflict*, government buy-in or willingness to fill gaps in basic services/local government structures, accountability mechanisms, and provide funding for maintenance/ownership of services established

¹⁸⁸ MercyCorps (2020) MARKET IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON NORTHEAST NIGERIA: Rural Resilience Activity Rapid Assessment

¹⁸⁹ <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Mercy%20Corps%20Nigeria%20Policy%20Memo%20Economic%20Costs%20of%20Middle%20Belt%20Conflict.pdf>

by aid agencies. Note the Government of Nigeria is

- *Macroeconomic drivers*, e.g. currency deflation impact on food prices; operating in context of blocked imports helps strengthen demand for local produce/increased prices.

Key lessons (the things we can control)

Conceptual

It is possible to support markets, private sector engagement and longer-term livelihoods in conflict-affected regions. Markets do operate in conflict and local entrepreneurs are highly resilient. Entrepreneurs adapt the way they work around conflict, and interventions thus need to do the same - follow and adapt, not retract.

Conceptually, cash transfers should not be regarded as separate to approaches to support 'livelihoods' but a key aspect of it – cash transfers is one modality for supporting livelihoods, as is safety nets/social protection programming and efforts to graduate from poverty – though the approach taken depends very much on the context and what is appropriate/possible. Layering and integrating approaches may also be possible for greater impact in terms of supporting recovery and addressing longer-term drivers in conflict situations.

Moving towards integrated and layered approaches to supporting livelihoods and away from linear programming: Supporting a transition from humanitarian cash transfers to livelihood support as part of recovery approaches is not based on reality of how households cope in conflict situations. Support to income generation/access to work in parallel to cash transfers is key, to maintain agricultural production and protect development gains and self-reliance, at the same time as filling gaps in meeting basic needs through cash transfers, which adapt over time as per changes in needs and levels of self-reliance.

Technical

Analysis

Systematically undertaking in-depth market assessments (on types/terms of markets, barriers/opportunities, levels of inclusivity) at design phase – at local as well as national levels - is key to overcoming market barriers and helping to decide on the best modality of assistance. A shared assessment

between range of actors engaging in the conflict-affected regions is most effective and supports joined-up and complimentary responses. If this is not done and without enough depth covering local market dynamics, programmes can inaccurately assume markets need to be supported from scratch in conflict-affected regions, and fail, when what is really needed is support in overcoming barriers to existing markets exacerbated by the conflict.

A household/community vulnerability assessment level is key to making decisions on the appropriate modality, transfer size and duration to addressing immediate needs and supporting longer-term livelihoods – a shift from sector-based assessments in humanitarian settings is key.

Programming

There is a need to fill the 'missing middle' between humanitarian lifesaving assistance (often targeting IDP camps) which focus on the short-term and longer-term livelihood programmes which are not tailored appropriately to conflict-affected contexts.

This is key to providing appropriate support to livelihoods tailored to specific needs of conflict-affected populations. In practise this could be achieved by:

Ensuring that livelihoods/markets/income generation programmes are appropriately tailored to conflict

- **Embedding a cash component into agriculture/livestock interventions in conflict-affected regions:** The review has found that agricultural/livestock programmes have a greater impact on household's ability purchase food in conflict-affected areas, expand livelihood opportunities or invest in education and health, and in reaching the poorest households, if a cash transfer component is provided in parallel to protect productive assets. When a cash component is incorporated into such programmes, it is usually conditional and lacks flexibility (e.g. to be used on specific items or at certain times of the year e.g. hunger periods). Strengthening flexibility and unconditionality of cash components is key – households know how best to prioritise own needs.
- **Training is most effective when linked to a specific outcome or when supporting farmers/smallholders/SMEs to overcome a specific barrier to feasible market engagement**

e.g. support to private sector in overcoming a barrier to engaging in conflict-affected areas or pursuing a viable business idea (e.g. lack skilled extension workers in conflict-affected area, so support in training them).

- **Programmes that build upon existing initiatives and address barriers faced in smallholders connecting to markets (value chains, partners, skills) are most successful** – in Northern Nigeria poultry/livestock health (though vaccinations and kits, especially for women), grain storage and agricultural inputs particularly impactful in terms of sustainability, scale and reach of the programme, asset accumulation and household nutrition/food security. Poultry health interventions especially impactful on women’s livelihood opportunities
- **Dry season drip irrigation regarded as successful in addressing food insecurity in hunger seasons**, as well as labour savings for women through low-tech affordable methods
- **Dry season farming mitigating herder-farmer conflict** in North West states as herders graze on land during dry season when not used for farming.
- **Supporting formation and functioning of community-led/owned cooperatives or village saving committee is key** to delivering other programmes relevant to strengthening livelihoods (education, agricultural development, education, infrastructure). Key is to support community members in recognising benefits of such committees will help sustain it – then connect it to market – greater impact. Evidence suggests such community mechanisms help to facilitate community ownership and leadership in maintenance of infrastructural outputs (boreholes, schools).

Cash plus programmes have much potential in this space

- **Cash plus programmes¹⁹⁰ which include a nutrition component** do appear to result in changes to behaviours leading to wider (beyond households targeted) and longer-term impacts on

health and nutrition, though for lasting nutrition outcomes, length of cash transfer provision is important (i.e. beyond two years). In addition, behaviour change is not enough (e.g. encouragement to use health facilities), support to the facilities themselves and ensuring they are affordable needs to happen in parallel.

- **Delivery cash plus programmes in conflict-affected regions requires existing health/education and other basic services to be in place** – so support to these services through complimentary programmes alongside SP is often necessary, especially in conflict contexts where services/government structures are often destroyed.
- **Cash plus programming with a livelihoods component has much potential though evidence of impact is limited and the scale of projects which test this approach are limited** (e.g. FAO provision of cash plus livelihoods support programmes in North-East – some positive though small-scale results). There is a need to increase evidence base on this, and for future studies to specifically focus on the cost benefit of providing regular cash transfers plus in-kind livelihoods assistance vis-a-vis providing livelihood support as lumpy cash.

Lifesaving assistance to consider how to support livelihood/employment opportunities in the longer-term

- **Research corroborates existing evidence that in-kind humanitarian assistance undermines the local market** and programmes focussing on market access/agricultural development (e.g Propcom-M staff refer to situations where they had to withdraw from geographical areas humanitarians engaging in for this reason). This results in humanitarian and development (market strengthening) programmes targeting different geographical areas limiting opportunities for coordination. Need to deliver cash transfers not in-kind assistance where possible.
- **Interviewees highlight the need for humanitarian assistance to be designed in a way that considers**

¹⁹⁰ Complementing *cash* transfers with additional inputs, services, and linkages to other services in order to more effectively achieve successful outcomes and ensure long-term sustainability

longer-term livelihood opportunities to build self-reliance— such as support to developing alternative livelihoods while displaced (portable or mobile activities), support to recover previous livelihood or transition to new permanent livelihood (same or new location).

Ensure support to restoring basic services designed in way that considers conflict and role in promoting peace

- **Non-traditional mobile/radio-based education programmes are important when targeting conflict-affected areas** where school infrastructure has been destroyed and is especially impactful on the engagement of girls.
- **Role of cash for work and infrastructure projects in peacebuilding** linked to establishment of community dispute mechanisms and community engagement at all stages of process.

***Overarching: programmes which bring together short and long-term outcomes in an integrated way, through layered modalities and approach, have much potential.** Practically this means humanitarian assistance designed with additional longer-term livelihoods components, cash transfers with ‘plus’ components on supporting livelihoods and nutrition, or agriculture/livestock programmes with cash components to protect productive assets and build self-reliance.*

Partnerships

- **Collaboration with humanitarian actors:** Humanitarian and development actors often divide their target groups in NE Nigeria – with humanitarian cash programmes targeting IDP camps and agricultural development/income generation programmes targeting returnees and host communities. There is a clear need for joined-up approaches, especially when are targeting the same populations only at different stages (e.g. returnees). For this to happen, coordination mechanisms need to be stronger at local and national levels (area-based approaches), and donors could play stronger roles in not only supporting such mechanisms but also facilitating a connection between the humanitarian and development programmes they fund which target the very same geographical areas (evidence this doesn’t systematically happen in Nigeria).

- **Need for stronger collaboration with local government: Evidence from programming across a range of areas** - cash for work, infrastructure and market access programmes –highlight the need to more strongly engage with local government. For example, regarding cash for work and infrastructural/WASH restoration programmes, there is a need to identify sources of funding for maintenance from outset (lots of cases of community engagement in maintenance but not enough for sustainability without government ownership).

Financing

- Annual funding is an ongoing barrier to supporting longer-term livelihoods, evidence highlights the importance of **MY funding** corroborating well documented evidence on this.
- **Embedding a flexible/risk financing mechanism into development livelihoods programmes** operating in FCAS enables programme scale-up in response to unforeseen conflict and emerging needs of IDPs for self-reliance and income generation opportunities. Similar mechanisms should be more widely used in development programmes/ operating in FCAS even where violent conflict is not occurring at the specific time of programme design.
- **There is a clear gap in the use of anticipatory action and financing mechanisms in in Nigeria.** This is a largely unexplored area, though has much potential in terms of building preparedness capabilities to respond to emerging climate and disease-related shocks. The World Bank has disbursed funding to respond to emerging disease (e.g. Lassa fever) through the Contingency Emergency Response Component (*CERC*) fund. While this funding was released once the disease was well established (not ‘anticipatory’ as such), it was released within a much faster timeframe when compared to funding in response to the Covid-19 crisis through the Crisis Response Window of IDA. While the World Bank has a clear role to play on preparedness and funding for early and anticipatory action, other avenues could be explored in more depth in Nigeria, drawing upon OCHA’s anticipatory action pilots and models applied through NGO consortiums (e.g. Start Fund).

- Fundamentally, it is unhelpful to think about support to livelihoods in terms of a division between cash transfers (humanitarian) and agriculture/livestock/income generation (development finance) – **combined financing/programming which targets multidimensional short and longer-term needs and priorities of conflict-affected populations** through an integrated programmatic approach would be more effective.
- **Continued financing for education post-pandemic**, evidence from Ebola response is that this is deprioritised.

Results

- **5 years is regarded to be the minimum timeframe required to realise results from programmes supporting engagement in markets & income generation (as per Nigeria KII and document review).** A sense that donors prioritise cost efficiency (in shorter-term interventions such as cash) over cost effectiveness (in longer-term programmes), which needs to be reassessed. It also costs more to deliver agricultural development/market programmes in conflict-affected regions.
- **Sustainability and wider impact of agricultural/livestock programmes depends on** engagement of local as well as state government officials, and broader uptake of approaches tested in projects by private sector actors – depends on profitability of business opportunities, risk appetite of private sector actors and alignment with central and local government policy/priorities.
- **Interventions that target women specifically** (as opposed to mainstreamed)¹⁹¹, often take longer and cost more to deliver returns but are regarded to be cost effective as women are considered more likely to invest a return on their investment in family members and the community; (education, health care, nutrition) in addition to economic activity.
- Agricultural development programmes initially designed in non-conflict regions but expanded to cover conflict-affected regions need to **adapt the theory of change to consider impacts of conflict**

risks and embed programme flexibility to adapt to changes in the context, through risk monitoring and flexible finance.

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¹⁹¹ Such as women’s community gardens, women’s agricultural committees, women-only boreholes/latrines, guidance to construction companies in cash-to-work programmes on engaging

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Somalia

Nature of conflict – causes and consequences

For the past two decades, the situation in Somalia has been characterised by an interplay of ongoing conflicts and insecurity, continued political instability, as well as climate-related and economic shocks.

While Somalia experienced relative peace for the first 17 years after its independence in 1960, the period between 1977 and 1991 saw three major armed conflicts, notably the Ogaden war with Ethiopia (1977-78), the war between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia and the armed conflicts that saw the government battle against a number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 saw the disintegration of the state and the country descend into inter-clan warfare, banditry and looting, all of which caused large scale displacement and a famine that killed around 250,000 people. There was widespread damage inflicted on the country's physical and agricultural infrastructure, including much destruction in Mogadishu (Montani and Majid, 2002). Food aid became part of the war economy, with militias and warlords diverting funds to fuel the war.

The descent into chaos led to the formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in July 1992. It was initially a U.S.-led, U.N.-sanctioned multilateral intervention involving nearly 30,000 troops, but was then handed over to the United Nations in 1993 with a more wide ranging mandate. However, a complete inability to perform its mandate and heavy losses, including during the “Black Hawk Down” incident meant the mission departed Somalia in 1995, leaving the country in continued anarchy and fighting between different groups.

After the failure to form a Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2010, efforts, under the auspices of IGAD, succeeded to form the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which included a parliament with broad majority clan representation according to a 4.5 clan allocation formula (1 for each major clan, 0.5 for the minority clans). However the TFG faced significant opposition and never reached much further than Mogadishu. In 2005, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a cross-clan coalition mainly from

marginalised clans of rural southern Somalia, gained control. Ethiopia then invaded Somalia in December 2006 in support of the TFG and toppled the UIC. This gave rise to al-Shabaab, one of its most prominent members, who emerged as the leading Islamist militant group after 2006 and gained control of large swathes of territory in South-Central Somalia. In order to enhance stabilisation, the AU established the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2006, who continued offenses against Al-Shabab, including pushing them out of Mogadishu in 2011 and Kismayo in 2013. Throughout this, Somaliland, which declared itself independent, remained relatively peaceful (Bryld, 2019).

In 2011, a confluence of factors, namely a drought, an increase in food prices, ongoing conflict with Al-Shabaab and delayed humanitarian assistance (including the absence of WFP in Somalia, access restrictions and counter-terror legislation) led to famine in several areas of Southern Somalia that cost an estimated 260,000 lives (Maxwell and Majid, 2014). The principal victims of the famine, as in the 1992, were from the Digil and Mirifle/Rahanweyn clans and Bantu populations in the inter-riverine and riverine areas, who, as a result of long-standing marginalisation had seen less urbanisation, migration, education and were therefore less represented in the diaspora than some of the other major clans in Somalia (ibid). Non-traditional donors and organisations from Muslim and Arab states emerged as significant humanitarian responders in 2011, representing nearly 30% of the aid committed to the famine (IRIN, 2011).

Somalia again came to the brink of famine in 2017, caused by a mixture of severe drought conditions, conflict and increased displacement. However this time, rapid scaling-up of the humanitarian assistance and seasonal improvements helped to avert famine.

In 2012 the FGS held its first indirect elections; and in 2016 13,000 clan members elected a new parliament and a new president was indirectly elected in 2017. Progress has been made in building state institutions and instituting a federal institutional structure with the recognition of the five Federal Member States (FMSs). However, significant tensions over power and resources continue between the FMSs and the FGS, and have led to a standoff over the electoral process in 2021, which some fear may yet again spark significant conflict.

Since the beginning of 2020, extensive floods, desert locust infections and the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

Nature and conduct of conflict and interplay of different crises

While during the early 1990s fighting was mainly between different armed factions, the splintering of factions from the mid-1990s meant that much of the conflict thereafter was within rather than between major clans (Menkhaus, 2000). Conflicts were more localised, with some unstable areas experiencing periods of stability (Montani and Majid, 2002). While Al-Shabaab continues to control areas in South-Central Somalia, conflict and violence are geographically varied, though can be locally intense. Intercommunal conflicts over land (for farming or grazing), and other resources such as water, as well as general lawlessness also contribute to significant insecurity in other areas.

Many of the legacies of the Barre period, notably the manipulation and politicisation of clan identity, as well as the monopolisation and exploitation of state resources, and the appropriation of land and other assets by political leader and other elites continue to fuel distrust, division and grievances (World Bank, 2005). While clans can be very influential as sources of conflict, they are also the main sources of conflict resolutions (Bryld, 2019). Even though many commentators highlight the influence of clans in Somalia, the role of self-interested elites and the economic disparities in society are also important, and long-standing patterns of alienation and exploitation were in many ways perpetuated in the factional fighting after 1991 (Montani and Majid, 2002). The targeting of aid can also be influenced by some of these societal inequalities, with aid during the 2011 famine at times not reaching some of the minority groups most in need (Hedlund et al., 2013).

Traditional pastoralists in particular have faced a mixture of negative impacts related not only to conflict, but also issues such as unregulated exploitation of natural resources and enclosures of rangeland, expansion of private reservoirs etc. which may have contributed to increasing marginalisation of more vulnerable households (Bishop et al, in Alinovi et al, 2008)

In addition to conflict, climate change continues to be a major contributing factor to displacement and food insecurity in Somalia. Historical trends showing droughts occurring regularly at intervals of 2–3 years in the deyr season and 8–10 years in consecutive *deyr* and *gu* seasons, alongside annual flooding during the rainy seasons, but increasingly unpredictable weather patterns and climatic shocks have exacerbated these trends. (WFP, 2018).

Consequences for lives and livelihoods

Large scale displacement triggered both by conflict and drought and rapid urbanisation : the interplay of conflict, drought and floods have triggered large-scale displacements of the population: around 2.6 million Somalis are displaced and an additional 1 million are refugees in neighbouring countries. Displacement has particularly affected minority or marginalised groups associated with agro-pastoral production who are now living in IDP camps in and around urban areas, effectively becoming the new urban poor. Poverty rates of IDPs in settlements are around 70%. Between 70-80% of IDPs and refugees are women and children, often leaving men behind in rural areas to look after the herds (WFP, 2018). Forced evictions of IDPs in urban and peri-urban areas have also been a significant cause of secondary displacement.

Reduced farming - Crop production areas along the two river basins of Shabelle and Juba have been severely conflict affected, also due to land grabbing and their real estate value. Lack of investment and conflict has resulted in deteriorating irrigation and flood control infrastructure, with 85-90% of the irrigated land pre-conflict (in the 1980s) becoming rain-fed by 2004 (World Bank, 2007, cited in FAO, 2013). Farmers are planting less due to insecurity and lack of land, as well as large scale displacement leading to lack of labour, thereby leading to decreased overall cereal production.

Trade and Marketing Conflicts have also affected market infrastructure and farmers often have to immediately sell their produce after harvest at low prices because they are in need for cash, don't have adequate storage facilities or no means of transporting goods to other markets where they could get better prices (FAO, 2013). Poor people are often more dependent than others on the market because

they cannot sustain themselves any more through farming or smaller herds.

Loss of livestock due to sale or drought People sold assets to cope in distress sales, the scale and type largely depended on the diversity of assets owned. Smaller animals such as goats and chicken were sold first, followed by young cattle and then milking cows, oxen or camels (Maxwell and Majid, 2014). More than 6.4 million livestock were lost during the famine in 2011, with large numbers of cattle deaths in Lower Shabelle, and livestock losses estimated at 30–50% of herd sizes in some areas (ibid). Conflict, displacement and loss of grazing land also meant that herd sizes have become smaller, making it more difficult to sustain entire families. Larger herds are also contained in the hands of few wealthier owners. Conflict also means movement of animals, goods and people is more difficult, and access to markets, water and pasture is more constrained. Pastoralist households with too few animals to sustain themselves and their families are increasingly growing their own cereals, so as to not have to sell off their remaining animals and in order to purchase food (Little, P, in Alinovi et al, 2008).

Large numbers of chronically food insecure people 69% of the country's 12.3 million people live below the poverty line of USD 1.9 per day. FSNAU estimates that by mid-2021, over 2.65 million people across Somalia are expected to face crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity, due to a combination of shocks including insecurity, localised flooding, lack of rainfall, desert locusts and the impacts of COVID-19 (OCHA, 2021)

Malnutrition 60% of those in humanitarian need in Somalia are children, with malnutrition rates among children among the worst in the world. Around 1 million children are estimated to be acutely malnourished, including 162,000 under 5 suffering from life-threatening severe malnutrition. Pregnant and lactating women as well as people living with HIV/TB are also among those acutely malnourished (OCHA, 2021)

Natural resource extraction in particular cutting trees for firewood and charcoal production intensified during conflict and drought adding significant pressure on natural resources through deforestation.

Markets generally continued to function and adapt during conflict, including livestock markets. From 1988

to 1991, the livestock export trade was interrupted by the civil war and again during the livestock export ban imposed by Saudi Arabia in 1997 and 2000 due to animal diseases.

Social networks are critical to most Somalis' ability to cope and can be clan-based relationships but also include friends and family, including those further away sending remittances. Those clans that had less opportunity to diversify, in terms of urbanisation, education and expansion of their diaspora networks, such as the Rahanweyn and the Somali Bantu of the riverine and intra-riverine areas were often those most severely affected by conflict and drought due to lack of diversified social support networks. Support is often clan-based, though during the famine of 2011 for example businesses and the diaspora mobilised outside of the usual clan defined networks.

Remittances: conflict and subsequent displacement and/or emigration of many Somalis to neighbouring countries and all over the world have meant that many of those remaining have networks outside the country who are regularly sending money home to support those who stayed. Though those households receiving remittances tend to be the better-off ones that had been able to send members abroad and that have significant networks, rather than the poorest and those belonging to minority clans.

Increased seeking of loans and credit were often adapted as a distress coping strategies by households once other assets were depleted

Increased land grabbing, sale of land, loss of land have increased during conflict and lawlessness, particularly in areas of Shabelle and Juba where land has high real estate value

Loss of labour opportunities especially casual labour that would have helped the poorest households cope decreased due to collapse of large scale agricultural enterprises during conflict.

Effects on national economy

The Somali diaspora is estimated to contribute around one-third of the overall GDP or around 1.5bn\$ per year (in 2018 and 2019)– roughly equivalent to the total ODA to Somalia in 2018, and double the humanitarian assistance received (Dalrymple and Thomas, 2021). Remittances and international aid make up for Somali's trade deficit. The livestock sector supports more than 60% of the populations

through labour and food and exports of livestock and their products account for 80 % of exports in normal years, when they were not interrupted by droughts or conflict (FAO, 2021). Even though the economic growth rate averages 3.4% per year, the economy is highly vulnerable to shocks, as government capacity to generate revenue is constrained by the large size of the informal economy and difficulties in collecting taxes due to insecurity and weak systems.

Responses

Some of the most common interventions included:

Food assistance by WFP assisting between 1.34 and 3.58 million people a year, representing between 11 and 29% of the population. General food assistance and nutrition activities dominated the portfolio, together accounting for 75 % of planned beneficiaries (WFP, 2018) CBTs have become the predominant transfer modality, as WFP increased its use dramatically from 2016 onwards.

Cash Transfers. Used as early as 2003/04 on a small scale for emergency responses. Have become the main form of humanitarian assistance, in particular during drought and including in hard to reach areas. CBT for livelihoods was primarily provided in the form of cash grants or vouchers to facilitate access to agricultural or livestock (where appropriate) inputs or to support business establishment. Most cash transfer mechanisms were mobile money for unrestricted cash, and rechargeable electronic stored-value cards for e-vouchers and sometimes cash.

Feeding programmes the provision of specialized nutrient-dense supplementary feeding programs (BSFP and MCHN) and the promotion of optimal infant and young child feeding.

School feeding

Village Savings & Loan (VSLA) and increasingly **Self-help Groups (SHG)**, that enable communities not only to save but also to provide community based health care and nutrition support among other things.

Entrepreneurial training /business skills/TVET Many programmes include a hybrid of these.

Provision of assets for farming and livestock Mainly seeds, tools, fertilizers, fodder;

Creation, expansion or rehabilitation of productive infrastructure, in particular water provision irrigation

canals, grain stores, water pumps, hafirs, land reclaiming

Marketing infrastructure livestock, meat markets, slaughterhouses

Training for farmers or cattle herders : PFS or FFS, CAHWs, cooperatives support; CAHWs were particularly effective and seen as accessible and trustworthy by local farmers unlike the animal health, disease transmission and international standards approach pre-2003 which was largely unsuccessful

Consortia – humanitarian /resilience (implementing a mix of above activities)

BRCiS -The "Building Resilient Communities in Somalia" DFID funded – NGO consortium of 5 NGOs and 3 local orgs

SomREP - Somalia Resilience Programme seven NGOs (WV, AAH, CARE, COOPI, ADRA, DRC and Oxfam) established in 2011

UNJRS -The United Nations Joint Resilience Strategy (UNJRS) – WFP, FAO and UNICEF

SNS - Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia NGO consortium and the World Food programme, merged with BRCiS Phase II

Consortia – durable solutions and reintegration programming

EU-REINTEG (4) + Danwadaag and DSP – focusing on durable solutions and the reintegration of refugees and IDPs

Consortia – cash the Somalia Cash Consortium – harmonisation of cash

Social Safety net programming

World Bank pilot ‘Baxnaano’: cash transfers to establish the key building blocks of a national shock-responsive safety net system.

EU social safety net pilot programme

Markets and Value Chains – lots of development programmes focusing on value chains and market systems support, including fisheries, milk, sesame, livestock and other sectors

BORESHA consortium with a private sector company to carry out market and value chain analysis as well as establish the business links and incubators

Processes and underlying assumptions

Resilience building

Much of the programming since 2011 has been influenced by the failure of the humanitarian response to respond early enough to the threat of famine and has focused on how to prevent this from happening again. The 2011 response – even though late – was impressive in its use of a cash and market-based response that was rapidly scaled up to reach even Al-Shabaab controlled areas through local traders that were able to negotiate their ways across battle lines (Maxwell et al, 2014).

One of the major lessons however was to prioritise resilience programming alongside immediate humanitarian programming, together with building stronger – both community and national level- early warning systems. All the main donor agencies developed resilience strategies (DFID 2011; European Commission 2013; USAID 2012) and multiple large scale resilience programmes, run by consortia, were started, including the UN’s Joint Resilience Programme (UNJRP), Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS), the Somalia Resilience Programme (SomRep) and the Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia (SNS). Most of these included flexible funding to be able to respond to crisis, while some had complementary emergency response funds like DFID’s Internal Risk Facility (IRF), as well as the Somalia Humanitarian Fund and the CERF, which were used in the response to the 2017 crisis (Maxwell et al, 2014). Most of these resilience-building consortia are humanitarian-led, with limited engagement of development and private sector actors.

Durable solutions

Since 2017, there have also been a number of multi-year consortia focused on bringing a resilience- and development-focused approach to addressing displacement. The European Union funded **RE-INTEG** focuses on the sustainable (re)integration of IDPs and refugees. RE-INTEG was followed by two further durable solutions-focused programmes: the **Danwadaag Solutions Consortium** (DFID-funded) and the **Durable Solutions Programme** (DSP funded by Danida).

There has been a strong emphasis on learning from previous experiences by a number of these durable solutions consortia – especially the Danwadaag and DSP consortia. These consortia have actively built on,

and scaled up, a number of promising practices adopted by the EU-REINTEG consortia, such as use existing Community Action Plans (CAPs) and community engagement structures where possible, built further linkages and support to municipalities to implement a durable solutions agenda. Danwadaag has also ensured that there is close coordination with the other DFID-funded BRCiS programme, linking a resilience approach to a durable solutions approach that was previously missing, in particular in urban areas as well as across early solutions planning. As with resilience, much of the durable solutions work continues to be led by humanitarians with limited private sector engagement and development actors/financing.

Market systems support and support to private sector

Many different programmes exist on the development side, but limited linkages to resilience and durable solutions programming of the large humanitarian consortia.

Multi-year financing and consortium-based approaches, flexible funding

All of these consortia include humanitarian multi-year financing and are built on multi-sectoral expertise, and most also incorporate a learning partner. Most also have flexible funding, across programmes and years, and are able to shift funds at short notice to respond to shocks. Others also include contingency mechanisms such as the IRF to respond to crisis. Most of these flexible funding approaches have been implemented on the humanitarian side.

Consortium- based programming has become the norm in Somalia, with other consortia emerging in other areas, such as the Somalia Cash Consortium, which have adopted common approaches to their cash programming.

Increasing focus on social safety nets, including flexible, scalable initiatives

There is also increased focus on establishing longer term social safety nets by the World Bank, the EU and others. The World Bank’s pilot project ‘**Baxnaano**’ in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour to lay foundations for longer term social protection system for example provides cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households and aims to establish the

key building blocks of a national safety net system, together with the government of Somalia.

The **Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response Project** builds on this existing safety net programme and focuses on the protection of food security and livelihoods with an additional US\$40 million IDA grant.

The EU also plays a key role in the delivery of safety net programming and has a pilot safety net programme running.

Outcomes and analysis

Consortium- based programming has clearly led to increased harmonisation and coordination between different actors working on common themes as well as extended reach of interventions by avoiding duplication. In particular harmonised approaches have been seen around area-based approaches, the use of the same Community Action Plans (CAPs) and community committees, as well as a common vision and common approaches. They have also allowed partners with different expertise across the humanitarian/development and sometimes the peace and state-building spectrum to come together and work on common themes, often in support of government, even though in practice the humanitarian agencies still predominate and lead in most cases. Some of the consortia, such as the RE-INTEG consortia as well as Danwadaag and DSP have also effort to adopt common programming principles as well as work towards and measure collective outcomes according to 10 common IASC outcome level indicators.

However many of the consortia continue to be humanitarian led, with limited engagement of development and private sector actors, as well as continued need to engage more systematically with government as well as local communities and organisations. Questions remain whether these actors are the most suitable to work on resilience and durable solutions and to link up the resilience /durable solutions agenda more closely with many of the ongoing market/private sector support programmes, as well as longer term development / social safety net programming.

Multi-year financing as well as flexible funding mechanism are allowing to shift funds and activities between longer term resilience building activities and

short term humanitarian needs, as well as flexible programming to respond to crisis as they arise. Most interventions are being drawn up based on community priorities, based on community action plans (CAPs) who prioritise what the communities perceives as most pressing short and longer term needs to build their resilience.

While all these activities combined have supported communities not only through shocks but also in their longer term ability to adapt to shocks, it remains difficult to understand what the longer term impacts are, especially at the community level. With some exceptions, much of the monitoring continues to be at output level, and at household, rather than community level. Impact monitoring is notoriously difficult, particularly in places like South-Central Somalia where access is limited. Given that not only are resilience (and reintegration) are such difficult concepts to define but encompass such as wide variety of personal, household and community level aspects, it is difficult to know what contributes to a person's, a household's or a community's resilience, let alone to attribute causality to particular interventions.

On the other hand, it seems that the resilience and durable solutions agenda, and the coming together of different agencies around a larger agenda rather than focus on their individual programmes has provided an incentive for more sophisticated impact monitoring and evaluations.

Many of the interventions carried out by the consortia are not new, but have been employed in Somalia for decades – they are being repurposed for a new 'goal' – resilience or durable solutions. But the activities themselves have not fundamentally changed, nor have the people (mostly agencies of humanitarian background) that are implementing them.

Given the wide array of activities deployed, it is unknown which particular livelihood interventions, or

which combinations of activities work and to what end.¹⁹²

An evaluation of DFIDs Multi-Year Humanitarian Programme (that ended in 2017) (LaGuardia and Pinney 2018) highlights some of these points. The evaluation found that avoiding a slip into famine in 2017 was a clear success through both direct emergency intervention as well as longer term resilience programming and both BRCiS and UNJRS supported households dealt with the 2017 crisis remarkably well. Yet the evaluation also found that BRCiS supported households dealt with shocks, especially the 2017 food security crisis, differently than those supported by the UNJRS (which used more direct support rather than resilience building activities of BRCiS).. BRCiS households, with some variations, demonstrated stronger positive changes in Coping Strategy Index (CSI), without commensurate changes in Food Consumption Scores (FCS), as was the case, largely, with UNJRS households. BRCiS households resorted to fewer negative coping strategies and felt positive and engaged by how they faced the crisis, and, despite eating less, had more ways to cope. UNJRS households though had overall better results in CSI and FCS, which had however less to do with resilience programming and more with more direct support. The evaluation notes that it remains unclear, and remains an interesting test case which approach (and results) will ultimately make households more resilient in the longer term.

Cash

Despite the late humanitarian response and its inability to prevent a descent into famine in 2011, the cash based response has been credited for its rapid scale up and large market based response, working with local traders and through hawala agents to bring cash relief to most areas, including those controlled by Al-Shabaab at the time.

The rapid scale up of the cash response in 2017, unlike in 2011, including its ability to reach locations closer to where drought affected populations lived, has been credited with being effective at preventing a descent into famine. A review of 12 project endline assessment or evaluation reports commissioned by

CALP highlighted the overall positive immediate and short-term impact on vulnerable populations compared to baselines, including better access to food and other basic needs, though at times assistance was of too short duration. Other forms of assistance in kind, remittances and charity were also key. (Daniels et al., 2018)

Key lessons learned

- Famine in 2011 happened due to a confluence of factors, namely a drought, an increase in food prices, ongoing conflict with Al-Shabaab and delayed humanitarian assistance (including the absence of WFP in Somalia, access restrictions for humanitarian actors and counter-terror legislation). Lessons from 2011 were learned by humanitarian agencies and a large scale refocus on resilience building, early warning and multi-year flexible financing implemented post 2011, which, together with swift humanitarian action helped avert a repeat of famine in 2017.
- Importance of learning from informal community redistribution mechanisms and understanding the ways in which assistance is shared according to local priorities. This also includes understanding who receives remittances and other community support and who doesn't, and who therefore might need additional support as historically those without social support networks were those worst affected by different shocks.
- Rapid scale up of large scale cash-transfer programming has been effective in Somalia at preventing further decline into famine in 2017 and was also impressive in the 2011 response, even if too late to prevent a famine then. Cash programming is generally well suited to the Somali context, given functioning markets, regional integration, large scale coverage of mobile money transfer technologies and systems. The scale up of cash transfers and the risks of diversion of aid money have forced agencies to adapt multiple, innovative ways of remote

better understand which/what combination of activities work under what circumstances.

¹⁹² DFID Somalia have just commissioned their third party monitoring partner – MESH – to carry out an evaluation and inventory of the different livelihood activities deployed to

monitoring and learning, which have influenced the ability to implement cash programmes in difficult contexts around the world. Lessons were learned from 2011, in particular around prevention of misuse of funds and risk mitigation, as well as more sophisticated monitoring systems, including independent third party monitoring.

- Multi-year financing as well as flexible funding mechanism allowing to shift funds and activities between longer term resilience building activities and short term humanitarian needs have been key to addressing needs in Somalia post-2011. Consortium- based programming has led to increased harmonisation and coordination between different actors of different backgrounds working on common themes as well as extended reach of interventions by avoiding duplication. However, the question remains whether for longer term impact and resilience building humanitarian actors, who make up the majority of these consortia, are the right people to implement this or whether development actors or those with more economic background should be brought in or at least closer collaborations established. Similarly, closer linkages with emerging longer term social safety nets should be considered.
- While resilience building activities post 2011 have contributed to communities' abilities to absorb shocks, notably in 2017, it remains unclear exactly what the impact of the different livelihoods interventions undertaken by the different consortia is, and what combination of activities is more or less successful and why. The key seems to be that ways of working have been adopted, so the 'how' rather than the 'what' – given most of the interventions have been implemented in Somalia for decades. More detailed analysis needs to be done to understand what interventions or combination of interventions work and why, or whether adapting the 'how' is enough to create resilience.
- There are a number of market/private sector supporting programmes working on supply and

value chains of key sectors as well as market and trading infrastructure, mainly undertaken by development actors. Yet few linkages seem to exist to the ongoing resilience programmes run with multi-year humanitarian funding.

- Resilience focus seems to have given at least some impetus for better impact monitoring as 'measuring resilience' requires more than just output level reporting. However, still few agencies do impact monitoring – and if so focus on resilience overall, doesn't tell us much about which particular interventions work why.

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South Sudan

Nature of conflict – causes and consequences

Causes

The area that is now South Sudan has experienced on-and-off conflict since 1955. The first civil war with the North ran from 1955–1972; the second civil war fought between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) ran from 1983–2005, with a period of relative peace after the Addis Ababa Agreements between 1972–1983.

Fundamental grievances with regard to longstanding social, economic and political marginalisation of the south by the central government based in Khartoum have led to repeated violent conflicts with rebel movements in the south and other parts of the Sudan, such as Darfur. A long history of unequal exploitation of natural resources (especially oil, land, water) and unequal public investment has led to stark differences in levels of development between the poor south (and other marginalised areas in the North such as Darfur, Nuba and Eastern Sudan) and the much better off area in and around Khartoum.

The war with the North was exacerbated by the emergence of various rebel movements in the South, often fighting each other and at times opportunistically siding with Khartoum. Other countries, in particular neighbouring Ethiopia and Uganda at times fought proxy wars supporting diverse rebel movements inside South Sudan for their gains. The wars took heavy tolls on the civilian population. Between 1983 and 2005 about 2 million people died as a result of the conflict and 6 million people were displaced (Russo, 2008).

In 1989, **Operation Lifeline Sudan** (OLS), the then largest coordinated humanitarian operation was created after a devastating famine in Bahr el Ghazal. The OLS was a tripartite agreement between the GoS, the UN and SPLM, and included all the major UN agencies and several NGOs. At its core were a set of ‘ground rules’ – a negotiated agreement that governed humanitarian access to civilian populations and ensured the security of humanitarians. The OLS lasted until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, ending the 2nd civil war for a period of nominal peace (2005–2013) during which South Sudan gained independence (2011). However,

during this time violence continued in some areas, in particular around cattle raids and cycles of revenge among and between different ethnic communities, fuelled often by disaffected, unemployed youth that were at times manipulated for political gains by different leaders.

Full blown internal conflict erupted in 2013 after the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) party split internally between those loyal to President Salva Kir and those with Riak Machar, the vice president and leader of SPLM -in opposition (SPLM-IO). Fighting started in the capital, Juba, and rapidly spread throughout the country. A Peace Agreement (ARCISS) was signed in 2018 and a Transitional Government of National Unity nominally established in February 2020. While fighting between the major parties has largely subsided as a result of this, politically motivated violence is largely continuing, at times resulting in severe local violence and conflict and impacting already very food insecure areas. More recently, in addition to continued insecurity, other shocks like unusually heavy flooding in parts of the country, locust infestation, the COVID-19 pandemic, and lower oil prices have all combined over a relatively short period of time to exacerbate already existing vulnerabilities.

Nature and conduct of conflict

Conflict had very different impacts on local areas, and the assumption that conflict with external actors (in this case the North) was necessarily worse for livelihoods than ongoing inter or intra-communal violence is not always true. While GoS bombing and helicopter attacks/raids had a detrimental impacts on people and their livelihoods in some areas internal conflict between and within communities – including violent and increasingly commercially and politically motivated cattle raiding – had devastating impacts on local livelihoods. (Deng 2013)

The term post-conflict – often applied after 2005 and shaping outside interventions – was certainly a misnomer in many areas where intense violence continued at the local level (especially in Jonglei and Upper Nile states).

Since the new peace agreement in 2018 and the formation of the government of national unity fighting between the two major parties has stopped, but the conflict has not – instead it is being carried out by proxy, arming local militia and stoking inter-

communal violence. Violence at the local level has become more diffuse and sown into the fabric of different communities who are often being manipulated for political gains and are stuck in cycles of revenge attacks. Similarly, while cattle always had a central place in South Sudan’s agropastoral communities, the centrality that cattle is playing in the current conflict as well as the violence directed at it is new.

Consequences for lives and livelihoods

Main effects

- Depletion of livestock and other household assets.** Livestock losses were particularly severe in the 1990s. In Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal over 40% of families lost all their livestock, which was a major contributor to the 1998 famine in the area (Deng, 2013). Livestock production is currently at 20% of its capacity. Since 2005 number of cattle has reportedly increased, but is concentrated in the hands of a few, leading to more incentives for young people to raid them given the importance cattle holds for all aspects of local culture (marriage, settlement of disputes etc.)
- Inability to farm, especially in further away fields.** Only 4% of arable land is cultivated. Large scale displacement of the population as well as severe insecurity in rural areas led to loss of access to land, reduced planting and loss of labour due to rapid urbanisation, especially for young people and returnees. Yields have continued to be low, including post-CPA, and most food is imported from neighbouring countries.
- Widespread displacement, for many people multiple times during the past conflicts.** Estimates suggest nearly 400,000 people have been killed and a further 2.2 million people took refuge in neighbouring countries, while 1.6 million are IDPs ((ECHO 2021). Over 130,000 people – around 6% of the displaced –were thought to be sheltering in UN-administered Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in Juba, Malakal, Bor and Bentiu in 2015 (Loej, 2015).
- Rapid urbanisation.** Many returnees who came back after the CPA never returned to their rural places to cultivate but went to towns instead. In particular young men left looking for work, leaving behind female headed households in rural, often insecure and violent areas.
- Alternative livelihoods and coping mechanisms** such as fishing, hunting, gathering wild foods were often disrupted by violence as people did not dare to venture far from their homes.
- Poor infrastructure** South Sudan has one of the lowest road densities in Africa—15 km per 1000 km2 of arable land). There is a lack of secondary and tertiary/feeder roads; and where they were constructed, they were not maintained due to insecurity. Additionally large areas of South Sudan are inaccessible for several months during the rainy season. This is a significant impediment to market access and connectivity, particularly for farmers trying to reach markets, and for cereal producing/more peaceful areas such as the Equatorias linkages to cereal deficit areas further North. Basic services as well as market infrastructure was destroyed, often multiple times.
- Access to land** for many returnees, in particular, but not only in urban areas, has been difficult or impossible, due to confusing land demarcation systems, lack of enforcement of land laws and rampant land grabbing by soldiers and powerful people.
- There are large numbers chronically food insecure people, and their numbers have increased in recent years.** Approximately 8.3 million people—nearly 70 % of the population—will likely require humanitarian assistance in 2021, according to the 2021 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO). Households in six counties in South Sudan will likely continue to experience Catastrophe—IPC 5—levels of acute food insecurity through July in the absence of additional humanitarian assistance. In western areas of Jonglei’s Pibor County, famine—IPC 5—is likely ongoing already.

- **Kinship and social support networks were severely disrupted by multiple conflicts.**
- Most people in South Sudan now depend on **markets as their primary source of food as well as for non-material support**, but most of those who depend on markets do not have regular access to cash, thus there is a correlation between market dependency, hunger and cash poverty, in particular in places where conflict most intense. (Thomas, 2018) Markets are often captured by elites, the military and those with connections to the regime.

Effects on national economy

South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with oil accounting for almost the totality of exports, 90% of revenue, and more than one-third of its GDP. Since 2011, oil revenue has contracted by 72% while real GDP has contracted by more than 55%, leading to losses of job and small market activities and a breakdown in market demand. At the same time, over the 2015–18 period the country experienced explosive price rises, with annualized rates of up to 550%. Since then inflation has fluctuated, but again reached 170% in October 2019 (Mawejje, 2020). Since the South Sudanese pound was unpegged from the US dollar in November 2015, the exchange rate has plummeted by more than 2,000%. The consequent economic disruption has contributed to an overall decline in food security (source). There is a significant gap (of around 105%) between the parallel and official exchange rates (as of June 2020), which leads not only to price distortions and impacts demand and supply, but has also opened up opportunities for rent seeking for those with access to USD. (Mawejje, 2020; Mosel and Henderson, 2015)

Responses

There were many humanitarian-style interventions that mainly try to prevent further decline in food security, while most livelihood programmes were not really long term but operate in humanitarian mode.

About 90% of international assistance to South Sudan remains in kind, only about 10% is in cash. Scaling up cash assistance remains challenging given widespread insecurity, weak markets, few financial service providers and hyperinflation.

The most common interventions were:

- **General Food Distribution by WFP** assisting 2.9 million people a year and largely credited this for the fact that severe food insecurity did not degrade into widespread famine. Mobile **rapid-response mechanisms (RRMs)** were important in improving outreach to conflict-affected areas.
- **Food and Nutrition Support for lactating or pregnant women** as well as **child feeding programmes** WFP and UNICEF; **School Feeding programme by WFP and direct cash transfers to girls for school attendance and capitation grants to schools (GESS/DFID funded)** – programmes largely credited with increasing school enrolment, in particular of girls and keeping schools open even in conflict areas.
- **Food for Assets/Food for Work** programmes by WFP, GIZ and others though generally short-term, limited linkages to other programmes, and assets such as feeder roads of questionable quality.
- **Cash transfer Programmes-** many small scale, short term projects (around 25,000 people). In 2018, there were 58 actors engaged in 77 different projects in the cash sector. Very little on actual impact, beyond short-term outcomes. Mostly agency reports highlighting short term effectiveness in achieving goals and implementation (speed, ease, efficiency etc). A lot of these programmes were in the PoCs, thus very controlled environment.
- **BRAC project with Transfers to the Ultra-Poor (TUP)** found that not only household consumption increased but there was a persistent wealth effect with the TUP. Suggests cash + programmes more effective at building resilience than unconditional transfers alone.
- **Seeds and Tools by FAO** -Emergency large scale seeds and tools distribution by FAO and others – effectiveness long disputed in South Sudan, in particular when distributed to states that are not conflict affected /where markets are functioning. Often too late/wrong timing

- **Crop kits, vegetable kits and fishing kits** – vegetable and fishing kits reportedly positively seen, as able to cultivate close to home, unlike crop kits.

Social Safety Net style programmes

- **Safety Net and Skills Development Project (SNSDP) by World Bank** project provided temporary income opportunities to poor and vulnerable people for maintenance/rehabilitation of community assets, and included coordination and oversight structures within key target counties to be used for future nation-wide social safety net. The Project's design emphasized the participation of women through direct indicator and targeting of women, and by primarily targeting poor FHH. Instituted a number of things to facilitate female participation such as work sites close to women's houses, special working hours to take account of HH obligations, childcare, etc. plus GBV referral system.
- **\$40 million International Development Association (IDA) grant** approved through the South Sudan Safety Net Project (SSSNP) will expand access to safety net and provide income security for low income South Sudanese, as well as transfer cash to those who cannot work.

Livelihood programmes

- **VSLA** reported to be often suitable to the context – in particular for including proving robust during hyperinflation, as rapid turnover of savings into income generating activities
- **support farmers and farmer orgs** with seeds, tools, improved agricultural techniques, other inputs such as ox ploughs etc.) to strengthen seed production and quality. Some localised successes on small scale reported, but overall continued problems with pests, insecurity and erratic rainfall did not allow for higher yields. Lack of roads and transport to markets as well as storage continue to constrain ability to sell produce and generate income.
- **Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and Agropastoral Field Schools (APFS)** generally seen as appropriate

vehicle for technology transfer and extension but concern they need to be sustained, not one-off, and more sophisticated covering resilience and conservation as well

- **P4P – WFP** less than 10% of all food procured locally by WFP and less than 1% of WFP's food requirements in South Sudan. Outcomes have been modest and of uncertain sustainability, given lack of infrastructure and storage facilities, insufficient organisation of farmers
- **Animal Health Interventions/CAHWs** while useful and important had limited geographical coverage of CAHWs and lack of access to affordable drugs. Same emergency approach to animal health was rolled out in all States, and less focus on more development-oriented livestock work.
- **Vocational and Skills training** – often used 'standard' approaches - too disconnected from market supply and demand, too little linkages to future employers and job placements.
- **Microfinance** – very limited overall – less than 1% overall had access to credit. Some positive impacts in particular in urban areas, but not in rural areas, as well as inaccessible to returnees and people without collateral.
- **Support to return and reintegration** – most support was short-lived and focused on the individual. A lot of focus on the returns operation, with 3-month food ration, along with seeds, tools and non-food items. Limited longer term livelihood support and reintegration
- **DRR / Reintegration of ex-combatants** – generally recognised as a failure as focused on individualised approach with short term training/start-up capital. Overestimated abilities of individuals to reintegrate without community support
- **Infrastructure reconstruction (Roads and demining), Basic Services**

Market-supporting programmes

- **increased use of vouchers for seeds and tools, fishing kits, shelter materials** to attempt to

stimulate local markets and positive effects reported such as traders able to bring these good in increased numbers

- **Mercycorps programme in Ganyiel** - On the back of a local agreement by Nuer/Dinka groups support to trade across ethnic lines – both through unconditional cash transfers to displaced people and working with traders through 3 months cash transfers to replenish stock and meet increased demand, as well as support to transportation and organisation.
- **Input trade Fairs (ITFs)**
- **Lulu – Shea Butter Value Chain project** – supporting women’s groups for shea butter export

Examples of Integrated/layered programmes

- **VISTAS- USAID funded** supported customary reconciliation and peacebuilding at local level with funding for concrete implementation of certain resolutions, e.g. peace markets, constructing traditional courts, setting up early warning networks, providing water along migration routes, etc. Used ‘layered’ activities to create innovative synergies around for example migration centred issues.
- **ICLA -NRC** – holistic support to returnees in town to access land, refer to vocational training, link to jobs, psychosocial support etc.

Processes and underlying assumptions

The assumption behind many post-2005 interventions that investment in and restoration of basic services and socio-economic interventions would produce ‘peace dividends’ — leading to future conflict prevention and stabilisation and therefore recovered livelihoods were largely incorrect. No correlation between amount of aid spent and decrease of violence in certain areas was found. (Bennett et al. 2010) In fact, in many places violence continued, and insecurity was driven by poor livelihood outcomes rather than other way around. Interventions overlooked local causes of violence and lacked a real understanding of how interventions could contribute to end the violence and build peace.

In many places the restoration of security is the precondition to access the services that were built, so most people could not benefit so far. A much more sophisticated understanding of local conflict dynamics and sources of grievances and inter-communal conflict is needed. One key problem is large numbers of unemployed youth, engaged in cattle raiding, and politically directed violence – and a dearth of interventions geared towards youth and sustainable youth employment beyond short term FFW/CFW. (SLRC, 2016)

Relationships between aid actors and the Government changed when violence broke out again in 2013 and internationals were wary of engaging directly with the government due to atrocities committed by the security forces. While before then many donors supported the government with large amounts of aid for state building, infrastructure projects, service delivery, governance and capacity building, they quickly recalibrate programmes to work around governments, or at times more at state and local level.

Multi-donor funds and pooled funding mechanisms – ADD something on financing.

Outcomes and effectiveness

Despite the wealth of interventions that have been tried over and over again in South Sudan, there is very little literature on actual impact of interventions and what brought the impact about. Most reports, including available evaluations, focus on project outcomes and short term achievement of goals.

Aid interventions have done much every year to prevent further decline towards famine, through general food distribution, assets transfers, cash transfers, etc. — but most people remain stuck in perpetual cycles of food insecurity — and livelihood programmes continue to mostly operate in humanitarian modes.

Most interventions focus on external inputs to increase food production, yields, as well as increase cash or assets; few are working more holistically also on supply sides, along value chains, with traders and supporting markets as well as on removing barriers to food security (access to land, insecurity, etc.) There is a perpetual cycle where longer term/holistic activities even in more secure areas are also often not having the desired outcomes, as for example increase in yields doesn’t translate to gains for farmers due to a

lack of connectivity to markets due to poor infrastructure, pervasive insecurity, poor connections between farmers and traders/markets.

Some successful livelihood interventions, such as community animal health worker networks, seem to have been more sustainable during the previous conflict and the OLS than after 2005, when intra- and intercommunal violence was perhaps not as pervasive as today and did not target cattle as frequently as today. (SLRC, 2016)

The continued and now increasingly pervasive violence at community level does limit the kinds of programmes that can be carried out and needs realism as to what makes sense, i.e. no point working on restocking if this will only be an incentive to theft.

Key lessons

- Interventions **should focus on rebuilding / supporting social support networks** that have traditionally been key to food security and resilience in South Sudan. Studies from the previous and the current conflict show **that those with better social connections and wider support networks do better, whereas those without connections are the poorest and most vulnerable households**. Key will be to not inadvertently undermine them through programming. For example for cash programmes could consider giving more cash that can enable people to fulfil their sharing obligations rather than risk being ostracised for not doing so.
- **Programmes that take a holistic or integrated or 'layered' approach** which focuses on synergies created from interventions around particular issues tend to be more effective at addressing the problem. E.g. VISTAS project around cattle migration
- **Interventions should focus on removal of barriers to food security** (access to land, insecurity etc) **at the same time as focusing on immediate needs** and inputs in order to be more impactful and sustainable. Lessons can be learned from NMPACTs model and work on livelihoods during the last conflict.
- **Markets tend to continue to function**, to some extent, during conflict, even with limited supply and shorter supply chains. There are often opportunities to support markets in a smart way, even while continuing to deliver immediate lifesaving assistance in contexts such as South Sudan. Can learn lessons from Mercy Corps' work to restore markets on the back of local peace agreements between different ethnic groups, working creatively with both people and traders while supporting locally brokered agreements/linkages. Will need good understanding of local context and iterative approaches.
- **Markets /private sector in conflict are not neutral spaces, but often captured by powerful elites/military actors**. Even small scale, localised interventions can feed the overall war economy, hence importance of good political economy analysis of the whole picture, including how issues further down the supply chain, such as exchange rate differentials, or check points interact with the goals the programme wants to achieve and who ultimately 'wins' or 'loses'
- **Programmes targeting individuals rather than taking a community based approach tended to not be effective** given most people depend on kinship/social connections' support. For example both the DDR programme for ex-combatants as well as the large scale support to returnees after 2005 took individualised, short-termist approaches but did not focus on increasing the absorptive capacity of communities and work holistically by supporting people's social connections and (re)integration, thereby undermining the very support networks people had to rely on and at times exacerbating tensions. Those programmes that were more successful, for example ICLA programmes with returnees or others worked holistically to address a number of issues (e.g. support to returnees to access land, connect them to training/finance opportunities, connect to other support networks, supported community and host access to joint services and assets etc.)

- **Programmes need in-built flexibility to adapt approaches and outputs in contexts like South Sudan**, including changing overall strategy of working with government or only local government etc.

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Syria civil war 2011– ongoing

Nature of conflict: causes and consequences

Causes

There is unanimous agreement on when the ten-year long (and still ongoing) civil war in Syria started, but far less agreement on the underlying causes. Some political ecologists note that the preceding years of drought (2008 – 2009) in Syria and large-scale migration from rural to urban areas was the underlying cause.¹⁹³ Multiple academics dispute this simplistic claim, noting that while the drought was one of many contributing factors,¹⁹⁴ structural inequities from poor economic and social policies were the primary cause for Syria’s descent into civil war.¹⁹⁵ Grievances—from poor economic policies that pursued unequal urban versus rural development and a rentier state model meant that the fall in oil revenues in 2008 led to the GoS abruptly reducing fuel subsidies—the key lifeline of the agricultural sector. The reduction of subsidised fuel and overall food price increases were more keenly felt by farmers and the rural poor. Further, Assad’s social repression of the Kurdish ethnic groups through forced Arabization of prime agricultural lands; and greed—crony capitalism that benefited the minority Alawite (Shiite) ruling class and marginalized the Arab Sunni majority—all contributed to increasing discontent in Syria ahead of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring.¹⁹⁶ Syria’s conflict thus has roots in sectarian, religious and class divisions.

“The people want the fall of the regime.”

In February 2011, fourteen-year-old Mouawiya Syasneh and his friends were arrested and tortured¹⁹⁷ for spraying the popular slogan of the 2010 Arab Spring—*“the people want the fall of the regime”*—in the southern city of Dara’a.¹⁹⁸ Their families’ pleas for

¹⁹³ Kelley et al., ‘Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought’.

¹⁹⁴ Selby et al., ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited’; Selby, ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War, Part II’.

¹⁹⁵ Selby et al., ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited’; Selby, ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War, Part II’; Khan and Khan, ‘Syria’.

¹⁹⁶ Selby et al., ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited’; Khan and Khan, ‘Syria’.

¹⁹⁷ Doran, ‘The Boy Who Started the Syrian War’.

their release were met with derision.¹⁹⁹ Peaceful demonstrations for the release of the boys in Dara’a in March 2011, political reform and release of political prisoners was violently quelled and in turn sparked protests across multiple cities in Syria including Damascus.²⁰⁰ Academics note that President Bashar-al-Assad’s use of disproportionate force was to dissuade the political awakening of the 2010 Arab Spring which was gripping many parts of the Middle East, from taking root in Syria.²⁰¹ But this strategy backfired. Protestors initial demands for political reform turned into demands for a regime change. By July 2011, many members of the government army defected to join the protestors.²⁰² The primary armed opposition group—the Free Syrian Army—was born.

Nature and conduct of conflict

International governments took sides early on in the conflict. The West—US, UK, France allied with the pro-democracy protestors and called for Assad’s removal. Russia and Iran with motives to counter Saudi and US influence in the Middle East supported the Assad-led government.²⁰³ Besides these proxy wars, regional interests and the role of ISIS further complicated the Syrian civil war landscape. The Kurdish in the North East of Syria motivated by self-interests to establish an autonomous Kurdish region stayed out of taking a direct anti-GoS stance. ISIS entered the Syrian power vacuum in 2013 capturing large parts of oil-resource rich territories inside Syria and neighbouring Iraq. Turkey, initially allied with the West, became increasingly alarmed at the Syrian Kurds’ increasing control of territories at its Northern borders and military wins (backed by the US) in the battle against ISIS.²⁰⁴ Out of fear of what a Kurdish self-autonomous region in Syria would mean for the separatist ambitions of the People’s Kurdistan Party (PKK) who had long clamoured for an autonomous region in Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan switched allegiances

¹⁹⁸ BBC News, ‘Middle East Unrest’.

¹⁹⁹ Doran, ‘The Boy Who Started the Syrian War’.

²⁰⁰ BBC News, ‘Middle East Unrest’.

²⁰¹ Khan and Khan, ‘Syria’.

²⁰² Davenport, ‘History of Syrian Civil War.’; Khan and Khan, ‘Syria’.


²⁰³ Khan and Khan, ‘Syria’.

²⁰⁴ Khan and Khan.

siding with Russia, and also led a military campaign against the Syrian Kurds to capture key border areas of Northern Syria.²⁰⁵ Syria's civil war is complex web of military actors. and shifting alliances. Over the course

of the conflict military groups and factions proliferated and splintered often fighting with, against, or among one another. (Figure 1 recreated from Khan and Khan 2017²⁰⁶)

Figure 1: Actors and alliances in Syria's civil war



Despite this complexity, Russia's entry into the civil war in 2015 with military backing and support for the GoS was **the** gamechanger that allowed Assad to regain control of large swathes of Syria by early 2017.

Consequences for lives and livelihoods:

Direct effects

Few parts of Syria with the exception of sparsely populated zones have remained untouched by the conflict. All parties to the conflict have targeted civilian infrastructure—marketplaces, bakeries,

hospitals, schools and factories²⁰⁷; or engaged in crop or harvest burning²⁰⁸ --as a deliberate military tactic. An estimated 586,100 Syrians—majority civilians—have been killed;²⁰⁹ 5.6 million Syrians are refugees; and 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced (March 2020).²¹⁰

The economic costs of the conflict are estimated at USD 442 billion.²¹¹ The conflict-led destruction of value chains and US economic sanctions has resulted in trade declining from 8.7 billion USD (2010) to 0.7 billion USD in 2018.²¹²

²⁰⁵ Khan and Khan.

²⁰⁶ Khan and Khan, 6.

²⁰⁷ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 'Syrian Revolution NINE Years On'.

²⁰⁸ Linke and Ruether, 'Weather, Wheat, and War'.

²⁰⁹ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 'Syrian Revolution NINE Years On'.

²¹⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Syria Emergency'.

²¹¹ United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 'Losses Exceeding \$442 Billion and Millions in Need of Humanitarian Assistance: The Catastrophic Repercussions of 8 Years of War in Syria'.

²¹² United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 'Syria at War: 8 Years On'.

Displacement and lack of skills: The early years of the conflict saw population shifts from urban to rural areas as manufacturing units for textiles, soap etc., particularly in opposition-controlled areas were destroyed. Many urban skilled workers lost jobs, migrated outside Syria or displaced to rural areas. In recent (2021) developments, key informants note that the population movement is now from rural to urban areas. This is likely due to the GoS prioritising reconstruction and services in areas that have always remained in its control, as opposed to those that were recaptured from the opposition forces. The government has centralised its services in the capital cities of the regions it controls, with very few services being provided in rural areas.²¹³ Population movement—whether urban to rural, or the reverse—has meant that displacing individuals do not have the skills to survive in their location of displacement. Skills inside Syria were previously learned from previous generations or tradesmen, as opposed to formally taught in vocational training centres. The migration of skilled workers to other countries and destruction of traditional (urban) livelihoods—textiles, soapmaking, furniture-making etc.—has meant that many young people do not have the necessary channels or resources to obtain these skills.

Agriculture sector and irrigation-systems decimated: During the early phases of the conflict those in rural areas—particularly farmers -- remained since they had access to land. But agricultural systems—previously controlled by the GoS— including wheat stores and the technical capacity or knowledge of seed multiplication etc., embedded in line ministries were decimated. Nearly 50% of irrigation systems—that were previously used to irrigate 1.5 million hectares of agricultural land—has now been decommissioned due to damage from conflict; or stolen/destroyed equipment. Forty percent of private wells have also been destroyed due to the conflict.²¹⁴ Small scale producers have been impacted by the lack of agricultural subsidies, the cessation of extension

services including pest-control, lack of technical knowledge in identifying good quality seeds and products, and high prices for agricultural inputs (currently sold in the open market).

Growing war economy: Cross-border trade is primarily monopolized by large traders that are significantly enmeshed within the war economy.²¹⁵ There has been a proliferation of small individual market actors particularly in the supply of agricultural inputs, but they lack the cash and capital to invest and grow their businesses.

Social and economic harm of the conflict:

Social: Men including male youth have either been killed, disabled, arbitrarily detained and tortured in GoS prisons;²¹⁶ forcefully conscripted into military service;²¹⁷ or have fled Syria to avoid conscription. Women, women-headed households and female youth are now the primary breadwinners alongside domestic responsibilities but are ill-prepared to play economic roles.²¹⁸ One in three households inside Syria today is headed by a woman. Young girls are being married at a much earlier age as a means of protection and to cope against the economic impact of the conflict.²¹⁹

Economic: Markets have remained largely functional throughout the course of the conflict, but prices are high (10x higher than pre-conflict as early as 2017).²²⁰ Trade—both official and unofficial--across conflict/market lines continues. For example, the GoS buys wheat from the North East in exchange for other food and pharmaceuticals; similarly, vegetables and fresh produce from besieged areas (South/South Central) are purchased in exchange for wheat flour and fuel.

Psychosocial: Nine out of ten Syrians live in fear: fear for themselves, and for the physical and economic wellbeing of their families.²²¹ Men face intimidation and gender-based violence by military actors; prefer to remain invisible from local authorities due to

²¹³ Daher, 'The Political Economy of Syria'.

²¹⁴ Key informant interview_MR_Feb 2021

²¹⁵ Saint, Grandon, and Guicherd, 'Understanding Market Drivers in Syria'.

²¹⁶ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 'Syrian Revolution NINE Years On'.

²¹⁷ Al Jazeera, 'SDF Militia Forcibly Conscripting Teachers in Syria'; Al Jazeera, 'Syria Kurds Impose Mandatory Military Service'.

²¹⁸ Howe et al., 'The Wages of War'; CARE, 'Understanding Resilience Perspectives from Syrians'.

²¹⁹ Howe et al., 'The Wages of War'.

²²⁰ Howe et al.

²²¹ Howe et al.

forced military conscription; or report feeling emasculated due to their inability to generate an income.²²² Women have better mobility compared to men in crossing checkpoints to access marketplaces, but this comes with considerable trade-offs to their personal safety²²³ since bakeries and marketplaces have been deliberately targeted during the conflict. Children are staring down years of interrupted or poor-quality education and poor mental health outcomes. One in five Syrians is at risk of developing mental health issues. Despite an overwhelming need to address the mental health consequences of the conflict, aid actors report that there is a lack of funding and simply the inability to provide targeted support given the ongoing (and increasing) food insecurity.²²⁴

Indirect effects

“Syrians tell us that this year of all the years of this conflict is the breaking point.” – KII respondent

Currency devaluation: The Syrian Pound faced a steep decline in 2019 (*currently estimated at 1 USD = 3700 SYP as of Feb 2021*). The Lebanon financial crisis in 2019 effectively wiped out nearly USD 30 billion in wealth for the GoS, Syrian businesspersons and ordinary Syrians who store their money in Lebanese banks.²²⁵ The GoS in turn introduced fiscal policies forbidding the use of USD in areas under its control—exchange shops were shuttered and anyone found with USD faced arrests. All inward remittances into GoS control areas were directed via the government bank and exchanged at official rates (1 USD = 1250 SYP)²²⁶. But these policies to shore up the Syrian currency backfired. Non-GoS controlled areas—North West with economic links to Turkey and North East with political backing from the US—rapidly divested the SYP in favour of the Turkish Lira (NW only) and the USD (NW and NE-Syria).

Areas under GoS control are more impacted: The GoS remains the primary provider of essentials like bread, fuel, etc., in areas under its control despite the

significant decrease in subsidies.²²⁷ The recent currency devaluation of the SYP and GoS’ fiscal response has meant that today, GoS-controlled areas are more impacted by food shortages and price rise.²²⁸ There is a rising anti-government sentiment in the South with interview respondents noting graffiti similar to those seen at the start of the conflict.²²⁹

Increasing tensions between the GoS and the Self Administration:

Key informants note that tensions between the Self-Administration (NE-Syria) and the GoS over wheat produce has increased, with the GoS bypassing the Self Administration to offer producers and market actors with 2x the wheat price set by the Self Administration.²³⁰ The GoS’ move is likely reflective of the steep economic decline in the GoS controlled areas as a result of the recent currency devaluation. While previously the Self Administration sold excess wheat flour to the GoS (payments made in USD) the Self Administration has recently embargoed this trade, which has worsened flour availability inside Syria.²³¹ It is unclear if this embargo is in effect due to the GoS’ lack of hard currency or in response to the price wars.

Climate and Covid: Beyond the conflict impacts, Syria also experienced a drought in 2018 which significantly reduced the capacity of wheat producers to obtain a sufficient harvest. FAO interview respondents report that due to the lack of government capacity to provide water (and destruction of irrigation systems and wells during the conflict), many Syrians have resorted to drilling for water—water which is salty and resulting in a reduction of water tables inside Syria. Finally, with the arrival of Covid-19, multiple respondents note that local governing bodies across Syria imposed lockdowns which further decimated jobs and wage labour in many parts of Syria. (*Lockdowns have since been lifted.*)

Impact on ordinary Syrians: The currency devaluation has meant a 247% increase in the price of bread and fuel for ordinary Syrians from a year prior.²³² A lack of

²²² Howe et al.

²²³ Howe et al.

²²⁴ Key informant interview_MR_Feb 2021

²²⁵ Key informant interview, Feb 2021

²²⁶ Key informant interview_SC_Mar 2021

²²⁷ Daher, ‘The Political Economy of Syria’.

²²⁸ Key informant interviews, Feb 2021

²²⁹ Key informant interview_CC_Feb 2021

²³⁰ Key informant interview_NB_Feb 2021

²³¹ Key informant interview_MR_Feb 2021

²³² UN OCHA, ‘Syria | Global Humanitarian Overview’.

fuel and sporadic access to electricity has also impacted bakeries' capacity to produce bread and bread shortages inside Syria. In GoS areas, partners report that people wait in line for bread from 4 am every morning, but bakeries are only able to meet 60% of demand on a regular basis.²³³ Government employees in GoS areas today earn 20% of what their wages were worth pre-2019.²³⁴ Nearly 50% of Syrians are currently food insecure.²³⁵ From these compounded crises, wages have fallen—it currently takes seven-weeks of labour to feed one's family for four weeks.²³⁶ Key informants also note that an overall lack of economic opportunities is leading to increased reports of militia groups actively recruiting young people.²³⁷

Factors that support Syrians to adapt their livelihoods

A high reliance on social networks for information, protection²³⁸ and economic support—either as loans from social connections or market actors—have been the primary factors that supported livelihood adaptation for Syrians even after the start of the conflict.²³⁹ But over the course of the conflict, the economic capacity of these networks has considerably reduced.²⁴⁰

Functioning markets²⁴¹ and information on in-demand crops: In response to a lack of demand for cash crops such as cotton many farmers shifted from

producing wheat and cotton to short-cycle crops including coriander and cumin.²⁴² Farmers strategically made this choice based on market information on crops that can more easily be sold in local markets and transported across conflict lines. (Wheat as the primary staple is a heavily controlled commodity). A number of small businesses and entrepreneurs have proliferated and are currently providing agricultural inputs and tools previously provided by the GoS.²⁴³ Even as early as 2015 – 2016, the border crossing via North East Syria—Peshkhabour—saw a line of trucks carrying vegetables, livestock (sheep) into Iraq, which was reportedly exported to the Gulf countries; while seeds and agricultural implements were imported via Iraq into Syria.²⁴⁴

Current zones of control and fragmented humanitarian response

Syria currently resembles three separate countries in terms of actors in control and humanitarian response (*See Figure 2²⁴⁵*). The GoS however has very little control over key resource rich areas inside Syria. Turkey controls oil and fertile lands in the North; the Kurdish have control of wheat-growing regions and oil in the North East (including Deir-es-Zor). In effect, this has led to continued sporadic attacks including on oil refineries in Turkey-controlled Northern Syria.²⁴⁶

²³³ Key informant interviews, Feb 2021

²³⁴ Key informant interview_SC_March 2021

²³⁵ UN OCHA, 'Syria | Global Humanitarian Overview'.

²³⁶ Key informant interview, Feb 2021

²³⁷ Key informant interview_MR_Feb 2021

²³⁸ Howe et al., 'The Wages of War'; CARE, 'Understanding Resilience Perspectives from Syrians'.

²³⁹ Howe et al., 'The Wages of War'.

²⁴⁰ CARE, 'Understanding Resilience Perspectives from Syrians'.

²⁴¹ Howe et al., 'The Wages of War'.

²⁴² Saint, Grandon, and Guicherd, 'Understanding Market Drivers in Syria'.


²⁴³ Saint, Grandon, and Guicherd.

²⁴⁴ Author's observations from working in the North East between 2015 and 2017

²⁴⁵ 'Infographic'.

²⁴⁶ Al Jazeera, 'Missile Strikes Hit Oil Refineries in Northern Syria, Killing One | Conflict News | Al Jazeera'.

Figure 2: Zones of control as of 2019. (Notes in text box added by author)



Response and effectiveness

This section is ordered based on interventions where effectiveness of the intervention is borne in external evaluations. Where such evidence exists, this information has been included immediately following a description of the intervention.

1. Food security and basic needs: Food—delivered either in-kind, as restricted vouchers or through cash-based modalities (USD 50 per month per household) and multipurpose cash—previously USD 120/month, currently USD 100/month for 3-months—are the primary food security interventions in Syria. In non-GoS areas, partners provide 8-months of regular food aid; while in GoS areas WFP and partners provide 12-months of assistance. The Food Security cluster and Cash working Group (CwG) coordinate coverage among partners as well as standardise values/frequency of the response. Market monitoring reports (REACH) are conducted on a regular basis to assess market availability of key goods and prices to support decisions on the use of cash or in-kind food modalities.

Effectiveness of multipurpose cash for women.²⁴⁷

Cash offered women with a layer of social protection, allowed debt repayment, reduced reliance on social connections and increased economic independence. Women also report short term improvements in psychosocial wellbeing—reduction in anxiety and stress. But some women reported negative consequences—household-level abuse; and jealousy and suspicion within the community on why they were selected. Some women worried that their social connections would rescind informal forms of support, even after the cash assistance ended. (Past media reports in Syria have reported aid workers pressuring women for sex, in exchange for humanitarian aid.)²⁴⁸ Overall women did not report a positive or negative change in household relationships. However, widows and divorced women in particular reported extended family members trying to interfere in their economic decisions. Authors find that since cash programs are

short-term with a primary focus on providing economic relief, it does little to change pre-existing household dynamics.

2. Integrated livelihood and psychosocial support: In North East Syria, Humanity Inclusion (HI) trained local staff to provide three-weekly home-based psychosocial support (PS) sessions. The first session was aimed at building trust with the entire family, and the second and third session was aimed at the primary household-head (men, women, PwDs) to understand household-level stressors and aspirations for future livelihoods. The PS-sessions were provided to a randomly selected pool of participants who were also receiving other types of agriculture sector interventions—agricultural inputs—seeds, tools; or livestock feed.

Effectiveness of integrated livelihoods and ps-wellbeing:²⁴⁹ Standalone livelihood programs for farmers had a positive impact on psychosocial wellbeing, but integrated psychosocial-livelihood support programs had an even greater impact. In particular, participants with disabilities benefitted the most from these integrated programs. The integrated livelihoods and PS-wellbeing support approach was found to have a higher impact on women compared to men.

3. Rural development projects: IFAD—International Fund for Agricultural Development—provided the Government of Syria with loan support and technical capacity in five key areas: production of biogas to increase availability of home cooking fuels; solar cookers; mushroom production for sale in the marketplace; conservative irrigation techniques; and egg incubator projects.²⁵⁰ The IFAD loan—estimated total cost USD 58 million with co-financing requirements—was approved in 2007 (i.e., pre-conflict) and the loan period ended in 2015.²⁵¹ The IFAD fund was intended to reach 190,000 individuals—tenant farmers, women and youth in North East Syria (Al-Hassakeh province). **Note:** Evaluation of this project was conducted in 2018 (that is three-years following the program end) but the

²⁴⁷ Blackwell et al., 'Women's Status and Qualitative Perceptions of a Cash Assistance Programme in Raqqa Governorate, Syria'; Falb et al., 'Cash Assistance Programming and Changes over Time in Ability to Meet Basic Needs, Food Insecurity and Depressive Symptoms in Raqqa Governorate, Syria'.

²⁴⁸ BBC News, 'Syria Conflict'.

²⁴⁹ Ziveri, Kiani, and Broquet, 'The Impact of Psychosocial Support on Well-Being and Agency within an Inclusive Livelihood Programme'.

²⁵⁰ Alobid et al., 'The social and economic impact of small projects in al-hasaka province, syria'.

²⁵¹ International Fund for Agricultural Development, 'North-Eastern Region Rural Development Project'.

evaluation was only conducted with **eighty-five** participants.

Effectiveness of rural development projects:²⁵² Two-thirds of production projects are able to continue, but participants report that they are not able to save any money. In the case of mushroom production, participants struggled with marketing the production of their outputs due to a lack of knowledge regarding the product markets or lack of proximate markets for sale of these products.

4. Food and agriculture value chain interventions:

4.1. Subsidised flour: In North West Syria, local partners provide subsidised flour to bakeries—at the cost of USD 300/metric ton. In GoS controlled areas WFP provides subsidised flour to government-owned bakeries. WFP interventions are meant to complement or fill gaps in the GoS subsidies to bakeries, however WFP interview respondents note that given the steep deterioration of the government’s financial resources and capacity, WFP interventions have replaced government support.

4.2. Wheat, olive and vegetable value chain: In North West and North East Syria, INGOs and Syrian NGOs (S-NGOs) provide farmers with vouchers or cash to purchase agricultural inputs—seeds, tools, irrigation drip kits—from local market actors. Farmers also receive cash for harvest to pay for local labour—intentionally designed to benefit women or women-headed households inside Syria and based on assessments of gendered-division of agricultural labour. Farmers are selected based on an assessment of pre-existing skills and capacity, and land ownership—a majority participants are either small or medium-land holders or tenant farmers. Vegetable farmers are also linked to individual women, who in turn pickle/preserve local vegetables for sale in the marketplace. Interventions were chosen based on market assessments that find Syrians’ preference for local produce in the marketplace; a demand for Syrian produced olive oil which is unofficially transported and sold in Turkey and other parts of Europe; and greater access to olive plantations in the North East compared to Raqqa (previously ISIS-control; a large producer of olive oil in Syria).

4.3. Seed multiplication and quality certifications: In the North East and North West of Syria, one INGO is supporting farmers with seed multiplication techniques to improve farmers’ seed stock and quality, for the following planting season. This intervention was chosen to address the gaps left by the large-scale destruction of seed siloes and erosion of good quality wheat seeds during the conflict. The INGO is also supporting olive oil quality certification laboratories to enable olive oil farmers to sell their produce to Turkish traders at a better price.

5. Climate-smart agricultural investments: Partly in response to the large-scale fuel shortages or high prices and as a response to the 2018 drought inside Syria, livelihood actors in the North East and North West of Syria introduced solar water pumps, drip irrigation kits to farmers, and provided technical capacity in water conservation techniques and support in greenhouse vegetable farming techniques.

6. Community water infrastructure repair and rehabilitation: FAO and partners support with the restoration of community-level water irrigation networks, small-scale or light touch rehabilitation of water irrigation equipment and hand it over to the community. Due to donor funding “redlines” that preclude FAO from providing any support to line ministries, FAO and partners only engage at the household or community-level.

7. Small and medium enterprise support: Based on labour market assessments in urban areas such as Aleppo, INGOs (with S-NGO operational support) provide individuals with financial, technical and business skills support to start small businesses in urban areas. These interventions are designed to address gap in skills when people displace from rural to urban locations.

8. Women’s entrepreneurship support: UNDP is currently supporting 45 individual women entrepreneurs across all parts of Syria with financial support and technical/business skills capacity. The call was designed to provide gender-sensitive women’s livelihoods inside Syria that builds on women’s own ideas of what is culturally acceptable and ways to reach other women in the community. Examples of ideas funded: Women’s catering service (Damascus)

²⁵² Alobid et al.

with revenues generated from these businesses to support women experiencing Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) or gender-based violence; women providing vocational training to other women, in previously male-dominated fields/professions (Raqqā—previously-ISIS control) to address the gaps in demand left by men due to forced conscription or death/disability in the conflict.²⁵³

Response—implementation

9. Integrated approach: INGOs and UNDP report taking a three-pronged approach for all livelihood programs inside Syria—**provide** food/cash or access to other basic needs; **protect** existing assets including livestock and small ruminants or mobilising savings and loan groups; and **promote** the establishment of pre-conflict (or new) livelihoods. Interventions are targeted at different individuals with varying skills and capacities within the community, however for INGOs short funding timelines (primarily 12-months) is a key barrier in achieving a coherent strategy. (UNDP has independent funding and reports far more success with taking an integrated long-term approach.)

Effectiveness of long-term flexible funding:²⁵⁴ An evaluation of Australia's three-year assistance finds that the scale of funding, geographic focus, and programs included were all appropriate. A mix of modalities and funding length—multiyear funding (MYF) in particular—was found to increase efficiency and effectiveness with partners reporting better VFM. MYF also reduced the need for partners to gain government approval—a considerable bureaucratic barrier that D-INGOs report in programs operating in GoS areas—and allowed for longer, uninterrupted implementation periods. Unallocated funds in years two and three allowed partners to better respond to dynamic, changing contexts. Authors recommend that future MYH packages should include flexible funding in earlier years.

²⁵³ Key informant interview_GN_Feb 2021

²⁵⁴ Hemsley and Achilles, 'Aid in Limbo: Why Syrians Deserve Support to Rebuild Their Lives'.

²⁵⁵ 'UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions', accessed 8 March 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=syria&cbtype=syria.

10. Political dynamics of the conflict has an impact on a principled and neutral humanitarian response in Syria: Until 2017 a majority of humanitarian actors accessed Syria via cross-border operations from Turkey (into the North of Syria), North East (via Iraq), and local partners in the South/South Central. A few INGOs sought and received approval to operate out of Damascus. The GoS' recapture of large swathes of Syria in early 2017 with Russian military backing has meant that Russia uses "national sovereignty" to veto or limit humanitarian access into Syria for non-Damascus based INGOs. The current resolution (UNSC 2533) is limited to one border crossing--Bab-al-Hawa in the North (via Turkey) and is set to expire in July 2021.²⁵⁵ Damascus-based INGOs continue to advocate the GoS for independent humanitarian assessments, reducing bureaucratic red tape in program start-up; and better information sharing with UN agencies.²⁵⁶ INGOs and local partners operating in other parts of Syria—North East (governed by the Self-Administration²⁵⁷) and North West—administered by the Syrian Interim Government and the Salvation Government (Hayat Tahrir-Al-Sham: HTS, a designated terrorist organisation previously linked to Al Qaeda) also face challenges in negotiating with local authorities. However, local authorities' interests in gaining legitimacy²⁵⁸ have meant that humanitarian actors are better able to dictate pre-conditions of humanitarian engagement.

In GoS controlled areas, external studies report that businessmen particularly those in the diaspora that are aligned with the GoS have established charities that are closely networked with GoS authorities, while also limiting and disbanding locally established community initiatives.²⁵⁹

Effectiveness of sustained and principled humanitarian access: In a shifting political context and changes in INGO access inside Syria, trusted Syrian partners are the key to both sustained access and a more effective response inside Syria. External

²⁵⁶ Hemsley and Achilles, 'Aid in Limbo: Why Syrians Deserve Support to Rebuild Their Lives'.

²⁵⁷ Previously the "Kurdish" Self-Administration has reportedly dropped the "Kurdish" nomenclature in a bid to gain legitimacy with the Arab populations in the North East.

²⁵⁸ Financial Times, 'Syrian Jihadi Overhauls Image in Effort to Hang on to Power'.

²⁵⁹ Daher.

evaluations find that where donors have invested in building Syrian NGOs’ operational **and** organizational capacity, these have been effective in supporting a principled humanitarian response. Syrian partners also have considerable local knowledge and trusted individuals that they can rely on within the community to help ensure that humanitarian aid does not fund the significantly enmeshed war economy inside Syria.

Key lessons

Causes and nature of conflict

Grievances—from poor economic policies and unequal urban-rural development; the Government of Syria’s social repression of Kurdish ethnic groups; and greed—crony capitalism that only benefited the minority Alawite (Shiite) ruling class and marginalized the Arab Sunni majority—all contributed to increasing discontent in Syria ahead of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring. In March 2011, peaceful demonstrations in the southern city of Dara’a following the detention and torture of two young boys for spraying anti-government graffiti was violently quelled. The government’s disproportionate use of force sparked protests in large parts of Syria with protestors demanding for a pro-democracy regime change. Many military personnel from the government’s army defected and joined the protests. The Free Syrian Army—the primary armed opposition group was born.

The West—US, UK, France allied with the pro-democracy protestors; Russia and Iran with motives to counter Saudi and US influence in the Middle East supported the Assad-led government. Besides these proxy wars, Kurdish interests in establishing an autonomous state in North East Syria, ISIS’ entrance into the Syrian power vacuum, and Turkey’s military campaign against the Syrian Kurds to thwart separatist ambitions among its own Kurdish population have all led to complex and shifting military alliances in the Syrian conflict. Military groups and factions proliferated and splintered often fighting with, against, or among one another. All parties to the conflict have targeted civilian infrastructure—marketplaces, hospitals, schools and factories; or engaged in crop or harvest burning --as a deliberate military tactic. As of March 2020, an estimated 586,100 Syrians—majority civilians—have been killed; 5.6 million Syrians are refugees, and 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced.

Direct and indirect effects of the conflict:

The economic costs of the conflict are estimated at USD 442 billion. The conflict-led destruction of value chains and US economic sanctions has resulted in trade declining from 8.7 billion USD (2010) to 0.7 billion USD in 2018. Markets have largely stayed functional throughout the conflict, but the SYP took a nose-dive in 2019—the Lebanon financial crisis resulted in the GoS, Syrian businesspersons and ordinary Syrians losing access to nearly USD 30 billion stored in Lebanese banks. The GoS’ fiscal policies to halt black market use of USD and shore up the Syrian currency backfired and has led to non-GoS controlled areas rapidly divesting the SYP in favour of the Turkish Lira (North West Syria) and USD (North East and North West Syria).

Syrians in all parts of the country have been affected by an over 247% increase in the price of staples and fuel. Government employees have seen the value of their salaries drop by 80% of its pre-2019 worth. Covid-19 related lockdowns further decimated jobs. Temporary wage labourers now have to work for nearly 7-weeks to be able to provide basic food needs for their households for 4-weeks.

The prolonged conflict and lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities has eroded the mental health of Syrian men and women—nine out of ten report living in fear, daily. Men have been killed, maimed in prisons or conscripted into military service. One in three households in Syria is now headed by a woman. Women and female youth have become the primary income earners but lack the economic skills to take on this responsibility. Social networks are no longer able to provide economic support.

Responses and Impacts

Humanitarian assistance—including food and cash--is the bulk of donor investment but has limited effectiveness.

Multipurpose cash is a relatively more effective modality compared to food and has been found to improve short-term economic independence and psychosocial wellbeing for women. However, these effects are not uniform for all women participants. Cash actors should be careful to mitigate any negative consequences for women participants.

Livelihood interventions are more effective in reducing recurring needs *and* improving psychosocial wellbeing, but donor investments are limited.

Pockets of stability—particularly in non-GoS controlled areas inside Syria is expanding partners’ ability to provide longer-term livelihood interventions. In a protracted conflict such as Syria, addressing the psychosocial wellbeing of Syrians is a huge priority and will need targeted support, but studies find that standalone livelihood interventions in Syria themselves can improve participants’ psychosocial wellbeing. NGO partners also report downstream effects for women. Agricultural labour is a historical historically a woman’s income source in Syria.

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Uganda

Nature of conflict – causes and consequences

Causes

Uganda had been in near permanent strife since 1966, just after independence. A bloody civil war in the West and in the south of the country ended when President Obote was overthrown in with a coup by in 1985 that overthrew led by an Acholi from Northern Uganda, Tito Okello, and the formation of a Joint Military Council of the various rebel groups. In 1986, the vice-president, now President Museveni, overthrew President Okello and seized power. Long-standing ethnic tensions in the country were exacerbated when Museveni's National Resistance Army, dominated by tribes from the West, conducted revenge attacks in the north, home to both the tribes of former presidents Obote and Okello. Civilians were killed and a mass cattle raiding operation was conducted together with the traditional rivals of the Acholi, the Karamojong, and almost the entire livestock population of the whole agro-pastoral region were stolen or rapidly sold off.

A resistance movement (the 'Holy Spirit Movement') was created in 1987–88, which reached close to Kampala before being decisively defeated. From 1988 a new rebel force was created, incorporating disenchanted members of other former rebel groups from the war against Obote and from the former national army. The group deliberately tried to make Uganda ungovernable, using terror and attacks against both civilians and state infrastructure as a weapon. The NRA (from 1995, called UPDF) was also brutal in its counter-operations, increasing resentment of the local population against the regime and accusations that they were supporting the rebels. Peace talks were believed to be on the verge of bringing an end to the conflict in 1994, but then collapsed in an atmosphere of mistrust.

Attacks on the population grew, as the power of the LRA grew with the support of the Sudanese government, in retaliation for the support of the Ugandan government for the (then rebel) SPLA. A new phase of the conflict began in 1996 when the government introduced policy of forced encampment of the civilian population which continued to expand to wider areas. The rural population was given no

notice of their forced displacement and sites where they were ordered to congregate, euphemistically called 'protected villages', had not been prepared to accommodate them. In 1996 around 400,000 people were in camps, but this policy intensified and by 2002 the vast majority of the Acholi population were in camps or had left the region, and the local economy was destroyed.

The LRA petered out as an active force in Uganda from around 2005, leading to progressive population movements of IDPs back to their origins over the following years.

Consequences for lives and livelihoods

The northern economy had been a major agricultural surplus producing region ("breadbasket") country and a main supplier of livestock and of oil crops (sesame and groundnuts), and linked directly by rail to the Kenyan port of Mombasa. The collapse of the agrarian economy because of the loss of livestock plunged the region into high rates of poverty, which even before mass displacement were the highest in the country at over 60% (using a national poverty line below that of the international standard). There was substantial urban growth both from migration/displacement of population and of investment, but little livelihood security in the informal economy that arose.

Individual villages and households faced catastrophic damage of livelihoods if they were attacked by either of the warring parties, from loss of life, serious injury, looting of possessions. Over the course of the war, this affected a huge number of people. Over 50% of the population of Acholi suffered from one or more serious crimes (Mazurana et al 2014).

Much of the country was benefiting from investment in post-war recovery (from the 1980-86 war) and vast sums of development aid, but this investment was lost to the north. One estimate has identified specific planned industrial development investments worth US\$20m which were redirected to other parts of the country (Dorsey and Opeitum 2002).

Trade with the rest of the country was increasingly disrupted. Frequent rebel attacks on lorries carrying cargo increased the costs of doing business, raising prices and reducing the availability of goods in the north. This was exacerbated by the poor condition of the roads, made worse by the danger of undertaking

maintenance – and possibly the de-prioritisation of investment in infrastructure for the north – made attacks on lorries easier and more frequent at places in the road where it was known that they had to move slowly.

Forced encampment saw a new level of impact on livelihoods. Much of the displacement as ordered at harvest time, and standing crops worth millions of dollars had to be abandoned together with personal possessions, decapitalising the rural economy almost completely. In camps, strict limitations were placed on freedom of movement (FoM), and in many camps people were only allowed to cultivate to a radius of 2 km or less. Given the size of the camps, this meant very little access to farm land. The camps were situated on private land, which meant that IDPs had to negotiate to rent plots, often at a cost of around a third of the harvest or in return for cultivating an equivalent area for the landowner. The owners of the land where the camps were sited lost much of their land.

There were further restrictions on farming with the army often slashing any tall crops grown in proximity to roads or near camps, and people fearing to grow sweet cassava away from the road because it was a favourite crop of the LRA. There was a decline in growing the main staples of the region (cassava, sorghum, maize and millet, and of rice and sesame) in favour of sweet potatoes and beans. Inputs, including vegetable seeds were difficult to access in the camps. By 2003, most households were farming less than 0.2 ha and producing just a quarter to a half of their own food (measured in Kcal).

The vast majority of the population was now living in absolute poverty, which created difficult conditions for anyone trying to establish a small business – even if they had the capital to do so. Market demand for anything except the basics was very limited, and casual work opportunities in the camps were limited. Where there were construction projects, some were either able to obtain daily labour or they made bricks to sell to the construction projects – with knock-on employment opportunities, often for women, in carrying water for brick construction.

Because attacks continue on camps, many women would walk in each night to town to sleep on the streets where they felt safer, walking back the next day ('night commuters'). Apart from the human

suffering that this evidenced, it reduced their time and energy for economic activities.

Brewing/distilling and alcohol sales were a significant source of income for many, fuelled by the increasing consumption of alcohol – and, almost certainly of undiagnosed alcoholism – brought on by enforced idleness, loss of purpose, loss of hope and depression.

Access to forest land became dangerous, with fears of attacks from both LRA and UPDF, but people continued to depend on natural resources exploitation because of the lack of any alternatives. Men made charcoal where it was sold by the road for around half its cost just a few kilometres away outside the conflict area; men and women collected firewood and poles and thatch which were often sold to those who needed them to construct their huts in the camp.

Land became an increasingly politicised and fought-over asset across the country, following its privatisation in 1996 and the statutory recognition of customary ownership. (Previously land had been owned by the state.) conflict exacerbated the situation in the north.

Traditional authority had been weakened and in those areas where there was less displacement (eg in the Lango sub-region just to the south of the Acholi sub-region), land disputes were common, and land-grabbing was common, targeted at those who were regarded as weak (widows, the old or disabled, those without adult sons, the poor, those without connections). A study of one village, interviewing all the widows in the village, found that over 80% had suffered from attacks on their land rights. The rights of rural landowners were ignored by the Government which created camps on private land, and generally by the aid sector when creating social infrastructure, behaving as if all rural land were communal. (The contrast with what would be seen as acceptable on urban land was striking.)

Land disputes intensified on return from camps, because some IDPs moved out of camps before others, but were not necessarily able to immediately return to their village of origin. Later arrivals could find their land already occupied. Disputes were exacerbated because many of the traditional markers of land boundaries had been destroyed, some of the elders who knew the details of land ownership had died, and because of a general breakdown in the social ties governing the society. There were a large

number of people particularly vulnerable to land-grabbing, including female headed households (widows, divorcees and most vulnerable of all, separated women) and people returning from abduction by LRA, who were often treated with hostility – and whose status was an opportunity for appropriating their land, which since 1996 had become a valuable and marketable asset.

Employment in the aid sector was sought after, but required education or connections. It was not unknown for the politically powerful to insist that their relatives were given jobs. Those with land in town and access to capital could rent out houses to aid workers. The rich, often allegedly using money gained from corruption, could build hotels for workshops.

The state provided very little support to those in camps through policy. Camps were set up without any basic services. Education was hard to access. Spending allocated to health posts was returned to the treasury if the population had been displaced, rather than redirecting those funds to where the excess population was now encamped. The long term impacts of a generation who lost an opportunity for education will continue to be felt in northern Uganda for many years.

Return was gradual from around 2005-8. Although the farming economy received something of a (short-lived) boost with the opening of the border with southern (now South) Sudan, which sourced much of its food from Uganda, pushing up farm-gate crop prices, the economy has still not recovered. In 2011, a third of the chronically poor in Uganda were in the northern region, despite it having less than a fifth of the population. By 2016/17, poverty rates in the north as a whole were 33%, compared to the national average of 21%.²⁶⁰

Effects on national economy

In 2001, just before the height of the war, its total cost to the Ugandan economy was already estimated at US\$2bn (in 2021 USD). The estimate made of ongoing costs suggested that costs would have reached over US\$4bn by the end of the war. This includes the lost income from farming in the north,

loss of tourism, loss of tax revenue, lost infrastructure and military costs.

For most of the conflict, Uganda successfully portrayed itself as a development success story and it was a large recipient of foreign aid. It did not suffer from catastrophic inflation or devaluation – the shilling depreciated by less than 50% over the worst ten years of the conflict (1996-2006). However, inflation was held in check partly by a tight monetary policy and very high interest rates. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess how far the costs of the war to the economy slowed down investment and, in particular, concentrated investment in the hands on those who could access investment capital from rent-seeking rather than commercially obtained funds.

Responses

Relief interventions

Food assistance

The main intervention in the food security sector was a general food distribution that continued throughout the conflict. In-kind food aid was the only intervention used at scale. (Emergency cash programming did not emerge globally as a relief assistance modality until towards the end of the conflict.) The volumes of aid were very significant. In many years, programmes were designed for a 100% ration (i.e. covering all of the populations calorie needs), but it did not cover people's total livelihood or even food needs. People received only around half of their calorie needs from food aid, because of irregularities with distributions and people's need to sell a proportion of their food aid to cover other needs (including to mill the grain they were given so they could prepare it) for which people typically sold around 20% of their ration. Considering people's other needs, it was found that direct household transfers only provided around a third of people's total food and cash income: this was significantly less than a third of their needs because they were failing to meet many of their needs. However, in very difficult circumstances, especially relating to security, the mass food aid operation broadly succeeded in preventing excess mortality, and

²⁶⁰ The national poverty line used was around \$0.88 per day per person.

rates of acute malnutrition were largely kept below emergency thresholds.

Food aid was targeted at people in camps, with little assistance for people who had fled to towns. Food aid was also only regularly distributed in those camps where the government had ordered the civilian population to be concentrated (inaccurately referred to as ‘gazetted camps’), and not to people who were displaced in spontaneously created sites. This was a major protection failure and a breach of humanitarian principles. (Aid should have been distributed according to need – and those in spontaneous camps often had greater needs – and with neutrality, rather than effectively supporting the government’s policy of forced displacement.)

Towards the end of the conflict, cash aid was piloted by one NGO. This was suspended when a vehicle carrying bank-notes was attacked, after an announcement about the upcoming distribution had been publicised. Monetary transfers to households were later piloted for supporting return and recovery in what was then considered innovative programming.

Food for work/Public Works

This was commonly used in populations where displacement was lower and in areas recovering from the conflict. (IDPs were receiving unconditional transfers and there were fewer opportunities to construct assets with those confined to camps). Despite being so widespread, evaluations point to the common failings of these programmes, that the quality of the assets created was poor and it was “difficult to show results beyond output”. ‘Cash for work’ began to attract interest after the war, though it was regarded as experimental programming, even though most construction of schools, roads and other infrastructure in Uganda was undertaken using labour paid in cash.

Assistance in other sectors

A huge operation to help people in camps also covered other sectors including water, hygiene and health. These all have livelihood implications but these are beyond the TOR of this study to examine.

Livelihood support

Livelihood support to the conflict affected population was extremely limited for a number of reasons. IDPs confined to camps were considered as needing relief, which was partly seen as an alternative to supporting

people's own livelihoods, although this perhaps under-appreciated the extent to which those receiving relief also needed to earn their own living as well. Economic opportunities were very limited, making it difficult to know how best to help independent livelihoods. This was compounded by a difficult security situation making access to populations intermittent, limiting both the opportunities to gain more familiarity with people's situations and their opportunities and then to work with them to advance their livelihoods.

The Government’s interest in presenting Uganda as a post-conflict success story matched the political interests of donors, who neglected the conflict for many years until it was forced to their attention. Even then, it was not prioritised by all. Some donors were supporting development through direct budgetary support, help to finance the Government’s own strategy for combatting poverty. As a result, development resources tended to be directed to the more peaceful parts of the country favoured by the Government rather than to those who needed them most.

Agricultural extension

Some national development services continued to function at some level in some conflict affected areas. The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) has some coverage, delivering the same packages of support as elsewhere. This included the promotion and distribution of new seed varieties. Evaluations found that these ‘were appreciated’. There was no systematic assistance for farming that addressed the specific production constraints in camps – particularly the lack of land, lack of inputs, poor soil fertility, lack of freedom of movement to ensure timely field operations, restrictions on the crops that were allowed by the army and difficulties with marketing.

The extension model was later changed from one where farmers groups were responsible for contracting their advisory services to one based on a model farmer approach. It was found that the choice of model farmers (who were the beneficiaries of grants of inputs with substantial value) was highly political. Given the conflict situation in the North, it was not found that the power of the Party officials was used in a conflict sensitive way. (Uganda was a one-party state until the end of the Civil War.)

One study found that there was no improvement in agricultural productivity from extension, by comparing areas where agricultural extension programmes were running compared to control areas.

Seeds and tools distributions (S&T)

As in every crisis in the Great Lakes region, every season aid agencies distributed free seeds of the main crops and hand-hoes. Because people had so little land to farm, their hand tools did not wear out in a single season and after every distribution, many tools ended up in local markets. In some areas, bordering the more secure parts of the north where some agricultural development programmes were being implemented, this created tensions because it was undermining their attempts to develop agro-input businesses.

There are no rigorous assessments available of the impact of S&T. There are reports that farmers felt the lack of supply of some seeds, in particular of some vegetable crops, but the main seeds distributed were largely available, and the quantities needed by most were limited by the size of the land they were able to access for farming. Additionally, many switched to sweet potatoes as a staple crop, because it was fast growing, could be harvested gradually and produced more calories from a small area. The main benefit to recipients was probably limited to the value of what they were given, or the discounted value at which they sold it.

Community grants

The conflict happened at the time that Social Action Funds (SAF) were fashionable, and the World Bank financed large SAFs in northern Uganda, including in the war-affected areas. These had several elements, as often found in SAFs around the world. Much of the funds went on infrastructure which was chosen and managed through 'community driven development'. The exact models used for the management of the funds varied throughout the conflict, and this has been found to make a big difference to the power dynamics involved in the use of the funds.²⁶¹

Impact was highly uneven, as might be expected. In many cases, infrastructure was created that matched

people's needs and with money going into the local economy – many IDPs in camps, for example, earned a living by making bricks for sale to such projects. In other cases, the quality of construction was poor, the choice of projects was in the hands of a few and funds were badly managed.

Cash grants to groups

The social action fund model also involved giving grants for productive investments to groups typically of 15-20 members. This included some limited coverage to IDPs in camps but in the Acholi subregion it was more commonly used in urban areas. This model was also occasionally used by NGOs to IDPs, where community management of the project was a response to the NGO's difficult access. The most popular use of cash transfers was for livestock.

The intention was that the grants would provide investment capital to groups of individuals who would manage profitable productive businesses, that would in turn further stimulate economic recovery in northern Uganda. Evidence of impact is limited, but it was found that the majority of the groups were very short lived, and were no longer functioning as groups after eight months.

This is not surprising, for a number of reasons. Group members were found to have had very low influence over the management of the grants. In many, perhaps most, cases the groups were highly artificial. Most of the population could not meet the requirements of submitting eligible proposals as a result, a better-off and/or better educated individual would invite a number of people to create a "group" under their leadership. Patron client relations were thus built in from the very formation of the group. The governance arrangements were designed to remove one cause of sub-standard inputs, since group leaders received funds directly and could to some extent ensure the quality of they were receiving. However it created another problem of elite capture by group leaders.

It is reported that there was a degree of corruption with demand for payments in order to get project authorisation. One report stated that this could be 'up

²⁶¹ See Birner et al 2010 for a detailed analysis of the governance issues in several different implementing modalities.

to 70%' of project funds. There are also problems of ghost group members and even ghost groups.

Accountability mechanisms, including systems for feedback and complaints, were insufficient. People with disabilities were found to have largely been excluded from benefiting from the SAF as a whole.

Restocking

Apart from the provision of grants which many groups used to purchase livestock (see above), and also specific programmes for restocking. The government was managing a large programme, ostensibly for restocking cattle in northern Uganda, but for political reasons the great majority of the country was included in the programme. There were enormous problems of corruption with the government scheme in both purchasing and in targeting. Many of the livestock provided were found to be young animals worth less than half the amount paid for them. The identification of beneficiaries through Party officials was highly politicised and apparently corrupt.

There were also some NGO restocking initiatives, which included training and financial/material support for animal housing. These projects showed mixed results. In some cases, animals had multiplied enabling recipients to sell some for income and still to maintain their initial holding. Other recipients suffered from cattle raiding and high mortality. In camps, there was great difficulty in finding adequate grazing land.

Other interventions

Animal health: There was a limited intervention in community animal health workers (CAHWs). This project was not in accordance with state policy on veterinary care, but livestock mortality was reportedly very high and it was felt to be beneficial. No detailed information is available about impact. There is also no information available about the sustainability of the CAHW system. This may be in doubt, if support to CAHWs was not part of government policy on livestock. On the other hand, it could legitimately be argued that the long-term sustainability of a critical

livelihood service with a secondary consideration in response to the acute crisis that people were facing.

Seed multiplication: There was some support for local seed multiplication in northern Uganda, but this does not appear to have existed during the height of the conflict will people in camps. Reports of support to set multiplication are limited to the early years of the war, before displacement in 1996, and after the war for supporting agricultural recovery. No information is available about its impact.

Land: Access to land in the short term and protection of land rights in recovery were among two of the most pressing livelihood problems faced by rural people in northern Uganda. Following the systematic destruction of their livestock, land was almost the only asset of value that people owned: without it, they could not farm and there were very few livelihood alternatives. Very little was done by aid agencies to help address land problems, but there were a few initiatives small-scale.

One programme directly rented land from leaseholders²⁶² and then allocated plots to beneficiaries to farm for one season. The programme paid the army to ensure security and regular access to the fields for IDPs in the nearby camp. Unfortunately, project funding ended just before harvest, and without the financial incentive, the soldiers then did not allow IDPs access to the land to harvest the crops that they had grown. Apart from this operational failure, there must be serious questions raised about a project contracting the army to provide security for civilians, when this is its only justification for existence. The risk of feeding a war economy is high. Had security been arranged through negotiation, this might have been a model worth replicating.

A less formal advocacy initiative did take place, led it seems by a UN organisation, that was successful in the short term in expanding the area available for farming. The army was persuaded to increase the distance from the camp IDPs were allowed to go for cultivation, vastly increasing the area inside the permitted circle. Apparently, the government had an interest in the UN led S&T distribution, and the need to allow IDPs enough land to use the seeds was used

²⁶² Before privatisation of land in 1996, land could only be held on leasehold from the state. Very few people in rural areas leases, and only of large areas of land.

to convince the military to relax FoM restrictions. This mediation/advocacy was entirely informal and no documentation about it having occurred can be found. There is therefore no evidence about its impact, but one can assume that increasing land for farming by 400% had a significant impact on food production and household welfare.

At the end of the conflict, various organisations became interested in land rights and in particular women's land rights. Different approaches were favoured by different organisations. Some promoted mediation and alternative dispute resolution for dealing with land conflicts; others were supporting registration of land rights; one was formally documenting customary land law; others were providing counselling, legal assistance and paralegal services. Although some organisations reported on outputs (e.g. the number of disputes which they had mediated), it is unfortunately difficult to find documented evidence of impact.

Key lessons

This review of the aid operation to Northern Uganda 1996-2006 undertaken in 2021 shows that substantial change has occurred in the aid sector in the past two decades. Notable differences from responses to current crises include: the absence of cash responses; the absence of any possibility of mobile money transfer; the absence of discussion of social protection; the absence of discussion of market support in the humanitarian context (despite significant investment in agricultural markets in Uganda as a whole during the period); and even the fact that very limited information is publicly available via the internet.

The humanitarian sector was largely successful in achieving its mandate. However, it was not equipped to deliver livelihood support. Development assistance was being provided on a huge scale to Uganda during the civil war, but was largely absent from the conflict areas.

We know that despite the war and despite the harsh conditions of forced displacement, IDPs continued to have some economic life, though this was often highly limited. Support for those livelihoods was needed and even if there are only a few cases where there is good evidence of success, even this is enough to prove that in principle it is possible to support livelihoods – even

in an acute civil war with the population confined in camps.

The vast majority of people did not receive any livelihood support during displacement – or even on leaving the camps, to help them to rebuild their lives (beyond a last food ration). Investment in support to the IDPs' livelihoods was not undertaken at anything like the scale needed. Given the ability and relative successes of agencies in delivering relief assistance, it is probable that livelihood support was not undertaken on the scale which would have been possible.

One of the reasons for delivering limited livelihood support was insecurity, which made project implementation more difficult. One or two attempts were made to pilot remote implementation, i.e. giving support without being present or visiting camps. Such remote implementation presented challenges, not least for accountability to donors – and to affected populations – where livelihood support followed the model of transferring productive assets (cash, inputs, livestock) to designated households or groups of households. This model remained dominant in both humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance during the conflict in Uganda. (It remains a dominant model in livelihood support for the displaced and in resilience programming to this day.)

There was a lack of support for marketing. Outside of the camps, this was seen to be critical for agricultural change in conflict affected areas, as shown by two private sector initiatives. In the east of the country, also affected by the war though to a lesser extent, farmers profited from production of a new variety of sorghum provided by a brewery, which also guaranteed the market. In the north west, a similar impact was seen towards the end of the war with new varieties of sunflower supplied by a vegetable oil factory. Further northwest, agricultural livelihoods had been rebuilt after displacement from an earlier conflict by tobacco production (though at an environmental cost), again where both inputs and a market were supplied by a company.

We know very little about the impacts of interventions. Very little is documented. This is only in part an evaluation deficit. Even where evaluations exist, they present little evidence about impacts, either at the level of livelihoods or even at the level of (for example) agricultural productivity. In some projects, it even appears that agencies were more

concerned about activities and outputs in the design and management of interventions than they were about impact.

The limited evidence on impact from the national development programmes that included Northern Uganda is not encouraging. Agricultural extension failed to improve crop yields; group ventures that received substantial grants broke up within months; public works programmes were poorly targeted and did not create viable assets. However, this does not necessarily mean that the programme *type* was inappropriate. The failings could have been in the way that programmes were implemented - for example, in the failure to match design and context (see above). Conclusions about the relevance of programme *types* would need evidence from several projects that had used a similar approach or design, in order to see which factors shaped outcomes (including the choice of programme type, the detailed design or implementation).

It is probably true that the majority of programmes to support livelihoods did not have significant positive impact. Although this is an unwelcome conclusion, it may be the most important one. The high level of relative failure to achieve impact should not be seen as a criticism of individuals or organisations concerned. A great many development programmes fail to achieve impact, because achieving successful impact is difficult. In the middle of a civil war, where the social fabric is broken down, economic infrastructure has been destroyed, security makes all contact with the client group difficult and intermittent, achieving success is many times more difficult. It is not clear that there is sufficient recognition by any stakeholders related to the programmes of the difficulties involved and the relatively high likelihood of programme failure.

The comparison between the different models by which agricultural extension and community grants were implemented illustrates importance of governance in determining impact. There is a clear conclusion that the success of the programmes (i.e. impact) is derived from the *performance* of the programme, how it was enacted. Neither performance nor impact can be read off from the design: the shaped by the match between design and context. Small changes in design shifted the balance of power between different stakeholders enormously. How this affected impact depended on relationships

between the different stakeholders, including trust, the role of politics, their ability to hold each other to account, etc. Successes in one place cannot simply be copied in another.

In some places, national development programmes were implemented in IDP camps, including the use of grants for groups (NUSAF) and agricultural extension (NAADS). It is not possible from an evidence review to determine how far NAADS was implemented in a standard way (i.e. promoting the same agricultural messages as elsewhere), ignoring the fact of encampment; or whether there was any attempt to promote agricultural techniques or crops that were particularly appropriate to the displacement situation. The fact that reporting about the project does not disaggregate any information about the camps vs settled populations (i.e. even of outputs) does not suggest that the agricultural extension service explicitly took on the challenge of supporting people as IDPs in camps. This is an unfortunate gap. Farmer were struggling to farm on tiny exhausted plots. Evidence from other conflicts, and from areas in Uganda that were recovering from a lesser degree of conflict shows that in such circumstances, farmers most want a high value crop with a guaranteed market and guaranteed input supply (e.g. the role of poppies in Afghanistan, of sorghum for a national brewery in Eastern Uganda, sunflower seeds for oil processing in the Lango sub-region after displacement had ended, and tobacco in the West Nile area of northern Uganda following their return from an earlier displacement). Could it have been possible to find such a crop and a market, possibly taking advantage of the relative difficulties farmers would have had in defaulting on commitments by side-selling given their confined situation?

Investment in recovery was limited. Donors perhaps felt that after many years of sustaining a large population, needs were going down as people became more able to take care of themselves. In other words, recovery needs were measured by humanitarian standards. Investment bore no relation to the scale of losses which had been inflicted on the population and to the local economy. This was not a government priority. If aid donors wish to prioritise post-conflict areas for development assistance, this may cause tensions with the principle that donors support development policy set and owned by sovereign governments.

Mental health was not addressed during the war, except for a few small projects offering ‘psycho-social support’. Mental health has also not been given attention during recovery.

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Yemen

Nature of Conflict -- Causes & Consequences

Yemen has been subjected to a cascade of crises since the outbreak of hostilities in late 2014 following the capture of Sana'a by the Houthis. Along with a coalition of Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia began its current military campaign in early 2015 in an attempt to roll back gains made by the Houthis. Blockades instituted by all conflict actors have disrupted the importation of key commodities--including fuel--driving up the prices of staple foods and goods. In addition to a deadly war, competition from the Houthis and the Government of Yemen (GoY) over the control of key aspects of the economy have led to its weaponization. This has manifested in divergent exchange rates, the battle over control of trade and importation leading to recurrent fuel crises, severe pressure on the banking and financial sector, and the double taxation of many key businesses.

Ground fighting and aerial bombardments have led to the deaths and injury of tens of thousands and displaced nearly 4 million Yemenis.²⁶³ 2020 proved to be a devastating year in the conflict as COVID-19 resulted in early lockdowns and new frontlines emerged. From cholera outbreaks to the threat of famine and the weaponization of the economy, six years of conflict have left more than 16 million Yemenis food insecure and nearly 20.7 million in need of humanitarian assistance.²⁶⁴ Historically, however, food security issues have pre-dated the current conflict. Numerous economic and political shocks in the 1990s, along with variations in agricultural inputs, have resulted in a population that is almost entirely dependent on imports for most of its basic food commodities--a situation exacerbated by conflict

actors' attempts to secure control of Yemen's numerous ports.

2021 may prove to be a decisive year in the history of conflict, as the Houthis battle to gain control over the city of Marib and UNOCHA forecasts further declines in the socio-economic environment.²⁶⁵ Although Yemen narrowly avoided a famine declaration in 2018, UN officials raised the red flag of famine again earlier this year, warning that the window of opportunity to avert widespread hunger is quickly closing.²⁶⁶ While food and commodities remain present in markets, the continuous depreciation of the Yemeni riyal and the reduced purchasing power of households has severely diminished households' capacity to meet their needs.

Nature & Conduct of Conflict

As the Arab Spring swept the region, 2011 saw the ousting of President Ali Abdallah Saleh following 33 years in power with his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi, assuming leadership. The catalyzing event of the current conflict is debated by both sides; however, it can be agreed that 2014 and 2015 proved to be pivotal turning points. Late 2014 saw the capture of the capital city of Sana'a by the Houthis--a Shiite rebel group with links to Iran--whose demands for lower fuel prices was used as a pretext for calls for a new government. Following failed negotiations at the beginning of January 2015 and the resignation of President Hadi, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Gulf countries launched a series of blockades and air strikes in an attempt to roll back territorial gains by the Houthis. A political solution has remained elusive as parties to the conflict have repeatedly walked away and rejoined the negotiations table. Nearly seven years later, control of Yemen is nearly divided in half, with the Houthis in control of most of the north and the GoY having maintained control over the south.

²⁶³ Yemen. (2021). Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/yemen>

²⁶⁴ Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021. (2021). UN OCHA. <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021>

²⁶⁵ Elbagir, N., Robertson, N., Arvanitidis, B., Platt, A., & Khalid, A. (2021, March 2). *Houthis say they've seized majority control of key city in Yemen*. CNN. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/03/middleeast/houthis-marib->

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²⁶⁶ Hyde, M. (2021, March 10). *"This is hell": UN food aid chief visits Yemen, fears famine*. AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-sanaa-famine-david-beasley-philanthropy-9de48557737362bbe9e1c3f05dcbca89>

Consequences for food security and livelihoods

Direct Effects

The conflict has had a devastating impact on human security, with widespread hunger and internal displacement. The main direct impacts of the conflict include:

Rising Food Insecurity. While food insecurity predates the conflict, six years of conflict have left 16 million Yemenis food insecure, more than 5 million of whom are experiencing emergency or catastrophic conditions (Integrated Food Security Classification [IPC] 4 or 5).²⁶⁷ Although the government authorities managed to keep food prices stable early on in the conflict, the degradation of the private sector and decline in local production have helped drive up prices. High levels of food insecurity have forced households to resort to utilizing negative coping mechanisms, including reduced food consumption and early withdrawal of children from school.

Destruction of Infrastructure. A 2016 damage and needs assessment by UNDP estimated that the total cost of damage to overall infrastructure in Yemen was somewhere between four and five billion USD.²⁶⁸ With energy, water, and agriculture infrastructure the most frequently targeted by Saudi coalition airstrikes, destruction of civilian infrastructure was found to have compounded crises, magnified need, and resulted in massive risks to human security.²⁶⁹

Collapse of the Education System. Approximately 2,000 schools have been lost due to partial or total destruction or are now being used to shelter Yemenis

displaced by the conflict, and two million children are now out of school.²⁷⁰ Challenges to the education system have been exacerbated by the suspension of salaries for most public servants including teachers, many of whom have not received regular payment of their salary since 2016.

Suspension of Salaries. A significant portion of the Yemeni population benefits from the public sector salaries, with numbers suggesting that as high as 30% of the workforce was employed by the public sector.²⁷¹ Salaries by the GoY were suspended in September 2016 following a liquidity crisis, with education and health among the hardest hit sectors. However, while salary payments resumed in early 2017, this was limited to government-controlled areas. The loss of salaries and a stagnating economy have helped drive up recruitment by armed groups, particularly among young men who are desperate to earn an income.

Mental Health Crisis. As one report emphasized, “the ongoing conflict is continually increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to trauma” with outsized implications for the health and well-being of Yemenis.²⁷² Estimates from 2017 suggest that nearly one in five Yemenis struggles with a mental health disorder. This crisis is further compounded by a number of factors including widespread stigma and lack of accurate information regarding mental illness; a small mental health workforce in which there are only 40 psychiatrists total to serve a population of about 28 million; and a shortage of donor funding for comprehensive services.²⁷³

²⁶⁷ *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021* (2021).

²⁶⁸ Moyer, J. D., Bohl, D. K., Hanna, T., Mapes, B. R., & Rafa, M. (2019). *Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen*. UNDP. <https://pardee.du.edu/assessing-impact-war-development-yemen>

²⁶⁹ Sowers, J., & Weinthal, E. (2021). Humanitarian challenges and the targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Yemen war. *International Affairs*, 97(1), 157–177. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa166>

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²⁷¹ Al Bashiri, M. A. (2019). *Economic Confidence Building Measures – Civil Servant Salaries*. Sana’a Center for Strategic

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²⁷³ *Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Assessment: Needs, services and recommendations to improve the wellbeing of those living through Yemen’s humanitarian emergency*. (2019). International Medical Corps. <https://cdn1.internationalmedicalcorps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/IMC-Yemen-2019-MHPSS-Assessment.pdf>

Indirect Effects

In addition to creating new and ever-evolving crises, the conflict has also exacerbated (and been exacerbated by) existing challenges to infrastructure, livelihoods, and the environment. These indirect effects include:

Environmental/ Agricultural Degradation. Several years of conflict have aggravated environmental and agricultural degradation in Yemen, resulting in “severe agricultural distress.”²⁷⁴ While decades of water and land management policies have contributed to the vulnerability of the environment and agricultural systems, direct attacks on farmland, reduced access to water and agricultural inputs, and the collapse of the Yemeni government have accelerated their degradation. Climate change has further aggravated these vulnerabilities, as Yemen has had to reckon with repeated locust swarms and heavy rains and flooding.²⁷⁵

COVID-19 & Livelihoods. Like many other nations, Yemeni authorities--GoY and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis--implemented a number of measures to help slow down the spread of COVID-19 at the beginning of the pandemic. As a result, many daily wage workers lost their livelihoods due the restrictions on movement and gatherings in public places. Moreover, as factories and businesses were forced to close, many households lost their primary source of income, leading to significant market losses.

These losses were further exacerbated by misinformation surrounding disease transmission, with some key informants reporting a decline in the demand for fresh produce due to the belief that purchasing and consuming them could lead to catching the virus. Although restrictions have been lifted and markets have reopened, partners reported that small business profits have not returned to pre-COVID levels.

²⁷⁴ Darbyshire, E. (2020). *Report: Yemen’s agriculture in distress*. Conflict and Environment Observatory. <https://ceobs.org/yemens-agriculture-in-distress/>

²⁷⁵ Gebre, S. (2020, December 17). New Locust Swarms in Africa, Yemen Prompt UN Appeal for Funds. *Bloomberg*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-17/new-locust-swarms-in-africa-yemen-prompt-un-appeal-for->

Effects on National Economy

As the Houthis have expanded the territory under their control over the past six years, competition over the management of the economy has increased between all parties to the conflict. While the GoY has access to international financial systems and some ports through which key commodities pass, it continues to fight for control over economies in the north, particularly over the import and trade of fuel. This has helped give rise to a pervasive black market as Houthi authorities have attempted to make up for losses in its fuel trade, driving up the costs of fuel and contributing to rising food insecurity. In addition to the weaponization of the economy by both the Houthis and GoY, the national economy has been impacted by several key financial developments, including the relocation of the Central Bank of Yemen to Aden and rapid devaluation in the national currency.

Central Bank of Yemen

Following the capture of Sana’a by the Houthis in 2016, the GoY relocated the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) to Aden, further exacerbating the financial crisis. With the CBY serving as the main source of communication between Yemeni and international banks, this move by the GoY led many international banks to put in place de-risking policies that led to the denial of letters of credit for small businesses and local and international non-profits. Ultimately, de-risking by international banks and subsequent delays in money transfers was found to have contributed to the rise of the war economy and corruption.²⁷⁶ Along with the politicization of the CBY, these factors helped give rise to a strong black market where food and fuel are sold at inflated prices and led to the proliferation of unofficial (and often) corrupt money brokers.

Currency Devaluation

In response to rapid devaluation of the Yemeni Riyal and with very few options on the table, the GoY began printing new banknotes between 2017 and 2018.

[funds?utm_source=url link](https://p.dw.com/p/3ghVD); Floods in Yemen kill 130, displace thousands, rebels say. (2020, August 8). *Deutsche Welle*. <https://p.dw.com/p/3ghVD>

²⁷⁶ For further discussion on the impact of de-risking on the economy of Yemen and the humanitarian response, see [El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2018](#).

Ultimately, the Houthis banned the use of these new banknotes in areas under their control, resulting in a split currency with differing value and threatened to further split the economy in two. Old banknotes are now increasingly in demand in Houthi-controlled areas and, by extension, have a higher value compared to new banknotes. Key informants noted that even old notes that are damaged and would otherwise be removed from circulation continue to retain a higher value. With significant differences in the 'exchange rate' between these banknotes, the Houthis have been able to profit off of the old banknotes and purchase foods and fuel from GoY, selling these goods at inflated prices. This has resulted in stark differences in prices for fuel, food, and other key commodities between GoY and Houthi-controlled areas, contributing to increases in food insecurity.

Responses

From conflict to near famine and now COVID-19, humanitarian actors have primarily operated in emergency mode, addressing the immediate needs of Yemeni households and working to prevent the country from tipping over the brink into famine.

Humanitarian & Emergency Assistance

Humanitarian assistance has primarily addressed two needs during the Yemen conflict: food security and social protection concerns. Support has been delivered in the form of in-kind food baskets and vouchers, as well as cash assistance to help households address immediate needs. However, with no political resolution in sight (at least in the short term), humanitarian actors are increasingly exploring ways to integrate transitional programming and shift toward early recovery activities.

Food Assistance

Food assistance remains the chief intervention delivered by humanitarian actors, led largely by the World Food Program (WFP) and primarily provided via food baskets and paper vouchers redeemable at select vendors.

Although WFP has reached nearly 10 million households per month across Yemen, delivery of food

baskets remains rife with challenges, with key informants and the literature reporting the significant costs associated with its delivery and delays in delivery, a situation further complicated during the initial phases of the COVID-19 lockdowns.

Food assistance has been a critical source of support for vulnerable populations, with partners reporting that vouchers have been particularly successful in improving the food security of women and children because cash is frequently controlled by male heads of household.

Key informants reported that while it helped to temporarily protect household assets and improved some health and malnutrition outcomes, improvements thanks to food assistance were short-lived. It did not help to build the resilience capacities of households or provide sustainable paths for NGOs to wind down programming in the short- or medium-term.

Cash Assistance

Cash assistance has played a considerable role in the humanitarian response in Yemen, taking the form of multipurpose cash (MPC) transfers and at times layered with rehabilitation and livelihood interventions. Evaluations from partners found that cash was effective in improving the food security of households. However, food security gains from MPCs were found to erode within several months of the last transfer, aligning with key informants' statements that cash only provides short-term relief for households. This echoes findings from the literature that cash programming must take contextual factors into account and draw stronger links between modality choice and programmatic objectives.²⁷⁷

Some additional findings related to cash and social protection and social cohesion include:

- A significant amount of cash has been programmed through social safety nets such as the Social Welfare Fund. This support, including from the World Bank and others, has largely been considered effective in meeting immediate needs through existing government systems and help

²⁷⁷ Ward, S., & Qatinah, A. (2019). *The Gendered Dimension of Multi-Purpose Cash Supporting Disaster Resilience*. CARE. <https://carevaluations.org/evaluation/the-gendered-dimension->

[of-multi-purpose-cash-supporting-disaster-resilience/](#); Schwab (2020).

address some of the underlying structural causes of the conflict. Need remains especially high among IDPs and other vulnerable populations.

- However, reporting by partners suggests that a lack of understanding between humanitarian and social protection actors has resulted in high levels of variance in their targeting mechanisms and likely significant overlap in beneficiary lists.²⁷⁸ They called for improved coordination between humanitarian and social protection actors to scale up protection efforts and improve delivery mechanisms.
- In communities where good targeting practices were implemented--e.g. targeting the poorest and most vulnerable households--cash was found to improve the standing of community leaders and helped to establish them key conduits for local authorities and NGOs.²⁷⁹
- However, in instances where cash assistance was not implemented alongside awareness-raising or sensitization efforts, it contributed to fears of corruption and patronage within the community.²⁸⁰

While cash programming has been critical in the Yemen response and improved food security, it has only provided short-term relief and not been large or extensive enough for households to build up their assets or savings. This has led some partners to call for complementary activities focused on financial inclusion to be included alongside cash programming, such as the creation of and/or support to Village Savings and Loans Associations.

Early Recovery

Key informants and the literature emphasized the need for integrated programming that address cash assistance as well as market interventions and social protection needs. As the conflict approaches its seventh year, partners are increasingly exploring

²⁷⁸ Nimkar, R. (2021). *Humanitarian cash and social protection in Yemen: CaLP case study*. The Cash Learning Partnership. <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/humanitarian-cash-and-social-protection-yemen-calp-case-study>

²⁷⁹ Bagash, T., Perezniето, P., & Dubai, K. (2012). *Transforming Cash Transfers: Beneficiary and community perspectives of the*

avenues to begin early recovery and reconstruction activities in Yemen, with an emphasis on livelihoods and market activities. Key informants repeatedly called for comprehensive approaches that promote livelihoods and strengthen households' ability to cope in the face of ongoing shocks and stresses.

Livelihood Support

Partners have been providing livelihood support since the early days of the conflict as part of a response that integrates both humanitarian and development assistance. Integrated humanitarian and development approaches could, for example, include identifying households that possess the skills and capacities to benefit from livelihood interventions during targeting for food and cash assistance. However, livelihoods programming remains limited, both in scale and scope, due to limited resources and donor appetite.

With the suspension of salaries, some Yemenis have established small businesses to help generate income and offset the loss of their salaries. Mercy Corps programming in Yemen has recognized the opportunity provided by these emerging small businesses and provided technical training and assistance along with financial support to local business owners to help improve livelihood outcomes.

Partners underscored the need for investments in underdeveloped industries and sectors, including agriculture and fisheries. Local actors have already been conducting assessments of key value chains, and partners report that there are increasing opportunities to invest in parallel sectors--such as manufacturing--to help develop them further and create new employment opportunities.

Small business support in the form of vocational training may be especially critical for Yemeni youth, who continue to struggle with access to educational opportunities in Yemen and abroad, and improve their employability.

Women are increasingly engaging income-generating activities, presenting a significant shift in gender roles

Social Welfare Fund in Yemen. ODI. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/transforming-cash-transfers-yemen.pdf>.

²⁸⁰ Bagash, T., Perezniето, P., & Dubai, K. (2012); Samuels, F., Jones, N., & Malachowska, A. (2013).

in some regions of Yemen and one that is occurring largely out of necessity. This includes engaging in handicrafts work at home that is then sold in their local markets, but some partners have reported that women are also utilizing social media to sell their wares online.

Market Systems

Market monitoring and analysis has been central to the humanitarian response, providing a macroeconomic understanding of the impacts of the conflict on markets. However, while economic analyses have been crucial in understanding the prices of commodities at the governorate or regional level, partners report they have not been as successful in understanding changes and challenges in the supply chain. Key informants suggested that this information could help facilitate more timely decision-making, allowing them to use analysis regarding these trends as an early warning mechanism to forecast challenges to food security, etc. Additional key findings from the literature and key informants include:

Key informants reported that they continue to work with local market actors to establish new enterprises, identify ways to bring goods and services closer to the community, and work with them to create new opportunities to integrate them into value chains.

Key informants emphasized that there is opportunity for creativity when it comes to designing and implementing market interventions, encouraging investments that focus on improving the purchasing power of households in the face of a fluctuating currency and investing in emerging sectors like solar panel installation.

Some findings in the literature suggested that investments in early recovery and reconstruction, such as the reconstruction of local agriculture infrastructure, may strengthen livelihoods and market interventions.²⁸¹

Markets have struggled exponentially over the past several years, especially in the face of rising food prices and the spiraling of the Yemeni Riyal. More recently COVID-19 lockdown measures have reduced

demand, both due to misinformation around the virus and the loss of salaries as a result of manufacturing shutdowns. Despite their potential, market-focused activities remain very small scale, with limited donor appetite to invest in market-based responses.

Strengthening Local Partnerships

Despite the strategic and contextual knowledge they provide, local NGOs have only played a small role in the humanitarian response thus far. This is exacerbated by a dynamic in which INGOs primarily rely on local NGOs to operate as contracting agencies and local partners' lack the capacity to deliver assistance in a timely manner. Key takeaways on local partnerships include:

- Local NGOs are included in some cluster meetings, particularly in discussions concerning food security. However, because they do not yet possess the technical capacity, they have been excluded from certain sectors.
- Current project timelines--typically 12 months--complicate INGOs ability to collaborate with and include local NGOs in the planning and design process.
- Key informants have emphasized that local organizations are better able to gain the trust of key local stakeholders and community leaders, have an improved understanding of local market dynamics, and are able to reach isolated regions that are often more operationally expensive to access and work in.
- Partners have found that they have been particularly successful in engaging women in humanitarian and development when local partners have led discussions and engagement with community leaders. They have emphasized that working with and abiding by local gender norms--especially in more conservative regions--helped to build trust between participants and NGOs.

²⁸¹ *Addressing Food Crisis in Yemen*. (2019). CARE Yemen. <https://careevaluations.org/evaluation/addressing-food-crisis-in-yemen/>; *Integrated Basic Emergency Assistance to Conflict-Affected and Vulnerable Communities in Yemen Project*. (2020).

Care Yemen. <https://careevaluations.org/evaluation/integrated-basic-emergency-assistance-to-conflict-affected-and-vulnerable-communities-in-yemen-project/>

As partners are beginning to identify pathways for early recovery programming, key informants identified this as a critical opportunity to strengthen the capacity of local NGOs, increase local ownership, and create equal partnerships.

Key Lessons

Shifts from humanitarian to development assistance-- and the presumed benefits that would bring to supporting markets, livelihoods, and food security-- continue to be hindered by the conflict and insecurity. Little of the current funding has gone toward addressing the factors that perpetuate the conflict and increase the risk of future insecurity. Such a shift would help households better respond to these factors, interrupt the cycle of conflict and vulnerability, and strengthen their resilience to emerging shocks and stresses.

As the conflict continues, there are several key lessons to consider:

- **Need remains high.** The education system has approached the brink of collapse, with children's education interrupted due to displacement or the need to work. With salaries suspended and livelihood opportunities few and far between, young men are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups--often one of the few sources of a stable income. While emergency assistance has saved lives, communities are increasingly in need of long-term solutions to their food security and livelihood needs.
- **Continued insecurity and instability is requiring a shift and commitment to early recovery and livelihood programming.** These responses, which include shoring up local markets, restoring basic service provision, and expanding sustainable income opportunities, could help address the underlying factors driving insecurity and increasing reliance on negative coping strategies, such as child, early and forced marriage.
- **Stronger local partnerships are crucial to stronger humanitarian and development responses.** A shift toward early recovery could provide a critical opportunity to strengthen the capacity of local NGOs, increase local ownership,

and create equal partnerships. Key informants have emphasized that local organizations are better able to gain the trust of key local stakeholders and community leaders, have an improved understanding of local market dynamics, and are able to reach isolated regions that are often more operationally expensive to access and work in.

- **Underdeveloped sectors--including agriculture and solar energy--are rife with opportunity.** Upfront investments may pay off in the long term, empower communities and strengthen their resilience and self-reliance despite ongoing insecurity. Solar energy is a salient example of an underdeveloped sector that could prove to be sustainable and also aligns with existing community-based reconstruction efforts.
- **The need for psychosocial support is high, yet donors have invested little resources or funding.** Integrated humanitarian and development approaches that focus on livelihoods may contribute to improvements in psychosocial well-being and long-term decision-making. However, with many children struggling with the impacts of the conflict--both physically and mentally--key informants and reporting from partners emphasized the need for specific investments in mental health and psychosocial support.

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Annex B Grids of interventions

Afghanistan

Measure	Effectiveness	lessons
For IDPs		
Vocational training (also for returnees) SALAM (UNDP): Project was to have been 5 years, 5 provinces, \$120m. Only had \$6m, so 1 Province, 3 years,	Didn't help create employment, tried to help people to be job ready [<i>a common issue with VT/job creation projects?</i>] 1,200 trainees in total (\$5K/benef). Run through Ministry Lab (MOLSA), but not part of mandate or function of MOLSA. No evidence on how many sustainably into work – or the net impact (ie who lost the job opp/business?)	Need to analyse where employment/self-employment is a matter of political economy, macro-economics, skills shortages or other – e.g. lack of networks. They got the wrong solution (using MOLSA) for the wrong problem (it was mainly a PE and E issue, not skills.)
Direct hand-outs Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) (2015-) Inter-agency preparedness mechanisms for rapid response to fresh displacement (200K-300K new IDPs p.a. post 2015) Mainly cash, but also did other sectors (eg WASH). One-off payment c. \$250, depending on market prices, for one month's needs for immediate shock. Common agreed Interagency M&E framework – which only allows concs on outputs, not on outcomes.	'absolutely not cost-efficient' due to its reliance on the 'pre-positioning' of teams, vehicles and other resources to enable a rapid response should a shock arise. Used sometimes for small pop groups, where there are no economies of scale. Interagency collaboration did not improve efficiency.	"consortia should never be encouraged by a donor unless they arise organically". Too much attention to 'the system', not enough on finding local solutions?
Non-IDPs		
School feeding – 25% of resources. Design shortcomings and conceptual confusion... its original design as an emergency response mechanism to get children back		

<p>into school after a period of conflict is no longer applicable in a country where demand for education now outstrips supply.</p>		
<p>Food aid (2001-2)</p> <p>Sudden (perceived) need for large hum response in country where H activity was minor. Agencies shifted sectors to suddenly 'do FS' at scale. Urgent hand-outs of food and NFI before winter ('life-saving'), targeted FFW.</p>	<p>Evals: Food reduced stress migration, and distress asset sales and debt; reduced food prices.</p> <p>Evidence on trade flows, inc imports, suggests that despite fears (and reports), food <i>availability</i> would not have been a major crisis without food aid, as markets functioned despite conflict – though evidence of some price reduction with aid.</p> <p>One agency used independent FNS assessment, not WFP, to trigger response. Logistical achievement.</p> <p>FFW? See FFW!</p>	<p>Why were they caught out? Incomplete contingency / emergency preparedness planning undertaken prior to September 2001 despite being 3 years into the worst drought in recent memory and in a country that had been at war for decades. Agencies must look out the window.</p> <p>Not enough details on the agency vs WFP assessments, but a question of principle: trade-offs with standardised and monolithic (or collaborative and coordinated) assessments? With creation of clusters, one agency now has more hegemony than in 2001.</p>
<p>FFW</p>	<p>Value of assets unproven – no evidence for irrig system, and agency vehicle was the only that had used the road!</p>	
<p>Support for business investment</p>		
<p>Micro-credit</p> <p>Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) – multi-million multi-donor project under MinFin through WB.</p> <p>Support to 15 MFIs within 5 years using imported models, mainly group lending (mutual guarantees), some individ. Typically \$100-\$600 for first cycle loans.</p> <p>USAID support for credit unions (member-only loans).</p>	<p>'little focus on assessing returns on investment by borrowers'. High repayment rates, even i rural areas, but partly because borrowers prioritise repayment over repaying informal loans – but at what cost? Returns are generally low to investment in many areas.</p> <p>Emphasis was put by MISFA on achieving sustainable and viable MFIs – but this affects their products, how they lend, where they go. Policy was successful but it doesn't guarantee that MFIs help finance sustainable and viable businesses through their loans.</p> <p>Significant use of loans to repay credit that falls due.</p>	<p>Strategy of using large intl MFIs to create a new sector possibly appropriate – but it doesn't replace informal sector and has a secondary role in credit for most (esp. rural) areas.</p> <p>Policy of rapid growth to achieve economies of scale may not be appropriate.</p> <p>Don't assume lack of credit is the problem. Far more vibrant informal sector – inc interest free loans – than recognised in policy, inc credit from wholesalers and using multiple sources of credit.</p> <p>Repayment doesn't mean everything is OK! Careful what you monitor.</p>

<p>With 5 years, >350K borrowers, >\$100m loan value mainly 4 big intl MFIs – but 40% in Kabul. Most credit still informal in rural areas.</p>	<p>MFIs had their packages – they didn’t assess nature of demand in villages. T&C varied a lot. Worked through village power structures.</p> <p>MISFA has got better over the years – changing emphasis on role.</p>	<p>Micro-credit may lubricate investment but it doesn’t create investment opps on its own. Capital was not the only constraint for most. B=needs to be part of a bigger dev't strategy.</p> <p>Less useful for the poor than for the non-poor or just-poor.</p> <p>Need to understand informal micro-finance sector to develop products that <i>complement</i> it.</p> <p>Informal credit plays many roles, can’t be jeopardised, even if it’s somewhat exploitative. But formal MFIs can replace some more exploitative forms of credit if well targeted – esp in trading relationships.</p> <p>Need to support MF programmes to develop and adapt over the medium term. No-one gets anything right first time.</p> <p>Variety in product offerings is useful!</p>
<p>Irrigation support. WB, FAO, managed by Ministry</p> <p>2004-11, \$130m</p>	<p>Project ‘efficiently and effectively managed’, (benefitted from rare stability with staffing).</p> <p>Reports that area under irrigation has increased, crop yields have increased and a substantial increase in land values. Supported traditional irrigation systems, so traditional management system already in place. Make it “more likely” to be sustainable.</p> <p>Weak M&E systems. Hard to find staff who understand not only education construction, but also water management, cropping systems, etc.</p> <p>Difficult to take on board requirements for environmental social impact studies before every scheme.</p> <p>Project not linked to any other farming support.</p> <p>Tensions where a scheme has reduced availability of water to downstream villages.</p>	<p>Similar story to other large donor programmes.</p> <p>Some progress – despite difficulties, some implementation successes achieved.</p> <p>State bureaucracy made implementation more difficult – project found it hard to fit between a) donor demands b) profile of trained personnel in Afgh c) state bureaucracy d) technical demands e) the realities of village life and their demands for improving cropping.</p> <p>Additional demands were not picked up in any documents – how project interacted with local power structures and how this affected distribution of benefits.</p> <p>Lesson: Need to design interventions more slowly. Can’t remake an agricultural economy even in 10 years. Start slower, build on what is</p>

	<p>Some irrigation water has been used to expand opium production.</p> <p>Dam construction not cost-effective “until political stability assured”, because of requirements for management through a state institution. Better to invest in rehab of existing community systems.</p> <p>No information on impact (assessment of increase yields, distribution of benefits within the village, et cetera) even in the end of project evaluation.</p>	<p>there, invest in understanding the farmer, not just in creating bureaucratic management systems for multi-million dollar projects?</p>
<p>Community grants</p> <p>National Solidarity Programme,</p> <p>Strengthen local governance (inc participation), win hearts and minds (demonstrate a peace dividend). 15,000 development councils established, block grants to 17,000 projects worth nearly \$1.6m - roads, water supply, education, etc.</p>	<p>Regarded as a “notable success”.</p> <p>Some worries about elite capture (!)</p> <p>“Extreme poverty and widespread illiteracy, in conjunction with social pressures, continue to constrain the development of village-level civil society”</p> <p>Evidence from RCT - positive effect on access to drinking water and electricity, perceptions of economic wellbeing, and attitudes toward women. However, “irrigation projects have no impact on the ability of land-holding villagers to access sufficient irrigation” and no impact from road projects (i.e. the majority). Limited, if any, effects on perceptions of local and national government performance - <i>and material economic outcomes</i>.</p> <p>Weak evidence of small impact no diversification of income sources – but any impact does not survive project completion .</p> <p>So, presumably , described as notable success <u>in process terms</u>.</p>	<p>Don’t do it!!!</p> <p>In project of this size and complexity, attention is inevitably on managing the process – up to grant disbursement. That can’t work. Have to keep your eye on impact – that lets you adapt and change course.</p> <p>The idea that democratically elected structures are democratic is naïve.</p> <p>Infrastructure projects don’t change the fundamentals: if these don’t need to change (eg for a shallow-well project) then it’s not a problem. But just creating a road or an irrigation system doesn’t change lives on its own.</p> <p>An unwelcome truth, that is not new – you can’t deliver development in a box, not can you deliver it through a community grant.</p> <p>One fact not mentioned in documents about the project: villages with irrigation are those with greatest disparity of wealth and power and many landless households. Villages in highlands are grain deficit but less unequal. So, who does investment in irrigation help? In this context, can you measure a contribution to devt in terms of yields – even if there were an impact?</p>

Some of the important findings and lessons are on overall strategy, not by interventions type.

- Negative impacts of aid - remarked on in several documents, inc aid evaluations. Facilitated and fed corruption.
- Failure of aid strategy. There was rapid economic growth in Afgh post-2001. But from what? Aid money created a boom in urban service economy – which hasn't lasted. And opium fed the rural economy.
- Stark contrast between documents that start with a project and those that start with rural people (see also: studies in N Uganda, Et, etc.) Aid documents may talk of successes, but if you just look at rural life, it is no better now than 15 years ago. (There are good longitudinal studies in Afgh to show this.) key issues – migration and remittances, not projects !
- Can the policy of agricultural transformation really take place? So far it hasn't worked for the poor. Would require radical redistribution of power (and land access), btu this can't happen. Attempts to remake a political economy through aid don't work. (Cf Somalia). But aid doesn't get to grips with the political economy, and can't. It tried – as it always tries – to create a new one as if on a *tabula rasa*.
- Need to think more slowly. But the post-conflict context creates a need to capture a quick peace dividend. (Evidence: there are no peace dividends.²⁸²) This is where lessons are needed – how do you create momentum for progress but in a way that is both transformative and organic? These aren't technical questions and best-buy lists won't help for this.

²⁸² look up refs from the multi-country study on this

Darfur

Responses	Effectiveness	Lessons/Recommendations
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Emergency humanitarian response by UN agencies (general)

Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis (2004)

Although humanitarian needs and protection issues in Darfur increased sharply in early 2003, following fighting between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and insurgents groups, the UN humanitarian and diplomatic community did not seriously begin addressing the crisis for nearly a year, despite calls to do so from a number of high-level UN officials. Associated aid organisations were also slow to begin scaling up programmes. While a big part of this was due to the obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the Government of Sudan, the agencies themselves identified internal issues/misteps that further slowed the emergency humanitarian response, namely poor coordination.

The importance of an assertive and robust United Nations role in coordination, along with a disciplined approach by agencies associated with the UN system in their pursuit of their own activities is needed. ‘Coordination and UN leadership in both North and South Darfur are not strong’, observed the Oxfam evaluation. ‘This leaves agencies more or less on their own to assure relevance and avoid duplication or gaps’ (Oxfam, 2004, p 11). Experience in earlier crises suggests that the weaker a government in a given crisis, the more essential it is for an outside coordinating element to take an active role.

Setting up IDP camps

Lessons learned: the Darfur experience (Larry Minear) Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis (United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

The UNHCR along with some 40 NGOs set up several IDP camps along the Sudan-Chad border for those forcibly displaced to reside and receive humanitarian assistance. There were several issues of concern related to this:

- Camps were organised haphazardly, with an absence of leadership present, owing to ongoing lengthy negotiations between different agencies around roles and responsibilities, and a lack of expertise and capacity by individuals responsible for camp management.
- While UNHCR has the most expertise in this area, when requested by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to take the lead in August 2004, UNHCR declined.
- There was poor security protection at these camps, enabling Government led forces to carry out violent raids and rapes in and around the camps.
- IDPs often had to travel long distances from their camps to fetch, water or carry out livelihood strategies, leaving them vulnerable to beatings and rape by government led forces.

A deeper UN field presence would have allowed the UN to better lead and shape the response at the field level.

UNHCR attempted to identify a new site further from the border, where the refugees could be relocated and receive the security and assistance they desperately needed. But there were mounting concerns among IDPs that they would not have adequate water supplies for their families and livestock if they were moved, as water sources would be too far away. Reluctance to move, coupled with the challenge of moving hundreds and thousands of people in the midst of protracted insecurity meant that it was fraught with challenges. As such, preliminary planning, feasibility studies and scenario analysis related to camp locations should be carried out in advance. This should be complemented with more effective engagement of IDPs in decision-making and activities including women, who are the most vulnerable individuals at the camps.

All agency headquarters should review their existing staff complement to ensure that their offices are fully staffed and more importantly staffed with appropriately experienced personnel holding contracts for at least one year. Where

- The some 40 NGOs that were involved in IDP camp coordination, and who had agreements signed with OCHA, did not consider themselves strictly accountable to OCHA for the quality of services in the camps.

Local Food Relief Committees (FRCs) who support the WFP in the targetting and distribution of food on the ground "enjoy a relationship with" local government, the tribal administration and local NGOs who are aligned with the government. Below are some of issues raised concerning FRCs:

- FRCs are dominated by particular interest groups aligned with the government - for example urban resident known for having political ties.

- FRC membership is supposedly dependent on a number of principles, including balanced gender participation. However in reality, the involvement of women tends to be limited to certain tasks, such as disseminating information, and dirty, less desirable jobs. For example, women distribute corn soya blend, lentils, and oil, while men circulate other more economically valuable (and cleaner commodities, including cereals, salt, and sugar).

- There were no well-developed complaints mechanisms linked to the FRC in Darfur. They had no way of knowing if reduced rations were because the FRC had received less from the cooperating partner or because of the diversion of food. People often claimed not to be aware of their entitlement.

There was however positive feedback from IDPs about the grouping method of distribution, which is associated with less corruption. Here, food is arranged in piles based on the number of groups and an elected FRC member is in public view, hence the process is more transparent.

necessary, quick action should be taken to address existing gaps, such as replacing under-performing staff.

There should also be a clearly-identified agency or organisation responsible for the coordination of external assistance and protection in and around IDP camps (this could be a group of well experienced organisations e.g. Spanish Red Cross, NRC, IOM). This would require them to take the lead, ensuring protection issues for the most vulnerable are addressed, while also providing quality guidance and ensuring area management/coordination in both camp and non-camp environments.

There is a need to strengthen good governance in the targetting and distribution of food resources. This could be done by:

- Instead of FRC members being appointed privately by the government, they should be democratically elected by the recipient community in public meetings, allowing for increased transparency and accountability of the process.

- Thorough third party checks should be made concerning alignment with FRC principles (a gender balance in the membership; honesty, trustworthiness, and experience of members; democratic processes of electing members; and a degree of education and literacy—at least three members must be educated and literate, preferably with some knowledge of English.)

- A clear grievance mechanism led by a third party should be in place to allow IDPs to comfortably lodge queries or complaints.

- Research and stakeholder mapping to garner a greater understanding of local actors/institutions and dynamics should be carried out in advance.

Targeting and distribution of food aid

Young and Maxwell: Participation, political economy, and protection: food aid governance in Darfur, Sudan (2013)

Provision of vouchers (subset of cash interventions)

Sarah Bailey, Kevin Savage and Sorcha O'Callaghan (2009) Cash transfers in emergencies - a synthesis of World Vision's experience and learning

Action Contre la Faim (ACF) noted that internally displaced persons receiving food rations in Darfur were selling or bartering part of their ration in order to grind the cereals. In 2007, to reduce this milling cost, ACF distributed vouchers to 20,781 households receiving rations. The vouchers could be used at milling machines in the camps. ACF repaid millers who would accept the vouchers as payment. Each voucher had a value of USD 1, and households received up to eight vouchers per month depending on the household size.

Overall, 96 percent of the vouchers were used for their intended purpose (milling and cleaning of cereal), while only 2 percent was sold or exchanged. After two months of operations, the percentage of households selling the GFD cereal decreased significantly with a 55 percent decrease in South Darfur and a 70 percent decrease in North Darfur. The share of households bartering the GFD cereals also plummeted to almost 0 percent.

MSF feeding programmes

Darfur 2004: a review of MSF-Holland's responsiveness and strategic choices (2005)

Inadequate WFP general food distributions in July 2004 prompted MSF-H to buy 2000 MT each of CSB and sorghum, 400 MT of oil and 8 trucks in order to do blanket feeding in all its locations.

However, except for a small number of limited distributions in the Muhajaria area, it was not implemented because there was no longer a need (the rainy season had less of an impact on food availability than expected, the GFDs improved and ACF said they intended doing blanket feeding in Kalma - although this did not actually take place until November).

Tracing and message service

ICRC update (January to May 2005)

Displacement has made it difficult for labour migrants to send money back to recipient families, because their new location is unknown. Communication via mobile phones is limited, due to weak or no signals outside of major towns.

One of the constraints ACF has faced during the implementation of the programme is the unpredictability in the price of fuel. Fuel prices in Darfur increased just before the start of the programme in 2007, leading to a 40-60 percent increase in milling costs. This meant that ACF paid higher prices to millers, while the beneficiaries' entitlement remained unchanged. As such, constant monitoring and forecasting of fuel prices should be carried out. ACF can then anticipate the prices they'll need to pay millers going forward, thus providing clarity to project planning/financing.

MSF's nutritional assessments failed to predict accurately West Darfur's nutritional situation due to the erratic nature of GFDs to Darfur, caused by delays at ports and customs; delayed humanitarian response (see previous row); and insecurity in the region causing transport delays. Better communication and coordination with international agencies supplying food aid + those in the field would have helped them to better understand the constraints on the ground.

Initiatives similar to the ICRC's tracing and Red Cross message (RCM) service could be used to locate family members, which could improve the prospect of remittances. Helping to support communication, ICRC/Sudanese Red Crescent operations in Darfur ran a tracing and to enable the tens of thousands of family members separated by the conflict to locate and communicate with each other.

Between January and September 2013, the ICRC and the Sudanese Red Crescent collected and delivered nearly 8,400 Red Cross messages and organised over 800 telephone calls between members of dispersed families; clarified the whereabouts of dozens of people reported by their families as missing or

DFID WASH programme

DFID's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Programming in Sudan (2013), Independent Commission for Aid Impact.

Addressing impartiality in humanitarian assistance

Young and Jacobsen: No Way Back? Adaptation and Urbanization of IDP -

DFID funded the £6.7m Darfur Urban Water Supply Project in 2010 in an effort to mitigate the effects of ongoing drought by improving water supply services. Its aims was to increase the sustainable water supply to four towns in Darfur to increase their resilience to drought through a two-year programme of investment. The programme was managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

The project was originally set a target of improving water access for 450,000 people by its completion date of December 2012. This assumed a parallel Government of Sudan investment in extending the piped network to more of the urban population. This investment was not made and the target was reduced to 150,000 people. Achievement of this revised target was also not realised because most urban households are not connected to the piped network. In El Fasher (capital of North Darfur), the main beneficiaries of any increased water supply were private companies, government institutions and international organisations.

Other shortcomings included high management overheads and a lack of responsiveness to changing needs. As a funding mechanism, it had extensive teething problems and DFID was required to invest considerable effort into improving its functioning. It was reasonably efficient at co-ordinating the mass delivery of standardised WASH interventions during the emergency but less effective at tailoring its WASH support as the context changed (becoming more protracted).

It was also slow to build the working relationships with government agencies required to secure permits for its work and to partner effectively with the responsible water authorities.

Aid workers were often the subject of threats by Arab groups in need of assistance, because aid was skewed toward predominantly non-Arab IDPs. By leaving these groups out, aid workers were not only putting themselves at risk, but it also left non-Arab beneficiaries vulnerable to more inter ethnic violence, further inflaming tensions. While these Arab groups did not necessarily need food aid, this was often the first step toward receiving other forms of humanitarian assistance such as blankets and other household items.

captured in connection with conflict; and received 437 new tracing requests.

The no. of offices for collecting and distributing RCM could be expanded in camps and cities where IDPs have gathered.

Though technically sound, the project's design neglected the political and institutional challenges involved in improving urban water supply. It was not based on an analysis of the commercial interests involved in the delivery of water. Meanwhile, increasing the availability of water without addressing the operation of the water market is unlikely to benefit the urban poor. As such, more careful attention should be placed on the economic and governance dimensions of water supply to avoid making the same mistakes.

Had the project been set a more beneficiary focussed objective, such as lowering the price of water for poor households, it would have been obliged to engage directly with the operation of the urban water market.

The international humanitarian community should make efforts to demonstrate impartiality by responding to the needs of all groups, not just non Arab IDPs. To do so, they should seek out the views and experiences of Arab groups too and attempt to address their needs. In the case of one tribe of Arab pastoralists (the Riziegat ethnic community who are a number of clan-based

Livelihoods in the Darfur
Region of Sudan (2013)

Addressing protection of
vulnerable groups

Young and Jacobsen: No
Way Back? Adaptation and
Urbanization of IDP -
Livelihoods in the Darfur
Region of Sudan (2013)

Humanitarian agencies see collecting firewood as a protection issue requiring action (due to the vulnerability of women and men being raped/beaten). However, firewood collection provided a new livelihood opportunity for those groups living in the vicinity of urban areas which had unrestricted access to rural areas and a way of transporting the wood back to town. Meanwhile, a study of camel-herding pastoralists found that diversification into firewood was an important livelihood strategy for some groups, especially as they were able to carry out this activity safely.

Livestock reconciliation,
restitution, and
compensation

Young et al (2005): Darfur -
Livelihoods under Siege

The widely heard story known as the "IDP narrative" is that IDPs are vulnerable, that they risk attack if they leave the relative safety of the town or camp, that returns are impossible partly because of this, that the government is at fault and at worst is responsible for direct attacks on civilians, that they are due compensation for their former losses.

communities), their main needs were blankets to prevent malaria and pneumonia.

This suggests that the motivations underlying the violence and the restricting of access to rural areas for firewood collection are complex. Humanitarian agencies should take this into consideration when making decisions to clamp down on certain livelihood strategies such as firewood collection, which they deem harmful and unsafe to some tribal groups/sections of society, in this case mainly non-Arab IDPs.

A potential way to combat this is by firewood patrols organised by the AU. In some instances, the patrol team would leave several hours after the women and patrolled the area that had been agreed upon as the firewood gathering spot. The Sudanese police and AU CIVPOL waited in one area for a few hours, stating that the women knew this spot in case they had to report a problem. Nevertheless, the women have no means of warning the patrol team that they are under attack if they are not right next to the team.

IDPs are requesting compensation for their livelihood losses, with preference to continuing their traditional livelihood strategies of livestock production/rearing. Therefore the creation of a Livestock Reconciliation, Restitution and Compensation Commission (LRRCC), covering all three states of Darfur, and all groups within the region should be set up. It should:

- Oversee procedures for registration and verification of livestock losses
- Oversee the taxation of livestock sold and ensure that all export taxation revenue is used to compensate those who have had livestock looted, including traders who have lost camel caravans and who have had drovers kidnapped by rebel groups Darfur
- Encourage the voluntary return of looted livestock by providing a process for this to take place as part of the local reconciliation process

Aid worker presence

Young and Jacobsen: No Way Back? Adaptation and Urbanization of IDP - Livelihoods in the Darfur Region of Sudan (2013)

The growing number of professional national aid workers, while necessary, has meant that regular well-paid salaries for nationals have affected expenditure patterns and the wider networks they support. Increased demand for local property, rentals and new construction has strained the supply of local building materials (timber, bricks, water, etc.).

Meanwhile, the demand for imported luxury goods (furniture, electronics) and fruits, unlike spending on locally produced goods, does not boost Darfur's economy but rather stimulates imports and financial transfers out of Darfur. According to interviews with bank informants, these purchases have been linked to international humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping forces.

Studies should be carried out to on how the presence of humanitarian workers impact IDPs' transition to more urbanised livelihood strategies, namely their influence on local markets, upon which IDPs rely for employment and purchase of vital goods. This will allow humanitarian agencies to better manage any negative impacts on IDPs.

Evidence grid, DRC (livelihood support) - note: much of the humanitarian activity in DRC is on food assistance (relief)

Responses	Effectiveness	Lessons/Recommendations
Seeds and tools <i>(this does not refer to projects aimed at introducing new varieties of seeds)</i>	Still standard humanitarian programming in DRC, as it has been for decades. No evidence can be found of seed needs assessments. No evidence can be found of impact. (No study attempts to assess a counterfactual of what farmers, inc IDPs or returnees do when they are not given seeds by humanitarian orgs.)	How is it possible that this is still allowed to go on??? Why do we waste so much money every year on this nonsense? How is it still possible for FAO to get away with saying that handing out 90 tonnes of seed is equal to 10 million meals and \$100 per month per household? (FAO 2018) (Do seeds turn into food without land? Without work? And would that land and labour power have remained idle without FAO's gift? Answer: the status quo still suits everyone (see: actor oriented analysis, Levine and Chastre 2004!).
Provision of virus-resistant cassava cuttings	Several programs supported distribution of cuttings of cassava varieties that are resistant to the 'new' variant of the EAMV/AMV virus. Consistently reported as highly successful, e.g. yields doubling. Often included in agricultural extension programs which claimed significant successes in increasing yields – but each time, what brought about the positive impact was mainly cassava cuttings. It's unclear what research is ongoing to continue to develop new cassava varieties. No evidence can be found about the scale of the solution: what percentage of farmers had received cuttings? What percentage of area planted was with resistant varieties? What was the projection for year in which variety replacement would be complete? No mention made of intra-community mechanisms for onward supply in future years.	The worrying thing about these programs is that they were being conducted in the last decade. (and are possibly still continuing?) Resistant varieties were being multiplied and distributed in Uganda over 20 years ago. Because cassava cuttings aren't food, mechanisms for intra-community onward multiplication are easy. This problem should have been sorted a decade before these projects were being undertaken. That's not a criticism of the projects – but why was this basic agricultural investment neglected for so long in an area where cassava is the staple food and which was so badly hit by the virus over 20 years ago? It doesn't appear that all recipients villages were being trained in rapid multiplication through micro-cuttings - would be useful to see projects going beyond handing out a new variety, though in some places that might be difficult (e.g. where insecurity makes repeated visits difficult). So let's give this one a belated thumbs up: big lesson is support for production is many, many times more effective at improving food security, and surely orders of magnitude more cost-effective, than food assistance! Even in the worst conflicts, think beyond humanitarian.
Animal traction	Centralised training of oxen for animal traction – for transport by cart on bad roads, as much as for tillage. Grants of 800 USD to purchase bullocks. "To ease the working load of women from Masisi" - though unclear how much time it would save for people with small landholdings. No evidence from evaluation or impact assessment available. A report from VoA: broken carts lying visible, anecdotal report that carts had fallen into disrepair and no one knew how to repair them. Bullocks purchased not been strong enough, because recipients only used half the money for intended purpose.	Hard to see how this is a priority intervention. High cost if animals/cash provided. People priority their livestock appeared to be elsewhere from the reported purchases. Livestock theft a significant problem in conflict area. Sustainability? Ability to achieve scale? Relevance for people with very small landholdings? If promotion of animal traction is needed, probably needs a different approach so farmers can train their own cattle.
credit	Many FS programmes include credit, e.g. formation of VSLA. Many include a support fund (i.e. free grant as cash injection).	Flynn 2014 is probably overly optimistic (report based only on self-reporting, not rigorous financial examination of household income). Pro-project bias also

	<p>Evaluations comment that they are very useful. One report (MC 2014): average savings \$40, average loan \$56. Limited evidence on impact on household income or even evidence of income from credit supported investment. One (Flynn 2014) found household income up by over 200%. Also claimed a transformation in gender relations and women's empowerment. Funds often used for emergencies (consumption smoothing), allowing better household financial planning. 88% of women who had no IG have now started their own 'project'. Some jealousy among those who were not members and did not receive cash support grant.</p> <p>One project: over 40% default rates, caused in part by very high default rates in area hit by M23 rebels. (MC 2014)</p> <p>One project found that interest rates too high for many to benefit from loans.</p>	<p>probably plays a role in what has been heard. But that doesn't negate evidence that credit seems to have proved very useful.</p> <p>Perhaps consideration needed about how much of a grant a VSLA should get to start it up. More evidence would be useful on how they function years later – does group continue to function?</p> <p>Critical Q: how far can VSLA survive direct conflict? Can people repay loans if businesses hit they are forced into displacement? Is the solution that donor money should keep on helping people to restart activities through new support grant for credit? The concept of sustainability is hard to maintain in an active conflict. But does that mean not risking capital, and not supporting people who could benefit even if it's only for three or four years?</p>
Rural roads	<p>All road rehab in S Kivu was with int'l donor money (Ferf et al 2014). State doesn't invest in road maintenance/rehab.</p> <p>Many programmes have invested in road reconstruction/rehabilitation over many decades. Emphasis on feeder roads, often done through FFW. Appear to be a high-impact – many FS assessments highlight for road infrastructure as a significant cause of food insecurity (low farm prices because of lack of traders, higher expenditure prices, marginalisation from services...). Actual evidence is harder to find.</p> <p>One evaluation: "the price [of a sack of cassava] went up when roads allowed us to get to more buyers." "The improved roads proved to be critical in facilitating access to markets and the movement of goods" (Mitchell Group 2016)</p> <p>However, only serious sectoral study (Ferf et al 2014) has been done on roads (i.e. a study not linked to a project) which found that most roads were "barely passable" a few years after rehab; road rehab did not reduce transport prices; transport frequency had increased (and because of low capitalisation, trade works on very small stocks and frequent trips); but there was no impact on prices.</p> <p>Some evalns claim that sustainability is built in because committees formed and training for local maintenance. Almost certainly highly naïve.</p>	<p>Villagers want roads – they bring projects, NGOs, employment (FFW) and some trade opps – selling alongside road. Do they contribute to rural reconstruction? Ferf conclusion: poverty is the limiting factor in lack of transport which is the reason roads are so bad, road reconstruction is not the driver or rural reconstruction as hoped for. A difficult conc to maintain in the face of many voices calling for investment in feeder roads. But maintenance is the issue. Until that is sorted... In other words, state of roads is an outcome of a political situation (that is bigger than just the conflict). Unless that is changed, <i>status quo ante</i> will return very quickly.</p>
Integrated production/marketing	<p>Several programmes used multi-component projects for food security – typically giving seeds (eg new varieties), ag extension/FFS,VSLA, irrig rehab, roads (FFW), l'stock grants, group formation (inc local development committees, marketing groups), training on marketing, etc. In one case, linked to P4P for WFP to purchase production.</p>	<p>There's enough successes in there to suggest that ag can be supported even in conflict areas. But, beyond that, hard to draw much in the way of technical lessons on what helps.</p> <p>Little evidence that projects really understood what farmers were trying to do – what they wanted to grow (eg shifting away from high value crops to low-value crops because of insecurity! Kibriya et al 2016), how they wanted to sell, how</p>

	<p>Several evaluations with some useful lessons but weak evidence on impact – often methodological questions can be raised (e.g. use of quant data but without control. Why? If you can't do a control, why no use of prog theory eval instead?) Often hard to pick out what was useful among the various interventions.</p> <p>In general, hard to pull out clear lessons because results are inconsistent both in comparing programmes and <u>also within any one</u> project. E.g., P4P showed increased yields and increased sales – but no impact on household income. One program showed that “Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning (MAHFP)” went up a lot, but HDDS went down. (Unclear if baseline and endline were in the same season – endline was just after harvest! And eval finds MAHFP may have increased because of ‘prominent role of food aid’.) One prog found composting went down as a result of extension. Another found yields of some crops doubling, and others halving, but with no explanation.</p> <p>Marketing interventions don't show clear results. With P4P, 2/3 still sold to middlemen, which project and eval considered meant losing potential income. In some cases, despite creation of marketing assocs and training, ‘little formal application of the value chain study and formal micro-enterprise development activities’. In another, project contributed warehousing for onions for large group, and marketing improved (i.e. income up).</p> <p>The various development planning committees and early warning systems don't seem to have been helpful. Unclear purposes. Weak functioning, weak legitimacy (Mitchell Group 2016)</p> <p>Provision of price info on radio reportedly much appreciated – but no evidence of impact.</p> <p>One such programme (RISE) had to scale down/pull out of most insecure area.</p>	<p>they organised themselves in the community. Even how they farm. Extension messages are pretty standard for SSA as a whole, eg planting in lines . Where is the evidence that someone had studied local farming ad worked out with farmers what could improve, eg considering time as critical input, considering objectives such as risk reduction. (Staff of one USAID prog found that Farmer field schools didn't help because entirely class-room based theoretical teaching!</p> <p>Evidence that replication/‘spill-over’ was low – non-benefs did not copy beneficiaries. Partly, adoption of project messages is about getting aid: finding that ‘second-line training (i.e. passing the messages on) didn't happen because ‘communities perceive material handouts to be a central component of the programme’ and there were no free inputs for 2nd line trainees.</p> <p>Strong sense that too often project is about achieving results, rather than bringing about sustainable change, eg project (WFP/FAO P4P) which provided seeds, empty sacks, agricultural tools and equipment, bicycles, wheelbarrows and carts to the project participants to ease the problem of transportation. Sustainable? Replicable?</p> <p>Ability to implement in high conflict areas is in question.</p> <p>Mutli-component prog evalns are designed for accountability, i.e. did the project help? That doesn't help learning, which needs a thematic evaluation i.e. assessing the same component across a number of projects. (Cf SLRC study of roads. We badly need something similar for different elements of agricultural support</p> <p>Somewhere, the SLRC finding may just be important: survey results were that “no variables that are consistently associated with better food security <u>and</u> with asset ownership outcomes”. So does that undermine the standard model, i.e. help households build up assets because that means they have better FS?</p>
Health care	<p>Support for running hospitals. (Note: particular support for Ebola control is not considered).</p> <p>Clearly much appreciated and reduced household expenditure on healthcare where it was provided free. However, no evidence on improved health outcomes (e.g. shorter time sick, reduction in chronic illness) much less any evidence about the impact on livelihoods. (It would be reasonable to assume a livelihood impact from evidence of production, shorter periods of sickness, reduced chronic illness.)</p>	<p>Investment in healthcare is not usually seen as a livelihood intervention. Beyond the scope of this RER to assess effectiveness of different health interventions (e.g. support for vaccination, malaria control, support for primary health care, provision of healthcare in health centres/hospitals). However, the evidence on the cost of ill-health makes it clear that being the health status of the population is a huge contribution to livelihood security. Probably deserving of far more attention? (But would need a review of existing health interventions to substantiate this claim!)</p>
Promotion of veg gardens	<p>A regular part of many FS programmes, often targeted on mothers. Supplies of veg seed (i.e. ‘European’ veg) and tools (watering cans, etc) are normal.</p>	<p>Distribution of veg seeds has been going on regularly in Great Lakes for decades. No study yet showing if it increases consumption of veg – or does it just</p>

	<p>According to one eval: 'well received' but no multiplication beyond immediate benefs. Which is telling. No studies showing how much income it has provided or how much it has increased consumption of veg/vitamins. More significantly, no reports showing how many people continue practice in following years when not supported.</p>	<p>substitute for local veg (eg highly nutritious cassava leaves)? More to the point, if the intervention was going anywhere, would it still be necessary to distribute seeds (and watering cans) every time? wouldn't people be keeping seeds and have found a way of improvising watering cans?</p>
<p>Mitigation of land disputes</p>	<p>Several initiatives identified, only one of any size.</p> <p>UNHCR/UN-Habitat: supports mediation, supports land admin, supports land reform.</p> <p>Mediation, inc with UNHCR for returnees., eg 183 Twa able to return to land taken from them while they were in IDP camps. Estimated 27,000+ beneficiaries from mediation (but no details on what outcomes were) (Aime 2018). Different models used. Evaluation after 2.5 years of programme – “too early to measure the impact of land conflict management on the daily life and livelihoods of the program beneficiaries”. (Final evaluation apparently conducted but unavailable.) Support to land registry and cadastre in 3 conflict Provinces. <i>“With an improved cadastre system, corruption is reduced and easier access to land for the poor is made possible.... Peaceful co-habitation between communities is possible with mediation and transparent land administration system”</i> No other evidence of impact can be found. Causal chain sounds at the same time unlikely – how will it help poor get land that is in the hands of the? - and simplistic (good land admin = peaceful cohab)</p> <p>Other interventions. 2 local NGOs: one promoting mediation, inc customary chiefs and legal authorities, rather than legal approaches; one promoting info sharing (Raymond 2013)</p>	<p>MTE of UNH makes clear some the challenges of working in DRC. One the one hand: “The program as a whole has developed ...under very difficult context conditions; security situation, absence of everything, initial reluctance of some institutions and organizations to engage. Over this period UN-Habitat and its partners have built a rock solid program that responds to the initial objectives for which it was created”. On the other hand “It is highly unlikely that the external driven models of Nord Kivu can be replicated outside a project context.” So – a fabulous effort, but it's not going to solve the problems.</p> <p>There is no doubt about the huge need for a massive investment in land reform, in land administration and in the functioning of customary land institutions especially around dispute resolution. It's far from clear what is the best way to go about this – cf disagreements about how to approach land administration and dispute resolution on customary tenure in countries where the problems are far less intractable. How well can mediation work for the least powerful? Does it necessarily entail compromise with land grabbers?</p> <p>How much is it possible to achieve in a situation of active conflict, especially of conflict which is so closely linked to land, ethnic claims of land and inequalities in land ownership? Is it possible to imagine state institutions of land administration ever being helpful for the poor?</p> <p>Lots and lots of other similar questions remain. But these questions don't undermine the case for working on land, they just mean that a lot of experimentation and learning is needed for we can say what actually works.</p>

Mali

Responses	Effectiveness	Lessons
<p>1. Economic recovery</p> <p>1.1. Directly to farms and enterprises 1.1.4 Supplementary animal feed (e.g. cotton seedcake)</p>	<p>Widely used as part of FS Cluster emergency response in northern and central Mali; a drought response that is also useful for conflict where herds are displaced and more concentrated by insecurity. Not a new response - dates back to droughts of 1980's. An important agro-pastoral/livestock sector input even in non-conflict, non-drought years (seedcake a by-product of the cotton industry, leaves from peanut, cowpea, sweet potato..., fresh and grass cut from forests/fallows etc.). Also used by GoM as a [political] response e.g. in Ke- Macina (directly or through local NGO, with media coverage)</p>	<p>Accepted good practice (FS Cluster) evaluations will be in individual agency reports NB special case of 1.1.1 (inputs) for pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods</p>
<p>1. Economic recovery 1.1. Directly to farms and enterprises 1.1.1. Seeds, tools, small numbers of breeding livestock for restocking;</p>	<p>Typically part of humanitarian (Cash+) or mixed resilience/food security response. Assessing effectiveness of individual measures not feasible without detailed analysis of many reports). Popular; widely requested; identified in needs assessment. Logical response to restore productive assets or support IGA. Can be easily targeted to women and youth. Effectiveness more likely to be linked to timeliness of delivery and quality of inputs</p>	<p>Mostly Sheep, goats, poultry; rarely/never large livestock (cattle, camels, donkeys...) (key informant). The evaluation of the joint FAO/WFP project «Supporting Resilience of vulnerable populations (2019) in North Mali made specific recommendations to FAO to respond more rapidly, consult available local actors and prioritise them for certain orders e.g. plan to buy back locally produced seed from the cooperatives supported</p>
<p>2. Restoration and development of supply chains/market development</p>	<p>Implementation is based on working through farmer based organisations (FBOs) and specifically CNOP (National Coordination of producer organisations) and its members According to the donor (SDC website) this has enabled the FBO support to make a significant contribution to achieving food security, the peaceful management of natural resources and the promotion of family farms. FBOs have capacity for dialogue with the government (advocacy) representing the rural world at the national level. In a fragile context and with a view to decentralisation FBOs have succeeded in influencing the agricultural development strategies of local authorities Weaknesses: a disconnection between the leadership of the FBOs and their bases, internal governance problems, poor quality of services offered, a lack of innovation and weak mobilisation of their own resources.</p>	<p>SDC and partners have not stopped because of crisis. The “Programme de Soutien aux Economies Locales dans le Delta Intérieur du Niger (PSEL Delta)” implemented by Helvetas and local partner AFAR is listed as continuing into Phase 4 (2021 -24) Project covers districts of Youwarou, Tenenkou, Mopti and Niafunké (i.e. controlled by armed groups - Katiba Macina Liberation Front) Expected results 1) development of market systems for agric, livestock and fishery products increases incomes of 150'000 people 2): Local government bodies build and maintain infrastructure required for climate sensitive local development 3): local and regional actors establish a functional mechanism for the prevention and management of conflicts linked to natural resources. On website lessons learnt from previous phases relate only to the impact on the FBO and their capacities. Lessons will be in agency reports</p>

2. Restoration and development of supply chains/market development
2.5. provision of public information to participants in supply chains;

When conflict and insecurity made it difficult to reach farmers, CARE worked with in partnership with Farm Radio International and local radio stations to host shows on nutrition, agriculture, and child health, and the intersections between them. Talking Books and WhatsApp groups also being used to inform famers about input availability, access, and use.

New communication channels have potential to keep advisory services and inputs flows going in a crisis. CARE note that Indigenous and learned knowledge and methods on proper seed storage are important to share for seeds that can be re-used for multiple seasons.

Note: Numerous actors are developing/delivering ICT enabled extension services. The FAO has established the Global Forum For Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS) with national groups bringing together Producer organisations (end users) with public and private sector services providers. The Global Commission on Adaptation has commissioned a working paper “Investment Blueprint for Digital Climate Advisory Services: Building Resilience of 300 Million Smallholder Producers by 2030” to be published in 2021 (authors World Resources Institute, Global Centre on Adaptation, Terranomics, IRI Columbia, World Food Programme, World Business Council for Sustainable Development)

2. Restoration and development of supply chains/market development
2.8 Mixed approaches based on "resilience" and food security : value chains + NRM/land tenure conflict management.[Case of Phase 2 (PASARC-II) NEF Mali]

Referring to both its programmes in central Mali (Pogramme d’Aménagement du Delta Intérieur du Niger (PADIN II) and the Projet d’Appui à la Résilience des Populations aux Crises Climatiques et Sociales (PASARC)) the Dutch Embassy in Mali gives examples of concrete results including "the increase in rice yields in the project area to 6.3 tons/ha and the rehabilitation of another 330 ha of highly productive flood pastures" (bourgous). This is in a context with challenges of food security, poverty and recurrent conflicts

Drawing lessons from evaluations, and its previous experiences, Near East Foundation Mali (NEF-Mali) brings the following new orientations to PASARC II (2018-2023) : development of agricultural and non-ag value chains with focus on markets and demand (target 42 857 HH); promotion of IWRM/NRM as a lever for food security (increased access; reduction of conflicts over resource access); a training of trainers approach; reduction of subsidies in favour of loan funds and; greater focus on empowerment of women and youth

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict
4.1. Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc. [case of Mali’s safety net programme]

Impact evaluation by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Institut de recherché pour le développement (IRD), in five regions of Mali (Sikasso, Koulikoro, Kayes, Mopti, Segou). Communes randomly assigned to Cash transfer (CT) and accompanying measures (AM) components either in 2014–2015 (early treatment) or in 2016–2017 (late treatment). The two components were implemented for three years in both treatment groups. Then, within a subset of the early treatment communes deemed more nutritionally vulnerable, villages were randomly assigned to either receive the PNP (nutrition) component for one year or not to receive it. Findings
1) Comparing early (CT only) and late treatment (CT+AM) groups at midline, the cash

Jigisémejiri met its objective to reduce the vulnerability of poor households (beneficiaries showed significantly improved household food security, dietary diversity, savings and investments). It had little impact on child nutrition - reinforcing lessons from other studies that CT alone or combined with relatively low-intensity AM, have limited impacts on child nutrition. IFPRI end line evaluation recommended (i) make transfers more frequent rather than quarterly ii) target the CT exclusively to the household head or (at minimum) target both

transfer (CT) and accompanying measures (AM) intervention led to significant improvements in household welfare in terms of increased proportion of HH classified as food secure or having little to no hunger, improved household-level dietary diversity, and improved diet quality. Also significantly increased the probability of a household purchasing cereals and maize in bulk. No impacts on the value of food consumption 2) The program reduced determinants of poverty and increased resilience by strengthening households' savings and asset base. Early treatment households had higher savings and higher asset values at midline (esp livestock and transport assets i.e productive assets & store of wealth) 3) both women and men reported being happier (CT component) + new learning (AM).

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict 4.1. Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc. [case of Mali's safety net programme] continued (1)

IFPRI also investigated the Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) impacts of Jigisémèjiri which primarily targets men in a West African context where nearly 40 percent of households are polygamous. Found that the CT program causes significant decreases in IPV in polygamous households – physical violence decreases by 7 percentage points, emotional violence decreases by 12 percentage points, and controlling behaviours decrease by 16 percentage points -- but has limited effects in non- polygamous households. Evidence on mechanisms suggests: significant decreases in men's stress and anxiety among polygamous households, and larger reductions in disputes in polygamous households compared to non-polygamous households.

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict 4.1. Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc. [case of Mali's safety net programme] continued (2)

Mali's safety net programme (Jigisémèjiri) managed to extend to North Mali - Gao - during conflict (2014). More recently the project has maintained its presence in the North by including new areas of Mopti, Gao and Tombouctou for cash transfer and or income generating activities and or labour intensive public works (e.g rehabilitation of the Konna port in the framework of the Alliance Sahel)

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict 4.1. Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public

The World Bank SAHEL ADAPTIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAM (SASPP) is working with Safety net programmes in 4 Sahel countries to evaluate how different "productive packages" impact the wellbeing and economic stability of beneficiaries Mali has recorded 10,000 direct beneficiaries of these pilot productive inclusion and income-

the household head and spouse and encourage household heads to engage other household members (to involve women more, reduce confusion about who should attend. iii) Reduce barriers to attending the AM sessions (improve communication to all HH members); iv) combine the AM session with the PNP component iv) strengthen AM nutrition impact with a behaviour change intervention (communication, interpersonal and group counselling, and community mobilization)

Results suggest that changes in women's empowerment are not necessary conditions for improving women's wellbeing. When transfers given to the households of women in polygamous marriages their lives get better, even though they largely do not receive the transfer themselves, do not have a say in how it is spent, and do not show improvements in mobility or economic empowerment.

Policy implication: the lives of vulnerable women can improve if their husbands are made better off, but that these effects may depend on household structure and are likely not sustained after programs end.

One factor of success has been the projects ongoing collaboration/coordination with humanitarian partners (PAM, UNICEF, UE et Programme ECHO) and other development partners in the design and use of the same unique register of beneficiaries (to create synergy and avoid duplication). e.g. CARE HARANDE project – when they decided to introduce CT as part of their adapted response, local partners already in the field identified and collected information on target households then passed it to the Govt. Social Protection service for validation and inclusion in the national registry

The evaluation is underway in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal [so not Mali] and results are not yet available. According to the WB, findings will have country, regional, and

employment for those out of work, pensions, etc. [case of Mali's safety net programme] continued

generating activities programs (some mix of coaching and facilitation; community sensitization on aspirations and social norms; facilitation of savings groups; micro entrepreneurship training; behavioural skills training; and a one-time lump-sum cash grant to assist individuals in initiating their income-generating activities, savings groups, life skills training, post-training coaching, etc.)

global implications for the design and scale-up of productive inclusion interventions and their use in building resilience

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict Mixed interventions (Cash +) combining unconditional cash transfers, productive inputs or assets, and technical training and extension services. [case of FAO]

CASH+ was combined with FAO "caisses de resilience" for a response in Mopti region (2015-17) targeting 3,000 vulnerable households in 64 villages. Small ruminants and cash transfers to beneficiaries reinforced with education on nutrition and essential family practices. The 2020 evaluation report found food security improved by about 23 percent among beneficiary households; dietary diversity increased by 25 percent among children (aged 6-59 months); and income generation improved; proportion of beneficiaries having an above average income increasing by 20 percent (from 41 percent before the intervention to 61 percent after). Farmer field school organisation of target HH (CEAP) in combination with CASH+ (productive transfers) was indeed beneficial for poor and very poor HH in hungry season. Targeting process was adequate. The shift from payments by micro-finance institutions to mobile money payments because of insecurity caused some issues for poor and very poor HH (no phone, difficulty to sign up to mobile money and to get where the cash could be obtained). BUT there were numerous implementation issues and weaknesses including delays in delivery of response, inadequate M&E, no gender analysis in design and implementation, insufficient coordination at national level unlikely to lead to the institutional reforms.

FAO itself draws the following lessons:

Unconditional CT: A combination of transfers can provide a rapid boost to beneficiaries' livelihoods, enabling investment in assets or to quick recovery after an emergency hits. Evidence shows that combining lump sum transfers with regular, small transfers can increase productive potential, enabling households to make larger purchases (investing in productive assets) while they use the smaller amounts to smooth consumption, though careful attention must be paid in order to not minimize the risk management role that regular transfers provide.

THE PLUS - productive inputs, assets, activities, training and extension services must match households' needs in terms of relevance and suitability and include beneficiary input into defining content, value and timing (key) of the support to different livelihood categories (e.g. farming, pastoralism). Voucher systems (inputs/assets supplied by local producers or traders) are to be prioritized where possible as they offer choice and flexibility for beneficiaries, trigger a greater impact on local economies and have the potential to be more cost-effective than direct distribution.

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict Case of IRF2017 « Peers for Peace Building, Social Cohesion in Mali and Ségou Regions» funded by the Peace Building Fund Consortium PAM/FAO/UNHCR Consortium Local NGOs:

Approach: income generating activities with construction/ rehabilitation of community assets (for improved livelihoods) and as entry points for activities to support conflict resolution mechanisms (approach =FAO Clubs Dimitra). Evaluation does not give information on impact of individual types of response.

Found: Bottom up diagnostic process led to relevant activities at village/household level. Focusing activities on women and markets gardens helped to overcome community reticence to engage with project.

Evaluation report concluded it is unrealistic to try to significantly impact peace dynamics in a complex context, limited timeframe (18 months) with low coverage (500 peers for peace" in 20 villages across 6 communes in 6 districts) and on a limited budget

Also noted that a pilot- rapid impact intervention - should be automatically followed up, but funding stopped just as

AMASSA/ AMSS/ GRAT
/CAEB/ AMAPROS

Analysis of conflict dynamics limited to targeted villages -indicating a poor understanding of socio-cultural realities and inter-community conflicts.

The challenges caused by the presence of armed groups (djihadist) in the villages were left out of strategic discussions, yet implementing partner NGOs confronted them daily.

Reservations about sustainability of Clubs DIMITRA (new structures not linked to any existing village institutions and mechanisms)

community mobilisation began to be effective to great frustration of the partners on the ground

Where armed groups are present, activities and approach have to be acceptable to them even when their presence is not openly acknowledged

Quote from evaluation « Dialogue has in practice started with the djihadists. They are in village meetings; they are in the Clubs Dimitra. They follow closely what happens in the communities. We act as if we are unaware. We speak of the project in meetings, in front of these armed people. If we had come been partisan, they would certainly have intervened »

Another FAO evaluation proposed work through existing village structures using a DIMITRA “approach”. To address intercommunity conflicts over access to land forest and grazing resources requires more than a village (See Helvetas, NEF and other IWRM/NRM experiences)

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict 2.8 Mixed approaches based on "resilience" and food security [case of SOS SAHEL, H&I, Oxfam]

Ended 2020: 3 years: 23/01/2017 - 31/03/2020 Regions of Gao, Kidal, Mopti et Tombouctou au Mali. Beneficiary # (targets):

- 320 000 nutritional assistance;
- 85 500 better access to basic services;
- 40 000 development of IGA;
- 12 500 food security assistance

Budget: 25M EUR Financement Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’Union européenne implemented by consortium SOS SAHEL, Humanity & Inclusion, Oxfam

The project aligns itself with the National resilience plan (AGIR regional processes) and commits to working with and strengthening central and local government structures in particular the Commission for the Rehabilitation of post-conflict zones (CRZPC) and decentralised local government bodies.

Resilience = Resilience to food and nutritional insecurity: by strengthening capacity to anticipate, absorb and recover from shocks to FS [thro' locally coordinated actions]. Livelihood support - access to water supply (guessing this will be part of basic services); and support to develop income generating activities

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict 2.8 Mixed approaches based on "resilience" and food security [case of HARANDE led by CARE]

A study by TANGO international using baseline data collected in 2016 for HARANDE (Human Capital, Accountability and Resilience Advancing Nutrition Security, Diversified Livelihoods and Empowerment) Project - to provide insights into factors that strengthen household and community resilience in the Mopti region of Mali. At this point main shock reported by HH was drought; no significant exposure conflict.

Actions that might increase households and communities abilities to effectively respond to shocks are: cash savings and household shock preparedness; access to broader social networks/stronger social capital (encouraging stronger social ties across and between communities and with formal institutions); traditional economic development interventions increasing

Concluded that in the context of resilience capacity, having cash savings, more household assets, and stronger bonding social capital are most often, and directly, associated with better outcomes, including reduced poverty and less hunger. Reduced poverty is associated with greater access to formal safety nets and more access to services, which directly reduces likelihood of hunger. Households that received formal assistance and took out loans to cope with shocks were less likely to experience poverty. Households that relied on offtake of livestock, reducing child care costs, and receiving formal assistance, when used to cope with shocks and stresses, were less likely to recover from shock. NB Taken to indicate accurate targeting of most vulnerable HH for formal assistance. In response to shocks “resilient” HH use: offtake of livestock, participation in conflict management, seeking wage labour, taking loans, relying on formal assistance, and social capital.

HARANDE adjusted its approach in 2016/17 when faced with rising insecurity.

July 2020 - final evaluation completed - findings presented to local stakeholders (interview local partner) but report not publically available.

An internal Outcome Mapping report dated June 2020 does not provide any information about the effectiveness of the recorded changes with respect to livelihoods and shock resilience/recovery. All the lessons relate to the M&E process itself

4. Direct assistance in situ to victims of conflict

4.1. Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc. [case

[as relates to livelihood activities only] School feeding in the case of girls led to marked declines in participation and time spent in any work activity, especially farm labour. GFD does not appear to have offset the benefits of child labour among boys, for whom the opportunity cost of schooling can be higher because of their greater involvement in farm-related activities. Boys expanded their participation in any work, particularly in high-intensity conflict areas and among those living in GFD households.

agricultural/ livestock productivity, investment in human capital (education/ training), value chains, and infrastructure; greater access to formal safety nets; investments to support savings and education/training

The introduction to this report on the RESILIENCE LINKS Website but the study in the context of the "The Government of Mali's National Resilience Priorities (NRP/PRP-AGIR) which retraces the gaps and weaknesses in the existing policies, strategies, and programs to meet the specific needs of the most vulnerable populations and to strengthen their resilience to food and nutrition insecurity. NRP/PRP-AGIR priorities are articulated around four pillars: ii) restore, enhance, and secure livelihoods and improve social protection of communities and vulnerable households; (ii) enhance the nutrition of vulnerable households; (iii) strengthen sustainable agricultural and food productivity, incomes of the most vulnerable and their access to food; (iv) strengthen food security governance and nutrition.

It also notes: Strengthening Resilience Studies in Mali show that diversifying into non climate-sensitive livelihoods and receiving remittances are important to reducing poverty, improving diet diversity, and promoting a higher rate of recovery, ultimately increasing resilience. Asset ownership, access to formal safety nets, exposure to information, and education of adult household members also help strengthen resilience. Other actions to contribute to building resilience: reduce inter-community conflict and disaster risks and increasing access to basic social services

Labour constraints are important in making between schooling and productive activities among various household members. GDF did not offset the benefits of boys farm labour

of GDF and SCHOOL FEEDING]

Triple Nexus (military-humanitarian-development)

Many humanitarian organisations were very reticent to engage in the triple Nexus (military-humanitarian-development) perceiving "peace keeping" as implying use of armed force (militarisation of aid in the context of an integrated mission).

Consensus found for a Humanitarian-Development double Nexus (approved by the GEC in 2018). Action can include notions linked to resolution and transformation of conflicts, mediation and social cohesion (elements that can contribute to ending violence through dialogue), but this cannot be an objective in itself.

5. Direct assistance to IDP or refugees

USAID/CRS evaluation of impact on IDP HH in Segou Mopti Tbuctu and Gao regions of the ERRM-Kisili project. (21 of 155 sites; Total 234 533 persons assisted).

Future response should be more greatly oriented to opportunities for crop and livestock production complemented by development of income generating activities. Livelihood related recommendations for response to both IDP HH and vulnerable HH in host community: short term CASH assistance to enable HH to reconstitute their productive assets and support market development longer term; place more emphasis on supporting agricultural and pastoral livelihoods; support the development of income generating activities (IGA); build the capacities of people and grassroots community organizations.

5.1. While displaced, creating and providing shelter and security, employment, public services —especially schooling, health care

KEY FINDINGS : 93% of HH say displacement had substantial impact on livelihoods
Once emergency aid ended HH could not meet their needs; 21% had received some assistance after ERMM-Kisili , but 92% said it was insufficient; 7% poor quality/late. None received support post-ERRM to establish their livelihoods and as a result 92% of HH contracted debts at some point, to buy food. 57% of IDP HH were in debt at time of survey - male headed HH more indebted that female HH (65% :35%).75% do not have access to land (worse for female headed HH); 69% no livestock.

For information others include: SHORT TERM

- Provide assistance in water, hygiene & sanitation.
- Strengthen shelter assistance - items for construction.

Livelihoods: 98% of HH have income from at least one source (day wage labour, aid) and spend on average 50% on food. Only 12% have developed own economic activities and of these only 8% received any help with this. On average 31% expressed an ambition to return home but specifically in the Mopti region, 86% wished to go home for the harvest

MEDIUM TERM

- Support physical and financial access to preventive and curative health services.
- Strengthen protection against early marriage including the protection of children.
- Adopt a strategy of partnership with local NGOs as a method of implementing interventions.
- Include an approach to take into account the specific needs of the elderly and people with disabilities.

Conclusion: At end of ERRM-Kisili, IDP HH are still in humanitarian response phase and living in precarious conditions yet [livelihood] opportunities do exist

Nepal

Responses	Effectiveness	Lessons
<p>Rural Access Programme (RAP), builds roads through labour. 1,782 Road Building Groups (RBGs) were active in 2005, employing 35,148 people and indirectly benefiting 210,888; the RBGs had saved NRs 8 million (over £ 64,000) from employment through road construction (as at end March 2005).</p>	<p>Programme much welcomed by those employed, by local communities and by Maoists.</p> <p>RAP suffered from ad hoc increases to its planned works when costs were rising above budget and works were slipping behind schedule. This was exacerbated when DFID cut its budget to Nepal in 2006. This led to RAP reducing its plans to half of what had been promised, thus disappointing potential workers on the roads, and to threats to staff that if the RAP did not deliver no other development programmes would be allowed to operate in the area.</p>	<p>When planning and building roads that have a cycle of several years, promises need to be kept. This is critical to maintaining and building trust during conflict.</p> <p>If you build roads with and by the local community, do not expect this to happen as quickly as when a contractor is brought in.</p>
<p>Community Support Programme, DFID</p> <p>Community indicated needs — for example, irrigation, drinking water, school buildings</p> <p>Use of local labour and materials where possible</p>	<p>By 2007 reached 300,000 people (of which 19% are <i>Dalit</i> and 32% are <i>Janajati</i>) in the mid and far-west of Nepal.</p> <p>Reached remote areas</p> <p>Operated in conflict: transparency with public audits. Local community planning and participation critical</p> <p>CSPR's aim to provide rapid impact basic infrastructure has proved generally effective [DFID 2007]</p>	<p>Possible to operate during conflict</p> <p>Locals wanted physical works because external materials meant jobs portering them in to villages — necessary since many remote villages were far from road heads</p>
<p>Achham Livelihoods Security project, CARE</p> <p>Health, food security, water, income generation with participatory planning</p>	<p>Meets varied and diverse needs of community, builds on strengths rather than problems. Community-owned and planned bottom-up.</p> <p>Has to coordinate with many public stakeholders (and Maoists) which takes time</p> <p>Limited resources inadequate to address livelihoods needs of entire district.</p>	<p>Possible to work in conflict zones: education, health, sanitation, training — services that is — more acceptable than production support — or user groups and other decentralised institutions — seen as challenge to insurgents. Physical works appreciated, but vulnerable to attacks.</p> <p>Inclusion of women, disadvantaged groups and transparent finances — public audits — critical to operating in conflict zones</p> <p>Cannot cover more some of the pressing needs local express.</p>
<p>Integrated Community Development Programme</p>	<p>[Lack info on outputs, outcomes, and effectiveness.] Or even just what was done.</p>	<p>To work in conflict zones:</p>

(ICDP), Jajarkot — Action Aid Nepal with Jajarkot Permaculture Programme (JPP)

Included because of most detailed evidence on how to work on livelihoods during conflict

Plan and act participatively with local communities

Include women and other disadvantaged

Be transparent, neutral, frugal

Decentralise to local staff, trust them

Micro Enterprise Development Programme (MEDEP)

At 2007, 14k entrepreneurs in business, increasing family incomes by an average of over 50%. Businesses spread throughout 20 districts. 95% still continuing with their enterprises. 70% of entrepreneurs drawn from the hard core poor (incomes below NRs 4,000), *Dalits* or *Janjatis*, MEDEP

‘demonstrates an extraordinary ability, during an insurgency, in reaching the difficult cases with an enterprise development opportunity, rather than humanitarian welfare’. {DFID 2007}

Livelihoods and Forestry Programme (LFP) Support to forest user groups

Works with 3,851 of Forest User Groups covering some 452,000 households. About 54% of households reached LFP are poor, some 76,000 have already been assisted with income generating activities, including 31% poor households. [at 2007]

Forest users groups during conflict became the enduring local institution, seen across most villages.

Praised for reaching groups living in remote areas far from road heads

Support for Helvetas Programme

Water, physical works, agricultural support

At 2007, provided 49,000 people with safe drinking water, supported 2,040 communities to construct 911 bridges. 6,800 farmers annually earn NRs. 10,000 by selling cash crops, 12, 600 farmers earned NRs.5,500 by selling cash crops, i.e. vegetable, vegetable seeds, non-timber forest products, 43,800 people served by 374 micro rural infrastructure initiatives.

Supply chains

[Suspended during conflict??]

Services

Education

Little interference with schools

Health

Health posts operated in conflict zones. Insurgents value services

Specific programmes include:

Nepal was certified free of polio in 2005 , an achievement largely due to the DFID-supported polio eradication programme. For tuberculosis, due to rising cases detection rates and DOTS coverage, the annual risk of infection has fallen from 1.82% (1999) to 1.61% (2006) and deaths fallen from 16,000 to 5,000 per year.

Progress can be made on improving primary health care and health campaigns under conflict, linked to progress on national indicators.

Reproductive health

Safe motherhood

Polio eradication

Through the **Reproductive Health and Safe Motherhood Programmes**, improvements in contraceptive use, skilled birth attendance rates have measurably risen.

Notable reductions in maternal mortality: fallen in ten years from 539 to 281 deaths per 100,000 live births

Nepal Water for Health

'The Water User Committees of all 213 completed schemes from 1999 have been managing and using improved water and sanitation facilities as of the end of September 2006. The target is 262 schemes by 2006/7. The planned and under construction projects will be completed on-time'. (Nepal Water for Health (NEWAH) Review 2007)

Able to operate in remote and conflict affected areas

Assistance to those in conflict zones

WFP food aid

Scale and coverage not known

WFP able to operate in conflict zones

In 2002 DFID and WFP collaborated in a field surveillance system, so that info could be collected on food security, every 2 m, used to share info and for other agencies to plan activities ... Became national FS system: eventually handed over to national government.

Assistance to IDPs and refugees: barely applies

Those internally displaced by conflict tended to go to India, the towns and cities, and not to camps. They took care of themselves, rooming with relatives when possible, finding jobs. The increased rate of urbanisation seen helped stimulate the urban economy and thus allow the Nepali economy to grow quite quickly throughout the conflict

Nigeria

Activities	Effectiveness	Lessons
<p>Propcom-M (targeting North-East)²⁸³</p> <p>Propcom 2 (from 2012) M4P focus and from 2018 expanded to focus on conflict regions, and continued legacy focus on agricultural inputs & mechanisation from Propcom 1 (from 2003) targeting farmers. Note less focus on M4P in Propcom 2 – more focus on building resilience to climate shocks – addressing drivers instability, policy reform influencing market rules & piloting</p> <p>Propcom-M seeks to stimulate sustainable pro-poor growth in selected rural markets using a M4P approach. The programme does this by working as a ‘market facilitator’²⁸⁴, identifying constraints in market systems and facilitating changes to enable rural markets to work better for the benefit of poor smallholder farmers and rural small-scale entrepreneurs.</p> <p>Specific activities:</p> <p>Supply, production, management of crops, livestock</p>	<p>Propcom-M</p> <p>Effective</p> <p>Supported the re-engagement of private sector firms in conflict-affected states in the North-East by helping to e.g. the presence of extension workers in the states with adequate skills, and mobilising complementary support from partners to achieve outputs Propcom-M didn’t have the budget for, e.g. GiZ had funds for hardware such as infrastructure which was used to attract firms back to the region</p> <p>Facilitated links between farmers and markets (e.g. In the case of Babban Gona programme the intervention created a link between the farmers and multi-national buyers of maize for local processing who paid higher than local prices (in return for quality assurance and to demonstrate corporate social responsibility) (Propcom-M)</p>	<p>Propcom-M</p> <p>Engaging private sector as mechanism for creating LLH opportunities:</p> <p>Key is to find private sector firms that have appetite for risk and genuine business idea to help make viable. (Propcom-M & KII with programme staff)</p> <p>Market development where humanitarian agencies operating a challenge given in-kind assistance and focus on blanket assistance through INGOs/contractors as opposed to tapping into local/markets, misconception can’t source goods locally (Propcom-M & KIIs)</p> <p>Assumption often made in design phase of programmes that markets in conflict-affected regions are not functioning - for humanitarian actors this often means that in-kind aid is used as a modality as opposed to cash transfers and for market-focussed development programmes targeting conflict regions, this often leads to assumption (as was case in Propcom-M) that markets will need to be supported from scratch, and this has proved not to be the case, they are very resilient!. (Propcom-M contractors KIIs)</p> <p>Training is effective when linked to a specific opportunity for (or overcome a specific barrier to) engaging in the market, e.g. support to private sector in overcoming a barrier engaging in conflict-affected areas or pursuing a viable business idea Example from Propcom-M: Standard Microfinance Bank keen to engage in North-East given client base but no field personnel with skills, so project sought to train extension workers to be hired by the bank. (Propcom-M)</p> <p>Building agribusiness linkages between producer and consumer helps markets recover (KIIs). Seed fairs to redistribute seeds strengthen access to seeds in community (KIIs)</p> <p>Market assessments:</p>

²⁸³ Independent Evaluation for Promoting Pro-poor Opportunities in Commodities and Service Markets (Propcom) Maikarfi Programme, Northern Nigeria 2018 Final Evaluation Report https://iati.fcdo.gov.uk/iati_documents/44796851.pdf

²⁸⁴ PM works with private sector businesses, international NGOs, NGOs and some Government agencies.

and environment. Key interventions in poultry health, Babban Gonna (agriculture franchise), rice parboiling, tillers, crop protection Syngenta, crop protection and soap/handwashing

commercial agroforestry and solar-powered irrigation for scale-up based on review.

Propcom-M

See above

EUTF project²⁸⁵ (Restoring and promoting sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods for food security, employment and nutrition improvement in Borno State)

Propcom-M

Effective in terms of increasing yields, incomes and investments in wider Livelihoods (health/education)

In seven of the nine evaluated markets, incomes of participating households increased and were used to purchase assets to diversify income streams – leading to increased productivity/yields (e.g. maize productivity doubled in HHs targeted by Babban Gona programme and income of HHs targeted by poultry vaccinations rose by factor.27 on average), diversifying income streams by planting other crops or by investing in another business, and spend additional income on school and medical fees, enabling households to spread risk and build resilience to shocks (e.g. health emergencies, and of investing in their children’s education). Electronic Warehousing Receipts System intervention allowed farmers to store their grain and sell when prices highest. Poultry Health intervention (vaccinating against Newcastle disease) largest scale of impact (Propcom-M)

The programme increased men’s per capita incomes by approximately £43 compared to women’s average per capita increase of £32.6.

Farm inputs support those unable to access assets: (vaccinations, credit, tillers, feed supplements, hybrid seeds, fertiliser, paddy rice, inputs for rice parboiling) helpful for HHs with

Assessments on existing markets and types, terms, barriers, participation/how inclusive), increase the likelihood of the interventions gaining traction and overcoming market barriers (e.g. counterfeit and low-quality products in Propcom-M). Assessments help to decide on best modality of assistance at outset (KII WFP)

Need to balance support to agriculture and non-agriculture-based Livelihoods based on market assessment (KIIs)

A rapid market assessment to guide the implementation of market revival enables programme to understand existing market dynamics and identify ways to fill gaps/overcome barriers through the programme (EUTF project Borno state).

Shared market analysis key - MPFS market systems survey NW and North-East FAO sits in committee updated twice a year (KIIs)

Role of macro-eco factors in increases in production and incomes (e.g. Propkom-M): operating in context of blocked imports helped - leading to demand for local produce/increased prices. (Propcom-M)

Support to poultry/livestock (though vaccinations and kits) particularly impactful in terms of sustainability, scale and beneficiary reach of the programme, asset accumulation and supporting household nutrition/food security (evidence from Propcom-M and MARKETS II). Propcom-M found that agricultural inputs and mechanisation along with poultry health and grain storage were much more successful initiatives in supporting small holders/farmers to access markets in North-East comparison to livestock support, support in producing Shea and soap and handwashing initiatives Reasons why some worked and not others: those that engaged with partners and mobilised their resources (GiZ on infrastructure and equipment) worked better, those that engaged value chains that already existed and assisting to overcome barriers worked better than establishing new ones. Key learning – really understand what exists through market assessments and build on it/address existing

²⁸⁵ Joint FAO/WFP/UNWOMEN 2019 Annual Report: Restoring and promoting sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods for food security, employment and nutrition improvement in Borno State

Farming inputs – training/farmer schools, vaccinations, seeds fertilisers, water pumps, goat kits for women, bull kits for youth, poultry kits

labour, and those unable to access own agricultural land due to security sector restrictions on travel and types of crops in North-East. (Propcom-M)

EUTF project Restoring and promoting sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods for food security, employment and nutrition improvement in Borno State (2018 – 2020)

Effective – in terms of yield/incomes yes, wider impact on poverty undocumented.

2018/2019 dry season farming yields generating significant income, enabling households to address basic needs and to invest in farming inputs.

Evidence of yields produced for project HHs Vs non-project HHs identified in FAO post-harvest survey on impact of the 2019 rain-fed farm cultivation support (x3 volume for Amaranth, x2 for Okra, x2 for Sesame and Sorghum, but yields for other crops no difference).

The availability of water pumps allowed HHs to expand the size of the farmland they cultivated during the 2019/2020 dry season

Households generated increased income from their harvest, especially livestock and poultry vaccination interventions and aquaculture enabling beneficiaries to save and invest in tools to diversify income, invest in education and increase food consumption/strengthen nutrition.

As at November 2019, 39 percent of the beneficiaries sampled reported an increase in their herd by 1 to 5 goat kids, and many reported to have sold some of the kids. Direct link to food sec - 28 percent of the beneficiaries indicated that their capacity to purchase food for their HHs has increased because of the goat kits.

56 percent of sampled beneficiaries collect at least two crates of eggs from poultry per week while 39 percent and 5 percent collect three and four crates per week respectively. A crate of egg is sold at an average of NGN 800, this implies each beneficiary earned at least NGN 1 600 weekly

As at January 2020, a total of 20,500kg of fish sold within the communities. The first batch of 50 benefiting households generated an average of NGN 307 000 per household from the sale of the fish. From their earnings, beneficiaries are restocking for a fresh cycle of fish production with supervision from FAO. nutrition in house from fish.

Rice parboiling technique training has significantly improved the cost-benefit ratio of rice processing for beneficiaries. Time savings enable the HHs more time to allocate to other livelihood and domestic activities.

barriers – value chains, partners, skills – don't impose ideas or start from scratch.

The role of military/security providers in escorting staff on field visits and alerting agencies to spikes in violence/emerging trends is key – highlights importance of collaboration across the (dare I say it) triple nexus (KIIs).

Farmers & women's groups, will readily invest in low-cost drip-irrigation to produce dry-season vegetables, decreasing costs and time for collecting water while increasing income and improving household nutrition (MARKETS II). Note however, this may refer to HHs that already had assets not poorest groups.

Dry-season rice and maize farming works through irrigation especially relevant in situations of food insecurity: processors and buyers value the year-round reliable paddy and maize supply. Importantly, dry-season production can be significantly expanded through repair and maintenance of existing canals, and by encouraging processors to invest in paddy dryers to achieve proper moisture content (MARKETS II)

Strong belief by some KIIs (EU/ECHO) that it is not possible to support longer-term agricultural development/income generation in North-East given current levels of insecurity – war economies. Cash transfers regarded as only option for supporting Livelihoods and can monitor situation to gauge opportunities to begin to self-reliance when situation allows. Cash is 'quick and dirty' where situation not yet conducive to recovery/longer-term LLH support.

KIIs – most important is to support formation of community-led/owned cooperative or village saving committee or whatever it is called doesn't matter - help it form, grow, and community members recognising its benefit will help sustain it – then connect it to market – greater impact.

MARKETS II²⁸⁶ – agriculture development outside North-East but coverage of North-West (Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa), impacted by herder-farmer conflict since project inception

Non-bank credit programs to producer groups and small businesses;

The project piloted a drip irrigation system in the 2013-14 dry season for homestead farming for five vulnerable women's groups with an average plot size of 400 square meters - expanded to 25 groups in NW (Jigawa, Kebbi, Kano, Sokoto, and Kaduna) states by project end; agricultural inputs and mechanisation to farmer cooperatives, aquaculture training in irrigation and homestead vegetable

²⁸⁶ MARKETS: MAXIMIZING AGRICULTURAL REVENUE AND KEY ENTERPRISES IN TARGETED SITES II (2017) https://www.chemonics.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MARKETS_II_Final_Report_revised-submission_8Dec2017.pdf

production, drip-irrigation technology

Dry-season irrigated maize cultivation as a way to increase smallholders' incomes, boost the supply of food during the "hunger season," and produce cash flow in time for farmers to purchase inputs for the wet season;

Capacity building - peer learning via exchange visits

Integrated Community Recovery and Resilience in Borno State (IC2RB) in collaboration with WHO. funded by the European Union (EU) launched in December 2017 as part of the "EU Borno Package".

Livelihoods recovery to provide affected communities with immediate short-term opportunities to earn an income. Vocational training followed by start-up cash grant was provided to each qualified successful graduate based on business plan

Revitalization of agricultural production of food and cash crops in target communities

Market-based skills development for youth and women

Micro and small enterprise recovery in areas of return and

MARKETS II 2012 – 2017 (targeted some NW states, also conflict-affected by herder-farmer conflict)

Effective in strengthening production in dry-season of rice and maize as is key to addressing herdsman-farmer conflict

Maize: The projects' dry-season irrigated maize producers achieved yields of 5.7 metric tons per hectare in the final project year compared to the 1.31 metric tons per hectare baseline. MARKETS II's networked farmers generated \$40,284,240 in cumulative sales since 2014. Given the success of pilot, MARKETS II expanded to 6,000 farmers trained on best dry-season maize production practices in 2015.

Description of alleged positive impact on conflict dynamics: Maize harvesting leaves behind stalks that can be used as fodder for cattle during the dry season. The cattle then produce nutrient-rich manure that can be used to fertilize maize fields (seen in Kaduna, under MARKETS II project - cattle farmers pay maize farmers to allow their cattle to graze in their fields. In addition to receiving additional income, the maize farmers' fields are cleared in an environmentally friendly manner, and the cattle produce organic fertilizer to nurture the next cycle of maize. Note same situation regarding rice straws).

Rice: In the final year of the project, dry-season rice cultivation yielded 6.22 metric tons per hectare. Since 2013, MARKETS II has helped networked dry-season irrigated rice farmers in Jigawa, Kano, Sokoto, and Kebbi generate an additional \$199,636,611 in cumulative sales.

IC2RB Cash for Work

Some anecdotal evidence of small-scale impact, limited evidence of wide-scale impact on self-reliance, too soon to realise results

Generally, it is too soon to see results with impact of insecurity and Covid-19, some anecdotal evidence on impact from loans, vocational training and start-up grant packages, but HHs still need to borrow money for food and self-reliance not yet achieved and (80% target HHs still borrow money to purchase food over a one-year period)

Total number of beneficiaries who completed their vocational training under the project 816 (432 men and 384 women).

Loans have helped the members to develop their own businesses or keep the subsistence of their families. Out of the borrowers, 119 have begun repayments.

Volume of funding matters – impacts greater in Nigeria than others in region and one reason was greater funding from donors

Cash components key – Nigeria success in programmes attributed fact that production supplemented with cash transfers (e.g livestock programmes) during 2015-18.

Need to link more strongly to conflict dynamics to ensure programme supports peacebuilding -e.g. FAO could have further engaged in issues such as land reclamation, the development of pastureland through fodder seeding, the revival of agricultural and fishing activities, the construction of pastoral hydraulics (to reduce agricultural conflicts), the marking of transhumance corridors (also to reduce agricultural conflicts) or the setting-up of rural committees as a mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts. The rehabilitation of grazing reserves and stock routes within national and across inter-state boundaries should be considered to mitigate farmer-herder conflict.

Initiatives to support seed quality in local markets should be upscaled?

Missed opportunities:

FAO's assistance to producer organizations such as value chain development, processing operations, and access to finance and markets

the establishment of community-level loan and savings schemes.

2019, UNDP started capacity building for VSLAs as a Community-Based Social Safety Nets (CBSSN) mechanism in 14 communities across 6 LGAs in Borno state

UNDP programme:

Stabilisation of conflict-affected communities in North-East Nigeria (funded by JICA):

GiZ resilience programme (annual report 2020) – aligned to governments ‘Buhari’ recovery plan for the North-East.

1 of 4 components focussed on livelihoods: agricultural recovery, strengthening vocational training and market systems targeting conflict-affected farmers and youth (activities: start-up kits and grants, access to informal finance, skills acquisition programmes, capacity development, revitalise market storage and areas, strengthen market systems and support extension services). Support to small holder farmers, value chain entrepreneurs, market promoters & mentors, technical experts and unskilled

UNDP/JICA stabilisation programme: livelihoods, infrastructure (cash for work), community engagement, local governance and community cohesion (lots of overlap with project above)

GiZ Resilience Programme (livelihoods component)

Livelihoods: Building Resilience Through Sustainable Agriculture project (improved seeds, herbicides, compost fertilizer, spray and funds for labour participants, extension services and support with establishing VSLAs, access to microfinance) – smallholder anecdotally reported bumper yields and linked this to the good agricultural practice (GAP) initiative, though no evidence/data of this provided. Significant project management issues – time gaps between training and finance, lack communication between key actors, Covid-19 a key challenge to delivery over last year.

Evidence is limited to impact evaluation which focusses more on outputs.

Criticised by some for slow funding disbursements, don’t match seasonal calendar, severe delays in seed distribution (farmers have adapted by storing the seeds until the following year but food security implementations). Pockets of success in some areas (livestock/poultry and fuel-efficient stoves and where can provide cash component).

Small stoves: At the end of 2017, FAO had set-up three production & training centres for fuel-efficient stoves accommodated 100 people (in partnership with the International Centre for Energy, Environment and Development, or ICEED). Helped people reduce their impact on the environment, but also helped to create jobs in new industry and reduce the risk of conflict between displaced and host populations.

Contributed to sustaining food and nutritional needs, increased time for women to engage in other income-generating activities. Protection of women strengthened as don’t have to collect firewood.

Capacity building element of the interventions is weak and a risk of dependency on FAO’s support, and seeds’ provision. Although there is evidence of training of beneficiaries in micro-gardening and the implementation of farmers field school, these are very limited to a few intervention areas.

Seed fairs: poor seed quality in local markets: collaboration with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) to support seeds production in the southern part of Borno and in Yobe, which has led to the organization of seed fairs in 2018 and 2019 in Yobe State

Support to cross-border trade - could have contributed to agricultural value chains. Nigeria has transformed its value and sales, especially for export; the proximity of the Nigerian market is a significant commercial opportunity that could be exploited by the three other countries. Also, youth could be considered the main recipient or actors in this area,

Targeting youth for market opportunities key but now not consistent.

Poultry restocking and fuel-efficient stove’s providing income, food and source of livelihood to women in IDP camps and host communities – most appropriate for IDPs as small and can take with you if you return.

Targeting – think about pastoralists!

individuals – aim to strengthen informal market

Key projects delivered through Plan, AUN, MercyCorps: Building Resilience through Sustainable Agriculture (BRSA), Youth

Economic Empowerment for Resilience and Peace Building (YEE4RP) and Agricultural Livelihood and

Markets Recovery Intervention (ALMRI)

FAO²⁸⁷: Procurement and delivery of agricultural inputs, field farmer school, micro gardening, livestock inputs support, small stove initiative in parallel to supporting GLSA, and additional cash transfers to protect productive assets (cash +) – targeting IDPs and host communities. CdR approach? Focus on emergency agriculture and livelihoods support to protect people’s livelihoods and build their resilience

Propcom-M

MARKETS II

See project descriptions above

Positive outcomes of cash component initiative but v small scale: one livestock project also included a financial component: the allocation of grants to 800 women organized in groups to resume savings and loans activities.

Excludes pastoralists: Pastoralists not living in conventional IDP camps but found on the outskirts of relatively secure towns and villages in the northeast are largely excluded from FAO’s restocking interventions within the period, except for vaccination. They could be assisted with restocking kits, fodder and animal health services.

Somewhat effective in engaging other actors to scale-up effective approaches for greater coverage, though impact of programme on wider system not documented

Propcom-M

Project facilitated some level of systemic change through six of the nine interventions with crowding in and roll out of approaches by private and public sector actors, with Poultry Health and Electronic Warehousing being the most successful. Poultry Health intervention resulted in

Achieving wider impact of programmes supporting market access largely dependent on uptake and dissemination of outputs by private and public sector actors in these cases – this depends on a number of factors including profitable business opportunities, limited risks and alignment with central and local government policy/priorities as well as engagement of government actors for buy-in/sustainability and uptake.

²⁸⁷ Evaluation of the FAO response to the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin 2015–2018

both copying (non-intervention populations taking up the service) and crowding in (companies not directly involved in the intervention replicating or refining and replicating the business model) private sector partners refining and adopting the model, another donor programme refining the model for their purposes, and a public sector player using the model (with the assistance of the programme) as a foundation of a larger outreach model- National Vaccination Research Institute) and private sector actors (Propcom-M)

MARKETS II

Sustainability/wider impact of facilitating small-holder-market/private sector linkages demonstrated in NW: Examples:

UMZA International (agricbusiness) in Kano state has worked with the MARKETS projects since 2010. Initially sceptical that smallholders could produce the quantity and quality of product they needed. The company's regular supply of paddy now (2017) comes largely from MARKETS II farmers. UMZA has also constructed a separate warehouse where MARKETS II farmers' paddy is stored prior to processing, and it added a \$2.7 million milling line with the capacity of 12 tons per hour. With this expansion, UMZA is employing 165 full-time staff, with another 1,200 part-time employees.

Processing partners Labana Mills in Kebbi state, Popular Mills in Kano state, and Olam Nigeria in Nassarawa state all expanded their processing capacity recognising the value of smallholder farmers in supplying their needs

Nigerian Breweries Plc to Kiru Fadama Multipurpose Cooperative in Kano (Sorghum production). Based on this positive experience, in 2016, Nigerian Breweries Plc hired Kiru to plant another 80 hectares. In 2015, another MARKETS II-supported farmer group, Anguwar Makama Danlawal Multipurpose Cooperative Society in Kaduna state, also received a contract with Nigerian Breweries Plc to cultivate 10 hectares of hybrid sorghum, expanding to 70 hectares in 2016

Propcom-M

See project descriptions above

Propcom-M

Less effective in targeting women and poorest HHS

Impact on women: The changes in the market systems had positive effects on the empowerment of women, by default rather than design. Women gained in financial independence and self-esteem. Apart from rice parboiling and tillers none of the business models included specific activities targeting women. The programme did not achieve its Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) target of 250 000 women. (Propcom-M)

Landless and poorest HHs have not benefitted from inclusion in the markets – because they couldn't afford the inputs but also because Propcom-M struggled to operate where

Gender: Women specific interventions (as opposed to mainstreamed) often take longer and cost more to deliver returns (Propcom-M). BUT women more likely to invest a return on their investment in family members and the community; (education, health care) in addition to economic activity, so key they are targeted explicitly.

Owning large herds of small ruminants has socio-economic significance and represents self-reliance for women (EUTF project Borno)

Provision of water pumps enhance labour savings impacting especially on women who would usually irrigate their farms with buckets. (EUTF project Borno)

humanitarian assistance ongoing (due to in-kind aid replacing market demands) so likely to have not reached poorest HHs in these areas

Learning from WFP/USAID assessments of gender and markets in Kano (NW): women’s community gardens can diversify nutrition, boost food security and increase women’s ability to earn independent cash incomes; low-tech affordable methods can greatly reduce wastage and increase added value to agricultural products; implementing a quota system targeting women traders and supporting authentic women cooperatives and farmers and trade organisations can help to strengthen incomes of women

Targeting poorest HHs:

This type of agricultural/markets programme (Propcom-K) benefits individuals who can afford to acquire additional goods and services to improve their incomes - smallholder farmers and small-scale entrepreneurs were constrained by more pressing need to provide food/meet basic needs as opposed to investing in longer-term (Propcom-M). My thoughts: a cash transfer component embedded in the programme may have helped reach the poorest households?

ToC:

ToC should consider impacts of conflict risks and embed programme flexibility to adapt programme as per changes in the context

VFM considerations

Timescales for realising impact of programmes supporting markets and longer-term Livelihoods take time (KIIs suggest minimum of 5-7 years).

Costs of delivering in conflict regions higher: Benchmarking against other similar programmes in Nigeria/West Africa could help to identify differences of delivering in conflict context, (Propcom-M)

Indicators: Common KPIs for Livelihoods programmes include: Yields/production, income and how far it enables HHs to access education/healthcare, benefit to women, monitor savings in saving programmes, food consumption score, and IPC categories (KIIs, FAO). My thoughts: are these measures outcome orientated enough? Ultimate goal is graduation out of poverty how measure this?

Propcom-M

Propcom-M

See project descriptions above

ToC generally logical in overcoming demand and supply side constraints in most of the markets, thought the risks and assumptions that underpin ToC not fully aligned to realities of delivering in conflict contexts (e.g. agricultural season in the North-East also signals increases in insurgent mobility due to changes in vegetative cover)

Time-lag in realising impact Costs of delivering in conflict affected regions: As with many M4P programmes, due to the time lag between facilitation and intervention, the returns on this investment have not yet been fully realised and this is especially the case in complex conflict-affected operating contexts. Propcom-M is moderately higher than MADE II’s cost per farmer of £18.31.288 For the North-East, costs increasing from £30.30 to £40.50 reflecting higher costs for operating in a fragile environment and the introduction of 13 new interventions (see output 2), but again substantially below the BC target of £61. (Propcom-M). MADE II is the Market Developments in Niger Delta programme funded by FCDO in largely non conflict area so not covered here.

²⁸⁸ DFID Final External Review of MADE Nigeria Delta II (2019)

Propcom-M

See project descriptions above

Propcom-M

Limited engagement with local govt/authorities because not offering grants/competing with them, this impacted on sustainability of the programme. Perspective from KIIs that engagement with local government key for ensuring sustainability.

To leverage support from the public sector, identify how planned interventions match with policies and priorities Also consider scope for public sector partners not only private. (Propcom-M). Enabling Sustained Recovery in the Northeast Programme (ENSURE²⁸⁹) also identified importance of working with government and connecting national and federal govt agencies for greater sustainability. KIIs backed up – e.g. Adamawa support to Ministry of Agric, funded through WB project, strengthened impact/buy-in.

Assumption in Propcom-M programme that entry points for delivering activities in North-East would be in collaboration with humanitarian actors unfounded, in practise humanitarian agencies reportedly did not have resources/incentives to engage/plan for longer-term and not encouraged to by management and also less open to engaging with private contractors (Palladium) given perceived risk to humanitarian principles. This highlights the role of donors in facilitating collaboration between he humanitarian and development programmes they fund which target the same geographic areas.

USAID/American University of Nigeria (AUN) TELA project in Adamawa State, Northeast
USAID/American University of Nigeria (AUN) TELA project in Adamawa State, Northeast Nigeria²⁹⁰ – using radio and mobile technologies to increase the literacy and numeracy skills of vulnerable and Out of School Children (OSCs).

Most effective when education programmes tailored to conflict-affected contexts/designed with impact of conflict in mind.

AUN/USAID project

The project targeted and reached 22,000 children. After six months, average improvement of 99.1% in EGRA (literacy) scores and an average improvement of 97.2% in EGMA (numeracy) scores. (I haven't seen the evidence for this though). The programmes were most successful in supporting the weakest learners. Girls impacted more than boys

SLPs

The evaluation found that the SLPs had contributed to improvements in capacity and systems, and some improvements to service delivery. However, there was limited evidence that improved sector management processes and successful delivery of capacity development has translated into improved system performance/ accountability environment or development results. The SLPs have contributed to increases in public expenditure on education and health in the states in which they have worked. The overall results achieved have varied significantly by state, with Jigawa and Lagos generally the strongest performers, and Kaduna the weakest. (Kaduna also

Radio and mobile technologies can provide a swift response to the educational crises in active conflicts. A core objective should be to increase a child's love for learning, by using well known cultural characters in stories that children can connect to. It is a love for learning and curiosity that will bring children consistently to the non-formal learning spaces.

Beneficiaries exposed to a combination of mobile classroom visits and the radio programs outperformed those exposed only to the radio programs by an average of 25%.

Radio-based education is particularly beneficial for girls. This is especially useful in societies where there are cultural walls that stop girls from going to school.

Supporting education is a key component of strengthening livelihoods in active conflict situations, though a different approach (e.g. remote

²⁸⁹ Enabling Sustained Recovery in the Northeast – Project Update October 2020

²⁹⁰ American University of Nigeria Evaluation Brief: Where There Is No School: Radio and Mobile Technologies for Education in Crises and Post Conflict Societies

²⁹¹ The Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Project for the DFID Nigeria State Level Programmes (IMEP) Performance Evaluation of the DFID Nigeria State Level Programmes: Final Evaluation Report Volume https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/678856/Independent-Monitoring-and-Evaluation-Project-for-the-DFID-Nigeria-State-Level-Programmes-IMEP.pdf

include: public finance and management (SPARC), building capacity for voice and accountability (SAVI) strengthening the management and delivery of basic education (ESSPIN) and primary healthcare (PATHS2) services at state level. All four SLPs were implemented in five states (Enugu, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna and Lagos) – note Jigawa, Kano and Kaduna became impacted by conflict (herder-farmer) since programme inception.

GiZ resilience programme (annual report 2020) – aligned to governments ‘Buhari’ recovery plan for the North-East.

4 key components:

Governance: establishing Community Development Planning (CDP) mechanisms; capacity building local government and CSOs

Infrastructure construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities, including WASH, health, education and market facilities, provision of furniture, work tools and equipment, as well as drilling of boreholes fitted with solar-powered

Education: Conditional cash transfers, training and monitoring of teachers, strengthening school-based

experienced most incidences of interethnic conflict during period - raids on villages by armed groups & clashes between the civilians and military).

GiZ resilience programme

Strong community engagement though sustainability a challenge: Support through the project in establishing CDPs has played a key role in facilitating other components such as livelihoods working as a mechanism for engaging with communities. The Ward Project Support Committees (WPSC) are linking communities and local government. Community led management of outputs in project is strong - youths provide community led security of new boreholes. But communities can't lead on security/maintenance in long-term, high dependence on GiZ, need government funding/support. Strong engagement with state government but limited engagement/funding from Local Government Authorities (LGAs)

Infrastructure especially impactful in remote rural locations (where need is greatest), and positive impact of returnees and in addressing local conflict dynamics. Infrastructure has motivated displaced population to resettle in their original localities. Infrastructure has contributed to community cohesion/conflict reduction, by the manner in which implemented (by consulting community in planning, negotiations, dispute management – through CDPs) but also because they have restored services and reduced competition between communities, & provided meeting points/spaces for community consultation as well as reducing insecurity (e.g. boreholes situated closer reduce risk from attack when traveling longer distances, and women-only boreholes/latrines). Inclusive – wheelchair ramps in schools and latrines designed to reflect needs of women.

Example: GiZ revamped the vocational training centre (VTC) in Mafoni, Maiduguri - returned and improved its capacity. Has since supported 1,000 individuals to learn different trades/acquire skills. Strong coordination with state government - GiZ rebuilt the centre and the government

learning/radio/mobile classroom visits) is necessary to traditional education development programmes.

A more realistic timeframe (longer than 3 years) for achievement of impact objectives though education programmes is necessary

Establishment of community committee key to delivery of all programme components – infrastructure, education and livelihoods

Infrastructure projects can play a key role in peacebuilding if designed in a way that engage community in planning, delivery and include a dispute resolution mechanism.

While supporting establishment of community-level communities to ensure community buy-in and engagement in delivery is key, for sustainability of infrastructure projects, it is crucial that local government is engaged from the outset and funding for maintenance in the long-term discussed. The issues of long-term operation, maintenance and management of infrastructure facilities is crucial to the long-term viability of the measures. Communities can play a key role, but without some funding, the services cannot sustain.

Project management is key - there is a strong need for more effective management and oversight of partners and private sector service providers (especially in livelihoods component given large number stakeholders), including scheduling, management of delivery and the clarity of roles between partners

Mentors especially valued by communities

Targeting women directly and considering gender in programme design proved to be key – women only community committees, latrines and boreholes established to address security risks and education

management committees, capacity development for government institutions

funded participation of youth in trainings through the Industrial Training Fund (ITF) & national youth engagement schemes like N-Power.

Health: The reported effects of infrastructure on the health was greater than anticipated – not just because of the restoration of health facilities, but access to WASH facilities in schools (WASH facilities provided to 50 schools). Programme flexibility enabled private sector actors involved in project to support storage facilities and use for covid-19 health supplies.

Education:

Income-generating activities and financial literacy training to 280 households of registered school children as well as conditional cash grants to 530 household heads (conditional on children being kept in school). School attendance increased as a result of school restoration

Facilitated the School-based Management Committees (SBMC)'s work on developing a School Development Plan (SDP) – 10 schools – begin to take on school governance (training of committee members provided & integration Covid-19). Some SBMC's ran self-help restoration projects during school closures/lockdown, mobilising communities to play a role.

Project has strengthened SBMCs in holding duty bearers to account for the delivery of basic education services

Training for teachers in 30 schools (IRC)

component explicit target on strengthening inclusion of girls in education through conditional cash transfers

Continued funding of education key – lessons from Ebola show a decline in children attending to school following pandemic as pulled into income generating activities, and government focus on health funding

IC2RB

Repaired infrastructure: health facilities, nutrition stabilization centres, schools, water and sanitation facilities; renewable (solar) energy

Training to health professionals, teachers & community workers. WHO - trainings and supply of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) kits to the government and partner agencies in the North east Nigeria

Participatory local governance processes responsible for basic

Cash for Work: 2,461 women, 13,944 men employed in cash for work schemes by constructing companies that had contracts with UNDP with conditions of certain number of community residents. Limited participation of female workers due to cultural expectations.

UNDP and WHO supported government with approved Borno state strategic Health Development plan II

Supported the equipping of the colleges for 770 nurse/midwife student

Results from survey of HHs targeted on impact of services:

82% of the population living between 1 km and less than 3 kms of the health facilities now have access to quality health services with satisfaction rate of 63%

77% population living between 1km and less than 3 kms of the education facilities.

clean drinking water for 81% population through development of boreholes. 66% agreed that the water fetched from borehole is sufficient for daily needs

Challenge in engaging women in cash for work due to cultural constraints – importance of providing specific incentives for women and, clear guidance to the contracted construction companies implementing cash-for-work schemes to engage women.

Importance of flexibility in programming, i.e. to respond flexibly to suddenly imposed bans by Nigerian military on use of fertilisers

service provision and rebuilding
of social cohesion

CDGP combined cash transfers with social behaviour change communication (SBCC) Cash + (Nutrition advice, counselling and mentoring to support the feeding and nutrition practices of pregnant women, infants and young children).

CDGP (2013-2019)²⁹²²⁹³

Somewhat effective approach: combination of regular cash transfers and targeted SBCC (cash +) contributed to improved food security and the adoption of beneficial practices and behaviours to support better maternal and child health.

Marginal increased engagement with health services: 25% of children born after midline survey delivered in health facility. See literature summary for figures on higher %s of project supported HHs accessing health services Vs non-project HHs

Change in behaviours towards child health/nutrition witnessed: beliefs and attitudes regarding a range of health issues, including early initiation of breastfeeding, the benefits of colostrum, observed by both men and women (gender related outcomes). Snowballing impact as others in wider community copy behaviours. Impact on the uptake of vaccinations, as well as on a range of other positive health indicators, such as a reduction in the incidence of diarrhoea. Strong evidence of higher proportions of CGDP HHs using beneficial health practises than in non-project HHS (see document review). Nutrition of children targeted through the programme improved as per anthropometric data.

Sustainability of behaviours beyond programme: Positive practices for healthy child feeding and vaccinations was sustained for new children born in the household (siblings) towards the end of the programme, but while nutrition as measured by anthropometric outcomes improved for children targeted through the programme, this was not demonstrated however for children born into HH towards the end of the programme. So, without sustained transfers nutrition outcomes struggle to be maintained. Does this mean transfers are needed for longer?

Limited long-term impact on women's nutritional status: Little evidence of any effect of the CDGP on women's nutritional status, as measured by height, weight, body mass index, and mid-upper arm circumference. Does this mean that the additional incomes and food consumption witnessed only stretched to benefit children and not enough to cover women's needs?

MARKETS II (utilisation of programmatic flex financing mechanism in development programme to adapt and target

Programme not initially focussed on conflict-affected regions or populations – the escalation of violence in the North took place after project inception. Rapid financing mechanism embedded in programme (allowing USAID to respond to unanticipated events) enabled programme to adapt and target IDPs in camps in NW (from North-East regions and impacted by BH attacks)

Assumption that behaviours will strengthen access to health services unfounded – need to support health services in parallel. Challenge in beneficiaries accessing health services due to limited availability of skilled staff at health facilities, cost of getting to/accessing health service.

Challenge with child using anthropometric measures. Child nutritional status, such as stunting, have multiple, complex determinants that a single programme may not be able to jointly address in isolation.

Transfers are needed for longer-time period to benefit nutrition outcomes beyond programme, and to benefit women as well as children, a larger transfer value is needed (3,500 per month NGN = \$9)

Rapid response window enabled economic development programme to scale up in response to unforeseen conflict/displacement and scale-up

²⁹² OPM, Child Development Grant Programme end line evaluation <https://www.opml.co.uk/projects/evaluation-child-development-grant-programme-cdgp>

²⁹³ Social protection in Nigeria Synthesis report Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Rebecca Holmes February 2012 <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7583.pdf>

conflict affected
populations/IDPs)

through the programme, by promoting small-scale business. Programme reached 20,181 IDPs, many of whom were women with financing from Hisbah Board of Kano, and MARKETS II's IDP-adapted training program as a prerequisite for accessing financial assistance.

Rapid assessments undertaken of IDP camps in Kano, Kaduna, Taraba, Nassarawa, and Benue states, as well as the Federal Capital Territory, and contact other agencies working with IDPs to determine areas of support. Assessments resulted in modifying and integrating the existing training to target IDPs, nutrition and hygiene, and homestead gardening curricula. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the interventions helped IDPs, especially women, to develop business and life skills to diversify their livelihoods, or to re-establish livelihoods disrupted or destroyed by displacement.

Wider roll out/uptake of training: MARKETS II utilized its team of local master trainers to provide the IDP-adapted MEF training-of-trainers program to staff and project partners supporting orphans and vulnerable children. Today, MARKETS II's training continues to be replicated by other organizations across Nigeria targeting IDPs.

in response to the LLH needs of IDPs. Good model for devt actors re use of embedded programmatic risk financing mechanisms.

Somalia

Measure	Effectiveness	Lessons Learned
Economic Recovery Interventions		
<p>Resilience Building Consortia/strategies, notably</p> <p>Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) (DFID funded, and DEVCO; led by NRC; and CESVI, CWW, IRC and SCI. Phase I (2013-17), Phase II (2018-22) – included an additional 3 local NGOs and merged with SNS (see below)also including a learning partner (initially ODI, now MESH who also does monitoring)</p> <p>Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia (SNS).</p> <p>DFID funded, Save led. (the two merged in BRCiS II 2016 as multi-sectoral approach on health and nutrition was recommended)</p> <p>The United Nations Joint Resilience</p>	<p>BRCiS works in 99 communities across South-Central Somalia. Activities include short term humanitarian support as well as long term resilience building activities to deal with shocks. Activities are based on community based action plans that highlight issues to be addressed in WASH, nutrition, livelihoods, health, education, capacity building, food security etc. It also builds on community based early warning system that is meant to feed into wider national systems. Humanitarian activities included for example construction and rehabilitation of latrines and boreholes; water trucking; hygiene sensitization; health; nutrition treatment; distribution of NFIs, cash transfers, addressing GBV</p> <p>DFID impact evaluation of Multi-year Humanitarian Programme (MYHP (2013-2017)) which looked at DFID supported resilience programmes found that the MYHP provided flexible funding, both in the ways it supported resilience programming and in how the Internal Risk Facility (IRF) provided early response before and during the 2017 food security response.</p> <p>Found that 2017 famine actions: DFID supported early warning systems alerted global actors. The UK responded with an early £110m contribution that was followed by an additional £60m later in 2017. DFID promoted a cash-based response, building on longer-term resilience programming that included a variety of direct support to communities. DFID’s response included food or cash to over 2 million people, emergency health services for 1.1 million people, nutritional treatment for over 171,000 children, clean water for 1.7 million people, and the vaccination of 12 million livestock.</p> <p>The evaluation found that avoiding a slip into famine in 2017 was a clear success through both direct emergency intervention as well as longer term resilience programming. It found that ‘Resilience programming contributed to households’ capacities to predict, withstand, and recover from shocks’ and that ‘Households across cohorts (rural, urban, and IDPs from both DFID supported resilience programmes (UNJRS) and (BRCiS)) showed minimal changes in the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) and the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and managed the shocks including the food security crisis 2017.. this ‘illustrates a fair degree of resilience’.</p> <p>However, differences across the communities targeted by different consortia could be seen: it seemed that ‘BRCiS supported households and communities dealt with shocks, especially the 2017 food security crisis, differently than those supported by the UNJRS. In household surveys, BRCiS households, with some variations, demonstrate stronger positive changes in CSI, without commensurate changes in FCS, as is the case, largely, with UNJRS households. ... ‘BRCiS households were resorting to fewer negative coping strategies and felt relatively positive and engaged with how they faced the crisis, despite eating less. It seemed that BRCiS households had more choices—more ways to cope... UNJRS communities show better results overall and yet this may be due less to resilience programming and more to direct support. BRCiS communities chose to eat less and relied more on family and other members support – a key focus of the BRCiS programme.</p>	<p>BRCiS households reduced the number of negative coping strategies they deployed without necessarily improving their food diversity and overall nutritional intake. Yet the trend for self-concept/well-being was generally positive for BRCiS households.</p> <p>Test will be : Will improved FCS amongst UNJRS households contribute to increasing levels of resilience and/or greater capacity to avoid chronic vulnerabilities? Or, will stronger levels of subjective well-being and a wider breadth of positive coping strategies be more significant towards avoiding chronic vulnerabilities?</p> <p>Significant scaling up of activities, in particular the cash based response, in response to early warning in 2017 helped avert a famine, together with resilience building activities that had been ongoing in communities.</p> <p>Still very humanitarian led consortium – and many activities that are done have been done for decades in Somalia. So not activities that have changed, but the way people go about implementing the activities and coordination (i.e with consortium partners) Question remains: are these the right people to build resilience, work on longer term programmes, including markets etc.?</p> <p>Need to work more on synergies between agencies, including working on the same areas, agree on common understanding and measurement of resilience between agencies, use joint beneficiary databases, etc.</p> <p>SNS and BRCiS consortia merged to achieve better synergies and multi-sectoral outcomes.</p>

<p>Strategy (UNJRS) FAO, WFP, UNICEF</p> <p>Somalia Resilience Programme (SomREP) seven NGOs (WV, AAH, CARE, COOPI, ADRA, DRC and Oxfam) established in 2011</p> <p>Providing both immediate assistance during crises and longer term resilience programming, based on community priorities and community based planning plus early warning systems</p>	<p>What remains unclear is whether these more positive FCS trends will better enable UNJRS households, as compared to BRCiS, to sustain noted improvements. The evaluation recommends to assess further ‘which activities succeeded most in promoting this positive community-based self-reliance and how such activities may be expanded/brought to scale.’</p> <p>In response to the 2011/2012 famine in Somalia, WFP and FAO implemented in 2013 the Joint Road Map (JRM) in East Africa, with joint resilience strategies between FAO, WFP and UNICEF. In the first few years, FAO had the most prominent resilience approach, particularly given its Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA). Yet, by the 3rd year of the Programme, FAO, WFP & UNICEF were pursuing widely different resilience approaches. FAO emphasised livelihood support, especially in the areas of agricultural and livestock, including irrigation and other water infrastructure, animal health and CFW, as well as rehabilitation of marketing infrastructure. Also CCF UNICEF focused on a participatory approach that emphasised water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) activities along with the training of different community level service providers, e.g. community health workers. WFP focused on direct nutrition support, firstly through direct food support and then through conditional cash support. Given that they were not always working in the same communities, any results from joint programming, combining these different approaches, was lost.</p> <p>An FAO evaluation of the first two years of its resilience programme (2013-14) found that the programme seemed to be preparing communities against virtually any shock and highlighted that activities may improve households’ ability to resist one shock but at the same time increase their vulnerability to another. The three JRS partners have set up a joint impact evaluation system using the RIMA, though many thought RIMA to complex/difficult to understand, but need some consensus for measuring resilience. The lack of a joint beneficiary database or other mechanism (e.g. joint planning feeding into programmes, and field level coordination among agencies) also hampers joint efforts.</p> <p>SNS NGO consortium and the WFP. SNS was designed to combine the nutritional experience of multiple NGO partners to develop approaches to nutrition that addressed underlying causes alongside direct nutritional support from WFP. Evaluation notes that while programme targets were met underlying causes – in particular malnutrition related to WASH, food security and health were not addressed.</p> <p>DFIDs Somali Health and Nutrition Programme (SHINE) is addressing these more underlying causes – it focuses on access and quality of health and nutrition activities and includes innovative approaches to enable vulnerable populations to overcome barriers to access and help them to make healthy choices. BRCiS and SNS were merged in Phase II to enhance multi-sectoral programming on health and nutrition.</p> <p>SomREP consortium (from mid-line evaluation 2016)</p> <p>Uses resilience and shock-responsive models for linking short-term assistance and development. Building resilience at the community level, agencies working on a mix of livelihoods, CFW, VSLAs, strengthening market access, water systems and also trying to link initiatives to national frameworks.</p>	<p>Evaluation suggests linking CFW projects to VSLAs could lead to synergistic effects on households’ ability to pay down debt, save money, access credit in the dry season.</p> <p>Programme should focus on combining approaches to achieve system-wide resilience improvements. This means ensuring field teams have integrated design for resilience with a tighter of focus on the key livelihood impact groups rather than targeting all three equally (pastoralist, agro-pastoral, and peri-urban) in every district.</p>
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	<p>SomReP also includes the Somalia Response Innovation Lab which tries to strengthen impact of humanitarian and development interventions to improve resilience.</p> <p>Midline data evidence shows notable differences between recipients and non-recipients of SomReP programs in areas related to absorptive capacity and adaptive livelihoods, though differences could also be due to selection into programs by better-off individuals and HH. SomReP households consumed more diverse diets (as measured by the FCS) than non-recipients, have lower household debt levels, and higher average incomes than non-recipients. They also suffered slightly less impact from shocks, primarily drought, and experienced shorter recovery times. Though these observed trends will need to be further analysed at the endline to assess the nature and degree of specific program impacts. Communities targeted CFW programmes mainly toward water source rehabilitation, rangeland management, and livelihood infrastructure. Infrastructure benefits take longer to be felt, as majority of HH (86% of those surveyed) reported receiving cash as part of CFW but only 12% personally had experienced infrastructure improvements at that time.</p> <p>Credit-related interventions, such as VSLAs generally well received but slow to start up with only 7% reporting receiving credit assistance at mid-line. Building local civil society and governance capacity is lagging behind and one of SomReP’s greatest challenges currently.</p>	
<p>Durable Solutions Consortia</p> <p>EU-funded RE-INTEG consortia (The Jubaland Solutions Consortium (JSC); led by NRC.</p> <p>The Enhancing Integration of Displacement Affected Communities in Somalia Consortium (EIDACS); led by CWV</p> <p>The Somaliland Durable Solutions Consortium (SDSC) led by WV</p> <p>Durable Solutions for Returnees and IDPs in Somalia (DSRIS) led by CARE</p>	<p>All consortia trying to move beyond short term humanitarian approaches for return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. Focus on durable solutions, multi-sector and area-based approaches, focus on working with government, strengthening community-based planning and prioritisation, better coordination and coherence. All consortia humanitarian NGO led, but all include local NGOs and most include a learning partner, 3 of the EU RE-INTEG include REDSS as learning partner.</p> <p>RE-integ (REDSS)evaluation of 3-EU funded consortia (JSC, EIDACS, SDSC)(2017-20): Partners focused on the economic empowerment of displacement-affected communities, with a particularly focus on women and youth. Different approaches were adopted across the three consortia. Vocational skills training was supported, with the aim of enabling trainees to obtain employment or start their own business. Support to small and medium enterprises was also provided, comprised of business/ entrepreneurship training and the provision of start-up kits and grants. All three consortia also established self-helps groups- savings and loans groups comprised of IDPs, returnees and host community members.</p> <p>Generally better coordination of activities. Evaluation found that RE-INTEG consortia have been able to move beyond traditional short-term humanitarian programming, and bring a resilience- and development approach to addressing displacement. By pooling expertise, consortia have been able to deliver multi-sectoral programmes- focused on local governance, HLP, WASH, education, health, nutrition, protection, peacebuilding, and economic empowerment- that have advanced multiple elements of (re)integration (the physical, legal and material safeties outlined in the ReDSS Framework). Have also adopted common IASC indicators from REDSS framework to measure results. This has also aided implementation of area-based approaches, and created more space for the programmes to engage government representatives and communities collaboratively rather than as individual agencies. 3-year programme timeframe has also offered increased opportunities for</p>	<p>Consortia approach increased coordination and coherence, helped build on same CAPs and community groups, coordinated approaches around adoption of IASC (REDSS) indicators, focus on longer term solutions for IDPs and refugees,</p> <p>Need improvement in private sector engagement, better community engagement, more sophisticated understanding of capacity building,</p> <p>Common understanding of what reintegration is how do you get there, how do you measure it (a bit like resilience)</p>

<p>Danwadaag (DFID funded) Durable Solutions Programme (DANIDA funded)</p>	<p>learning and adaptation. Also helped align community action plans (CAPs) with consortia using existing/each others CAPs and community groups for interventions rather than reinventing the wheel each time.</p> <p>However still not clear what reintegration is and how to measure it, and how to get there. Lack of consensus by durable solutions actors about what works and what doesn't. Lack of private sector engagement, and need better understanding of how to build government capacity, as well as better community engagement</p> <p>DSRIS:</p> <p>3 year programme implemented between 2017-2020 under lead of CARE. EU funded. Worked on integration by improving access to basic quality services such as education, health, hygiene and sanitation, Child Protection and GBV as well as enhancing relevant and sustainable livelihood opportunities for youth at risk of illegal migrations, radicalization, as well as other vulnerable displaced people, returnees and host communities to enhance integration and social cohesion. Various outputs for the above reported in the evaluation.</p> <p>Danwadaag: from a small lessons learned paper</p> <p>Incorporates learning from BRCIS and uses same community groups and CAPS where possible, to complement durable solutions and resilience programming. Developed the LORA indicator, based on 32 indicators, derived from the IASC framework for Durable Solutions and ReDSS sub-criteria, that covers a number of elements of reintegration to compare the different issues faced by host and displaced communities and thus a 'road map' for how to increase displaced communities' integration and allows for prioritisation of different types of activities and assessment of effects over time.</p>	
<p>Social Safety Net Initiatives</p> <p>By World Bank, by EU pilot,</p>	<p>World Bank safety net pilot ' Baxnaano'</p> <p>Objective is to provide cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households and establish the key building blocks of a national shock-responsive safety net system. The SNHCP will provide poor and vulnerable households nutrition-linked cash transfers to meet their immediate consumption gaps and protect against food insecurity and malnutrition risks. With a view toward longer-term development, it would also support efforts by the FGS to strengthen institutional resilience and establish the basic delivery mechanisms of a national social safety net (SSN) system. The project is expected to target 200,000 poor and vulnerable households (approximately 1.2 million individuals) across the Federal Member States with nutrition-linked cash transfers.</p> <p>The World Bank's Somali Crisis Recovery Project (US\$137 million from IDA),</p> <p>approved in May 2020, supports a government-led response to the areas hardest hit by multiple shocks, such as Covid-19, locusts and flooding. Provides basic services and livelihood support, CFW, desert locust population controls, restoring and protecting agricultural production capacity, promoting household hygiene and treatment, and support to government systems and capacity for disaster preparedness and integrated flood and drought preparedness and risk management, including establishing a national emergency operations centre under the Office of the Prime Minister.</p>	<p>Still scaling up/starting to be implemented, but key focus on shock -responsive safety nets that can flex and also link to other initiatives.</p>

	<p>The EU has established a pilot safety nets programme as the third component of the Inclusive Local Economic Development Programme funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa since 2019 (€98 million)</p>	
<p>Livestock interventions</p> <p>Veterinary interventions in the 180s/90s to CAHWs later on till today</p>	<p>Overall move away from veterinary programmes that were non-participatory and did not work well in 1980s/90s to CAHW approaches now which seem to be very effective.</p> <p>From mid-1980s/1990s. Livestock interventions had a strong focus on veterinary programmes. In the immediate post-conflict phase ICRC and others provided animal medicines and vaccinations. A second phase involved training Somali veterinarians and providing business support for them to start veterinary businesses and clinics, funded by the EU, CARE and the Italian NGO Terre Nuova, but these had generally poor programme results. A large-scale programme to eliminate rinderpest and other livestock diseases, aiming to increase livestock trade, was implemented by the EU, transferring the model from other African countries, but in Somalia implemented by NGOs rather than government. The programme was not successful because rinderpest was not a priority for local farmers. Animal health, disease transmission and international standards approach was eventually dropped around 2003, because little progress was made.</p> <p>Overall strong focus on veterinary programmes relative to other livestock-related interventions. Striking that majority of livestock initiatives had lack of community participation.</p> <p>New focus utilised Community-based Animal Health Workers (CAHW) to provide veterinary care, livestock production and nutrition, improved water access, and livestock and marketing information. This was accompanied and supported by several NGO assessments and analyses. Also a strong focus on impact assessment, which showed significant positive decreases on livelihoods impacts when CAHWs treated animals, as opposed to diseases not treated by CAHWs, demonstrating the CAHWs were highly effective and seen as accessible and trustworthy by local farmers.</p> <p>e.g. example of VSF Suisse, EPAG and COOPI supported privatized CAHW approaches in the drought-prone Gedo region. Funded by ECHO to respond to the 2002 drought in Gedo, the project, known as the Pastoral Assistance Programme. Programme was unlike ICRC led programmes of 1992-93, and broke away from almost exclusive focus on animal health.</p> <p>It included veterinary care, livestock production and nutrition, improved water access through renovation of non-borehole facilities, and livestock and marketing information.</p> <p>From FAO resilience evaluation:</p> <p>Community members interviewed felt that livestock support activities, specifically CAHWs and vaccinations, had contributed to improving livestock health and reducing mortality. CAHWs in particular were mentioned as providing important services that, unlike before, could now be easily accessed at the village level. Impact Assessment of the CAHW Intervention in Dolow indicates that CAHWs are having a positive impact on communities. CAHWs are accessing drugs and services through linkages to the South-West Livestock Professional Association (SOWELPA, supported by FAO) agro-vets; are charging fees for services and drugs, and therefore increasing their chances of</p>	<p>Interventions used conventional technical approaches focusing on veterinary matters: it was assumed that improvements in the sanitary arrangements for livestock trade or the further education of veterinarians would benefit vulnerable pastoralists. However, even after more than 10 years of implementation, there was very little evidence that these approaches resulted in livelihoods benefits for pastoralists in southern Somalia.</p> <p>Enhancing the entrepreneurial skill of CAHWs will further strengthen their service delivery capabilities and the sustainability of their operations for the betterment of their communities.</p> <p>Evaluation raises the question of overall objective of restocking: important to understand what objective is, i.e. enable viable herd size and mobile pastoralism, then 'then the number and type of livestock handed out matters and should be premised on robust analysis aimed at quantifying the minimum number (and type) of livestock required to achieve this objective.</p> <p>Evaluation also recommends development of more holistic programming to complement animal health initiatives. Specifically, need to improve livestock productivity across a range of production systems. E.g. activities like training and establishment of PFS, livestock value chain development and rangeland rehabilitation, some of which are being implemented by the Resilience Sub-programme of FAO.</p>

	<p>sustainability in a private sector market; and are improving the health of herds (camels, goats, cattle) through services and simple surgery (e.g. dehorning).</p> <p>Overall on livestock support programmes, FAO evaluation notes that very similar livestock support activities have been implemented by various actors (including FAO) in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa region for decades. No indication that nature, design and implementation of these activities has changed in any way now that they are packaged under the Resilience Sub-programme. Restocking of small ruminants, training for fodder production and processing, and construction of fodder sheds were also widely mentioned as valuable interventions. In Bullo Qalloq village in Dolow, the construction of the fodder shed for storage and fodder production activities were indicated as having enabled availability of fodder for use during the dry season (thus having a protective effect on animal health and body conditions), as well as sales of fodder (thus increasing households' income levels).</p> <p>In the livestock sector, 80% of FAO's expenditure has been on animal health, but almost all monitoring has been at the output level and there is little evidence that these interventions are addressing underlying causes of vulnerability. Evaluation notes that livestock interventions may have had a comparatively larger positive impact on wealthier livestock-owning households.</p>	
<p>Agricultural Support interventions</p> <p>Substantial investments to improve irrigated and rainfed agricultural production</p>	<p>From FAO evaluation: Programme activities have focused on a wide array of initiatives aimed at intensifying and expanding agricultural production. These include creation or rehabilitation of shallow wells, weir walls, canals, gravel roads, storage sheds and training of canal committees. Agricultural support activities were indicated by beneficiaries as having improved their agricultural production. Majority stated that increased production was used predominantly for household consumption, a minority also stated that they had surplus production of vegetables and crops such as maize, sorghum, onions and tomatoes that they could sell. The findings of the quantitative analysis in Dolow also point to positive effects of the programme on food consumption. However, in one locality (Baki, Somaliland) challenges related to market access resulted in producers incurring high transport costs and high perishability risks. Similarly, in the villages of Beer and Owdweyne (Somaliland) a number of respondents complained that WFP food distributions constrained their ability to obtain better prices for their cereals at markets. Respondents indicated that they typically stopped selling their surplus production during these periods, as market prices were unfavourable.</p> <p>Some positive effects of agricultural support specifically on women as they expanded agricultural production and were able to sell surpluses, given women focus on marketing of agricultural products and men more on livestock rearing.</p> <p>FAO seed project also created two privately-owned and managed commercial seed supply companies which now supply farmers and also international agencies for their emergency seed distribution programmes.</p>	
<p>Farmer Field Schools</p>	<p>FAO evaluation: Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and related trainings that provided training including on introduction of new varieties of crops and vegetables, integrated plant and pest management and rural commercialization were well-received by communities. In Dolow, FFS were found to have well</p>	

	connected marketing committees linked to various markets, which were able to access information on prices and negotiate contracts with new buyers. As with findings on agricultural activities, this was noted as benefiting female traders of agricultural products in particular because they do most of the marketing of agricultural produce.	
Fisheries sector	FAO evaluation :fisheries is relatively new. Activities included provision of fishing equipment, solar powered refrigerators, integral cold boxes and fish processing sets in Mogadishu and Dolow (the latter for riverine communities) Equipment provision has been complemented by training on installation and use of refrigerators, basic hygiene, processing and maintenance of fish, and the provision of hygiene manuals and record keeping. Activities generally seen as useful though not clear at which groups activities were targeted (eg. Fishing or non-fishing communities) therefore difficult to know if they contributed to the stated outcome of livelihood diversification (FAO evaluation)	
Natural resource management	FAO evaluation notes importance of activities focused on natural resource management, including land, water and soil to strengthen resilience. However evaluation finds the nexus between conflict and natural resource management is not given sufficient attention in programme implementation. Also activities that focus on irrigation, natural resources and expansion of agricultural land is highly prone to giving rise to or re-igniting conflict – importance of context analysis and careful design beyond merely ‘technical’ aspects to avoid conflict. Also	
General Food Assistance	WFP evaluation: General food assistance and nutrition activities dominated the portfolio, together accounting for 75% of planned beneficiaries. Found strong capacity for geographical targeting, but there were concerns regarding the community-based targeting of households because social exclusion and marginalization were known to have affected the distribution and redistribution of entitlements in Somalia. Important gaps were identified in understanding of the comparative positions of beneficiary women and girls versus men and boys in rural and urban communities and differences between IDPs who had arrived recently and longer-term residents in and around camps. Insufficient attention was given to the influence of clan systems and “gatekeepers” on social exclusion and marginalization affecting distribution of entitlements. 55% of WFP food assistance reached women. CBTs have become the predominant transfer modality. While initially slow to employ CBTs, WFP increased the use of CBTs dramatically from 2016 onwards	
Therapeutic feeding programmes	WFP targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) programmes, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) programmes, support to pregnant and lactating women and girls through mother-and-child health and nutrition services, social and behaviour change communication	
FFA, FFT, School feeding	WFP : food assistance for assets (FFA), food assistance for training (FFT), school meals, including take-home rations for girls, and local food purchases	
Cash based responses To the 2011 famine	2011 famine cash response: Unconditional cash transfer programmes implemented in south and central Somalia by 17 NGOs, 8 of which were Somali NGOs, including monthly cash grants, ranging from USD80–120 and commodity vouchers worth USD50–75 over 16 months. Beneficiaries received on average 6 months of benefits.	Aid, including cash was implicated in the widespread migration to Mogadishu and surrounding areas—or to Kenya and Ethiopia as inadequate targeting pushed people to move and created ‘pull’ factors.

<p>To 2017 crisis</p> <p>CFW FAO programme</p> <p>DRC wet feeding and cash transfer programme</p>	<p>Together these agencies were able to scale up within 2 to 3 months to reach nearly 1 million beneficiaries by October 2011 in all affected regions. Starting slightly later, FAO implemented CFW program with an additional budget of \$45 m. These two programs combined reached approximately 1.5 million famine-affected people in South Central Somalia. Nevertheless, these programs only directly reached about half the affected population.</p> <p>Despite the response starting late (due to various reasons explored in case study) and inability to prevent famine evaluations and commentators still note enormous achievements of especially the cash based response. Maxwell, Majid et al. note it was ‘probably the largest market-based response to a crisis of this magnitude in a single country up to that time’, facilitated by nation-wide network of hawala (money transfer) companies who did the actual transfers, as well as good functioning cell network. Somali traders were able to negotiate way in across battle lines, so the markets were able to respond to increased demand, including Al-Shabaab-controlled territory. Al-Shabaab—and other local authorities likely taxed these transfers, but diversion and “taxation” were less a problem with cash transfers than had been the case earlier with in-kind aid. Concerted efforts were made to work with traders to ensure a rapid market response. In-built third party monitoring and evaluation allowed quite good data about response: results show biggest single use of cash was to purchase food and the second biggest use was to pay off debts. Cash was successfully targeted within the household and given the coverage of hawala agencies, could be distributed almost everywhere. Food price inflation did not emerge as a problem. This was at least partially because global food prices began to decline at about the same time the famine was declared. Cash and vouchers were much more cost effective than food aid. Of the budget of \$110m for the unconditional cash and vouchers response, some \$92m ended up in the hands of the final recipients—an average of 85% of the total budget compared to something like 35–40 % if it were in-kind food aid delivered under similar circumstances.</p> <p>Cash For Work FAO (2012-13) evaluation 2011-12: 865,000 person days of cash-for- work programme completed at a rate of USD 70/month per beneficiary disaggregated by gender with a target of 30% women participating and 2012-13: 63,090 households have access to the minimum food basket for at least three months. In 2012 CFW represented 30% of total FAO programme expenditure (FAO, 2013) CFW interventions were rapidly scaled up in response to the famine and the fact that FAO was the only UN agency with access to Al Shabaab-controlled areas in South-Central.</p> <p>Impacts: respondents reported increased production attributed to the infrastructures built or rehabilitated through the CFW. The roads built through CFW eased transportation of agricultural produce and water. However most pointed out short term nature of the programme, and only temporary protection of asset depletion. Once programme finished households reverted to habitual coping strategies.</p> <p>Multiplier effects on the village economy were common, though short-lived.</p> <p>Assessments showed that, in addition to the immediate effects of the cash transfers, beneficiaries also made livelihood investments (particularly on the second payment), with reported investment increases in education (school fees), health care, livestock and livestock medicines, farming tools,</p>	<p>Evaluation concluded that in the midst of an actual famine, Household targeting was an expensive waste of valuable time—and that the emphasis should be on targeting geographic areas and then providing “blanket coverage”—meaning that all households in the areas selected receive a transfer, but donors at the time were unwilling to consider.</p> <p>Coordination was a problem and it wasn’t clear who was responsible for the coordination function. The UN Cluster System is intended to coordinate responses in humanitarian emergencies. The Food Assistance Cluster not working well and had mostly experience with in kind. As many as fifteen separate bodies engaged in coordinating cash interventions in one way or another.</p> <p>Need for better monitoring, innovative methods and ongoing M&E including remote, of fraud and diversion. Much fraud related not just to armed groups but also agency staff themselves.</p> <p>Issue of conditionality – was it right to ask people to work for food in the middle of a famine? A two-week “unconditional wage” was initiated to enable recipients to regain some strength and nutritional status before work requirements began. In some cases, work requirements were reduced to account for the poor nutritional status of recipients, but still overall that expectation questioned.</p> <p>Lessons learned for FAO Cash for Work programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Better coordinate with other agencies Acknowledgement of informal community redistribution mechanisms and local concepts of justice in planning; undertake a more careful assessment to understand the implications of choosing to rehabilitate one type of infrastructure over another; ensure the inclusion of those who are fit for work but marginalised;
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	<p>seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, fishing equipment, transport, and starting businesses and small enterprises.</p> <p>Infrastructures were appreciated for their longer term benefits, though choice of asset and technical specifications were often questioned, and infrastructures were found to have variable and not always positive effects on different groups. Benefits deriving from CFW were widely shared, though unclear to what extent with the most vulnerable. Women complained of their marginal role in the programme as well as exclusion or exploitation of Bantu individuals reported.</p> <p>Cash response to 2017 crisis evaluation:</p> <p>Overall, a tenth of the CBA delivered in 2017 was conditional. Response was both faster and able to reach locations closer to where drought affected populations lived. The bulk of CBA delivered for the 2017 was focused on preventing the risk of famine and supporting beneficiary basic needs. Less CBA was provided to restore livelihoods, and little was seen for promoting basic services other than some water access and school enrolment, though there was a later report of some health clinic attendance incentives. Most CBA programmes that focused on livelihoods and resilience were multi-year projects that were already underway or planned before the famine alert was raised.</p> <p>Over 140 organisations used both cash and vouchers, with proportionately more beneficiaries receiving vouchers at the start of the response and cash increasing as the year progressed, reportedly because orgs followed beneficiary preference and shifted to cash. Water, shelter or education-specific CBA was exclusively provided through vouchers, though sometimes as part of multi-purpose.</p> <p>CBA for livelihoods was primarily provided in the form of cash grants or vouchers to facilitate access to agricultural or livestock inputs or to support business establishment.</p> <p>Most CBT was mobile money for unrestricted cash, and rechargeable electronic stored-value cards for e-vouchers and sometimes cash. Smaller volumes were distributed using printed paper vouchers or ‘cash over counter’ from banks, mobile phone companies or traditional money transfer agents (Hawala).</p> <p>Recent drought- or conflict-affected households were targeted as beneficiaries, and in some cases, so were returnees and refugees as well as IDPs. All beneficiaries report being selected because they are vulnerable, almost all organisations chose to select females as the main beneficiaries of the CBA, because of perception that men might misuse it. Most cash was found to be used for the intended purpose.</p> <p>Impact</p> <p>Interviews and 12 project endline assessment or evaluation reports reviewed by evaluation conclude CBA to have had an overall positive immediate and short-term impact on vulnerable populations compared to baselines. This includes better access to food and other basic needs, though some informants complained that the assistance was not enough and the duration too short. It is recognised that other forms of assistance (in-kind, remittances, charity) provided in Somalia also played a key role.</p>	<p>implement programmes over a longer timeframe, and employ more workers;</p> <p>deliver CFW as part of a package of interventions,</p>
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	<p>The main listed impacts were improved living conditions (access to basic needs, improved health and education, boosted morale) as well as access to credit and the ability to repay debts. Beneficiaries used CBA for the intended purpose, primarily food and other basics, with little misuse. Simple before and after comparison of the FSNAU IPC maps and population tables from January 2017 and 2018 show status improvement in some places, stability in others, whereas some seem to have worsened. Some informants questioned too much emphasis on IPC 3 & 4 areas, and not enough on IPC 2. The FS Cluster recommendation had been to provide only conditional CFW or livelihoods activities for IPC 2 areas, and unconditional CBA for IPC 3 and 4. One knowledgeable informant expressed concern that not all IPC 2 areas received CBA, and so they became IPC 3 or 4 because they were not supported.</p> <p>DRC wet feeding project and cash transfers : The wet feeding component was a six months continuation of a previous programme. The last phase of 2011 incorporated a household conditional cash transfer programme to allow purchase their food and NFI from local markets. The wet feeding component was implemented in partnership with SAACID and World Food Programme (WFP), cash directly by DRC as part of consortium with uniform approach.</p> <p>An average of 53,3281 servings was provided daily to needy households to increase food consumption and access to basic needs for vulnerable households reaching an average of 79,1462 beneficiaries. The majority (93.2%) of the targeted beneficiaries interviewed consumed 2,205 Kcal per meal. Nearly all (99.1%) of the cash beneficiaries received 6 cycle cash disbursements equivalent to the prevailing MEB averaging \$ 114.5/ HH /month.</p> <p>Impact:</p> <p>Most cash utilized to purchase food and NFIs. An increase in food consumption recorded for both categories with households reporting to have diversified their meals and increased in frequency from 54% before project inception to 81.9%. For the cash transfer beneficiaries, 73.3% indicated that CBT addressed their immediate needs, mainly securing their access to food. The project also improved the income level, the purchasing power as well as contributing towards debt reduction. The self-selection mechanism for Wet Feeding worked well and ensuring the project targeted those in real need. Typical beneficiaries were the most vulnerable i.e. female-headed households (52.5%), little or no formal education (83.3%), large households and households had no source of income in the past 1 month (48.1%).</p>	
<p>TVET</p> <p>Reduce irregular migration and radicalisation by improving employment opportunities</p>	<p>TVET and Higher Education for Boosting Road Infrastructure Development and Growth of Energy Services (THE BRIDGES) Project</p> <p>The project aims to assist in the development of high-quality skills both for gainful employment and sustainable economic development, to meet labour demands in road infrastructure and energy sectors, and strengthen TVET and Higher Education (HE), including national and local capacities related to TVET.</p> <p>The specific objectives were to improved market and social service access, improvement of energy services, and better availability of skilled human resources for Somalia/Somaliland’s road and energy sectors. Study findings show that the BRIDGES skills training has provided significant new economic</p>	

	<p>opportunities, particularly for female youth (22% and 26% in renewable energy) who had been sidelined from male dominated highly technical labor market skill areas such as the renewable energy and roads construction. Also increased employment prospect and greater interaction between IDPs and hosts.</p> <p>The Local Employment for Development in Africa (LEAD) programme has been implemented by SPARK (2016-18), and funded by the Dutch MFA (also implemented in Tunisia and Libya). Programme aims to reduce irregular migration and radicalization by improving employment opportunities for young people, with a particularly focus on women.</p> <p>Impact: in Somali context, given nomadic background of Somalis, different attitude to migration as Somalis migrate frequently to and from the country, and experience from abroad is seen as a significant asset upon return. As such, Somali migration seen more as a pull than a push factor, therefore project has less relevance in Somali context to reduce migration, given migration is seen as a positive thing. In Somalia, outcomes concerning establishing formal/informal businesses, supporting existing entrepreneurs, SMEs expansion in selected sectors and direct job creation for men were all comfortably exceeded over the period 2016-2018. Direct job creation for women and formal business established in selected sectors were slightly above and below target respectively. Programme was not able to measure the effect on radicalisation and migration.</p> <p>UNIDO/AMISOM Countering Violence and Extremism through Skills Training and Livelihoods Support for At-Risk Youth in Kismayo</p> <p>implemented in Kismayo in Jubaland, Somalia and aimed to increase the capacity of technical training centres and train 4-6 trainers and approximately 250 youth in technical trades and vocational skills. There was also a focus on small-group conflict-minimisation and harm reduction strategies.</p> <p>Impact reported (rather uncritically): Skills development led to a growth in income and an increase in work opportunities. Trainee graduates reported more respect for their community and were less likely to join local armed groups as a result of the skills and conflict training. Beneficiaries themselves reported abilities to better integrate into their local community and manage local conflict drivers. It was reported that individuals across clans were now communicating together in some cases for the first time. Project would have benefitted from longer time frame and more sustainability as well as focus on women in community stabilisation and household income.</p>	
<p>Self-help groups and VSLA</p>	<p>Lessons paper on self-help groups:</p> <p>Self Help Groups (SHGs) typically consist of 10-20 women to work together. They typically use strategies such as savings, loans, in kind grants and social involvement as ways of empowerment. Concern Worldwide has so far supported 250 SHGs (70 of these under BRCiS) with a number of different skills trainings (numeracy and literacy, entrepreneurship and business development.</p> <p>From self-help paper: SHGs and VSLAs have become a component of work under BRCiS with some indication in the literature reported that participation in SHGs is having strong impact on resilience outcomes. A 2018 study by SomReP found that people who had better food security and well-being outcomes were likely to belong to a saving group scheme. Participants in those groups universally</p>	

	<p>cited that the groups built social capital, self-esteem and empowerment. A recent evaluation of SHG programming found that 89% of members reported that their resilience to shocks and stresses had increased as they could access emergency assistance, finances and collective support Their livelihoods improved.</p> <p>Around 30 organisations working on SHG/VSLA in Somalia with two major networks and an SHG Working Group in Somaliand.</p>	
Miscellaneous	<p>Oxfam ‘Community Driven Livelihood and Food Security Initiatives (CLFSI) in Lower and Middle Juba Regions of South Somalia. Overall objective was to contribute to improved income generation and food security of families in eleven regions in South Somalia. Project activities included a cash grant for household businesses (IGA); provision of donkey carts for transport services; restocking of livestock herds; donation of agricultural equipment; donation of other agricultural inputs, e.g. seeds; support in rehabilitation of irrigation systems including the donation of water pumps; and provision of cash for work, though project notes agricultural activites were not really implemented.</p> <p>Oxfam GB in conjunction with a local partner organisation – Wajir South Development Association (WASDA)</p> <p>Results: The results show that on average respondents and their household members now own 2 more goats and 50% more sheep than households in comparison areas. 20 % difference in participation in group meetings between respondents in participant households and their household members, compared with non-participants. On average there was a 15.9 % increase and a 17% increase in the number of participant households reporting increased income from milk and livestock sales respectively compared with non-participants. On average there was a 5.9% increase in household reporting the use donkey carts for transport services thereby increasing their income. Evidence that on average the household wealth index had steadily increased since 2009, however, revenues obtained from household businesses were not significantly different between the participant and non-participant households and household income among project participants (as measured by consumption and expenditure) was not significantly different between intervention and comparison households.</p>	Use of project committees, with whose help project was delivered in hard to reach areas due to prevailing insecurity was found to be a key delivery model. Their involvement in future projects will be strengthened by improving training and monitoring involvement.
Restoration and development of supply chains, including market development		
Market based responses	<p>See above under cash transfers during the 2011 famine working with traders and sending cash through hawalas.</p> <p>FAO working through local traders in insecure areas of southern Somalia, to support farmers by sourcing quality inputs such as local seed varieties through a network of 300 agro-dealers. FAO provides cash and livelihood inputs to rural communities through their e-Platform for Mobile Money and Livelihood Assistance, with cash and electronic vouchers for livelihood assistance reaching people by SMS. Nearly 435,000 rural households (comprising 2.6 million people) registered on the e-Platform as of Oct (2020).</p> <p>The Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia programme PIMS (2014–2018), funded by the UK and Denmark, implemented by DAI. Aims to stimulate growth of the private sector by supporting</p>	

measures to deliver long term job creation and reduce poverty. With an integrated CFW component, aims to address market failure by supporting market systems in three sectors (with cross-cutting light manufacturing inputs): Dairy, sesame, ocean fisheries. Interventions include animal health (CAHW - supporting networks for selling quality vet drugs with strengthened distribution networks), working to ensure quality milk (reduction of spoilage and more sustainable practices to ensure milk hygiene), fodder (including out-grower system for fodder production and retail and distribution system for fodder sales), improved agricultural production practices and market linkages, post harvest value additions through loss reduction technologies for fish, as well as good handling practices.

Results:

for dairy: shift in behaviour of milk producers with 21% increase in use of aluminium cans from 2016-19 as well as 17% reduction of use of plastic containers, which attracts a higher price.

Sesame: canal rehabilitation has proven most productive support for sesame sector, as expansion of canals opened up 4,856 Ha of new productive arable land and increased employment for over 4,0000 farmers. Led to an net additional income of \$3,656,493 from increased crop sales.

Ocean fisheries: decrease in spoilage rates from 25% to 4%. Change in fisherfolk behaviour had knock on effect – non supported firms are now promoting cooling technology.

USAID: The Growth, Enterprise, Employment & Livelihoods (GEEL) program promotes inclusive economic growth in Somalia. Aims to improve the country’s competitiveness in export markets, reducing reliance on imports, increasing market linkages and business partnerships, spurring new investments to create jobs, and engaging the private sector to support resilience of vulnerable populations. GEEL activities focuses on (1) technical assistance and investment facilitation for priority economic sectors; and (2) policy and regulatory reforms.

GEEL brings together private sector actors and government institutions to attract capital investment for businesses creation and expansion. Also builds the capacity of internal and Somali diaspora investors to contribute to economic growth through investment facilitation events and micro-finance linkages as well as supports the start-up and expansion of SMEs enterprises.

Impacts: agriculture, fisheries, and dairy sectors have remained resilient and production is growing. GEEL trained more than 8,000 farmers on efficient production practices, improved irrigation technologies, and created market linkages. An on-farm training approach using demonstration plots. Vegetable producers have reported harvest yield increases of up to 200% following technical assistance, and GEEL’s facilitation of market linkages at international agriculture trade shows in Dubai and Istanbul increased exports and contributed to the re-emergence of Somalia as a player on the global market.

GEEL is increasing cold chain facilities, improving fish processing techniques, reducing production costs, and working with fisherfolk and fish businesses to capture data for analysis and long-term fisheries management

Somali youth are employed to better respond to market needs. When the COVID-19 crisis started, GEEL pivoted to help businesses protect jobs and support youth at-risk of losing income. 6 local SMEs

	<p>employed more than 300 Somali youth to produce 500,000 Centers for Disease Control (CDC)-compliant face coverings for their local communities in and around Mogadishu.</p> <p>BORESHA consortium (DRC, WV, CARE, WYG), funded by EU trust fund.</p> <p>Overall objective is to promote economic development and greater resilience, particularly among vulnerable groups in the Cross Border area between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. Adopting a community-driven approach to address the shared nature of the risks and opportunities on in this border area.</p> <p>Consortium mainly humanitarian consortium contains a private sector partner/consultancy (WYG) that helps to focus on market development, employable and business skills enhancement, product innovation and the building of enterprises, all within context of cross border trade. five key project activities: research on private sector potential in the cross-border project areas, the Grant Facility, the Apprenticeship Scheme, a Forum of Funders and Business Development Support Centres or BDSCs.</p> <p>Promoting an internationally competitive Somali meat industry-Phase II” implemented by FAO/VSF-G (mid-term evaluation)</p> <p>The Project a follow on from EC-funded Phase I and the League of Arab States funded projects aimed at supporting the Somali meat industry. Objective is to improve livestock based incomes through support to value addition and access to markets. Three activities: Capacity of public and private sector institutions to regulate the Somali meat trade, Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) and quality assurance system (QAS), and Market access/product marketing and processing sustained and improved</p> <p>Most of the main activities planned for the first half of the project, namely a meat sector situational analysis, support to legal and regulatory framework, establishment of meat hygiene units, human resources development through training and creation of public awareness regarding meat hygiene and safety have largely been successfully implemented</p> <p>Resilient Fisheries and Livestock Value Chain for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Somalia (RAAISE) project (2021) The project aims to create new jobs, increase and diversify livelihoods, foster inclusive economic opportunities, and rehabilitate primary infrastructures within the fisheries and livestock sectors. Activities are planned to take place across Somalia but with a focus on corridors in Somaliland, Central North, Shabelle and Juba River.</p> <p>EU expanding support to Somalia’s private sector with 3 new projects. Focus on enabling financial institutions to provide access to finance for local SME’s and supporting overall investment climate.</p> <p>The 3 new projects entail:</p> <p>1.Finance for Inclusive Growth: with an EU funding of 4.5M€, the project seeks to strengthen the capacity of partner financial institutions to fill the financing gap in Somalia ensuring increased access to finance by providing micro loans and technical assistance to women and youth in business and producers, promoting financial inclusion for all. It will be implemented by AECF;</p>	<p>NB: here not quite working with private sector, but include a consultancy/private sector actor to help with market analysis.</p>
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	<p>2.EU Contribution to the Nordic Fund: with an EU funding of 5.5M€, the project will contribute to the Nordic Horn of Africa Opportunities Fund which is an impact fund targeting Somali SME's The Fund is managed by Shuraako, a programme of the 'One Earth Future Foundation', in collaboration with IFU. Shuraako connects investors with promising Somali-based businesses to encourage economic development and stability throughout the region.</p> <p>3.Support to Policy Dialogue on Investment Climate: implemented by DAI, with an EU funding of 1,8M€, the project will target the investment climate and business environment by improving access to finance, markets, and essential services for medium, small, and micro enterprises (MSMEs), with a special focus on women's economic empowerment. The project's key areas are public-private dialogue; regional market access; responsible business conduct.</p>	
Information management FSNAU/SWALIM	<p>FSNAU – sits with FAO – the backbone of data in Somalia terms of the public information systems that FAO has been running. FSNAU has been a key source of data and analysis on food security needs, as well as providing seasonal assessments of emergency and humanitarian needs. FSNAU has been key for planning purposes of humanitarian and food security interventions. SWALIM has played a similar role in relation to natural resources.</p>	
Basic services and infrastructure Market infrastructure - see above under private sector programmes	<p>EU: The EU is supporting the development of key infrastructure, mainly in Northern Somalia in order to promote sustainable economic and social development, in particular water, energy and road infrastructure in Somalia. public/private partnerships for urban water management and the promotion of small scale renewable energy.</p> <p>FAO: market infrastructure rehabilitation, support to access to markets and market linkages etc. see above.</p> <p>Lots of work on health, education, irrigation, market, road infrastructure also under the resilience consortia above (already in previous entries).</p>	

South Sudan

Measure	Effectiveness	Lessons Learned
Underlying assumption underpinning many programmes	NB added this category as so many reports and evaluations highlight these fundamental points – so just as background reading to the actual interventions grid below	
Overall underlying assumption that interventions – especially the provision of basic services but also others -	A number of studies and large evaluations (Bennett et. al, 2010) challenge the presumed link between provision of services and reduction of conflict/ provision of 'peace dividends'. There was no such correlation found and the amount of aid spent in a particular place/ state did not correlate with reduction of violence there.	Programmes need to be more grounded in local level conflict analysis, and understanding of politics, including inter-communal grievances and relations, rather than vague allusions to 'conflict

contribute to conflict reduction and end of violence through 'peace dividends'

In fact in many states there was no 'end of conflict' or 'post-conflict' environment, but continued cattle-raiding and attacks involving significant violence.

Conflict also was not found to be the result of competition over resources (grazing land, water) but violence more linked to local politics, cattle raiding, cycles of retribution. (Maxwell et al., 2016)

Insecurity was often the result of poor livelihood outcomes (e.g. especially unemployed youth) and not the other way around as often assumed. In some states (Jonglei, Upper Nile) security first needs to be established if basic service access is to be realised at all.

Example of Programme that went wrong due to lack of proper conflict analysis : Water for Peace and Recovery Programme (WRAPP) helped with tensions over WASH resources in areas with a high proportion of IDPs and returnees, all of the conflicts that the interventions resolved related to those caused by the intervention itself (i.e. standposts, community management, user fees), and there was no evidence of reduced conflict through the provision of hafirs (Welle et al, 2008).

Economic Recovery Interventions

Formation and input to Farmers' associations; support to farmers through inputs (seeds, tools, training on improved agricultural techniques, etc. as well as increase farmers' access to markets and links with traders

Many different projects (FAO, NGOs etc.) that support farmers and farmer orgs with seeds, tools, improved agricultural techniques, other inputs such as ox ploughs etc.) to strengthen seed production and quality. Some localised successes on small scale reported, but overall continued problems with pests, insecurity and erratic rainfall did not allow for higher yields. Lack of roads and transport to markets as well as storage continue to constrain ability to sell produce and generate income. Lack of connectivity of farmers to markets, and surplus producing areas to other areas, as well as lack of information for traders of where surpluses are mean most projects fail to effectively work on that aspect.

FAO evaluation found that for seed multiplication, FAO targeted mainly smallholder farmers, although with little evidence of sustainable results. In order to achieve a sustainable seed production system, targeting of more progressive and entrepreneurial farmers that have the capacity to turn this activity into a business would be better.

analysis' or objectives to reduce conflict that are not anchored in real understanding of local-level situation.

Multi-donor Evaluation (Bennett et. al, 2010) identified 3 aspects in which to link development activities to local peacebuilding: 1) identify key local drivers of violence, 2) place assistance in geographic areas most prone to violence, and 3) lend necessary institutional support to uphold peaceful relations within communities

'All evidence suggests that youth employment would have a more direct potential for reducing tensions than any other form of basic services' (Bennett et. al, 2010)

Since 2008, WRAPP is implemented without any direct peace-building objectives given lack of evidence in relation to broader peace-building objectives. Instead, it has separate programmes in peace-building and justice. As above, causal links between basic service delivery and peace-building or state-building are not clearly identified, and other sectors or services may have greater impacts conflict mitigation processes.

Key is lack of road (especially tertiary roads) that link farmers to markets, and cereal producing areas to those with deficits. Upgrading along the entire value chain is needed to move South Sudan out of chronic food insecurity.

FAO: Importance of linking support to farmers with sustainable extension services and better linkages to seed marketing and Input trade fairs.

Weakness of value chain component of linking farmers access to market risks undermining overall project. Importance to find synergies with other projects

Traders' lack of information about the location of surpluses; limited knowledge and ability to maintain quality; and farmers'

FARM (large USAID supported) project 3 main components: 1) increasing agricultural productivity (through the provision of improved farm inputs and training), increasing agricultural trade (by helping farmers to access markets), and capacity building of both the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) and farmer cooperative. Data analysis showed that knowledge of good agricultural practices promoted by FARM was already widespread, agricultural yields – with the exception of maize – were not higher for FARM participants than controls. Two of the most serious challenges facing farmers—post-harvest losses and limited market access—were addressed only to a limited extent.

Programs supported by MAFS, AGRA, and others have supported enterprise model for seed development by establishing seed companies, with an out-grower model that contracts independent farmers to produce seeds. Many survived during current conflict. Reports of labour shortages as constraint. Reasons unclear but could be competition with donor funded projects, lack of interest in agriculture by youth. Only 17% demand for quality seed met by domestic production. Private seed companies tend to focus on maize and sorghum, leaving a large gap in quality seed for other core crops such as groundnuts, cassava, sesame, etc.

Some examples of what worked, though very small scale and direct support to farmers and buyers.

Example of SNV Netherlands project facilitated horizontal organization of farmers to establish smallholder farmer-led seed production. Working with a group of 50 smallholder farmers to establish individual seed producing farms ranging from 2 acres to over 10 acres each. Community field facilitators trained the farmers on land preparation and agronomic practices. MAFS scientists provided technical backstopping to the production process. SNV identified a private sector seed company to enter into a contract farming agreement with participating farmers. The company bought seeds from the farmers at harvest and did the post-harvest processing. This project tripled the profits from seed production.

Vertical organisation of farmers around a common product.

Example from Agroplan Oils and Fats Processors in Kajo Keji. Agroplan operates a sunflower oil press with a workforce of 15 employees. It uses an out-grower model that provides inputs to its producers (over 200 women) and buys the sunflower seeds for processing. A network of female retailers sells the oil to generate income.

and traders' expectations of price also present challenges to increasing market access.

Many farmers do not know where they can sell their produce (other than at the local village market) and lack means of transport and connections to access markets further afield where there may be more demand, such as Juba

Enterprise provides steady work for 215 people and provides stock to a system of independent vendors.

Crop and Livestock market information system

Government in partnership with FAO have developed a crop and livestock market information system named CLiMIS. MIS network has been operating for 4 years and involves monitoring of the food security and nutrition situation by collecting and analyzing information on food security indicators, crop production data, market data, livestock data, rainfall data, etc.

Farmer Field Schools, Lead Farmer Field Schools; Farmer Field Schools with vouchers

Farmer Field Schools generally seen as effective and appropriate to the context by a number of agencies as a vehicle for technology transfer and a promising approach to extension but concern are that they need to be sustained, not one-off, and more sophisticated covering resilience and conservation as well.

Agropastoral Field Schools

One agency (GIZ) found that using poorly trained extension workers or government extension workers was ineffective due to trust issues, and resorted to Lead Farmer Field Schools which are more participatory and involve training a lead farmer from the community and then cascading down. GIZ supports the lead farmers mainly with capacity-building measures and agricultural inputs and they in turn train other small farmers.

Project also used vouchers to small-scale, food insecure farmers for good quality seeds and agricultural services (bush clearing, ox ploughing etc.) to increase purchasing power and supporting local markets. Previous project just distributed seeds but most farmers couldn't participate as had not enough seeds and had negative effect on local market. Results: In 2015–16, GIZ, in cooperation with Welthungerhilfe, distributed around 10,000 vouchers with a total value of €400,000 to 420 subsistence farmers in the Equatorias. This resulted in 210 hectares of additional cultivated farmland, equivalent to an additional total cereal production of 600–700 metric tons.

FAO Agropastoral field schools (APFS) evaluation found that to transfer skills and technologies effective in helping to increase resilience, food security, row planting and animal traction. Some included work on improved milk hygiene and draught animal power, or used animal health services to build relations between pastoralists in Abyei, which is challenging but evaluation found worthwhile pursuing.

Buying food for humanitarian aid locally from farmers

Not very widespread currently only some NGOs on small scale/sporadically. WFP Purchase for Peace (P4P) activities that supported 136 farmer groups and purchased 462 mt of food from 13 of these groups since 2015. This was less than 10% of all food

Depends on ability of extension workers and trust; different models such as lead farmer schools who train their peers more appropriate than for example government extension workers.

Also some interventions found that farmers had the knowledge already, but lacked the ability to implement and increase productivity due to other things, including lack of connectivity to markets due to poor roads, lack of networks with traders, lack of inputs like ox plough etc.

Voucher approach deliberately strengthens local businesses and seed production and also aims to improve the relationship between farmers and seed suppliers and supports customary arrangements

Need significant inputs or linkages with other agencies in order to achieve sufficient quantities and qualities to achieve programming results at scale. In current context not sustainable.

procured locally by WFP and less than 1 percent of WFP's food requirements in South Sudan. Outcomes have been modest and of uncertain sustainability, given lack of infrastructure and storage facilities, insufficient organisation of farmers and quality of goods. 12 warehouses, each with a capacity of 300 metric tonnes were built during the pilot programme though maximum of 10 % of this capacity has been used. The spread of insecurity to the Equatoria region has curtailed activities in 2016.

Animal Health Interventions/ Community Animal Health Care Workers/Networks

Evaluation found FAO and partners' support to community-based animal health services highly relevant to improving food security and livelihoods given livestock disease as a main constraint to livestock production. Though currently limited geographical coverage of CAHWs and lack of access to affordable drugs. Same emergency approach to animal health was rolled out in all States, whether they were in crisis or not, and less focus on more development-oriented livestock work. Efforts to improve water access and livestock feed through APFS important given reduced seasonal movement of livestock due to the conflict.

Provision seems to have been better during the OLS were this was one of the most innovative approaches taken by the OLS Livestock Programme, which began as an alternative approach to rinderpest eradication in South Sudan and then expanded into a large-scale community-based animal health worker system. The programme was able to introduce participatory approaches to bring about impressive results in rinderpest eradication and the provision of primary animal health care. Among the most important factors in its success were recognising and building local knowledge and skills and supporting local institutions (despite the relief setting); incorporating elements of sustainability, such as payment for clinical services; using donor agencies funds in innovative and unconventional ways; establishing strong links with global programmes; and participatory impact assessments.

Integrated programmes addressing inter-communal violence with tangible benefits/support to implementation of resolutions in pastoralist areas/centred around cattle issues

Viable Support to Transition and Stability program (VISTAS) - USAID supported programme 2013-2019).

VISTAS supported customary reconciliation and peacebuilding at local level. Helped communities prepare before, during and after peace dialogue, including supported implementation of certain resolutions, such as improving peace markets, constructing traditional courts, setting up early warning networks, providing water along migration routes, and promoting livelihoods that required cooperation over competition, especially for young men.

Livestock interventions focusing on animal health could have made stronger links to achieving sustainable increases in livestock production

Animal health interventions could be improved include ensuring each animal is vaccinated against all target diseases at one time, and a more geographically focused approach to raise herd immunity.

When political violence broke out in 2013, project had to adjust its strategy from supporting the capacity of the State (as could no longer work to support the state) to community building. Proved flexible and innovative to adjust to political context. However, needed more clarity on if could work with local governments and how to ensure sustainability if working around nascent (local) structures.

Addressed inter-communal grievances, but many conflict stem from political interference/insecurity stoked by the centre – this

Evaluation found that activities most often found effective were those that dealt with traditional chiefs, women, and/or cattle-related issues (especially migrations) of both moral (compensation under customary law/restorative justice) and market (trade) natures. Successful VISTAS activity examples include pre-migration and post-migration peace conferences, dissemination of agreements on grazing rights, cattle vaccinations and dipping pens, livestock markets, and hand-dug well construction.

Evaluation suggests that activities that were ‘layered’ (here meaning ‘separate activities that contribute to common outputs/outcomes and/or build synergies that multiply or increase impact’) to create innovative synergies around migration centered issues such as in Northern Bahr el Ghazal were most successful.

Privatisation of livestock medicines

Example of VSF-B programme that tried to transition from relief to more developmental/privatisation approach to veterinary medicine

VSF-B supported a veterinary medicine supply system in Tonj, Bahr El Ghazal, with technical assistance and drugs provided at subsidized prices. The system was designed by relief agencies to provide medicines to herders at an affordable price and used a set of trained and qualified animal health workers (AHW), who supervise community animal health workers (CAHW), who distribute the medicines and provide advice to livestock herders for a fee. After CPA wanted to privatise the system to make it more sustainable but faced resistance when adopting a technical approach rather than one based on market realities. A tiered pricing structure created incentives for AHWs to sell directly to herders, thus circumventing CAHWs and the desire of most AHWs to be employed—rather than work as entrepreneurs—was not taken into account. Had to adapt by opening pharmacies also to CAHWs to create more competitive environment.

Restoration and development of supply chains, including markets

Support to traders to restock or keep the supply chain going – direct cash grants or incentives to traders, money for transport, vouchers for transport etc.

Few agencies are working directly with traders but where they do this can help to keep markets going, increases supply and helps market systems, though examples are all small scale. A number of agencies work either by giving traders unconditional cash grants or support for example with transport costs or work through trade unions.

One good practice example of a Mercy Corps programme in Ganyiel, Unity State. On the back of a local agreement by Nuer/Dinka groups to support trade across ethnic lines – Mercy Corps supported displaced people with unconditional cash transfers as well as

more difficult to address – how do you link this to local reconciliation/peacebuilding?

Evaluation concluded that VISTAS does best when it supports community initiatives aimed at peace, recovery, and stability, supporting collective actions that unite communities and layers activities to create synergies around certain key issues, e.g. migration.

Importance of appreciation of markets and local preferences /customs rather than purely technical approach when trying to build more sustainable systems

Works well when in support of local arrangements / local peace agreements that had already partially restored trade and local market activity rather than new invention by aid agencies that then isn’t sustainable. Can support peaceful collaboration by showing tangible benefits of cooperation between different ethnic groups for example. Can complement emergency food distributions.

trader with three months of cash transfers to replenish stock and meet increased demand. The program's evaluation showed greater increases in sales revenue for supported traders (75 % vs under 10% for non-supported traders) along with increased supply of food in markets. When the program ended, the final evaluation warned that traders might not be able to continue supplying the market at current levels without continued support. A subsequent program partnered with traders to address other constraints related to transport and business capacity, through continued cash support plus business skills training hosted and cost-shared with the local traders' association, support to the association in negotiating improved transit fees for its members and (planned follow up phase) to provide affordable loans to purchase boats for river trade.

A fisheries programme initiated by AECOM (USAID funded) before the current conflict provided links between communities and supported trade after the conflict began. People in Tayer, Unity State are cut off from roads by wetlands and seasonal floods, and depend on the Nile for fish and trade but fisheries equipment is scarce and locally available dugout canoes very slow, limiting the markets that fishermen and traders can reach. South Sudanese NGO partner trained groups of integrated Nuer and Dinka youth in fishing techniques and provided them with fishing equipment and fiberglass canoes. The program's benefits reported were higher fish yields, more fish in local markets, faster transportation between villages and better relations and cooperation that has ensured trade and movement between Unity State Nuer and Dinka communities in Lakes State. An emergency livelihoods assessment in 2014 found fiberglass canoes from had become an essential part of local food distribution and humanitarian networks.

Oxfam canoe programme (Irish Aid funded) in Nyal, Unity State, providing free canoe transportation programme to displaced people and the communities that host them, for example to access food distributions or medical treatment. Programme provides vouchers for transport to those in need and training for canoe operatives, including women. Anecdotal evidence suggests programme facilitated movement for displaced poor and supported income generation for canoe operators.

Input Trade Fairs (ITFs)

FAO evaluation found that ITFs have generally been positive and effective, in particular in less conflict affected states. Provided vendors with a guaranteed market and beneficiaries with quality seed. Though sometimes fairs were organised too late in agricultural calendar due to late signing of LoAs. The vouchers FAO used were complex

Need to be closely monitoring markets and conflict analysis plus adaptive management of programme to respond to changes.

Might need to support wider market systems (including markets and traders further afield such as in Juba, Bor and beyond) to make this sustainable.

Targeting weakened but recovering markets where interventions will have maximum impact, focusing on strategic locations that can have good impact.

Appropriate mix of mechanisms to stimulate core markets important - including unconditional cash transfers to consumers, smart subsidies to traders, and capitalization of key businesses.

Facilitative, market-based programs require iterative analysis and adaptive management over a longer time period to achieve the impact and scale desired

and at times delayed payments to traders, forcing some of them to take out loans for seeds at high interest rates.

Value chain interventions

Few examples of projects that support all along the value chain. Many focus on one bit of the value chain (e.g. increase inputs to farmers and help with storage but no further), and value chain effects constrained because of broader structural issues around infrastructure, transport, storage etc.

One example of good practice on integrated value chain promotion is USAID-funded Lulu Livelihoods Programme, which focused on utilising South Sudan’s indigenous shea nut tree, known in Arabic as lulu, for the development of a value chain for shea butter production for local and export markets and provided support all along value chain. The shea butter value chain in South Sudan was able to successfully involve and utilise the skills of women.

Case showed that results and sustainability for value chain programmes in conflict-affected settings take time: ongoing NGO and donor support has been provided for 7 years and an estimated 10 years are needed before external support and subsidies can potentially be withdrawn. (not sure if project still ongoing now)

Direct Assistance to People affected by conflict (both hosts and IDPs/refugees (very difficult to distinguish as most interventions target vulnerable hosts/refugees/IDPs) except in PoC sites where there are only IDPs(see below.)

General Food Distribution

WFP -Evaluation found that food assistance was generally effective with WFP assisting 2.9 million people a year and largely credited this for the fact that severe food insecurity did not degrade into widespread famine. Mobile rapid-response mechanisms (RRMs) were important in improving outreach to conflict-affected areas. Nutrition outcomes – as measured by the recovery rate – were good.

Some evidence that food distribution is harming functioning/recovery of markets. Consider supporting markets alongside food distribution where needed.

Food /nutrition support for lactating/pregnant mothers and children

Nutrition support to pregnant and lactating mothers: UNICEF/ WFP provides nutritious food as well as nutrition counselling to pregnant women and children aged between 6 and 11 months. Nutrition volunteers trained and mobilized as part of outreach initiatives. Has helped address severe short-term malnutrition problems particularly prevalent among internally-displaced women. In some cases, programs last only for a few months though leaving women exposed to food insecurity.

UNICEF’s Nutrition Program: In addition to treating children affected by severe acute malnutrition, UNICEF extends nutrition support and counselling to lactating and pregnant women. It also provides psychosocial services to children and women who have suffered GBV or who are most vulnerable to violent activities.

Food For Assets

WFP gives food or cash to HHs to build assets by restoring productivity of arable land and constructing community-level infrastructure. FFA reached more than 80,000 beneficiaries per year. Evaluation notes that communities valued assets such as dikes, feeder roads and training, but the quality of tertiary roads was limited. Most FFA activities remained short term, with little evidence of the complementarity layering of multi-sector actions over a sustained period.

Cash Transfers

Agencies did a mix of unconditional and conditional transfers, Transfers to the Ultra Poor/Cash+, Cash for Work/Food for Work/Assets for Work /Vouchers for seeds and tools

Summary Cash Transfers: Even though many agencies use cash transfers (conditional, unconditional, vouchers, etc.) there is limited actual evidence on effectiveness in the literature – more small project reports and description of short term impacts of particular projects (most remain small scale, around 25,000 people). In the cash-transfer sector in 2018, there were 58 actors engaged in 77 different projects. Many of the agency reports suggest that programming was effective in short term, in particular at improving nutrition, increasing spending on food, assets replaced or added, children in school, women taking control over household spending and mirror much of global evidence on cash transfers and at implementation (speed, ease, efficiency etc). Still only about 8% of assistance is cash. Many of these programmes also tended to be in Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites – so very controlled and closed, camp-like environment. Most only work on demand side and not on supply side with traders as well which would be key to ensure availability of goods in some markets. Some larger cash transfers for girls education (GESS/DFID), WB, and UNDP (see below)

Generally cash transfers seem effective at stopping women going to search for firewood and make charcoal; some evidence of increased power of women to hold/decide what to do with cash (though unclear whether this results in better decision making than men).

Some examples of the most common approaches below:

Worldvision project targeted 21,000 people including 5,000 children under 5 years in PoC camps with vouchers that replaced some of the in-kind foodstuffs. Vouchers were exchangeable for eight food items agreed with the target community to diversify nutrition for children. HH gained access to additional food products that were not distributed (milk and wheat flour most popular, followed by tomatoes and onions).

Cash transfers need close monitoring of markets for availability of goods and inflation as well as safe access. E.g. often in PoC sites cash was not considered feasible due to lack of financial providers and security concerns so vouchers were preferred.

Cash transfers need to increase incrementally, also to monitor effects, in particular inflation and trader capacity/ability to supply market.

Targeting to local understanding of vulnerability is critical, as otherwise risk undermining social support networks as people seen to unjustly receive CBT might be excluded from social networks. Studies found most vulnerable HHs are those without social connections / larger support networks. E.g. consider giving more cash beyond emergency allocations to allow people to continue meeting sharing obligations and strengthen social support.

As conflict escalated access to external markets was more restricted and also caused high inflation. Project adjusted the amount of the vouchers accordingly – needed continuous market monitoring,

Need to focus on right timing when prices are not inflated. Also need to look at what support over what time. Need to cushion traders from inflation - USD redemption of vouchers.

53% of HHs improved the diversity in their food baskets; 32% reported that they had more food to eat since receiving the vouchers. Milk for children was of particular nutritional value. Over time women were the main collectors and spenders of the vouchers (60% men at the beginning vs 90% women at the end – though unclear what this really resulted in). 184 traders got linked to the project and they employed 400 youth to go and get goods from external markets

NRC project targeted 4,500 households (22,200 persons) in three counties providing seeds, tools, fishing kit complemented by training in improved agricultural practices. 49% (2,200 households) also received unconditional cash transfers (6,000 SSP/mth) or conditional payments (cash for work done on communal gardens and demonstration fields). 79% of respondents said food was the most important item they spent the cash on; clothing the second most important (31%) and healthcare (30%); 46% said the amount of money was not enough to cover all food needs for substantial families; exchange rate changes aggravated this challenge. 37% said the food they bought with cash transfers lasted just one week and extra funds were desired to pay school fees, invest in livestock etc. 38% shared part of the cash they received with relatives and this was another reason given for needing more cash; conversely most people (68%) did not share the food they bought with cash transfer money.

IOM gave 810 conditional cash grants in PoC Wau to upgrade shelter for 6,480 individuals (22%) among the caseload of 30,000 individuals. Overall the project generated a 38.5% cost reduction compared to in-kind assistance and created temporary employment opportunities. \$40,000 was injected into the local economy after distribution of cash for work grants and redemption of vouchers.

DCA switched from vouchers to unconditional cash transfers in 2016, given it allows for more choice, can be saved and transported more easily during displacement. Almost all recipients spent their money on food and basic goods (soap, utensils), with smaller amounts going on smaller assets (animals), business investments, paying school fees and medical treatment. Very few reports of money being spent on alcohol or other anti-social expenditures; at times some 'high cost' items such as sugar were included.

WFP evaluation found large scale CBT difficult given widespread insecurity, weak markets, few financial service providers and hyperinflation, thus CBT beneficiaries remained a minor part of the total WFP caseload (around only 152,671 received CBTs in 2016) where this modality was introduced as an integral part of the emergency

CBT inject large amounts money into markets, at an estimated scale of 1.5% of GDP and perhaps 5-10% of government expenditure, thus starting to have a macro-economic impact, and engaging with the war economy. Markets tend to be captured by powerful military as well as few small traders with connections in south Sudan— needs close monitoring of who wins and who loses. (Thomas et al, 2018)

It may also be possible to cushion traders from the crushing effects of inflation by redeeming vouchers in US dollars, which gives traders access to hard currency to buy goods in neighbouring countries where the SSP has become too weak. In some areas, South Sudanese traders have resorted to buying cattle with SSP, and then transporting the animals to neighbouring countries where they are used as currency to buy goods and food In general, organisations using cash or vouchers try to reduce the time between the exchange from US dollars to SSP and the actual distributions to minimise the amount the SSP drops in value

response, it was significantly more cost efficient, predictable and timely than in-kind transfers, and had potential secondary benefits for the local economy

GIZ did a comparative analysis of their FFW and CFW programmes in 2 counties (Magwi and Morobo). Found participants had a clear preference for Cash due to choice it affords. Found that both FFW and CFW participants reported changes in their household food consumption habits, mainly in the form of having more meals per day or eating more food per meal. However, only CFW participants stated that they also ate different types of food, an indicator for increased food diversity through CFW.

Reports note increased use of vouchers for seeds and tools, fishing kits, shelter materials to attempt to stimulate local markets and positive effects reported such as traders able to bring these good in increased numbers, but no formal evaluations of impacts on markets could be found.

Some evidence, that regular payments over extended timescales provide households' capacity to make savings, invest in assets (commonly small livestock), and make them more resilient in the face of economic or security. One evaluation of BRAC programme for example compared cash invested via a supported, graduation style social protection programme (Transfers to the Ultra-Poor or TUP) with unconditional cash transfers, and found that while both increase household consumption in the short term, there is only a persistent wealth effect with the TUP. Suggests cash + programmes more effective at building resilience than unconditional transfers.

Social Safety Net type programming

Safety Net and Skills Development Project (SNSDP) by WorldBank project provided temporary income opportunities to poor and vulnerable people for maintenance/rehabilitation of community assets, and included coordination and oversight structures within key target counties to be used for future national-wide social safety net. Wages/transfers were US\$3 per day per beneficiary for 10 days/month for three months in a year in rural counties and four months in urban counties; Evaluation of Juba component found transfers have had a positive impact on the lives of the beneficiaries, including increased purchasing power which led to greater frequency and better quality of meals and money for school fees; greater engagement in small scale income generation activities.

The Project's design emphasized the participation of women through direct indicator and targeting of women, and by primarily targeting poor FHH. Over 70% of HH were FHH; about 30% percent IDPs. Instituted a number of things to facilitate female

Food-transfer programs account for approximately 98% of total safety-net expenditures.

Direct targeting made this safety net project accessible to poor and vulnerable women, particularly when it comes to benefitting from labor-intensive works and skill-development components. Project also provided space for childcare and consideration of proximity of works to women's homes etc. (Though evaluation did not address impact on time-poverty of FHH by involving them in labour intensive public works)

Community based approach to public works to lead and manage this project, including community based targeting of households.

participation such as work sites close to women’s houses, special working hours to take account of HH obligations, child care, etc. plus GBV referral system.

\$40 million International Development Association (IDA) grant approved through the South Sudan Safety Net Project (SSSNP) will expand access to safety net and provide income security for low income South Sudanese, while strengthening delivery tools and local level capacities. Will also provide direct grants to those who are unable to work, including people with disabilities, the elderly and pregnant or breastfeeding women, among others.

Seeds and tools distribution

Emergency large scale seeds and tools distribution by FAO and others – effectiveness long disputed in South Sudan, in particular when distributed to states that are not conflict affected /where markets are functioning. Often too late/wrong timing due to lengthy procurement render them useless. Also seeds and tools without knowledge and extension services not useful in long term.

Vegetable seeds introduced by NGOs/UN, specifically targeted at women, WHH – been seen as successful as can cultivate nearby on small plots, have high value.

FAO Fishing and vegetable kits generally more appreciated by many rather than crop kits, which often came too late and were not useful given people couldn’t access distant fields/were displaced.

VSLA

VSLAs generally proved effective and well-suited to the context according to a number of agencies. Lessons learnt from IRISS/BRACED financed programme found VSLAs to be major successes of the intervention, including proving robust during hyperinflation, as rapid turnover of savings into income generating activities was mitigating factor. E.g. SHARPE survey shows respondents savings rose by 34% btw baseline and endline

VSLAs also enabled communities – and especially women often for the first time – to access affordable credit and start income generation activities

Vocational and Skills Training

Skills training – many ‘standard’ programmes by different agencies, especially for youth and returnees who do not want to go to rural areas and engage in agriculture. However, (as elsewhere) TVET too disconnected from market supply and demand, too little linkages to future employers. Importance of life skills, numeracy and literacy training, life skills (including on how to approach market) input and starter packs, as well as language training etc. not acknowledged/integrated enough. Assumptions like ‘tailoring that would work well for women’ common even though evidence shows most people prefer to buy second hand clothes from Uganda therefore making it

Importance of market-relevant skills training. Too much focus on ‘standard’ programmes.

Instead for example horticultural products are needed in almost every market, or fishing value chains, from canning, food processing, agro-processing, and production of oils etc. – there is much market potential but very underexploited.

unsustainable. Or training on electrician/plumbing in urban areas, though little demand for those skills as few have access to that kind of indoor housing.

Very few programmes link trainees to market or provide apprenticeships; many trainees cannot find employment afterwards. Especially for returnees without connections, as well as demobilised soldiers very difficult to start anything useful from skills training. Also need to link to VSLA, start up and microfinance initiatives better.

Important barriers for access for women – e.g. in one state only 10% were women in TVET and half dropped out.

Need to connect to future employers and markets through apprenticeships etc. that are incorporated in/after the course

Also need numeracy and literacy and language skills, life skills, business training, access to microcredit and start-up money and kits, integrated approach otherwise skills training alone not really working.

Pay attention to women and ability to join and to graduate, barriers to entry.

What are people going to do afterwards – there are only so many micro-enterprises that markets can take given lack of employment possibilities.

Microfinance

As of February 2018, South Sudan had 10 microfinance that had reached only about 5% of the potential clientele in the capital (Juba) and less than 1% of the potential clientele in the entire nation. South Sudan has one of the lowest rankings on access to credit in the region.

Microfinance reported to have had positive impacts in particular in urban areas, and especially for women in those areas who got engaged in micro-enterprises. Contributed to increased employment and increased efficiency in small business management. Though many in peri – urban areas and rural areas left out of opportunities for lack of collateral (e.g. land) and conflict in 2013 led to collapse of microfinance sector. Better suitability of group loans for South Sudan due to most people unable to guarantee/secure collateral.

Group lending models more suitable

Re-establishment of public services e.g. education, health etc

School Feeding

WFP programme to encourage boys and girls to attend school by providing meals; also addresses short-term hunger, malnutrition, and cognitive development of children. WFP also supports girls' attendance at school through cash or rations. School feeding programme generally credited with increasing school enrolment and retention (add figures), reaching on average of 300,000 children per year – estimated at 20% of all primary schoolchildren. However, WFP evaluation found that overall effectiveness

compromised as not linked enough to complementary interventions and the absence of a strong inter-agency strategic framework.

Girls Education South Sudan (DFID funded) :

Provided direct lightly conditioned (on school attendance) cash transfers of relatively low value to girls' for education as well as capitation grants to schools. Intended to remove economic barriers to school attendance, hence covers shoes, uniform etc, providing incentives for families. Evidence from a fully disaggregated near real-time national dataset on school enrolment and attendance in South Sudan says GESS CTs and capitation grants made schools more likely to remain open, increase their enrolment numbers, and increase attendance rates despite the prevalence of substantial ongoing levels of violence and conflict. Girls (SAMS) has risen from 928,000 in 2014 to almost 1.7m in 2018.²¹ Further, girls now make up 46.06 percent of pupils, up from less than 40 percent in 2014.

- Same effect was not seen for secondary schools for variety of reasons, such as incentives might not have been high enough school vs. marriage, or CT not high enough or inaccessible secondary school

Assistance to IDPs and Refugees

Return and Reintegration of IDPs and refugees

Returnee support was short-lived and focused on the individual. A lot of focus on the returns operation, with included short term aid only to returnees (3-month food ration, along with seeds, tools and non-food items) though this was not effective in supporting returnees' livelihoods longer term, and particularly did not help the receiving communities who were bearing the brunt. Exacerbated tensions with hosts. Reintegration programmes were often time limited and not very effective/sustainable. Successes were those that focused on increasing absorptive capacity of hosts through programmes aimed at both returnees and hosts, e.g. Food for Work targeting Returnees, shared services to be used by returnees and hosts.

Integrated approaches to reintegration, eg. ICLA programme which focuses on counselling (e.g. for land disputes, trauma, health etc) and connections (e.g. to VTCs, to microcredit, to aid organisations,), integrated approaches to VTC that link to credit, business training, micro-enterprise start ups etc.

Microcredit opportunities through SUMI (national microcredit enterprise) and BRAC were available, but difficult to obtain for returnees as even group loans require people

to be settled, and individual loans need to be guaranteed by collateral (e.g. land) which returnees often don't have

Assistance to recover/access land

Limited programmes to assist with resolving land problems. Mainly focused on helping the Government draft Land Act/Law, but lack of implementation and limited knowledge/dissemination at state level/lower levels of government. Some programmes build community level capacity in land governance and management (USAID/IFAD), including support to drafting resource management policies but not much impact yet. Few programmes like ICLA (by NRC) in urban areas support individuals/returnees with access/recovery of land really useful but very small scale.

Unresolved land issues /land disputes major barrier to livelihoods recovery, especially for many returnees without access to land.

Need for support to resolution of land issues at state/local level, not just at the top (policy level) or individual level.

DRR / Reintegration of ex-combatants

DRR programme (national commission supported by UNDP/UNMIS/UNICEF and UNFPA) after the CPA generally recognised as a failure.

Process whereby 1)combatants received counselling services at the SSDDRC office in the state they chose for reintegration. 2) then received their interim reinsertion support, consisting of a cash grant of SDG 860 (USD 320), non-food items, and a voucher for three months' worth of food for a family of five; expected to use their own means to return to their places of origin or wherever they wished to settle. 3) at the stage of reintegration, ex-combatants provided with support for developing a new livelihood. Depending on the economic package, this comprises training, capacity building, and equipment for agriculture and animal husbandry (including fishery and forestry); small business development; vocational training; or adult education. Trainings provided by NGO/UN partners in each location. Individualised approach assumed that ex-combatants who reintegrate act as economic 'catalysts' for their communities, though this was increasingly recognised as overly optimistic and subsequent programmes were to be designed to extend longer term support also to communities.

Integrated training models offering combinations of entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy; vocational training; literacy and numeracy; and life skills shows much greater potential than standalone vocational trainings for ex-combatants

In community projects, ex-combatants May benefit from local knowledge and support, while communities can benefit from the ex-combatants' skills; Economic recovery also more sustainable if it extends to the entire community, reducing the risk of failure among ex-combatants and dissatisfaction or envy among those who do not receive support.

Individualised rather than community based approach did not work and much overestimated what one ex-combatant would be able to do without community support. Assumption of economic self-sufficiency for someone without skills etc too high, need a mix of skills training but also link to market, trauma counselling, etc. and community support to reintegrate.

Syria

Measure	Effectiveness	Lessons Learned
<p>Direct assistance to victims of conflict in situ.</p> <p>Counselling and other socio-psychological assistance to victims of violence and conflict trauma: especially those disabled, traumatised, ex-combatants.</p>	<p>In North East Syria, Humanity Inclusion (HI) trained local staff to provide three-weekly home-based psychosocial support (PS) sessions. The first session was aimed at building trust with the entire family, and the second and third session was aimed at the primary household-head (men, women, PwDs) to understand household-level stressors and aspirations for future livelihoods. The PS-sessions were provided to a randomly selected pool of participants who were also receiving other types of agriculture sector interventions—agricultural inputs—seeds, tools; or livestock feed.</p> <p>Effective: Standalone livelihood programs for farmers had a positive impact on psychosocial well-being, but integrated psychosocial-livelihood support programs had an even greater impact. In particular, participants with disabilities benefitted the most from these integrated programs. The integrated livelihoods and PS-wellbeing support approach was found to have a higher impact on women compared to men.</p>	<p>Standalone livelihood interventions can be effective in improving psychosocial wellbeing for Syrians.</p> <p>Integrated psychosocial wellbeing interventions are more effective particularly for women and PwDs.</p> <p>These are both low-cost and low effort (three-week sessions) that can be easily integrated into a range of sectoral interventions. Local staff however do need to be trained by qualified experts.</p>
<p>Process and implementation</p>	<p>PS-interventions were layered onto ongoing agricultural livelihood interventions. Qualified staff from Humanity Inclusion provided local teams with training, ahead of the home-based psychosocial support sessions. PS-sessions were not aimed at providing specialised mental health support but were light-touch sessions that provided an appropriate release mechanism for Syrians.</p>	
<p>Economic Recovery</p> <p>Grants, soft credit to restore working capital or allow reinvestment</p>	<p>Subsidised flour to bakeries: In the North West, Syrian partners provide subsidised wheat flour to bakeries to produce bread. Partners purchase wheat from local farmers, get this milled and transport these to bakeries in multiple communities to produce wheat. The cost of interventions is USD 300/metric ton of wheat.</p> <p>Effective, but varies between GoS and non-GoS controlled locations.</p> <p>Non-GoS areas: Partners note that the intervention has helped reduce the price of a basket of bread (1.3 kgs) by 40%.</p> <p>In GoS-controlled areas, WFP and partners support government bakeries with subsidised wheat flour. Given the higher needs in GoS areas due to worsening socioeconomic conditions, partners report that the intervention is only partly effective. It helps bakeries produce bread but does not meet the needs of entire communities. There are long lines at bakeries starting from 4 am and only some persons are able to obtain the subsidised bread.</p>	<p>Market-system interventions in the flour value chain can help reduce the price of staples for entire communities, not just direct program participants. Currently these interventions appear to be more effective in non-GoS areas due to relatively less economic impacts from the SYP devaluation.</p>

Process and implementation	<p>In non-GoS controlled locations, partners chose the intervention to support the reduction in price of staples—primarily bread—for the entire community as opposed to only program participants. Pre-conflict the GoS had a large network of government bakeries that received fuel and input subsidies and produced bread at a subsidised price for Syrians. During the conflict, many bakeries across Syria were deliberately targeted and destroyed. Bread continues to remain the primary staple for Syrians across the country and hence stabilising the price of bread is an effective intervention.</p>	<p>Impact of market system interventions are dictated by the macroeconomic conditions and donors’ political mandates. Since GoS retaking of many areas including previously besieged areas such as Dara’a, donor investments have considerably dropped but needs continue to remain high. Donor investments should be based on need, not political mandates.</p>
<p>Economic Recovery</p> <p>Seeds, tools, small numbers of breeding livestock for restocking</p>	<p>In GoS controlled areas, the economic situation is considerably worse than non-GoS controlled locations. The GoS retaking of many parts of Syria has also meant a considerable reduction in donor funding in GoS controlled areas. WFPs support to bakeries was initially meant to complement the GoS support, but with the shortage of overall donor funding and a lack of GoS financial capacity and resources, WFP’s response has effectively replaced GoS subsidies in large parts of GoS controlled Syria.</p> <p>Agricultural livelihoods: In non-GoS controlled areas—North West and North East Syria, partners provide wheat, olive and vegetable farmers with vouchers or cash to obtain agricultural inputs—seeds, tools, irrigation drip kits-- from local market actors. Partners also provide farmers with cash to pay for labour during harvest periods.</p> <p>Largely effective</p> <p>In the wheat value chain, 70% of farmers are able to continue producing and selling in the marketplace, but no change in market prices. In the olive value chain, there is a high demand for Syrian olive oil which is being (unofficially) bought and sold by Turkish traders in domestic markets and abroad—in Europe. Within vegetable/horticultural interventions—availability of local vegetables has increased in the marketplace but this has not had an impact on overall market price.</p>	<p>Skills and resources for agricultural livelihoods—especially wheat, vegetables and olives--already exist in rural parts of Syria. Market actors have also rushed to fill in input gaps (seeds, tools etc.) that was previously provided by the GoS.</p>
Process and implementation	<p>Downstream benefits for women: Across all these agriculture livelihoods, there are downstream benefits for women. Wheat and olive harvest is a culturally accepted activity and income-source for women. Within the vegetable production intervention, women once again benefit from picking fresh produce for sale in the marketplace—also a traditionally women’s income-source.</p> <p>Integrated and longer-term approach for livelihood interventions: INGOs and UNDP report taking a three-pronged approach for all livelihood programs inside Syria— provide food/cash or access to other basic needs; protect existing assets including livestock and small ruminants or mobilising savings and loan groups; and promote the</p>	<p>An evaluation of Australia's three-year assistance finds that multiyear programs that allow for a mix of modalities and funding length—multiyear funding (MYF) in particular--was</p>

establishment of pre-conflict (or new) livelihoods. Interventions are targeted at different individuals with varying skills and capacities within the community, however for INGOs short funding timelines (primarily 12-months) is a key barrier in achieving a coherent strategy. (UNDP has independent funding and reports far more success with taking an integrated long-term approach.)

Intentionally chosen interventions: Interventions were chosen based on market assessments that find Syrians’ preference for local produce in the marketplace; a demand for Syrian produced olive oil which is unofficially transported and sold in Turkey and other parts of Europe; and greater access to olive plantations in the North East compared to Raqqa (previously ISIS-control; a large producer of olive oil in Syria). Farmers are selected based on an assessment of pre-existing skills and capacity, and land ownership—a majority participants are either small or medium-land holders or tenant farmers.

Gender-sensitive livelihoods for women: Cash for harvest interventions in the wheat and olive value chain are intentionally designed to benefit women or women-headed households inside Syria and based on assessments of gendered-division of agricultural labour. Vegetable farmers are also linked to individual women, who in turn pickle/preserve local vegetables for sale in the marketplace.

Rural development projects: IFAD—International Fund for Agricultural Development—provided the Government of Syria with loan support and technical capacity in five key areas: production of biogas to increase availability of home cooking fuels; solar cookers; mushroom production for sale in the marketplace; conservative irrigation techniques; and egg incubator projects.²⁹⁴ The IFAD loan—estimated total cost USD 58 million with co-financing requirements--was approved in 2007 (i.e., pre-conflict) and the loan period ended in 2015.²⁹⁵ The IFAD fund was intended to reach 190,000 individuals—tenant farmers, women and youth in North East Syria (Al-Hassakeh province). Note: Evaluation of this project was conducted in 2018 (that is three-years following the program end) but the evaluation was only conducted with eighty-five participants.

Effective

found to increase efficiency and effectiveness with partners reporting better VFM.

Agriculture is a key source of income for IDPs and local communities in northern and NE Syria. Agriculture wage labour is high because of a labour scarcity. With the large-scale migration of men, agriculture labour is particularly beneficial and is a culturally acceptable income-source for women.

Conflict-related fuel scarcity and high price for fuel means that there are effective gaps in solar energy and biogas (for cooking) markets. Fuel continues to be subsidised in GoS areas but there is an overall lack of fuel availability. This makes alternative cooking fuels, investments in solar energy both effective and an in-demand livelihood opportunity inside Syria. .

For non-traditional agricultural produce such as mushrooms, additional marketing skills and linkages to markets are needed.

Economic recovery

²⁹⁴ Alobid et al., The social and economic impact of small projects in al-hasaka province, syria.

²⁹⁵ International Fund for Agricultural Development, ‘North-Eastern Region Rural Development Project’.

Two-thirds of production projects are able to continue, but participants report that they are not able to save any money. In the case of mushroom production, participants struggled with marketing the production of their outputs due to a lack of knowledge regarding the product markets or lack of proximate markets for sale of these products.

Multipurpose cash: In non-GoS areas, cash cluster partners provide 3-months of unconditional cash of USD 120/month (prior to 2019) and currently USD 100/month (based on market assessments of prices following SYP decline in 2019-2020). Some partners report that cash is a food security response in non-GoS controlled areas in Syria.

Direct assistance to victims of conflict in situ.

Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc.

Effective compared to food modalities, but impacts for women are mixed.

Cash offered women with a layer of social protection, allowed debt repayment, reduced reliance on social connections and increased economic independence. Women also report short term improvements in psychosocial wellbeing—reduction in anxiety and stress. But some women reported negative consequences—household-level abuse; and jealousy and suspicion within the community on why they were selected. (Past media reports in Syria have reported aid workers pressuring women for sex, in exchange for humanitarian aid, which may help explain women’s fears of community suspicions.) Some women worried that their social connections would rescind informal forms of support, even after the cash assistance ended. Overall women did not report a positive or negative change in household relationships. However, widows and divorced women in particular reported extended family members trying to interfere in their economic decisions. Authors find that since cash programs are short-term with a primary focus on providing economic relief, it does little to change pre-existing household dynamics.

The Cash working Group (CwG) coordinate coverage among partners as well as standardise values/frequency of the response. Market monitoring assessments (REACH) are conducted on a regular basis to assess market availability of key goods and prices to support decisions on the use of cash or in-kind food modalities.

Process and implementation

There is a lack of qualified women staff among many INGOs and S-NGOs inside Syria. Hawalas—while a frequently used cash transfer channel inside Syria—does not provide cash participants with adequate privacy in receiving their cash transfer. Many women report a preference for home-based distribution of all aid modalities including food and cash, but aid actors lack the operational capacity to operationalise this.

Food insecurity inside Syria is a function of financial barriers to access, as opposed to an issue of non-availability. Cash is in high demand within Syria and hawalas are a ubiquitous form of money transfer inside Syria. All these make multipurpose cash a more effective modality to meet a range of household needs compared to food.

Considerations for women participants need to include privacy to avoid the loss of social network support. The use of female staff—although considerably challenging inside Syria—during cash transfer assessments and/or home-based delivery of cash by women NGO staff are all important considerations.

Uganda

Measure	Effectiveness	Lessons
Assistance to IDPs		
Food assistance	<p>The biggest component of humanitarian assistance to IDPs was for food assistance, for which in-kind food aid (a blanket or ‘general food distribution’, GFD) was default modality,. The intervention was broadly successful in preventing excess mortality and malnutrition - global acute malnutrition (GAM) never got to scary levels. With provided over many years, often as a theoretical 100% ration (i.e. 2100 kcal), but because of pipeline problems, sale of food aid to meet other needs (c 20% of ration), etc., it still only provided around half people's calories, or 25-33% total household food and cash income.</p> <p>Cash only began to be recognised by the humanitarian community to attend to the conflict and when returns from camps began. Towards end of conflict, cash aid to IDPs was piloted but vehicle carrying bank-notes was attacked. (This was before mobile money was possible.)</p> <p>Food assistance was only provided to people who were in government sanctioned camps, i.e. not to IDPs who fled to towns/relatives, or to those in non-sanctioned camps. The populations were not included in nutrition surveys, etc., so it’s hard to gauge the impact of their exclusion – likely to be serious, though.</p> <p>Some evidence that some IDPs had to make small payments to be included on distribution lists.</p>	<p>Even though most IDPs had some independent livelihood, these were so curtailed that relief food assistance was unquestionably justified. In today’s world, one would hope that the assistance to most camps would have been given in cash, but this was less feasible 20 years ago. Although a percentage of IDPs in the camps (perhaps 15%??) probably didn’t need the ration, targeting would not have been appropriate – costs, errors, corruption.</p> <p>There was a degree of complicity by the international humanitarian sector with the forced encampment policy. This was a good example of how much overall international political relations shape “humanitarian” assistance (comparing the attitude of the UN to the same policy adviser Ugandan and the Burundian governments, for example).</p> <p>Given that it was known how much of the maize ration people had to sell just to get money to pay for milling the rest of the ration, it was clear that this reliance on only giving food was a mistake - even if cash was not feasible, some form of vouchers to pay for milling would have been an easy solution. However, now that cash assistance has become more widespread, this lesson ought to be out of date.</p> <p>Could more have been done to combat corruption in compiling the registers? Certainly, this takes us into different territory, the way in which international humanitarian system dealt with camp leadership and structures – none of which were official; its unwillingness to push for legal action against those demanding bribes; and possibly, even if it had been willing, the difficulties of finding justice through Ugandan system. This raises wider issues about the extent to which pushing for accountability and enforcement of law should be seen as essential components of social protection, and ones which IDPs also deserve, rather than considering them merely as prisoners to be fed.</p>
S&T, ag inputs	<p>IDPs access to inputs was supported to different modalities. The main one (by volume) was direct distribution of seeds and tools. One NGO ran seed and voucher fairs. Other progs (state) used central procurement for group grants in-kind, (WB) cash grants to groups for procurement and (DANIDA) supply-side strengthening and the input-vouchers for work (VFW).</p>	

	<p>It's very hard to conclude much about effectiveness because impact has not been properly assessed. There was a degree of tension between agencies giving free distributions those working to support input supply, who felt that free distributions were undermining their work.</p>	
CFW/PWP/FFA	<p>Various programmes gave transfers (cash, food, vouchers) for work on constructing "assets". Access roads were a common project. PWP programming is a much more expensive way of making a transfer, both for donors and recipients, so its effectiveness depends on the assets created having a value. No record can be found for the impact of the assets having been assessed for any of the projects beyond the physical condition of the assets on programme closure. In general, this was found to be poor VFM. Maintenance of roads is another issue.</p> <p>There is little evidence about the impact of the transfer, especially considering the opportunity cost of people's time. Some projects deliberately paid below market rates for the purposes of "self-targeting" or to avoid distorting labour markets. However, one study showed that self-targeting didn't really work, despite this.</p> <p>"...difficult to show results beyond outputs" (WFP eval.)</p> <p>Some projects provided a larger final payoff after CFW (>\$100). Reports that these were used for investments – agric, petty trade.</p>	<p>The logic of using PWP as a vehicle for asset construction needs to be clarified. Until it can be shown that a) the assets to be created will have a value and b) PWP is the best way to create those assets, PWP should be resisted. Simple rule: if there is no plan to guarantee and then assess the value of the assets, then the PWP doesn't really value them. So just give the cash and let people work for themselves? This has been seen over and over again, so probably no point in drawing the lesson yet again.</p> <p>In N Uganda, grants of \$100-200 were useful enablers of investments. Even in camps, people found a way to invest this money in livelihoods.</p>
Agric extension	<p>This was provided on a small scale only to IDPs in camps, mainly provision of higher yielding varieties inc. for multiplication at a time when security improved and land access was greater. Mainly helped better-off farmers in first season, expectation that others would then access seeds in following season.</p> <p>No mention of using famers customary 'digging groups' for multiplication – opportunity lost, as many would be in same camps?</p>	<p>Clearly distinguishable from general S&T distributions. Although impact not measured, likely to be high (staple crops - new cassava varieties resistant to EAMV, hug-yielding early maturing groundnuts, sometimes sweet potatoes). Cassava especially likely to spread rapidly, as vegetative planting material. Given how many IDPs were farming small areas, hard to understand why mass messaging and making new varieties available was not done at huge scale.</p>
Land access	<p>IDP camps were set up on private land, and the land around them was also private, so most IDPs had to arrange to rent land for themselves within the radius that was permitted by the army - typically around 1–2 km. Households had only small farmed areas and over the years soils</p>	<p>Given that curtailed access to land for a largely agricultural population (in the context of a lack of alternative livelihoods) was the principal livelihood constraint of millions, it's hard to justify why supporting increased access to land was not a major preoccupation of aid agencies. It should also have been a main priority for government, though this would perhaps have called into question the very policy of forced encampment. That doesn't</p>

	<p>became exhausted. Very little was done to alleviate this key constraint by aid agencies or by the government.</p> <p>Three projects have been identified, each with different modalities. One (UN) involved advocacy outcome level with the authorities (political, military) to increase the permitted radius – doubling the radius increased the available area by four times! Another (faith based INGO) advocated with churches, local government and landowners for IDPs to be allowed to use some of their land without payment. A third (USAID) involved formal agreements with leaseholders owning land a short distance from the camp for ‘block farming’ (i.e. centralised division of area and allocation of plots) and with army, who paid to protect IDPs to farm there. There’s no documented evidence available of the impact of any of these schemes, but the first two seem to have been successful. There is little reason to doubt that enabling more people to farm more land would have had a positive impact on their lives, though there is no evidence that the project resulted in durable (i.e. for the period of encampment) change in land access. The third project closed before harvest, at which point UPDF no longer allowed IDPs to access land.</p>	<p>mean that it’s hard to <i>explain</i>. 1) these projects were the outcome of an understanding of the specific problems, and an appreciation of at least some of the institutional context through which short-term change could be achieved. (The second two examples related only to those with formal land tenure arrangements, customary tenure had not been well understood.) It’s less easy to see such initiatives as a blueprint that could be rolled out globally in IDP situations. 2) these are examples where the projects didn’t provide a solution, but facilitated it. This is not the default humanitarian mindset? 3) land had not previously been on the humanitarian agenda at all (cf. cash). One would hope that the importance of land access would now be better recognised.</p> <p>The two apparently successful projects that are based around advocacy appear to show that <i>something</i> at least would have been possible on a wider scale.</p> <p>This is another example where projectised livelihood support comes up against questions of protection and interaction of the aid community with state systems (cf. dealing with corruption in food assistance, above). What are the longer-term consequences of treating the responsibility of an army to protect civilians in a commoditised way through a project? Can this approach be assessed purely on its impact on the food security of beneficiary households during the lifetime of the project? The fact that protection ended before harvest illustrates the problem, but doesn’t answer the question - what would the lesson be if the project had continued for another two months?</p>
<p>Community grants</p>	<p>This involved the formation of groups, to whom grants were made (usually in cash, sometimes in-kind) in response to a group plan for its own livelihood project. Livestock was, unsurprisingly, one of the most common projects.</p> <p>Grants were made in different ways.</p> <p>Social Action Fund. This was a common WB model at the time [a fashion now superseded by household transfers in safety nets/“social protection”?]. \$100m was spent over 5 years, much of it in this way (see also: infrastructure). Groups put in project proposals often agricultural, which were vetted through a local state institution, run in parallel to normal local govt. Cash was then paid to the group leader. No assessment of impact can be found, but the majority of group projects were not functioning after 8 months. Many groups were created by the leader, and members then invited (really for the purpose of security the grant) leading to strong patron-client relations</p>	<p>SAF model highly problematic in conflict situation and where Govt is largely corrupt. Groups were often fictions. Eligibility criteria for grants ruled out the majority of the pop (e.g. literacy, ability to write a proposal, demonstrate ability to manage funds, etc.). Relative elites (i.e. not the big men, the medium sized men) needed a group to get their grants. System channelled many resources to relatively few people. Unless there is good evidence of trickle down, this is unhelpful for poverty alleviation at best of times, but worse in a conflict – it feeds the lack of trust in the state and between people, people are more vulnerable to being taken advantage of, systems of control (social norms, justice system) are both broken.</p> <p>Everyone in N Uganda was a member of more than one group, anyway – farming groups, burial groups, savings groups (esp women). But these were never considered as structures to work with by any project, which always started by forming groups. Why not? This would have worked with the social cohesion that already existed and supported it.</p>

	<p>between group leader and other members. Reportedly high level of bribes were paid to secure authorisation of projects. No accountability mechanisms in place [would defeat the real purpose of the project??]. Mechanisms was used across the northern region, mostly in settled communities but groups were also formed in IDP camps. No record of disaggregated performance analysis IDP vs at-homers.</p> <p>One NGO ran a similar model when access was difficult because of the conflict, but not through the state. Project facilitated group analysis of their FS constraints and opportunities. 23 groups in 2 camps – 3 mills, 20 l'stock related). Only evidence about groups that bought l'stock – some success (some had multiplied and sold), but others were raided, animals died, general lack of grazing land for IDPs in camps. No info on group cohesion. “The idea of rebuilding assets in camp situation was perhaps a bit too ambitious”.</p> <p>State agric extension service added input supply in 2005 (near end of conflict). Contracted out by extension service to private input suppliers. No evidence of impact. But on process, farmers had reasonable influence over inputs supplied, though less than project staff or local govt officials. Project then changed to model farmer approach – but selection of model farmers was highly politicised. Given political situation in the north, power of the Party (NRM) officials not seen as conflict sensitive (NRM blamed by many as equal part of their problem).</p>	<p>In principle, people should know best what investments make sense for them. And yet many chose investments that didn't work well (l'stock, in some cases). Why? Lack of alternative opportunities?</p> <p>Model farmer approach to supplying investment/inputs is unsuited to conflict situation. It restricts the number of people who benefit to a small number. This may be its political purpose – development-washing, providing success stories.</p>
<p>Fuel efficient stoves</p>	<p>Mentioned (FAO) but no details on scale or impact</p>	<p>Not a game changer on livelihoods, but potentially a useful tool for IDP camps where fuel is hard to find, esp if manufacture can be localised. Potential benefits for environment, reduction in household expenditure of IDPs, reduction of risks of violence against women.</p>
<p>microfinance</p>	<p>Some promotion of VSLAs in camps. Little evidence on economic impact, but VSLA “contributed to enhancing members' self-esteem and confidence” (?). Some evidence of savings taking place. Sums of money for credit reportedly quite small – which would probably be appropriate? Not targeted at 'poorest' – but in an IDP camp, that's not a bad thing.</p>	<p>If there is enough social cohesion to permit savings groups to function, there is good reason to support this in situations of protracted displacement (i.e. where camps keep people together for years). Unlikely that organisation would outlive displacement – no evidence on how savings/loans were managed on camp closure.</p> <p>Most households had been members of savings groups pre-displacement – unclear whether this social org could have been supported?</p>

Non-displaced

Non-displaced populations were in areas that were much less conflict-affected. Broadly speaking, “normal” development interventions would have been possible and appropriate. I’ve not prioritised this – there are no obvious lessons especially for a conflict context – except perhaps that dev’t investment should be targeted at places on the fringes of a conflict which have suffered some spill-over economic effects.

Support for return

Uganda	Cash grants \$285 in 2 grants, 3 months apart, to 1,500 ‘highly vulnerable’ households	<p>A rare intervention in the 2000s/noughties.</p> <p>Money spent on livelihood investments – often livestock esp for animal traction. Households could buy 4-5 goats with #1 and a bull (or a plough) with #2, plus have some for other needs. Some local inflation. “The amount of the transfers was a bit too large to be appropriate and should be reduced.” “focus on individuals rather than groups was appropriate”. Some difficulties with bank account as transfer mechanism. No of beneficiaries was too low (though, to be fair, cash was highly experimental at the time). Some implementation issues: ‘widespread’ corruption of staff (picked up after first tranche), splitting the transfer caused delays in purchasing, timeframe did not coincide with agric seasons.</p> <p>Choice of investments reveals that S&T were not the priority; other IGAS not deemed to be possible in village.</p> <p>C 10% of cash spent on food. No impact on nutrition/diet by project end.</p>	<p>Give lump sums of cash for investment for recovery, inc for return from displacement. Returnees prioritised household recovery over investment in immediate nutrition, i.e. spending on food. Go with it. Support them for longer term, if necessary rather than supporting immediate food consumption on return. People will survive. Another study showed the importance in medium term of getting a good start on return.</p> <p>Risk of corruption can be high in conflicts – but agency picked up on it. 12 staff were dismissed but not charged. Why not? Where’s the deterrence?</p> <p>If the sums make sense, splitting grant into 2 transfers makes sense – it worked because each transfer was enough to buy something they wanted plus a bit over. (A feasibility study had been done indicating possible transfer values).</p>
Uganda	Negotiating access to land	(NGO projects.) Few details – negotiating with army re security.	

Yemen

Responses	Effectiveness	Lessons Learned
<p>Economic recovery</p> <p>Directly to farms and enterprises</p> <p>Seeds, tools, small numbers of breeding livestock for restocking</p> <p>Technical assistance/vocational training</p> <p>Grants, soft credit to restore working capital or allow reinvestment:</p> <p>Restoring lost or broken physical infrastructure — e.g. rebuilding and repairing roads, bridges, power lines, water supplies</p>	<p>Agriculture inputs, seedlings, livestock support, etc.: Small scale investments that are taking place at the household level in agriculture inputs and training. Partners are having to account for significant environmental degradation, including water tables. Moreover, they have focused on providing inputs, tools, and materials needed to begin vegetable and seedlings production, with the goal of increasing vegetable and fruit production as a viable income-generating opportunity.</p> <p>Effectiveness: Too early to say; however, support to agriculture investments have promising impacts on livelihood and psychosocial outcomes. Partners reported that support for agricultural activities increased participants' sense of self-reliance, which in turn has positive implications for psychosocial well-being. However, no conclusive evidence or evaluations linking the two yet.</p> <p>Rehabilitation of community assets: Restoring lost and damaged infrastructure has been integrated into cash transfers, cash for work (CFW), WASH, and livelihoods programming of some partners. Rehabilitation of community assets has mostly included rebuilding (and in some remote rural areas building brand new) roads, water pumps, agricultural technologies, etc.</p> <p>Effectiveness: Too early to say, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are not widespread enough to draw a conclusion. However, reporting and evaluations by some partners suggested that community asset rehabilitation efforts helped to improve access to markets and health facilities. The construction of and rehabilitation of local water infrastructure was also found to decrease the burden on women.</p>	<p>Further efforts could include linking project participants with private inputs and potential customers, as well as creating opportunities to bring farmers, traders, and transporters together to exchange information and establish business relationships.</p> <p>Further investments are needed at the systems-level. While the household investments (like the provision of seeds, inputs, etc.) are important, systems-level investments will be more effective.</p> <p>Destruction of infrastructure was found to have magnified the breadth and depth of humanitarian need. Literature suggests that rehabilitation efforts improved access to water, expanded the reach of CFW programming, and improved livelihoods outcomes.</p> <p>Rehabilitation of crucial infrastructure, particularly roads, was found to improve access to markets and health facilities.</p>
<p>2. Restoration and development of supply</p>	<p>Small Business Support: Partners are providing support in the form of technical training and money to small business owners affected by the conflict and/or COVID-19. In 2015,</p>	<p>In addition to identifying households for food baskets, the targeting process for food assistance provides opportunity for</p>

chains, including market development

some partners reported providing food vouchers to targeted households that they could redeem at local businesses they had partnered with. Support is focused on rehabilitation and repair. Despite a number of partners taking this approach, funding shortfalls are not covering outstanding need.

Effectiveness: Too limited to say. However, one key informant reported that of the business they had partnered with for food voucher redemption in 2015, many are continuing to operate today. Suggests that early support to small businesses could help them continue to operate even as conflict carries on.

Solar Panel Construction: Most infrastructure in Yemen (and across the region) is highly decentralized and not integrated into wider national grids. With rising fuel prices due to the blockades, households and traders have switched to solar power as an adaptation to difficult circumstances.

Re-establishment of public services such as education, health care, etc. — through reconstructing and repairing damaged buildings, other infrastructure, recruiting and training staff, restoring budget lines to allow operations

Small amount of programming focused the installation of solar panels to help improve resilience and self-reliance, particularly in conflict-affected communities in rural areas. Objectives focused on improving livelihoods and income-generating activities, supporting community recovery efforts, and enhancing access to basic services including health, education, and water.

Effectiveness: Despite limited programming, initial signs show that solar panel installation is effective in meeting the outline objectives above and align with community needs. Despite alignment with community needs and sustainability, there has been little agency and donor interest in investing in wider solar panel installation. Literature suggests that solar projects need to be implemented in more areas and these interventions should assess the needs of communities and their capacities to maintain these systems.

Direct assistance to victims of conflict in situ [see below for IDPs, refugees]

Food & Emergency Assistance: Emergency assistance, both in-kind and cash transfers, remain the predominate mode of aid in Yemen. Food assistance has largely been led by the World Food Program (WFP), with nearly 10 million food baskets delivered to Yemenis in need on a monthly basis. Food baskets largely comprised of the most basic of commodities, including flour and oil.

Social protection through food aid, cash transfers, public employment for those out of work, pensions, etc.

Effectiveness: Emergency food assistance has been largely effective in staving off the worst of the food security impacts of the conflict, at the very least avoiding the decline into famine. Key informants noted that food vouchers were found to be particularly effective for women and children as men often control how cash is spent, whereas

actors to identify households that possess the skills and capacities for livelihoods training and support.

Good practices included thorough targeting criteria based on the basic service seeking to improve; engagement of local authorities; engagement of local stakeholders in design; implementation, and maintenance of systems.

Provision of solar lanterns was also found to improve access to energy among IDPs and helped households resume income-generating activities.

Wider implementation of solar panel installation will require assessments focused on community needs and what's need to upkeep maintenance of these systems. This may include awareness-raising programs in targeted communities and training on how maintain solar panel systems to maximize their lifecycle and capacity.

Some evidence suggests that cash transfers versus food assistance are most likely to be effective in contexts where there are functioning markets and recipients are struggling with deficiencies in the quality and not the quantity of food.

Modality choice should be linked to programmatic and/or project objectives. If the goal is to decrease malnutrition, food vouchers were found to be more effective. Cash helped to diversify diet and allowed households to spend excess funds on health needs and debt repayments.

women are responsible for ensuring household needs are addressed. Partners underscored that where the goal was to address malnutrition, food vouchers were found to be most effective compared to cash (which could be used to address other needs).

An RCT comparing one food vs. cash transfer program found that cash beneficiaries were found to have a more diversified diet and had a higher Food Consumption Score, but ate less calories per day overall. Those who received food consumed more wheat and oil (food basket staples) and spent excess money on higher quality good items like meat and non-food items (including qat).

Psychosocial Support: Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) need is high in Yemen. There is some programming focused on addressing the psychosocial needs of conflict-affected communities across Yemen. However, there has been limited funding provided by donors thus far and several challenges to delivering psychosocial support, including high rates of stigma and lack of information, a small mental health workforce, and a shortage of donor funding for comprehensive services.

Women were more likely than men to receive mental health consultations and express that they are experiencing distress. Some efforts have focused on addressing rising rates of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and its impacts on women and girls, particularly through the provision of gender-sensitive healthcare, creation of safe spaces, and economic empowerment programs.

Effectiveness: Effective, based on anecdotal evidence from partners. Partners report that livelihood programming and agricultural assistance contributed to improvements in the psychosocial well-being of participants. Findings from the broader literature suggest that improvements in mental health and well-being can also lead to improvements in long-term decision-making.

Cash for Nutrition: Implemented through the Yemen Fund for Social Development and with support from UNICEF over the course of two years. Focused on providing cash transfers to households along with complementary monthly health and nutrition education sessions for mothers of infants and young children. Nutritional training focused on improving practices related to child nutrition outcomes, increasing early initiation of breastfeeding and drinking of treated water.

Effectiveness: Effective. Evaluation found that the rate of child malnutrition diagnoses decreased by 10% over the past two years. Report also noted there was

Finally some evidence suggests that declines in food access are not linked to specific violent events. Instead, supply chains are more likely to have an impact on food security and extend across the country rather than one particular locality. These findings suggest that it may be important for humanitarian actors to differentiate between the types of violence and account for these variances when targeting and delivering assistance to households.

More extensive investment in MHPSS is needed, particularly to help address the gender gap in seeking out services and support. Reporting from partners called for increased awareness-raising among donors.

Investments could include training first responders in psychological first aid, as well as training service providers in screening mental health issues and providing referrals to the appropriate resources.

Economic empowerment programs and safe spaces were found to be an effective entry point for addressing GBV needs and the implementation of services. Moreover, involvement and participation of community members helped to facilitate the work of service providers.

Use of community health volunteers was reported to be particularly effective, with the training sessions was helpful for both literate and illiterate women. Suggests that such programming could be well-adapted for populations with high rates of illiteracy.

Targeting is critical for decreasing rates of malnutrition. The greatest improvements were found to be among the poorest tercile of households in the program

complementarity between the education offered by the program and the food distributions implemented by other NGOs in the community, which allowed households to use cash to also repay debts and pay for healthcare services.

Multipurpose Cash (MPC) Transfers: A 10-cycle MPC program implemented by CARE, recipients received 52,000 YR/month during the first six cycles and 73,000 YR/month during the last four cycles. Cash was transferred through local financial institutions in each of the targeted governorates of Abyan and Amran. The interventions aimed to improve food security and resilience of beneficiary households, as well as to support livelihood activities, savings groups, and the rehabilitation of shared assets as identified by the community through cash for work (CFW) programming.

Effectiveness: Largely effective. Cash was found to increase the food security of households, as well as reduce the burden (on women especially) of finding water and fire. Some households saved or invested the money for future use, particularly in areas that received VSLA and livelihood training. Respondents reported that the rehabilitation of community assets increased access to water, food markets, and expanded the reach of the CFW program. MPC and CFW helped increase the stability of local markets and increased sales. Interventions focused on livelihood capacity-building and VSLA promotion were perceived to be more relevant to improvements at the household level and the ability to maintain food security.

5. Direct assistance to persons and households internally displaced persons (IDP) or refugees

While displaced, creating and providing shelter and security, employment, public services —especially schooling, health care

Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM): Led by UNFPA, in partnership with the WFP and UNICEF. RRM aims to provide a basic assistance package of the most critical and urgent assistance for newly displaced persons and/or those in collective sites, hard to reach areas, or stranded in the military frontlines. Actors aim to provide these in-kind kits within 72 hours of a displacement alert and include:

- Immediate response rations from the WFP;
- Basic hygiene kits provided by UNICEF, and;
- Women’s dignity kits provided by UNFPA.

Report found that soft conditionality was effective at encouraging education sessions. This could serve as a viable alternative to strict or unconditional cash transfers, allowing for participation without consequences for non-attendees.

The evaluation suggests increasing the MPC amount to allow households to cover medical expenses to help facilitate savings and livelihood investments. For households that did not have significant sources of income, food security gains made through the MPC intervention eroded in the 3-4 months following the last cash distribution.

Households in the more mountainous, remote Amran felt the lack of the MPC more acutely and their food consumption scores decreased more quickly compared to the coastal Abyan. MPC could be more effective by taking each household’s specific vulnerabilities and the surrounding factors of each targeted community into consideration.

The relief provided cash is only short term, requiring more sustained interventions. In addition to targeting households for cash, programs should develop plans to support income-generating activities. This could include business/skills training, networking with MFIs, supporting business incubators, as well as supporting agri-business value chains.

Improved gender mainstreaming and GBV referrals will require strengthening capacities and referral pathways, as well as ensuring there are additional responses that work towards these efforts.

More efficient referral of both specialized and general protection services will require donors and actors to provide more resources to support more up-to-date service mapping and information on the service referral pathways.

Socially marginalized populations require more tailored services and assistance modalities. UNFPA is working with an inclusion

When moving back home, assistance in returning, including

Re-establishing and registering rights to land, water, natural resources,

Provision of working capital in cash or kind, such as tools and seeds.

Resettlement on newly granted land [esp. for former fighters]

Packets are intended to provide five to seven days' worth of assistance. It's followed by multipurpose cash assistance based on verification of needs and a one-time emergency food distribution.

Effectiveness: Largely effective. Since it was launched in June 2018, the RRM has reached 3 million Yemenis. Timeliness of assistance and referrals for multi-purpose cash assistance were the primary performance indicators for RRM.

taskforce to develop a set of recommendations and programmatic adjustments to prevent their exclusion from RRM assistance.