



SPARC

Supporting Pastoralism
and Agriculture in Recurrent
and Protracted Crises

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REPORT

READINESS TO ACCESS CLIMATE FINANCE IN CHAD

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About SPARC

Climate change, armed conflict, environmental fragility and weak governance and the impact these have on natural resource-based livelihoods are among the key drivers of both crisis and poverty for communities in some of the world's most vulnerable and conflict-affected countries.

Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crises (SPARC) aims to generate evidence and address knowledge gaps to build the resilience of millions of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers in these communities in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

We strive to create impact by using research and evidence to develop knowledge that improves how the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), donors, non-governmental organisations, local and national governments, and civil society can empower these communities in the context of climate change.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Climate finance readiness refers to a country's capacity to plan, access and make use of financial resources for climate change action. A country needs to be able to monitor and report on the use and results of its climate finance (both domestic and international), demonstrating that it is catalytic and fully integrated within national development priorities (UNDP, 2012). Readiness is shaped by national context and circumstances (Nakhooda et al., 2013). Assessing readiness could help identify barriers and gaps that need to be addressed for a country to become prepared or to improve its preparedness to access and deliver international climate finance.

This study assesses Chad's readiness to access climate finance. It identifies readiness gaps and uses these as entry points to make recommendations for improvement. To support this, the study develops a Climate Finance Readiness Framework that is based on the following two existing frameworks:

- **UNDP's Readiness Framework** identifies four components of readiness: (1) national capacities to plan for finance; (2) capacities to access different forms and types of finance at the national level; (3) capacities to deliver finance and implement/execute activities; and (4) capacities to monitor, report and verify financial expenditures and associated results/transformational impacts (UNDP, 2012).
- **GIZ and ODI's Readiness Framework** defines readiness as a function of in-country processes and institutions to plan for climate change, as well as capacities across a wide cross-section of national institutions and stakeholders (systems to access and spend climate finance) (Nakhooda et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the new framework has considered the Africa NDC Hub (2021) report's system enablers that are helping countries attract climate finance.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study is based on desktop research, stakeholder interviews (see Annex 1 and Annex 2), documents provided by stakeholders interviewed, and information gathered from participation in meetings of the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO)-led Access to Climate Finance (ACF) Working Group.

The list of stakeholders was drawn up in discussion with the British Embassy N'Djamena. It was not however possible to interview all stakeholders because some did not respond to repeated follow-ups. Given the sensitive nature of issues probed in this study, some interviewees requested anonymity in sharing their views. Therefore, the analysis does not identify individual interviewees nor uses direct attribution of stakeholder interviews. Unless noted through references, all findings in this report are drawn from stakeholder interviews.



Lake Fitri, Chad. © NASA 2012, U.S. government work

TABLE 1: ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE FINANCE READINESS

Competency	Definition	Capability	Metrics used in the report to identify capabilities
Planning	Supporting a coordinated, well-informed and strategic climate response	National policy frameworks to address climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National socioeconomic development policies set mandate for climate policies Strategies, plans or policies to address climate change Quality of strategies, plans or policies
		Enabling governance architecture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional mechanisms to set national priorities on climate change Institutional mechanisms to coordinate responses to climate change Systems for inclusive stakeholder engagement
		Sufficient, quality information and data for planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Availability of sufficient and quality data Assessments of climate risk at national, subnational and sectoral levels
Access	Capacity to access and coordinate different forms and types of finance	Institutional capacity and experience to access international climate finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional management of climate finance Liaison with vertical climate funds (VCFs) Institutions accredited to VCFs Capacity to identify and develop viable projects that can attract funding Systems for managing environmental, social and fiduciary risks
		Mainstreaming of climate change into national budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integration/reflection of climate change priorities in national budget Use of climate budgeting tools
Delivery	Capacity to spend finance effectively, implement and execute activities at national, subnational and local levels	Implementation capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence of national financial mechanisms Capacity of implementing entities
Monitoring, verification and reporting	Capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of climate finance on national mitigation and adaptation goals	Monitoring and evaluation systems and procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Efforts to identify, track and report climate-related spending in the national budget Efforts to identify, track and report international climate finance Systems for measuring and reporting the impact of international climate finance
		Knowledge management and learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systems for institutional knowledge capture and learning (including to build further capacity)

Source: Authors' analysis based on UNDP (2012) and Nakhlooda et al. (2013).

3. ASSESSMENT OF CHAD'S CLIMATE FINANCE READINESS

3.1 Planning

3.1.1 National policy frameworks to address climate change

READINESS GAPS

- Policies lack detail in terms of implementation, internal procedures and funding. This includes the prioritisation of different actions indicated under policies, identification of clear investment needs for these actions, and preparation of an actionable project pipeline that provides clear signalling for investment partners.
- Policy priorities have been repeated across different policy processes with little mention or consideration of results.
- Adaptation and mitigation measures tend not to be concrete or grounded in climate vulnerability and risk assessments. Lack of concreteness also makes it difficult to mainstream them into future sectoral or national development policies, or to develop financeable projects.
- The financing requirements for adaptation actions have not been properly quantified.



Sheep herder with herd of sheep in village in desert countryside. Chad N'Djaména
Image by mbrand85 / shutterstock

National socioeconomic development policies set mandate for climate policies

The current principal macro socioeconomic development plan for Chad is 'Vision 2030: The Chad We Want', released in 2017. Before 2013, the country published two National Poverty Reduction Strategies (Stratégies Nationales de Réduction de la Pauvreté or SNRPs). These covered the periods 2003–2006 and 2008–2011. They outlined socioeconomic objectives to access finance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme. Chad's first National Development Plan 2013–2015 (Plan National de Développement or PND1), marked the country's transition away from the two NPRSs and set the stage for medium- to long-term economic planning priorities.

Vision 2030 sets out four strategic policy axes: (1) Strengthening national unity; (2) Strengthening good governance and the rule of law; (3) Developing a diversified and competitive economy; and (4) Improving the quality of life of the people. Each of the four axes is further subdivided into a number of sub-axes and strategic directions. The axes, sub-axes and strategic directions of Vision 2030 encompass the country's priorities, the national five-year development plans, and the concrete framework and plans of action for incrementally delivering on Vision 2030. Its delivery is structured around medium-term (five-year) National Development Plans (NDPs), the current one being Plan National de Développement 2017–2021 or PND2), and sectoral development policies such as for agriculture or livestock.

There has been an evolution in how climate variability and climate change concerns are treated in national development policies since 2003 (see Table 2). National development policies, as the main policy instruments, provide the framework through which climate policies can be developed since they mention climate variability and change and make these strategic policy priorities. As a result, mitigation and adaptation measures can be integrated into subsequent PNDs and updated sectoral development policies. The early SNRPs made no mention of climate change or adaptation. Mitigation was, however, an indirect priority, through the objectives of expanding rural electrification, including through solar energy, to reduce deforestation.

Climate change adaptation was briefly mentioned in PND1 but the text relates more to mitigation. Vision 2030 explicitly states the need to strengthen mitigation and adaptation to protect development objectives, including through a long-term national policy for climate change adaptation and mitigation, and biodiversity preservation. The detail of Chad's vulnerabilities and risks from climate change and adaptation and mitigation measures is left to the country's specific climate policies. These are intended to align with and support movement towards achieving the aims of Vision 2030 by the expressed date.

TABLE 2: EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE PRIORITIES WITHIN SUCCESSIVE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS

	SNRP 2003–2006	SNRP 2008–2011	PND1 2013–2015	Vision 2030	PND2 2017–2021
Strategic axes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote good governance Ensure strong and sustained growth through improving basic infrastructure and private sector growth Improve basic services (healthcare, education, HIV/AIDS) Improve living conditions of vulnerable groups Restore and safeguard ecosystems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote good governance Pursue economic diversification, robust growth, job creation Enhance rural economic growth (fisheries, livestock, agriculture) Boost infrastructure (transport, water and sanitation, energy, ICT, land use and building codes) Improve basic services (education, healthcare, social welfare and gender equality) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve governance Improve access to decent jobs to support economic growth Mobilise capital to combat inequalities Protect the environment and combat climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen national unity (focus on peacebuilding and social cohesion) Strengthen good governance and the rule of law (focus on public administration capacity-building, good economic governance and security) Develop a diversified and competitive economy Improve the quality of life of the population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce national unity Reinforce good governance and the rule of law Promote a diversified and competitive economy Improve the quality of life of the population
Climate considerations	<p>Climate variability and change are not considered in the first SNRP.</p>	<p>Weather extremes and climate variability are listed as having negative impacts on livestock, agriculture and forestry, but these impacts are not described.</p> <p>Climate change adaptation is not specifically mentioned. The policy only recommends that climate change ‘adjustments’ should be included in subsequent development plans</p>	<p>Climate change is mentioned in the plan, mainly in relation to Lake Chad and that it is one of the factors contributing to decline in fisheries production.</p> <p>Climate extremes are noted as triggering food insecurity.</p>	<p>Climate change is linked to quality of life through its impacts on natural resources, and subsequent effects on farming and fisheries in the Lake Chad region. However, these impacts are not explicitly defined.</p> <p>There is continuity in the strategic objectives around environmental protection and ‘combating climate change’ in PND1 and Vision 2030.</p>	<p>For the first time in Chad’s economic policy, climate extreme impacts on agriculture and transhumance are described, and climate trends in precipitation and temperature are noted.</p> <p>The plan indicates that such impacts were a factor in its inability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), outlined in the SNRPs.</p>

	SNRP 2003–2006	SNRP 2008–2011	PND1 2013–2015	Vision 2030	PND2 2017–2021
Mitigation/adaptation-relevant interventions	<p>Objectives listed under the axis of restoring and safeguarding ecosystems include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ updating national natural resource and environmental protection policies ▪ improving household energy access, including to solar photovoltaic (PV), to reduce deforestation, and involving communities in natural resource management. <p>The second objective fits with mitigation criteria.</p>	<p>Some natural resource and livelihood enhancement measures with potential adaptation co-benefits (though not specifically designed or described as such) highlight the need to protect pastoral systems through activities such as pastoral watering points, coupled with establishing consultation mechanisms around natural resource management.</p>	<p>The word ‘adaptation’ is used, but not defined per se. Instead, it is tied to: protecting Lake Chad through specific named projects; enhancing urban resilience with land use planning and basic infrastructure in major cities and towns; strengthening early warning systems and responses, particularly around food security; and expanding desertification and biodiversity protection efforts.</p>	<p>Adaptation and mitigation are used interchangeably, with a continued focus on improving access to mixed sources of energy (solar photovoltaics, wind, biomass and geothermal). Other climate-related priorities include environmental preservation around Lake Chad, climate-resilient farming practices, preserving biodiversity, and land use planning.</p> <p>A need for more proactive disaster risk management to prevent humanitarian crises is also explicitly mentioned.</p>	<p>This plan provides the impetus for stepping up climate change mitigation and adaptation action and finding financing to do so – as critical components of strengthening the quality of life of Chad’s citizens.</p> <p>There is continued recognition that degradation of natural resources – deforestation, desertification, soil and biodiversity loss – will also have to be addressed to improve the population’s well-being.</p>

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Strategies, plans or policies to address climate change

The formulation of climate policies pre-dates Vision 2030, beginning with the 2009 National Adaptation Programme of Action (Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques or PANA). The PANA marked the first iteration of Chad's climate policy. The 2017 National Strategy to Combat Climate Change (Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques or SNLCC) was its first climate policy to take a longer view. It was developed with Vision 2030 and provides the overarching framework for coordinating climate change action priorities (both mitigation and adaptation) up until 2030. Covering various socioeconomic sectors, it aligns with (mainly) Axes 2, 3 and 4 of Vision 2030. The 2021 nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and the 2022 National Adaptation Plan (NAP) represent the latest evolution in Chad's climate policy and build upon the SNLCC (see also Annex 3).

TABLE 3: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES IN CHAD AS OF MARCH 2024

Year	Policies
2001	Initial National Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Convention Cadre des Nations Unies Sur les Changements Climatiques Communication National Initiale)
2010	National Action Programme for Adaptation to Climate Change (Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques)
2012	Second National Communication on Climate Change (La Seconde Communication Nationale du Tchad sur les Changements Climatiques)
2015	First nationally determined contribution (NDC) (Contribution Prévue Déterminée au niveau National de la République du Tchad)
2015	National Action Plan for Capacity-Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response (Plan d'Action National de Renforcement des Capacités pour la Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes, la Préparation et la Réponse aux Urgences)
2017	National Strategy to Combat Climate Change (Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques)
2017	National Environmental Policy (Politique Nationale de l'Environnement)
2020	Third National Communication on Climate Change (La Troisième Communication Nationale du Tchad sur Les Changements Climatiques)
2021	Updated NDC (Mise à Jour de la Contribution Déterminée Nationale)
2022	National Adaptation Plan (Plan National d'Adaptation)
2024	Strategy on Gender and Climate Change (draft) Financial Plan for Chad's NDC (draft) Partnership Plan for the Implementation of Chad's NDC (draft)

Source: Authors' analysis.

The SNLCC articulates actions under five strategic goals (Government of Chad, 2017). These are: (1) strengthening resilience in (agro)pastoral systems and urban areas, while increasing local environmental and biodiversity protection; (2) an emissions reduction action set aligned with REDD+ and promoting renewable energy sources (described as hydropower, solar and wind) including for domestic use; (3) strengthening weather, climate and epidemiological surveillance and early warning capacities; (4) strengthening institutional and technical capacities around climate policy and action planning, implementation and learning; and (5) enhancing capacities for accessing and mobilising climate finance. The fifth goal recommends that Chad pursue accreditation of national institutions to VCFs, boost advocacy on climate change at national level, and improve access to climate finance.

Priority actions under each goal are descriptive and do not offer concrete targets or mandates for fulfilling them. Interviewees indicated that they are encouraged by the SNLCC and find it progressive in Chad's context, although they said that they have yet to see evidence of implementation. The strategy specifies the need for revision every five years. It is understood it is currently being updated.

The elaboration of mitigation and adaptation actions, in accordance with the five strategic goals of the SNLCC, was done through the country's 2021 updated NDC and first NAP of 2022. The two climate policies were co-developed to link the NAP process to the updating of NDCs, as encouraged under the UNFCCC (Hammil and Price-Kelly, n.d.). Chad's adaptation priorities under its 2021 NDC signal to the international community its high-level adaptation needs for dealing with climate change impacts. Whereas the NAP provides a basis for a national adaptation process and objectives for operationalising the vision articulated in the NDC. The co-development of the two climate policies could also indicate that Chad intends to link its NAP process (updating of the NAP and adaptation priorities) with updating future NDCs (NDC Partnership, 2022).

The 2021 NDC adaptation priorities are high-level. They make no reference to the detailed adaptation measures or quantitative targets just described. However, the NDC notes that the NAP process will prioritise improved data collection, and a stronger evidence base is essential for the development of future NAPs and other development planning. It also briefly notes that adaptation measures will deliver co-benefits of reduction or capturing of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but provides no further elaboration.

The 2022 NAP groups 50 broad, medium-range adaptation measures under eight priority sectors for the policy timeframe up to 2030 and aligns with the high-level adaptation priorities outlined in the updated NDC (see Table 4). The adaptation measures were developed following the process outlined in the LDC Expert Group (2012) 'Technical Guidance on NAPs' (LEG, 2012). This describes trends in climate hazards and seasonal shifts, gives climate change projections, takes stock of existing factors of vulnerability and climate impacts and identifies near-term needs to reduce the types of impacts already being experienced. Adaptation measures also align with the action areas identified under the pillars of PND2 and the high-level axes of Vision 2030.

TABLE 4: OVERVIEW OF ADAPTATION MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE 2021 NDC AND 2022 NAP

Sector	Adaptation measures
Agriculture and livestock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promotion of improved crop varieties ▪ Agroforestry ▪ Sector-based approach to agro-pastoral and organic farming sectors ▪ Water management for irrigated crops ▪ Improvement of the adapted animal breeds ▪ Diversification of water and soil conservation techniques
Environment and forests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promoting and developing non-timber forest products (NTFPs) ▪ Showcasing indigenous knowledge and know-how ▪ Establishment and/or effective management of community forests ▪ Protection and conservation of biodiversity and protected areas
Water and sanitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Construction of modern wells and boreholes ▪ Construction of adapted ponds and dams ▪ Improving knowledge of surface and groundwater resources ▪ Promotion of basic sanitation measures (e.g. community-led total sanitation)
Renewable energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Popularisation of improved stoves ▪ Promoting solar energy ▪ Popularisation of butane gas
Fisheries and aquaculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Stocking dams and retention basins with fish ▪ Use of appropriate adapted fishing gear and equipment
Gender and social protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promoting green entrepreneurship among women and young people ▪ Facilitating access to land for women and young people ▪ Combating negative social norms ▪ Development of social safety nets
Risk management, infrastructure and land use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Raising community awareness of climate risk prevention and management ▪ Implementation of national and local Climate Risk and Disaster Management Plans ▪ Promotion of instruments such as zoning, building codes and redevelopment
Education and communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promotion of environmental clubs in schools and universities ▪ Finalisation and implementation of the NAP communication strategy ▪ Integration of adaptation into the education curriculum and teaching modules

Source: Government of Chad (2021); Government of Chad (2022)..

In terms of integrating mitigation within national socioeconomic development planning, the NDC targets a reduction of GHG emissions by 19.3% by 2030, using the year 2018 as the baseline (see Table 5). Of this target, a 0.5% GHG reduction is binding and committed to be achieved through domestic efforts. The additional 18.8% GHG reduction by 2030 is conditional on the international community providing finance, capacity-building assistance and technology transfer. GHG reduction in the conditional scenario is expected to come from interventions in the energy and land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sectors.

TABLE 5: GHG EMISSIONS REDUCTION SCENARIOS UNDER THE UPDATED NDC (kt CO₂eq)

Sector	Baseline scenario (2018 emissions)	Projected emission growth BAU 2030	Unconditional scenario	Conditional scenario
Energy	2,834	4,299	3,909	2,320
Agriculture	71,019	80,024	80,024	80,011
LULUCF	-641	-722	-722	-15,049
Waste	878	1,360	1,360	1,305
Total	74,090	84,960	84,571	68,588

Source: Government of Chad (2021).

The updated NDC provides an estimate of the financing required to implement the adaptation and mitigation measures: \$5 billion and \$6.7 billion until 2030, respectively. The financing requirements for mitigation are aligned with the unconditional and conditional GHG emissions reduction targets of the NDC (see Table 6). In line with the mitigation actions proposed in the NDC, the financing requirements for unconditional GHG emissions reduction are almost entirely for the energy sector. Financing requirements for conditional GHG emissions reduction are proposed for investments in forestry (51% of investments) and energy sectors (46% of investments).

TABLE 6: INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT MITIGATION MEASURES COVERED UNDER THE UPDATED NDC (\$ MILLION)

Sector	Investment requirement for unconditional measures	Investment requirement for conditional measures	Total
Energy	408.2	2,682.3	3,090.5
<i>Power generation</i>	296.9	1,616.6	1,910.5
<i>Electricity grid infrastructure</i>	111.2	956.9	1,068.1
<i>Energy efficiency</i>	0.1	111.8	111.9
Agriculture	–	2.5	2.5
Forests	–	3,556.2	3,556.2
Waste	6.6	44.4	51.0
Total	414.8	6,285.4	6,700.2

Source: Government of Chad (2021).

The Government of Chad is in the process of preparing a gender and climate strategy. A strategy was released in March 2024 (See Annex 3). It aims to mainstream gender into all national strategies to respond to climate change. Further, it is expected to: create a structure dedicated to gender within the national climate governance architecture; promote systematic collection of gender-disaggregated data on climate change; promote gender-specific monitoring and evaluation indicators within climate projects; and promote advocacy for gender-sensitive budgeting.

The draft strategy does not define gender although it notes that a definition is to be included in an annex to the strategy. The government intends to use the policy to support capacity-building of gender focal points, promote mainstreaming of gender into the NDC, and promote gender inclusion in access to finance.

The government is also preparing plans to support implementation of the NDC, with a draft financing Plan for Chad's nationally determined contribution (Plan de Financement de la Contribution Déterminée au Niveau National du Tchad) and partnership plan for the implementation of the NDC (Plan de Partenariat pour la Mis en Oeuvre de la CDN) (currently under discussion). Both are critical and complementary plans for moving forward with mobilising the finance to implement actions and coordinating NDC objectives and actions.

The proposed NDC financing plan covers the period 2024–2027, even though the NDC runs until 2030. Its stated objectives are to: (1) quantify the financing requirements of NDC actions; (2) build an inventory of potential sources of climate finance; (3) develop a targeted financing strategy based on suitable financing instruments for each NDC measure; and (4) design an engagement plan to mobilise resources from technical and financial partners. It explores sources of finance available to Chad to finance NDC actions, thus going beyond VCFs, multilateral development banks and bilateral donors.

The proposed financing plan notes that broadening the tax base, rationalising public spending, and implementing an ambitious carbon tax could generate more than 1.4 billion FCFA in annual revenues for adaptation measures. It proposes a combination of tax incentives and subsidies as well as the use of public–private partnership models to facilitate private sector participation in climate projects. It considers the role of national banks, microfinance institutions and diaspora. Further, it looks at opportunities arising from financial instruments, vehicles such as insurance products targeting climate risks, green bonds and climate bonds, as well as a sovereign fund.

Also mooted is the idea of a pilot green bond by an institution such as the Development Bank of Central African States, targeting 50 to 100 billion FCFA through bond issuance for the financing of one or two large-scale projects. With regards to a sovereign fund, one modelled on the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Senegal for Strategic Investments (i.e. FONSI or Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques S.A.) is suggested. This could be capitalised through national public resources and grants or concessional loans from international and even the diaspora. It suggests that such a fund could take stakes in companies operating in strategic low-carbon and resilient sectors in the country. While it does not examine the feasibility of these instruments and vehicles or examine the enabling environment for public–private partnerships, it highlights the need for political will and enabling regulatory frameworks in the case of options such as microfinance. Targeting \$15–20 million from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is also suggested but this is not reconciled with the fact that the allocation for Chad during the eighth GEF replenishment cycle (GEF-8) (July 2022–2026) is only \$11.4 million; of this, \$6.75 million has already been utilised.

The plan goes on to propose an action plan (see Table 7) **to mobilise climate finance in line with the challenges faced by Chad and the feasibility of the financing options.** For example, uncertainties around Chad's ability to undertake sovereign green bonds, blended finance involving private capital, and a sovereign fund dedicated to climate change, are noted. A key shortcoming of the plan is that it only translates the priorities of the NDC into targeted results, indicators and broad needs. The financing requirements of mitigation and adaptation actions are not quantified, and so neither are clear investment needs for each action or preparing an actionable project pipeline that provides clear signalling for investment partners. Specifically, the financing requirements for adaptation actions are still not properly quantified.

TABLE 7: STRATEGY TO MOBILISE FINANCE IN THE DRAFT FINANCING PLAN FOR THE NDC

Axis of intervention	Key action	Responsibility*	Period	Monitoring indicator
Mobilisation of national resources	Introduction of a progressive carbon tax	Finance, environment	2024–2026	Rate of carbon tax, receipts generated
	Broadening the tax base and strengthening controls	Finance and fiscal services	2024–2027	Tax rate, additional revenue
	Mass audit of public salaries	Finance and civil service	2024	Savings identified
	Tax incentives for green private investment	Finance, private sector	2025	Amount of Investment attracted
	Pilot green bond issue 50–100 billion FCFA	Ministry of Finance, La Banque de Développement des États de l'Afrique Centrale (BDEAC)	2026	Volume of bonds placed
Capacity reinforcement	Training of project managements for the GCF, GEF and Adaptation Fund (AF)	Climate, financial, environment, and technical partners	2024–2025	Number of certified trainees
	Operationalisation of NDA to the GCF	Prime Minister	2024	Efficiency of NDA
	Designation and support of at least two national entities for accreditation to the GCF	NDA to GCF, designated entities	2024–2026	Number of accredited entities
	Creation of an interministerial climate task force	Prime Minister	2024	Task force operational
Financing projects	Prioritisation of NDC projects by sector	Task force, stakeholders	2024–2025	Hierarchical list of projects
	Mobilisation of national public/private co-financing	Task force, finance, private sector	2025–2027	Amount secured
	Design and submission of projects to funding agencies	Task force, funding agencies	2025–2030	Number of successful submissions


Axis of intervention	Key action	Responsibility*	Period	Monitoring indicator
Dialogue and advocacy	Define commitment strategies for each funding agency	Task force, diplomacy	2025–2025	Strategies established
	Regular consultations with funding agencies	Task force, funding agencies	2025–2030	Frequency of meetings
	Representation of Chad in international climate bodies	Diplomats, negotiators	Ongoing	Influential presence
Institutional reforms	Climate institutional capacity audit	International Consultants	2024	Audit report
	Roadmap for reforming climate ministries	Office of the Prime minister	2025	Roadmap approved
	Implementing institutional reform	All ministers	2025–2028	New operational structures

* The draft financing plan is vague in terms of entities holding responsibilities for specific actions. It also mixes sectors and entities in some cases.

Source: Government of Chad (2024b).

The draft partnership plan sets an overall objective of designing a consolidated portfolio of ongoing and planned priority climate initiatives and projects, but falls short of these objectives. It identifies partners for mitigation and adaptation priorities without explaining how they were found to be most suitable for these priorities. Moreover, the plan does not cover all possible partners. For example, there is no mention of bilateral donors other than the European Union (EU). It also does not base partner identification in the technical assistance and project financing needs of the NDC. It is also unclear if the availability of partners identified under this plan, their planning, funding cycles and/or priorities have been considered in their selection. Moreover, instead of putting together a viable partnership plan, the plan repeats the roadmap for NDC implementation, as well as the provisions of the NDC financing plan that is also under discussion. Once finalised, the plan is intended to be a tool for steering, coordinating and monitoring climate action at the national level.

FIGURE 1: PARTNERS FOR NDC IMPLEMENTATION AS PER THE NDC PARTNERSHIP PLAN UNDER DISCUSSION (PLAN DE PARTENARIAT POUR LA MIS EN OEUVRE DE LA CDN DU TCHAD)



Note: the plan refers to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (Banque Interaméricaine de Développement – BID) without providing an explanation as to why the IADB, which has member countries in Latin America, would want to fund Chad.

Source: Government of Chad (2024c).

Quality of strategies, plans or policies

Mainstreaming of more concrete mitigation and adaptation measures within sectoral development plans and the PND2 is weak, in part because these policies were largely crafted before or in parallel to the SNLCC process, and before the NDC and NAP. The 2016 National Rural Investment Plan (Plan National D'investissement Du Secteur Rural or PNISR) and the 2017 National Policy on Land Planning, Urban Development and Housing (Politique Nationale de l'Amenagement du Territoire, de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat) mention the need for climate adaptation but only superficially. The former highlights the need to both limit environmental degradation exacerbated by climate change, as well as reduce conflict risks triggered by such degradation. But it does not indicate concrete measures. The latter proposes addressing climate change through better urban land use planning, but does not go any further. The 2018 National Strategy for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Schools (La Stratégie Nationale de l'eau, l'assainissement et l'Hygiène à l'école) refers to climate change only in the context of disaster resilience, while in the National Nutrition and Food Policy Plan 2015–2025, climate change does not feature at all.

Such climate policies offer a foundation for integrating mitigation and adaptation action into future national and sectoral development policies. However, there has been little evolution in the evidence base around climate risks, or monitoring or reporting. This would be on the effectiveness of actions taken to date that were designated as environmental protection, mitigation, adaptation or disaster risk management under the prior national development policies. Multiple policies mention the need for establishing monitoring systems and a database, intrinsic to tracking progress on 'adaptation' programmes, such as in the Lake Chad region, that were first mentioned in PND1 (IMF, 2015).¹ More worrying, mitigation and adaptation ambitions since the initial priorities identified in the 2009 PANA or 2015 NDC, and the current NDC and NAP, have not evolved to any significant degree, and remain difficult to finance because they lack concreteness.

Adaptation measures proposed in the NAP are not ambitious enough to reduce the country's systems-level vulnerabilities to climate change. Much of Chad's high vulnerability is driven by systemic underdevelopment in basic services, infrastructure and economic opportunities. This contributes to knock-on human-caused environmental degradation such as deforestation for domestic energy use due to lack of electricity. These factors are recognised in the NAP. Yet, no consideration is given to reducing systems-level vulnerabilities to climate change by using climate-resilient development for systems' adaptation, and linking subnational to national projects with more local, and community-based adaptation projects. The proposed NAP adaptation measures represent localised, incremental adaptation. In short, the broad measures in the NAP may not be ambitious enough to support the objectives in the axes of Vision 2030.

Some of the proposed adaptation measures may have potential maladaptive consequences beyond 2030. The NAP does not present a climate risk assessment containing the types of climate risks that the country might face due to climate change beyond 2030. These would be particularly relevant in infrastructure (e.g. improved borewells or constructing ponds, land use and natural resource management or economic diversification). The NAP does however note this weakness and urgently recommends conducting baseline risk assessments, ensuring

¹ An IMF (2015) advisory note on PND1 says, 'no measurable progress under the environment and climate change pillar as the strategic and intermediate indicators...were not reported...there is no information on the implementation of concrete activities under this pillar despite a high disbursement rate of allocated resources'.

these are aligned with national development priorities. Some longer-term climate risks and gaps in Chad's policies and implementation are detailed in the companion 'Chad Climate Risk Assessment Report'.

The process by which NAP adaptation measures were proposed is also not clear. The NAP (and the GEF proposal document for funding Chad's first NAP²) indicates a consultative process was used to develop broad adaptation measures (Government of Chad and UNDP, 2018). But information about the rationale for how those measures were selected or tied to specific vulnerabilities is not given. The plan also presents the measures as having been scored according to overall effectiveness, feasibility, acceptability and cost/benefit,³ but without explaining the scoring metrics.

Additionally, no information on the process for advancing the implementation of the NAP is given. The NAP itself notes the development of a coordination mechanism as an urgent priority accompanied with ongoing studies. It is not explained if an implementation roadmap is being designed and how the partners listed in the NDC partnership plan under its adaptation component might contribute to a NAP coordination mechanism or deliver on NAP adaptation measures. It is not clear if there will be a separate, more detailed NAP-specific financing plan to augment high-level adaptation financing requests made under the NDC. There is no explanation of a process for linking the broad, descriptive adaptation measures of the NAP with the even higher-level measures in the NDC.

There are gaps in the financing requirements defined in the 2021 NDC. Financing needs are skewed towards mitigation, which accounts for 57% of total needs. A significant amount of NDC funding is dedicated to renewable energies, which aligns with Vision 2030. This is intended to increase the overall proportion of the population with access to electricity to 30% in comparison with the estimated 6% in 2017. It is hoped that energy access will reduce deforestation, thereby providing additional benefits to adaptation. Nevertheless, the higher allocation of funding to mitigation in comparison to adaptation stands out, given the country's high levels of vulnerability to climate change.

Moreover, the NDC does little to expand on the intended adaptation co-benefits of mitigation measures. The financing requirements for mitigation measures in the energy sector also estimate \$111.2 million towards the electricity grid infrastructure in the unconditional scenario, even though no mitigation measures are proposed for the improvement or expansion of the electricity grid.

The financing needs for adaptation are not based on the costing of adaptation options listed in the NDC. Instead, they are calculated as a share of annual GDP. There is no mention of how the finance sought for the implementation of the adaptation component will be allocated across various adaptation measures. Nor does the NDC specify if the adaptation component depends entirely on international financing or if some measures will be delivered with domestic financing.

2 The GEF proposal notes a number of 'preferred solution aims' such as establishing an 'effective integrated information system (including climate and socioeconomic databases)...by project end', but it is difficult to track progress towards these aims, particularly when examining the lack of concrete targets or project documentation.

3 The NAP mentions that the proposed, broad adaptation measures were developed in consultation with stakeholders, including experts who scored them. No information is provided in the NAP about the consultation process, who was consulted, or the evidence base used to decide scoring metrics presented to the experts.

3.1.2 Enabling governance architecture

READINESS GAPS

- Despite the existence of several institutional coordination mechanisms within the government, strategic coordination across ministries to design policies and investments on climate change remains weak.
- Institutional capacities for cross-sectoral coordination are not yet systematic or efficient, leading to blind spots in coordination of responses to climate change.
- Overlapping mandates creates ambiguity on responsibilities for actively mobilising finance, and contributes to institutional rivalry about which institution would be entitled to make decisions.

Institutional mechanisms to set national priorities on climate change

Executive leadership is provided by the Office of the Prime Minister which is responsible for policy coordination on climate change issues and political mobilisation at the highest level.

At the strategic level, the Directorate of Climate Change (Direction de lutte contre les changements climatiques or DLCCC) is responsible for the development and implementation of strategies, action plans and programmes related to climate change.

It sits within the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in the Ministry of Environment, Fisheries and Sustainable Development (MoEFSD). It is also responsible for providing the governance architecture for enabling implementation, including for climate finance coordination. However, it is unable to perform this function effectively due to weak functional and technical capacities owing to a shortage of human and financial resources.

The responsibilities for resource mobilisation are split between the DLCCC and the Directorate of Resource Mobilisation within the Ministry of the Economy, Development Planning and International Cooperation. This ministry is responsible for mobilising partnerships for development programmes more broadly, including climate-relevant projects, and for managing contracts on projects. As such, all international agencies are obliged to inform the ministry of their projects. The endorsement of the ministry is also necessary for mobilising funds from development partners.

At the technical level, the government has created a National Commission on Climate Change.

The commission is expected to serve as a scientific and technical committee. It will support the implementation of climate policies and strategies; the development of climate mitigation and adaptation projects, and mobilisation of climate finance. The DLCCC it is understood intends to announce the establishment of the new commission with a validation workshop. Execution and implementation are entrusted to line ministries, which bear the responsibility for policies and programmes within their specific areas of expertise and jurisdiction.

The governance architecture however remains weak. This is mainly because of the institutional instability in the MoE stemming from frequent changes in the structure and mandate of the larger ministry within which it is located. The MoEFSD evolved from the Ministry of Environment and Fisheries to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Fisheries to the MoEFSD. These changes have led to the political rotation of ministers, new teams, and different priorities. As a result, there has been loss of institutional memory and a lack of

knowledge on climate change by individuals in charge of decision-making. Furthermore, a culture of nepotism has meant those with knowledge of climate change and relevant skills have been marginalised – leading to gaps in both direction and priorities on climate change.

Institutional mechanisms to coordinate responses to climate change

A number of institutional mechanisms exist with the objective of coordinating and responding to climate change and climate finance opportunities. At the strategic level, the National Committee on Climate Change (Comité National sur les Changements Climatique or CNCC), responsible for monitoring the implementation of the commitments to UNFCCC, and the National Technical Committee on Climate Change (COTNACC), are key. These platforms are designed to provide the opportunity for cross-government engagement on the agenda. Furthermore, the government has constituted a permanent committee on COP (see Annex 5) to support Chad’s preparation and participation for it, including in high-level engagements on resource mobilisation. This builds on past annual ad hoc committees set up to enable preparations for participation in past COPs.

The existence of multiple institutional mechanisms has not translated into improved coordination for mobilisation of climate finance. Most mechanisms exist on paper but are not sufficiently implemented, mainly because of the institutional instability in the MoE, noted earlier. Interviews for this study suggest that committees are non-functional and that stakeholders outside the government are not always even aware of these committees. A review of the mandates of these committees also indicates that they don’t include strategic coordination and response to climate change and climate finance opportunities in any comprehensive manner. The mandate of the recently created National Commission on Climate Change remains unclear, nor is it yet known how this will differ from that of the National Committee on Climate Change.

Lack of resources constrains the frequency with which many committees able to meet. For example, the NDA for the GCF, set up in 2018, was not operationalised until 2023. More importantly, coordination tends to centre around the NDA to the GCF and rarely on climate finance per se. Nor on opportunities for accessing finance from other VCFs, the AFe in particular, and multilateral development banks such as the African Development Bank (AfDB). As such, existing coordination mechanisms do not appear to facilitate coordination across ministries to develop policies and investments that tackle bottlenecks and other challenges in a useful way nor to mobilise climate finance beyond the GCF.

Even when there is coordination at the national level, institutional barriers persist. Interviews indicate that there is institutional rivalry between ministries, which may prevent cross-ministerial collaboration. An example is the overlapping responsibilities for mobilisation of finance of the MoE and the Ministry of Planning (MoP).

There are also suggestions that the MoE centralises the climate change and climate finance agenda within its fold and that line ministries are being excluded from discussions. Line ministries are often unaware of climate finance proposals and applications proposed for the VCFs. Interviews also indicate that some, such as the Ministry of Livestock, don’t necessarily see climate change as a key issue. As a result, they are less inclined to collaborate outside formal institutional mechanisms (and less inclined to mainstream considerations of climate change when updating sectoral policies).

Lack of engagement and coordination with the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is a major barrier. Stakeholders noted that although the MoF is included in several projects as well as in steering committees, it does not actively engage. In practice, the MoF is rarely involved in the design, establishment and contracting procedures for climate-related projects. It is brought in by the MoEFSD (and institutional structures responsible for climate finance elements) only when questions of taxation or tax exemptions specifically arise.

Stakeholders noted that this may be due to institutional rivalry driven by the MoEFSD on the climate finance agenda. Stakeholders noted that the MoF has very good capacity and, as controller of the Treasury, can catalyse the implementation of policy agendas as well as projects. The MoF also advises the Prime Minister and can therefore champion coordination and implementation of investments. But it is rarely involved in the climate policy agenda.

Systems for inclusive stakeholder engagement

Institutional mechanisms established by the government in Chad enable inclusive stakeholder engagement. NGOs, in particular women and youth groups, associations from the private sector as well as research institutions and universities, are members of these groups. For example, the CNCC includes representatives of the L'Association des Femmes peuls Autochtones du Tchad (AFPAT), Conseil National de Concertation des producteurs ruraux du Tchad and L'Association pour la protection et la Conservation de la Faune et de la Flore. The Permanent Committee on COP has provision for two members to be drawn from NGOs working on rural development – specifically, agriculture, livestock or environment – or energy. The government has also created a national platform for the NDC, intended to engage all stakeholders in relevant processes.

In practice, the ability for stakeholder engagement to be inclusive remains dependent on the functioning of these institutional mechanisms. For example, the NDC platform has remained dormant following the revision of the NDC. It is not being used to actively engage stakeholders around the implementation. A change in NDC focal points could be a reason for the platform not being active. Interviewees however noted that thematic workshops are organised from time to time to provide a framework for dialogue and consultation with stakeholders.



View of a camel caravan.
Image by Torsten Pursche / shutterstock.

3.1.3 Sufficient, quality information and data for planning

READINESS GAPS

- Lack of adequate and reliable climate observation data hinders the accurate assessment of climate change impacts, project development, proposals and the effectiveness of adaptation measures.
- Duplication in data collection persists with data often not being shared between agencies.

Availability of sufficient and quality data

Datasets on climate vulnerabilities and risks are obsolete. Socioenvironmental indicators, such as land use, have not been updated since the 1960s. As noted in the NAP and some GEF documents, indicators of progress on previously implemented social, environmental or resilience programmes are missing. Datasets are also patchy in terms of geospatial coverage. The draft financing plan for the NDC also notes a lack of both quantitative and qualitative data available in a consolidated manner in single databases. It specifically notes that comprehensive data on the climate finance received by Chad so far is unavailable and the absence of an inventory of projects for which finance has been received.

Quality climate observation data is limited by the coverage and outdated state of weather stations as well as the limited capacity of the Meteorological Agency (Agence Nationale de la Météorologie or ANAM), the Water Resources Directorate (Direction des Ressources en Eau or DRE) (see Box 1) and hydrological network. Development partners such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) previously supported ANAM. But in the absence of government resources for ANAM and the Direction des Ressources en eau (DRE), the efforts of these agencies have been insufficient to meet the country's needs.

Despite external support, ANAM continues to be plagued by lack of maintenance and functional meteorological equipment, non-availability of spare parts, lack of ICT infrastructure, and shortage of technical capacity. Insufficient training of staff further hampers its ability to extract and effectively utilise data effectively. Stakeholders noted the inability of ANAM to retain technical skills, pointing out that technical experts eventually go to work at the AGRHYMET centre in Niger. It is also possible that hydroclimatological data remains scattered across different ministries and/or resides with individuals within ministries. Stakeholders observed that there are no institutional structures to comprehensively manage data.

Limitations of quantitative and localised data affect the formulation of effective policy decisions. This makes it difficult to understand the vulnerabilities and risks of specific groups of the population and entirely sidesteps the needs of the 2.2 million refugees in the country. Weak data collection also prevents the evaluation of previous policies and therefore the creation of a coherent suite of policy revisions. Moreover, proposals, especially those to VCFs, need to be underpinned by strong climate rationale. Specifically, they need to be grounded in climate projections and climate risk assessment to allow for evidence-based decision making, distinguish between historical data and projections, and translate data into likely risks in the absence of climate change adaptation. The absence of sufficient and quality data therefore poses a major constraint for project preparation.

BOX 1: AGENCE NATIONALE DE LA MÉTÉOROLOGIE – ANAM (THE METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY)

- Meteorological services are provided by ANAM and hydrological services by the DRE. ANAM is under the Ministry of Civil Aviation and National Meteorology (Ministère de l'Aviation civile et de la Météorologie nationale or MACN). Meanwhile, DRE is under the Ministry of Water.
- MACN is responsible for the overall system of establishing and operating the integrated climate information system, including the climate and socioeconomic database; and for negotiating ANAM's budget with the MoF. However, it is understood that in practice, ANAM does not receive direct budget allocation from the government.
- In 2021, ANAM was staffed with 28 people (11 engineers, 6 technicians, 5 observers and 6 administrative agents) paid by the government (Alliance for Hydromet Development and World Meteorological Organization, 2021). Overall, only two staff are trained meteorologists, and staff do not have adequate training in scientific, technical and ICT disciplines (ibid.). Interviews indicate that staff capacity has reduced recently.
- ANAM has a total of 90 observing stations, of which 70 (77%) are automatic but not all functional, and 20 are staffed observing sites (23%) (ibid.). The latter are in remote areas and interviews indicate that they are not adequately staffed. Stakeholders noted that in general, the observing stations don't generate adequate or quality data.
- ANAM has access to information (numerical weather prediction outputs and satellite information) from regional and global centres to produce forecasts. However, it doesn't have the capability to run and maintain a model of its own given that there are only two forecasters and lack of operational forecasting infrastructure (ibid.).

Source: Authors' analysis.

Given persistent data challenges, agencies and initiatives tend to gather data for their own use, making data one of the most fragmented sectors. Various actors are typically keen to protect their turf and often unwilling to partner with others for data collection, meaning duplication of effort persists. One example that came to light during the study is that of data collection on transhumance movements.

The Ministry of Livestock has a department responsible for data collection on transhumance movements but is unwilling to share data. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) also gathers data on this to better understand the dynamics of transhumance movements and their impact.⁴ IOM works with the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques (INSEED) as data collection agent. The Ministry of Livestock is understood to be less enthusiastic about IOM continuing in this role since the ministry holds the mandate of data collection on transhumance movement.

⁴ IOM, through its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), has set up the Transhumance Tracking Tool (TTT) with the network of the confederation of professional organisations of pastoralists and actors in the livestock sector in Chad (COPAFIB) and its branches of relay organisations for follow-up in the provinces of intervention.

IOM has attempted to resolve this overlap and duplication of activity by approaching the Ministry of Livestock and inviting INSEED to partner with its data collection unit.

Data is also not readily shared between the government and other organisations including development partners and international non-government organisations (I-NGOs) to support national planning or preparation of projects. More importantly, although the government is concerned about interactions between migration, climate change and food insecurity, it has not prioritised gathering quantitative or qualitative data to support planning to this end.⁵

3.2 Access

3.2.1 Institutional capacity and experience to access international climate finance

READINESS GAPS

- The central coordinating entities for climate finance lack the capacity and skills to identify and blend finance from different sources and instruments, and allocate this to priority sectors, themes and projects.
- There is no coherent climate finance strategy, with different structures within the government likely working independently to mobilise finance.
- Institutional rivalry of focal points is limiting coordination on funding priorities and proposals for strategically accessing VCFs.
- The capacity of the NDAs to effectively interface between the VCFs and Chad and conduct activities required by VCFs from NDAs remains weak.
- Frequent changes in NDAs have led to loss of institutional memory on requirements of key donors and VCFs.
- Institutions lack the technical capacity to design a regular pipeline of bankable projects that meet the eligibility criteria of key donors and VCFs.
- In general, political seriousness, governance shortcomings in state institutions, and capacity constraints in meeting international fiduciary standards and environmental and social standards pose barriers for the accreditation of national entities.

⁵ Data to this end is being gathered by IOM Chad and the Food Security Cluster through the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) flow monitoring survey (FMS), the CILSS Harmonized Framework supported by the Food Security Cluster, the IOM Return Intention Survey, and pilot studies.

Institutional management of climate finance

The Government of Chad has put clear structures in place to coordinate access to climate finance. The DLCCC has a Climate Finance Resource Mobilisation Department (le Service de la Mobilisation des Ressources Financières Climatiques or SMRFC) with the mandate to mobilise national and international financial resources for climate-relevant actions, strengthen the capacities of national actors to mobilise climate finance, and ensure synergy between the National Designated Authorities (NDAs) to different VCFs, accredited entities and other relevant stakeholders. The SMRFC is also required to support the public, private, NGO, civil society organisation (CSO) and community-based organisation (CBO) sectors in this. Together with the MoP, DLCCC has to establish priority areas for funding.

The approach to mobilising finance as well as coordination on climate finance is nevertheless directed largely towards the VCFs and overwhelmingly towards the GCF.

Other VCFs and other sources of finance are not sufficiently considered. The focus on the GCF is also reflected in the institutional structures created by the government in support of the NDA to the GCF. (See the subsection below on Liaison with vertical climate funds.) Stakeholders indicate that limited analysis has been undertaken to identify climate finance sources beyond VCFs. It is worth noting here that the financing plan being prepared for the NDC does not dive into such analysis. However, given that the plan has been drafted only recently, it is possible that many stakeholders will not be aware of it.

According to the NDC, almost 94% of the investment required to implement NDC mitigation measures is expected to come from international sources. However, a strategic assessment of how this will be achieved has not yet been done. Although the NDC does not specify if the adaptation component depends entirely on international financing, or if some measures will be delivered using domestic financing, the majority of adaptation investment is expected to also require international funding. This is not clarified in the draft financing plan for the NDC, nor does the plan explain how the \$5 billion sought for the implementation of the adaptation component will be allocated across different adaptation measures.

Institutional mobilisation of climate finance is limited by the absence of a coherent climate finance strategy, capacity constraints and knowledge gaps (see also Box 7). Some stakeholders observed that the DLCCC has limited understanding of the evolving climate financing architecture and other sources of climate finance. As such, access to finance is constrained by the DLCCC's ability to only identify the resource flows required for priority activities and match needs with sources of finance. Another gap, mentioned earlier, is the limited engagement of the MoF. The MoF has both the skills and knowledge to find innovative solutions for climate finance. Stakeholders highlighted that the MoF's engagement with the IMF means it has a good understanding of innovative financing instruments such as debt swaps that could be useful in Chad.

Different structures within the government may be working independently to mobilise finance. Ideally, once funding priorities have been established based on the NDC and NAP project pipeline, depending on the sector/theme, a specific institutional structure (e.g. NDA for GCF, NDA for AF, GEF focal point, or DLCCC) should be given the responsibility to engage and coordinate climate finance access. The country programmes for the individual VCFs should be derived from this. However, this does not appear to be the case.

The NDA to the GCF has commissioned a private sector landscape analysis for Chad that could inform the NDA's private sector mobilisation and engagement strategy. Its objective is to give some visibility to private sector actors that could contribute to climate-relevant initiatives and the investment opportunities for private sector operators in the country. The extent to which the GEF focal point and the NDA to the AF are engaged in this study is unclear; the latter would be critical to a strategy that makes private sector investment in adaptation projects financially viable.

Moreover, the NDA to the GCF is beginning to focus on how to bring the private sector on board. While the benefits of these initiatives is unquestionable, they should be done at the wider institutional level to map NDC and NAP sectors/themes that can involve private sector operators, and include a project pipeline. Further, the GCF NDA's workplan features the internalisation of strategic documents such as the NDP, NDC and NAP for donor resource mobilisation. Once again, this should be done at a strategic level to avoid duplication and overlap. It is also understood that ministries prefer to work on individual projects as opposed to building cross-ministerial consortiums.

The government has not established structures or platforms to coordinate climate finance with donors. This risks overlap, duplication, and ineffectiveness of the myriad initiatives and support provided by different development partners. Stakeholder interviews indicate that the ACF group championed by the FCDO is the only platform that centres on climate finance and brings together government and development partners on this theme. However, since it is not government-owned and -led, it is not able to coordinate different government structures to access finance in any meaningful way.

The absence of a climate finance coordination platform has not however prevented ministries and different climate finance mobilisation structures within the MoEFSD from engaging with development partners. For example, FAO indicated regular engagements – outside formal collaborative activities – with entities such as the NDA to the GCF, GEF focal point and technical directors of ministries (environment, water, agriculture and livestock). Other stakeholders also noted that they are invited by different structures and institutions within the government on an ad hoc basis to discuss issues relating to climate finance mobilisation. The Great Green Wall (GGW) projects in Chad already demonstrate the risk of overlap and duplication, with some stakeholders noting that it is not clear how GGW projects fit within the NDC, NAP and the broader institutional agenda and management of climate finance.

Liaison with vertical climate funds

The Government of Chad has established the NDA to the GCF and the AF as well as a focal point for GEF. The Head of the DLCCC serves as the focal point for GEF; the Director of Forests within the Directorate-General of Forest and Wildlife Services (Direction-Générale des Services des Ressources Forestières et Fauniques) serves as the NDA for the AF. Meanwhile, another person within the DLCCC acts as the NDA for the GCF (see Annex 5), and there is also an NDA for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) known as AND-MDP.

Coordination between focal points on funding priorities and proposals to strategically access VCFs is limited. Stakeholders indicate that institutional rivalry between the focal points, concerned about others encroaching on their mandate, has meant there is no consensus about which VCF and therefore which focal point is best placed to engage on a project. Moreover, while the structure for the NDA to the GCF is well established (see Box 2), those for the NDA to the AF and the GEF focal point are believed to be comparatively less well developed. It is worth noting here that although the NDA to the GCF was created in 2018 and its structure fully realised in 2018, the NDA only became fully operational in November 2023.⁶

Previous FCDO reports have underlined that focal points to the VCFs are not paid and there is no regular funding from the government for their activities. When funding is provided, it is not enough. In the absence of sustained government support, the NDAs have not been able to recruit technical staff. As such, the NDAs/focal points to the VCFs are not properly operational and lack core technical staff.

BOX 2: OVERVIEW OF CHAD'S NDA TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

The structure of the National Designated Authority (NDA) to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) covers a steering committee, a secretariat (the focal point for the GCF acts as the secretariat), and a technical committee for the evaluation and approval of projects to be submitted to the GCF (see Annex 5).

As with the other institutional structures created by the government, the technical committee for the evaluation and approval of projects to be submitted to the GCF is multisectoral and draws representatives from the private sector as well from a wide range of NGOs and CSOs, including Agence de Développement Économique et Social (ADES). The ADES is seeking direct access⁷ accreditation to the GCF to support the implementation of Chad's climate change programmes and strategies.

Institutions such as Fonds Spécial en faveur de l'Environnement (Special Fund for the Environment or FSE), Fonds National de l'Eau (National Water Fund or FNE) and Agence Nationale de la Grande Muraille Verte are also represented on this committee.

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

The capacity of the NDAs to effectively interface between the VCFs and Chad and conduct activities required by VCFs from NDAs remains weak. In general, focal points for VCFs need significant capacity-building to be able to thoroughly understand the functioning of VCFs and the requirements for effectively engaging with it, and then relay that knowledge to other relevant national stakeholders. Capacity gaps can be attributed largely to two factors: first, frequent changes in focal points or individuals in the NDA (see Box 3); and second, the low institutional technical capacity of NDAs.

⁶ As noted by the Chad's GCF focal point during interviews (See Annex 1, Abakar Mournou Interview).

⁷ Direct access means that national or subnational entities become accredited to VCFs to receive finance directly from VCFs without going through an intermediary such as a multilateral development bank or a multilateral organisation.

BOX 3: FREQUENT CHANGES IN THE NDA TO THE GCF AND LOSS OF INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND CAPACITY

Chad has previously benefited from NDA strengthening and country programming support from GCF through the Centre de Suivi Écologique (CSE) of Senegal between March 2017 and November 2018.

The Alliance Mondiale Contre Le Changement Climatique (AMCC+) of Chad also provided support to make the NDA to the GCF functional. This was allocated for capacity-strengthening of the NDA for: (1) compliance with the eligibility guidelines of the GCF, social aspects, gender and environmental safeguards in the selection of projects; (2) application of the guidelines and procedures for evaluating and selecting projects to be submitted to the GCF; and (3) development and implementation of a project evaluation and selection matrix.

Subsequent changes in the focal point for the GCF in April 2020 however highlighted the need for repeated capacity-building activities and impeded the functioning of the NDA. The country programme, developed and submitted to the GCF in 2019, was also not taken forward. Chad therefore requested a second readiness support package from the GCF, which was approved in 2020. Its objective is building the institutional capacity of the NDA to lead and coordinate GCF-related roles and responsibilities, and to speed up the process of facilitating the development of GCF-relevant projects and programmes.

Planned over two years, the second readiness support was intended to: strengthen the institutional technical capacities of the NDA to perform its role; operationalise the No-Objection Procedure (NOP); develop a strong pipeline of projects with GCF concept notes ready to be submitted; and mobilise the national private sector for an active engagement with the GCF and investments in the fields of mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Discussions with FNE, the delivery partner for this project, suggest that it is operating with delays and is currently in its last phase.

In the meantime, the GCF focal point/individual to the NDA has changed again. The most recent roadmap of NDA activities to the GCF indicates that the NDA again needs to build exposure to GCF protocols, procedures and investment criteria and develop an understanding of roles and responsibilities. For example, the roadmap of activities indicates the need to build technical and institutional capacity in respect of the GCF, the functioning and role of the NDA, and the appraisal of projects and preparation of bankable project proposals, according to investment criteria of the GCF, aligning these with national priorities.

Other areas of capacity-building indicated in this roadmap include fiduciary management, environmental and social management, and gender and social inclusion in GCF projects. Implementation of the NOP manual and update of the country programme are other priorities suggesting that the NOP has not been operationalised, even after the second readiness support.

BOX 3: CONTINUED

The frequent changes in the NDA to the GCF specifically has meant that knowledge and requirements of criteria and indicators used by the GCF in the development, assessment and approval of projects has not been transferred to line ministries and other national stakeholders. As a result, project proponents are unable to design projects that meet these criteria.

It is worth noting that the GCF approved another readiness support project for the NDA in January 2024 to strengthen the NDA's private sector engagement capacity (GCF, 2024). Delivered by the Institut de la Francophonie pour le Développement Durable, its specific objectives are to strengthen the capacity of the NDA to effectively engage with the private sector for climate change-related resource mobilisation, lay the foundations for the availability of qualified human resources in climate finance, and increase the availability of climate finance teaching resources.

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

Together, these factors have meant that benefits from past capacity-building and preparatory support accessed from VCFs have been lost, and there is a breakdown in discussions on concept notes and potential proposals. For example, the first phase of the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative (Alliance Mondiale Contre le Changement Climatique or AMCC+) provided training to the GCF NDA on the development of concept notes for the GCF. This supported a broad consultation of national and international stakeholders with the objective of formulating a multisector and multidonor project. This resulted in the definition of a project targeting the strengthening of resilience through the scaling of good practices for adaptation to climate change. The concept note then needed to be realised in a project through the identification of activities, budget and implementation actors. However, the change in focal points meant that the concept note was not taken forward.

Although the NDA to the GCF has commissioned a private sector landscape analysis for Chad, there are concerns that the NDA lacks adequate capacity to design and implement a strategic plan for engaging private sector actors. There are further concerns around the poor ownership by the NDA of GCF's private sector vision and policies and the effectiveness of the NDA's private stakeholder engagement practices.

Accreditation of national institutions to vertical climate funds

Chad does not have direct access to the GCF or AF i.e. no national institutions are currently accredited to these VCFs. Fonds National de l'Eau (National Water Fund or FNE) and ADES are seeking accreditation to the GCF while the Fonds Spécial en faveur de l'Environnement (Special Fund for the Environment or FSE) (see also Section 3.3.1 on Existence of national financial mechanisms) has been a candidate for accreditation to the AF.

FNE initiated the accreditation process to the GCF in 2018 and successfully completed the GCF's financial management capacity assessment with a score of 95%. This has allowed FNE to become a delivery partner for projects under the GCF in Chad. Besides the readiness support access by Chad from the GCF in 2020, FNE is the delivery partner for another such project. This aims to build the resilience of vulnerable communities and groups by advancing the adaptation planning process for priority climate sensitive sectors. Its objectives include the following:

- Establish an integrated information system, including a reliable and informative climate and socioeconomic data bank, to guide the process of mainstreaming adaptation into decision-making.
- Strengthen institutional capacities in key sectors and bioclimatic zones to facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation into planning and budgeting.
- Sensitise and train the private sector, women, youth, indigenous peoples and civil society in mainstreaming climate change adaptation into their planning.

Although advanced in the process of seeking accreditation, FNE faces constraints to completing the accreditation process. Discussions with FNE suggest gaps in staff capacity. FNE does however have specialists in environmental issues, civil engineering, geophysics, lawyers, geologists and financiers, as well as access to specialised software, for example geolocation and georeferencing tools.

As with FSE, FNE has limited proven experience in terms of application of environmental and social safeguards (ESSs) and gender policies to field projects, and project audits, both of which FNE needs to demonstrate to be accredited. Further, it needs to show it has experience of delivering projects that target climate risks or mainstream climate change. Governance is another key challenge. FNE notes that weak institutional, organisational and operational governance is a critical constraint to accreditation (Djimasngar et al., 2024).

Stakeholders believe that the Agence de Développement Économique et Social (ADES) is on track to secure accreditation with the GCF. Headquartered in Chad, ADES operates in various countries in the subregion. It has expertise in developing and implementing programmes at the intersection of development and climate change with a particular focus on population displacement in Chad. ADES is currently accessing readiness support from the GCF to build its institutional capacity to become a Direct Access Entity of the GCF.

ADES is understood to have validated the necessary ESSs and gender policies and fiduciary standards. Its expertise and experience of working in other countries to mobilise resources for projects is understood to be an advantage. Some stakeholders indicated that it is likely that ADES will secure accreditation by the end of 2024. In the absence of either direct discussions with the organisation or evidence, it has not been possible to verify this. It is however worth noting that not all stakeholders are aware that ADES is seeking accreditation to the GCF, e.g. UNHCR, which is collaborating with it on reforestation projects, said that it was unaware of this and has as a result not expanded discussions with ADES beyond current projects.

Unlike FNE and ADES, FSE has made little progress towards accreditation. In 2015, CSE provided readiness technical assistance to FSE which involved sharing experience on the AF accreditation process. According to the FSE, this allowed FSE to review its management system, establish internal mechanisms that are key for accreditation, review and develop manuals for administrative and financial procedures as well as for monitoring and evaluation, and develop an environmental and social policy. FSE also received support from the AMCC+ during 2016 and 2017 for accreditation to the AF. Discussions with the AMCC+ indicate that the AF was appreciative of the response and documentation provided by FSE in January 2018 but FSE has not yet met the AF's full requirements, 70%–80% of which have been met, according to the AMCC+. The requirements FSE is unable to meet relate to experience of managing external financing agreements. This is mainly because FSE has not applied international standards in the financial and technical monitoring of projects that it has financed. Other stakeholders note that FSE's technical and financial monitoring of field projects is limited.

FSE is often unable to provide further information needed by the AF to support the accreditation process. Finding information within FSE is a time-consuming process and information is often missing. Frequent staff turnover results in loss of institutional memory. As a result, every request for information by the AF 'resets the counter to zero'. Previous FCDO reports note that the accreditation of FSE has been paused by the AF who have questioned the government's seriousness about accreditation of a Direct Access Entity. Some stakeholders noted that FSE suffers from a range of problems including lack of transparency and corruption, management problems, staffing problems, and capacity challenges. The misappropriation of more than 540 million FCFA intended for the FSE was acknowledged by the President of the Board of Directors of FSE in 2023 (Ministry of the Environment, Fisheries, and Sustainable Development, 2023).

FSE needs to accomplish the following to get back on track to gain accreditation to the AF:

- Undertake financial monitoring of past,⁸ ongoing or future projects through professional accounting softwares.⁹
- Finance the remaining tranches of some ongoing field projects, carry out monitoring and evaluation missions, and integrate monitoring data into the monitoring and evaluation system.
- Mobilise funding to implement new projects in the field following calls for proposals.
- Apply ESS and gender policies to field projects and conduct relevant audit of these projects along these parameters.
- Report financial monitoring, ESS and project audit activities.
- Reactivate and update the FSE website including establishing specific procedures for reporting complaints.
- Design and produce leaflets on the transparency and fraud management policy integrating the online submission form for complaints.
- Recruit an internal auditor to carry out internal audits for 2021, 2022 and 2023.
- Carry out external audits for years 2021, 2022 and 2023.

As of April 2023, the FSE estimated the budget to fulfil these requirements amounted to 122.5 million FCFA. Delays in the release of funds from the public treasury to FSE (see also Section 3.3.1 on Existence of national financial mechanisms) is expected to impact the execution of a number of these activities, thereby further delaying the accreditation process.

Stakeholders pointed out that there is no transparency in the functioning of the FSE or FNE. No information is in the public domain. Annual budgets are not known. People who do know how these organisations work are not keen to discuss this even behind closed doors given how politicised they are. Stakeholders also cautioned that the accreditation of FSE and FNE to the GCF is impacted by the uncertainty associated with an unstable political environment, the complex political economy of many organisations, as well as the leadership of individuals at the helm of the two organisations and the ministries to which they are affiliated.

The readiness proposal approved by the GCF in January 2024 includes the development of a roadmap for the identification of the most suitable Direct Access Entity from the private sector. This roadmap will be integrated within the broader climate change private sector stakeholder group bringing in all the key actors and organisations that are eligible for GCF accreditation. IOM is also understood to be keen to support the entities seeking accreditation to VCFs through its projects over the next two to three months.

8 In the case of past projects, FSE could undertake an audit of financial statements.

9 FSE has acquired an accounting software called Tompro and trained staff to use this software.

BOX 4: CAN ACCREDITATION TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND AND ADAPTATION FUND UNLOCK FINANCE FOR CHAD?

Accreditation of a national entity to the GCF is high priority amongst national stakeholders in Chad. Interviews indicate that national stakeholders believe that accreditation would automatically unlock finance for Chad.

In reality, accreditation to GCF and AF would provide the means for countries to directly access financing and manage all aspects of climate change mitigation and adaptation projects, from design through implementation, to monitoring and evaluation. As such, it would allow national entities to directly put in proposals to these funds.

It does not however mean finance will flow automatically, immediately or at the time and pace needed by countries. While getting national entities accredited to the GCF and AF is important for Chad, it must be noted that this will not in fact automatically unlock finance from these funds.

Mobilising resources from the GCF and AF requires project development capability that is still a major gap in Chad. This is a time-consuming, complex and often expensive operation. Development of projects that will satisfy the required project approval criteria of the GCF and AF is not easy.

This can be due to the complexity of project approval criteria set by the GCF and AF, or to intrinsic characteristics of adaptation projects that make it more difficult to structure the financing of these projects. Stakeholders noted that other countries with direct access to GCF and AF and with greater capacity than Chad, such as Uganda, have still not been able to mobilise funds.

Mobilising resources from the GCF and AF after accreditation requires several shifts in investment approaches of the accredited entities. Whilst institutions traditionally may have played the role of passive investor, as a direct access entity they are required to play a much more active role in the identification and scoping of investible projects at the outset. Further, they will need to manage the process from feasibility through to proposal development and submission, and post-GCF approval: project implementation, monitoring and reporting.

Understanding the kinds of investments that are both in line with the institution's mandate and the investment criteria of the GCF and AF, while also being aligned with the country's climate priorities, is critical. Experience from other countries (for example Niger where the Banque Agricole du Niger is accredited to the AF) suggests this is often challenging. National accredited entities can also find it challenging to develop projects that are outside of sectors they work in.

Finally, the approval processes of the GCF and AF can be time-consuming. The time taken from concept to approval varies for several different reasons. But approval can take more than two years. A review of the time taken by VCFs to approve projects in Chad as well as in other countries (for example Niger) indicates this is the case even for international accredited agencies (IAEs).

Source: Authors' analysis.

In the absence of national entities with direct access to the GCF and AF, Chad has been reliant on international and regional entities accredited to these funds to access finance. However, Chad has not collaborated with these entities to get funding for national projects from either the GCF or AF (see Box 5). The problem is two-fold. On the one hand, international entities have found it difficult to work with their respective NDAs as well as the government more broadly to prepare concept notes and proposals for a range of reasons covered in this report. On the other hand, the government considers international entities as poor value for money as these entities are perceived to have high overheads and bring in international consultants (see Box 6).¹⁰

BOX 5: CHALLENGES WITH MONITORING THE IMPACT OF MULTI-COUNTRY PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

A review of the projects funded by the GCF and AF indicates that as of November 2023, Chad had not received funding for national projects from either the GCF or the AF. All the projects that Chad has received funding from the GCF for are multi-country.


There are concerns within government about these. First, the amounts available to Chad are not known to the government. Second, there is no way for Chad’s NDA to the GCF to track their expenditure, activities and outcomes. Third, no national coordination structure has been engaged.

Finally, the impact of these projects is not visible to national stakeholders. While some implementing entities of multi-country projects have organised dialogues for all the NDAs involved, interactions have focused on sharing experiences.

According to the NDA/focal point, in one such case the implementing entity was not aware of the amount of finance allocated to each country under the multi-country project in question.¹¹

Source: Authors’ analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

FIGURE 2: OVERVIEW OF PROJECTS FUNDED BY VCFs FOR CHAD



Source: Authors’ analysis and interviews conducted as part of the study.

¹⁰ One of the main reasons cited by the GCF NDA for not collaborating with international entities was the project management fee charged by these entities. The NDA indicated that these entities were charging the government as much as 40% of project budgets as project management fees. It was unclear during discussions if the 40% referred to project management fees or to the share of project budget going to accredited entities. It must be noted here that all VCFs have a cap on fees applicable to public sector projects/programmes. Fees also vary according to the size of the project. VCFs also conduct due diligence on the project management fee charged by accredited entities. It was noted during interviews that there is a misconception that direct access entities do not charge project management costs. Direct access entities also need to recover the associated costs of project development that they would draw on at project implementation.

¹¹ The example used by the GCF NDA was of Sustainable Solutions for Africa. A scan of the GCF website indicates that Sustainable Solutions for Africa is not involved in GCF-funded projects in Chad.

BOX 6: SUPPLY SIDE BARRIERS TO PROVISION OF CLIMATE FINANCE TO CHAD

Several supply side barriers constrain the flow of finance to Chad. To begin with, the climate finance landscape is highly fragmented and complex. Each provider possesses different mandates, financial instruments and modalities to access funding, which are often not tailored to the needs of vulnerable countries like Chad.

Current mechanisms for accessing climate finance are slow, complicated, cumbersome, resource-intensive and often involve non-recipient centric processes for all but the largest and best-resourced entities to navigate. For example, and as noted earlier, project approval processes of VCFs may mean two to three years of unfunded proposal development without guarantee of success.

Guidelines to write proposals to access finance, and accreditation and application processes are seen as unclear, bureaucratic, bearing heavy reporting aspects, time-consuming, and having high transaction costs.

Second, approaches to climate finance are set up to cater to donors' incentives and risk tolerance. Countries such as Chad are classified as fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCASs). They exhibit institutional and social fragility and thus pose a unique challenge for providers of bilateral, multilateral and private sector finance.

The central tension between risk appetite and investing in these contexts lies in the operating environment. The dynamics in these countries can evolve rapidly, and security can deteriorate quickly, creating uncertainty and heightened risk. In contrast, climate finance providers tend to favour safer operating environments where a higher certainty of return on investment and project success exists.

Third, there is a lack of coordination between accredited entities specifically and development partners that support access to finance in general. These tend to compete for resources and mandates, and therefore don't coordinate well with each other. Discussions with development partners and at ACF meetings indicate that while partners do cooperate and engage with each other, this is limited. Moreover, development partners are not fully aware of each other's projects, activities or pipelines.

Finally, accredited entities do not always actively engage with the government and specifically NDAs in the design of projects and proposals. Project expenditure and activities are often structured in a way that leads to actual spending from the project in Chad being substantially reduced. This includes on elements such as use of consultants and contracted project teams. The effectiveness of such funding in building climate-resilience in Chad is thus questionable.

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

Capacity to identify and develop viable projects that can attract funding

There is insufficient capacity to develop bankable project proposals. Stakeholders noted that Chad faces difficulties in developing (domestically) and sourcing the highly technical skills sets needed to progress project proposals and specialist skills for writing proposals. FNE also acknowledges that this is a barrier in fulfilling its mandate. This affects the country's ability to translate development priorities into bankable proposals, develop comprehensive feasibility studies, and articulate the technical issues to successfully complete project concept notes and to obtain project approval.

BOX 7: INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY CHALLENGES IN CHAD AS A BARRIER TO ACCESSING FINANCE

The lack of knowledge and adequate technical and institutional capacity emerges as the biggest challenge to designing and implementing policies, strategies, programmes and projects targeting climate change. The challenge manifests itself in different ways. These include shortage of staffing, lack of human resources with knowledge of climate finance, acute lack of knowledge of the many issues related to climate change, lack of skills to develop bankable project proposals or write proposals, and inability of government institutions to retain qualified staff.

Chad's NDC also notes the acute and urgent need for capacity-building to support NDC implementation. The challenge of capacity is not limited to the MoEFSD or the NDAs to the VCFs but also extends to designated and relevant ministries to develop projects and programmes. Capacity gaps have also led to weaknesses in climate diplomacy at the international level, particularly in UNFCCC processes.

Several donor programmes have delivered a range of capacity-building activities at different levels. For example, FAO has provided technical and financial support to state institutions on climate-relevant issues as well as training on resource mobilisation at the community and national level.

Additionally, FAO is supporting the MoE, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Livestock, and the Ministry of Water, to formulate and develop concept notes for projects. FAO has engaged the NDA to the GCF in these discussions. Moving forward, FAO is keen to enhance support for training and capacity-building initiatives, ensuring consistent support to the NDA across various projects and concept notes.

UNHCR has supported training of local stakeholders on solar energy technology in the context of solar-powered water supply as well as on environmental conservation. AMCC+ has provided resources for capacity-building for participation in international negotiations. Under the first phase, it supported capacity-building of 30 individuals to become negotiators.

The project has however found that many of these people have not stayed in their jobs for myriad reasons: from being assigned roles that do not match their skills, to being given positions across ministries or in regions where they are unable to use their skills and therefore feel undervalued or frustrated. As noted earlier, AMCC+ has also supported the capacity-building of the GCF to the NDA.

Stakeholders noted that sometimes donors and multilateral institutions also lack the knowledge of and capacity for climate-relevant issues and climate finance. For example, UNHCR noted that staff underwent training on disaster management and climate action in the context of flooding.

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

Conducting environmental and social impact assessments in support of project development is also cumbersome in the absence of strong national institutions. This is not to suggest that no projects are developed, or get funded. Stakeholders noted that small projects do get developed and financed, but not the big ones that are necessary for development and therefore key to climate resilience.

Systems for managing environmental, social and fiduciary risks

Systems within state institutions for managing environmental, social and fiduciary risks remain weak. Even where tools exist to manage these risks, the capacity of institutions to use these tools remains questionable. Interviewees indicated that many actors do not have risk analysis software to facilitate identification and management of such risks for large projects.

Interviews also suggest that the management of these risks is not a priority among institutional actors, either because of a lack of knowledge or interest, or because these risks are not perceived as sufficiently strong given the typically small scope and size of the projects. Therefore, little time and resources are allocated to the assessment and management of these risks. For example, this has been the case with FSE and it remains to be seen how FSE will institute systems for managing such risks.

3.2.2 Mainstreaming of climate change into the national budget

READINESS GAPS

- Climate change is being mainstreamed in the national budget, but budget implementation and results are yet to be seen.
- The use of climate budgeting tools remains non-existent.

Integration/reflection of climate change priorities in the national budget

Climate priorities are integrated into the national budget with the budget circular note mentioning climate priority by name. In the past, the amount of funding allocated to climate-relevant investments has been low and projects have been dependent on external financing sources. The draft budget law for 2023 demonstrated a change and specifically identified priority investment projects (amounting to 4% of non-oil GDP in excess of the programme's projections) mainly aimed at increasing the country's resilience to floods and climate change (IMF, 2023).

These projects are mainly aimed at increasing Chad's resilience to floods and climate change – dikes, roads, pipelines and crossings to facilitate traffic in cities during all seasons and the flow of rain and flood water – and at facilitating access to certain regions cut off from the rest of the country during the rainy season due to dilapidated crossing infrastructure or flooding. The government has committed to adhere to strong public investment management practices to help support the quality and effectiveness of these projects (ibid.).

Effective implementation of the budget is however marred by weak public financial management (PFM), characterised by a lack of respect for the spending chain, excessive use of emergency spending procedures, and weak cash management that led to the accumulation of large amounts of arrears. It also remains to be seen if the government delivers on the projects included in the draft budget law for 2023.

Use of climate budgeting tools

Chad was a beneficiary of IMF's Climate PIMA (C-PIMA) in 2022 which includes climate budgeting as a feature (Infrastructure Governance Facility, n.d.). C-PIMA's goal is to help governments identify potential improvements in public investment institutions and processes to build low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure.¹² The C-PIMA also gives prioritised recommendations to strengthen climate-responsive aspects of infrastructure governance. As such, C-PIMA provides the base for climate-sensitive budgeting. However, not much is known about the findings and outcomes of the C-PIMA or the current status of implementation of recommendations provided by the IMF following the C-PIMA.¹³

Some development partners have supported capacity-building to enable climate budgeting at subnational levels. For example, the AMCC+ has provided support for the integration of climate resilience into planning, budgeting and monitoring systems in three local authorities as a pilot (Annex 6). It remains to be seen how these interventions are scaled up.



Village in desert.
Image by mbrand85 / shutterstock.

¹² The C-PIMA is designed around five pillars of public investment management that are key for climate-smart infrastructure: planning; coordination across government; project appraisal and selection; budgeting and portfolio management; and risk management.

¹³ The findings of the C-PIMA are not available on the IMF website although similar reports are available for other countries.

3.3 Delivery

3.3.1 Existence of national financing mechanisms

READINESS GAPS

- Domestic financing mechanisms remain fraught with capacity and governance challenges.
- Effectiveness of domestic financing mechanisms is constrained by the non-transfer of funding from the public treasury.
- FNE aims to mobilise resources through levies and taxes that will need to be approved through a government decree but the plan for use of proceeds remains unclear.

Chad established the FSE in 2013 as an institutional instrument for mobilising finance for the implementation of environmental and climate change adaptation efforts. An institution under the supervision of MoEFSD, FSE has autonomy in financial and administrative management but is not fully independent. FSE mobilises resources through a range of taxes: (1) taxes levied by customs on polluting products (such as cigarettes, imported plastic bottles, imported chemicals) that enter the country; (2) the taxes levied on the exploitation of resources (such as forestry, wildlife and fisheries); and (3) environmental protection taxes levied through the finance law on facilities classified as factories that discharge wastewater.

Annual revenues to be mobilised through these taxes are estimated at 3–4 billion FCFA. However, tax evasion, shortcomings in tax collections, and non-payment of taxes means that the actual revenues stand closer to an estimated 1.5 billion FCFA. FSE finances initiatives in four areas: (1) sustainable land management; (2) conservation and management of biodiversity; (3) pollution and nuisance control including waste management; and (4) climate change. Activities financed by FSE cover projects as well as studies and capacity-building.

FSE's effectiveness is constrained by the non-transfer of funds that are due to it but are held in the public treasury. Even when funds are released from the public treasury to FSE, they are insufficient. As a result, FSE's onward disbursements are affected. FSE estimates that it disburses only around 20% of the annual revenues collected through environmental levies. The delays in receiving funds from the Treasury and insufficient funds released by the Treasury have meant that FSE has completed only one funding window thus far (see Box 8), in 2014.

Under this window, FSE supported 36 small projects amounting to between 10 million and 30 million FCFA. These recipients of funding were almost all community organisations, and involved projects targeting agroforestry, preservation of natural resources, plantation and support for women's organisations to set up income-generating activities. The 2014 call however demonstrated the huge demand for funding and the appetite of local actors to prepare projects and access finance. FSE received over 700 applications under this funding window, although there were problems with proposals and many applicants were unable to provide the requisite documents.

The implementation of projects funded under this has been impacted by multiple crises spanning the 2016 economic crises and political unrest, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some projects have only received their first tranche of funding. FSE launched a

funding window in December 2023. The geographic scope of the call is restricted to eight provinces (Logone Oriental, Middle Chari southern, Kanem, Guéra, Wadi Fira, Ennedi Est, Ennedi Ouest, N'djamena) to facilitate proper monitoring of projects. FSE intends to fund 16 projects of higher value in this window.

BOX 8: FSE'S APPROACH TO FUNDING PROJECTS

FSE operates funding windows wherein it issues calls for proposals. The call for proposals defines the objectives of the call, eligibility, the criteria and guidelines to be followed for the proposals. Funding applications are open to the public sector, NGOs and civil society actors. They are evaluated and selected by a technical committee and approved by the FSE Board of Directors. FSE organises workshops to provide guidance and training to potential applicants on formulation of project proposals, and to facilitate a better understanding of the FSE's requirements and processes.¹⁴ Funds are released in tranches in line with agreed project milestones.

Discussions with FSE indicate that it has incorporated several lessons from the first funding window of 2014 into the 2023 funding window. These centre on inclusion of gender considerations in projects as well as including environmental and social assessments, risk registers, monitoring and evaluation plans. Risk registers did not feature in the first funding window because projects were small.

An overview of information sought under the call for proposals indicates that proposals sought by FSE adhere to formats and requirements similar to those of international climate finance actors. For example, proposals to FSE require applicants to include the following:

- project summary
- analysis of the situation, presentation of the context, objectives, justification of the project and alignment of project with national environmental policy and international conventions on the environment and climate change
- project beneficiaries with a focus on gender and vulnerable communities including how the project will improve the lives of beneficiaries
- expected results and sustainability of results
- project implementation team
- experience of applicant in implementing similar activities
- socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the project
- risks and risk mitigation
- detailed budget, log frame and a monitoring and evaluation plan.

FSE typically develops a strategic framework to guide its operations and activities with the current framework targeting the period 2021–2024.

Source: Authors' analysis based on information provided by FSE.

¹⁴ See: Adejumo, Q. (2023) 'Chad Initiates FSE Project Workshop: A Leap Towards Sustainable Development'. <https://bnnbreaking.com/world/chad/chad-initiates-fse-project-workshop-a-leap-towards-sustainable-development/>

FSE is also understaffed with only 10 full-time executives and relies on consultants to develop documents such as its strategic framework and to provide training. Financial management and risk assessment structures remain weak. FSE can mobilise resources through international sources. However, engagement with development partners is inconsistent and substandard although FSE has presented its strategic framework to partners.

As well as FSE there is FNE. FNE was established in 2016 with the objective of receiving and administering funds to support water management and access to drinking water countrywide. It serves as a mechanism to mobilise and deliver resources for climate change-relevant projects focused on water-related issues. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Water and Sanitation, FNE has autonomy in financial and administrative management but is not fully independent.

FNE is governed by a committee chaired by the Ministry of Water and Sanitation comprising representatives from nine ministries including the MoF, MoP and MoE. Its resources come primarily from government transfers. In future, it aims to mobilise resources through royalties on water distribution companies, taxation of bottled water, and taxes on polluters with a focus on industries and businesses. According to FNE, the government is in the process of approving these resource mobilisation options through a decree.

The plan for use of proceeds mobilised by FSE as of now remains unknown. According to FNE, it does not finance projects. It has funded only one project so far through its own funds. Projects funded by FSE have in effect come through from readiness funding accessed from the GCF. There is no strategy to refer to in this regard as to date FNE has not prepared one. The first such framework is being devised for 2025–2030 and is expected to be finalised by December 2024. It is also expected to include a resource mobilisation strategy.

As delivery partner on the readiness project that was approved in 2020, FNE is seeking to develop a pipeline of projects for the GCF through an open call for proposals that is based in GCF's funding criteria. It intends to select five private sector projects, which will then need to be approved by the NDA to the GCF. FNE is aiming for implementation of the projects to begin in November 2024. It is unclear if the GCF to the NDA has already sought the approval of the GCF for funding of these projects.¹⁵ Readiness support only targets the preparation of a pipeline of projects with concept notes ready to be submitted to the GCF, and does not provide actual funding of projects.

3.3.2 Capacity of implementing entities

READINESS GAPS

- Capacity to deliver projects involving multiple financing instruments and institutions is limited.
- National institutions don't have the opportunity to build implementation capacity given that donor funding bypasses national systems.

¹⁵ Funding projects through the GCF would require projects to go through the GCF project approval process which can be time-consuming. No concept note, proposal or approved funding proposal was found on the GCF website to this end.

Project implementation suffers from the weak capacity of government institutions, as well as project teams and implementing partners in the field, weak financial management, and a national procurement system that is inefficient and lacks transparency. Donor funding typically does not pass through national systems and excludes national or local level partners. The opportunity for actors to build implementation capacity involving multiple financing instruments and institutions is thus limited. This is not to say there is no implementing capacity amongst local entities. As seen from the projects currently being supported by the AMCC+ (see Annex 6), local entities are building this capacity while engaging with climate-resilient climate practices and technologies that are relevant to Chad.

3.4 Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)

3.4.1 MRV systems and procedures

READINESS GAPS

- The national MRV system to identify, track and report on climate action and climate finance or the impact of climate finance spend is yet to be operationalised.
- An MRV system already exists for adaptation, but it is unclear how this system is being used.
- Capacity of DLCCC to use and report on the basis of MRV system remains a concern.

Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems exist but are not sufficiently operationalised. Chad received support from the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT)¹⁶ towards the development and implementation of a national MRV system and NDC tracking framework to measure and report on the effectiveness of climate policies and actions. On the latter, this covered the identification of indicators for monitoring implementation of Chad's NDC. It also included the establishment of a national MRV agency.

Delivered during 2020–2022 in partnership with the MoEFSD, the ICAT provided support to deliver a blueprint for the establishment of a national MRV system including the institutional framework for an inventory system, as well as establishing roles and responsibilities of each actor within it. The blueprint was discussed and adopted during an MRV stakeholder workshop held in December 2020. It was also decided to establish a new national MRV agency to ensure sustainable funding from the national budget.

Changes in leadership at the Ministry of Environment (MoE) have contributed to delays. It is understood that the then Minister of Environment was keen to operationalise the MRV system and agency. At their initiative, MoEFSD engaged two partner organisations besides ICAT for this purpose, one of which was UNDP. However, a change in the Minister of Environment meant the ministry team changed, and engagements between ICAT and the ministry came to a halt. It is understood that the new Minister of Environment was not interested in operationalising the

¹⁶ The Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) supports improved transparency and capacity-building under the Paris Agreement. ICAT works closely with its partner countries to develop policy-focused, priority-driven projects that develop the information and data frameworks and related capacity to improve the implementation, tracking and enhancement of their NDCs and reporting.

MRV system. As of December 2022, the proposal to establish the national MRV system had not been officially endorsed by the government due to both institutional instability in the country, and the long process of procedural approval during which the consent of all relevant ministries and the National Assembly is needed (ICAT, 2022).

BOX 9: OVERVIEW OF THE INITIATIVE FOR CLIMATE ACTION TRANSPARENCY SUPPORT IN CHAD

ICAT's support in Chad during 2020–2022 covered the following:

- development and implementation of a refined GHG inventory to improve emissions tracking and reporting
- capacity-building in GHG emission inventories and modelling
- development and implementation of a national MRV system and NDC tracking framework to measure and report on the effectiveness of climate policies and actions
- use of ICAT methodologies/guides to assess the impact of the country's climate actions and policies
- training on ICAT tools and methodologies for monitoring and evaluating climate action.

The application of ICAT's Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Model (GACMO) is understood to have supported the analysis of Chad's GHG mitigation options and the definition of policies and measures for the updated NDC. Capacity-strengthening involved training approximately 40 individuals from across various stakeholder groups to assess the emissions reductions and cost implications of individual mitigation actions included in the country's NDC.


Source: ICAT (2022).

Chad is now building an MRV system for the implementation of the NDC and seeking to establish a national MRV agency. Being developed with support from the AMCC+, the MRV system targets the mitigation component of the NDC. An MRV system already exists for adaptation in the form of the Climate Change Adaptation Monitoring Database (Base de Données de Suivi de l'Adaptation au Changement Climatique). AMCC+ had supported the development of this database in the first phase of its support to Chad. This database has been transferred to the DLCCC which is responsible for operationalising the MRV system of the NDC. The extent to which the database is being used is unclear.

Support for establishing the MRV system for the NDC is said to be in line with the ICAT proposal on the organisation of the national MRV system and operating procedures thereof. In 2023, the AMCC+ project supported the establishment of the NDC MRV roadmap. It also held a national workshop the overall objective of which was to strengthen the capacities of national climate MRV actors. This was with a view to developing national expertise in support of regular updating of the GHG inventory, as well as for monitoring mitigation actions, financing, capacity-building and technology transfer. Stakeholders are however concerned about the capacity of national actors, in particular the DLCCC, to use and report on the basis of an MRV system.

The new Director-General of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) has once again engaged with ICAT and requested its support to operationalise the MRV system. It remains unclear if the support sought from ICAT is intended to build on the work of the AMCC+ or to commence from when ICAT work concluded in 2022.

FIGURE 3: ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL CLIMATE MRV SYSTEM AS WELL AS THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES



Source: AMCC+.

3.4.2 Knowledge management and learning

READINESS GAPS

- There is no national knowledge management system.
- Structures set up under donor programmes are discontinued after the programmes end.

Systems for systematic gathering of knowledge including lessons learnt from implementation of projects appear to be missing. No examples of government-led structures for knowledge management and learning were found during interviews. There is no central database with information on what donors have done, who has benefited from capacity development activities, or the extent to which knowledge and learning are translated into capacity.

The readiness proposal approved by the GCF in January 2024 to strengthen the NDA's private sector engagement capacity also notes the lack of a knowledge management system to capture, store and disseminate lessons learned from private sector engagement practices. Stakeholders indicated that structures for knowledge-sharing and stakeholder dialogues have been put in place under donor programmes. However, these are typically not sustained beyond the life of the donor programme (see Box 10) and there is no ownership or funding for these structures.

BOX 10: LA PLATEFORME AGORA 30 DE LA RÉSILIENCE AU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE (THE AGORA 30 PLATFORM OF RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE)

The Plateforme Agora 30 de la résilience au changement climatique (the Agora 30 Platform of resilience to climate change) was established in 2016 under the first phase of the Alliance Mondiale Contre le Changement Climatique (AMCC+) in Chad (see Annex 6).

The objective of this platform was to facilitate pooling and sharing of knowledge as well as information on interventions related to climate resilience in Chad. This was with a particular focus on sharing good practices for strengthening resilience to climatic and non-climatic shocks.

The specific objectives of this platform were:

- Conduct research initiatives for the production of knowledge and evidence on strengthening resilience to climate and non-climate risks.
- Share the results of initiatives on resilience to climate and non-climate change risks.
- Influence policies with the objective of integrating climate change into development strategies and plans.
- Strengthen the capacities of stakeholders on resilience.

Agora 30 functioned as a cross-stakeholder group. It was structured around a general assembly and a steering committee. This comprised four public-sector representatives (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment (MoE), Ministry of Livestock and Ministry of Territorial Administration), as well as representatives of civil society, private sector, locally elected officials, programmes and projects, and technical and financial partners.

In addition, there was a group of six coordinators responsible for implementation (including the MoE), a five-member Operational Monitoring Committee (including the Ministry of Water and the Ministry of Health), and four thematic groups.

The platform organised a number of events during 2016–2019. Following the conclusion of the first phase of the AMCC+, activities stopped and working groups became non-functional, largely due to a lack of financial support.

In July 2023, in its second phase, AMCC+ organised a workshop for mapping resilience projects for which 20 good practices were identified. AMCC+ expressed concerns during interviews about sustainability of knowledge-sharing activities beyond donor programming, in particular through nationally owned and led structures.

Source: Authors' analysis based on information provided by AMCC+.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CHAD'S CLIMATE FINANCE READINESS

Chad has undoubtedly made progress in improving the policy and institutional architecture to facilitate access to climate finance. But readiness to plan, access, deliver and monitor and report on climate finance remains weak (see Table 8). The evidence base around climate risks, monitoring or reporting on the effectiveness of climate actions taken to date, or concrete and bankable mitigation and adaptation ambitions between initial priorities identified in the 2009 PANA and the current NDC and NAP remains limited.

There has also been little progress in promoting more effective and responsive institutional capacities for the mobilisation, management and disbursement of climate finance, and for implementing and monitoring projects. Limited baseline historical and observation data on climate-related phenomena, partial socioeconomic data, patchy geospatial coverage, and weak data- and knowledge-management capacity add to the challenges of accessing climate finance.



Woman in traditional Chad clothes.
Image by mbrand85 / shutterstock

TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF CHAD'S CLIMATE FINANCE READINESS

Competency	Strengths	Weaknesses
Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A growing and evolving policy framework on climate change ▪ Adequate policy focus on adaptation ▪ Growing emphasis on establishing an enabling governance architecture and institutional coordination mechanisms ▪ Roadmap for implementation of NDC moving into final stages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policies not backed by adequate financing and implementation plans ▪ No proper quantification of financing requirements for adaptation actions ▪ Insufficient mainstreaming of more concrete mitigation and adaptation measures within sectoral development plans and national development plan ▪ Coordination mechanisms not sufficiently implemented ▪ Overlapping mandates and institutional rivalry preventing cross-ministerial collaboration ▪ Frequent changes in the structure and mandate of ministries leading to loss of institutional memory ▪ Lack of adequate and reliable climate observation data
Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Responsibilities for accessing finance established ▪ Established access to VCFs ▪ Extensive access to international support for climate finance readiness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No comprehensive climate finance strategy ▪ Lack of coordination between institutional structures mobilising climate finance ▪ Overwhelming focus on GCF ▪ Limited capacity of NDAs to play their role effectively ▪ Political seriousness and governance shortcomings in state institutions posing constraints to accreditation of state owned institutions ▪ Lack of government-led and -owned structures to coordinate climate finance with donors ▪ Absence of project pipeline ▪ Systemic human and technical capacity constraints
Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Established national financing mechanisms ▪ Gradual build-up of implementation capacity of local entities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Under-funded domestic financing mechanisms ▪ Capacity and governance challenges within domestic financing mechanisms ▪ Limited project management and financial management capacity ▪ Insufficient opportunities for national institutions to build implementation capacity within donor funding
MRV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National MRV system designed ▪ MRV system for adaptation exists ▪ NDC MRV roadmap established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use of MRV system for adaptation unknown ▪ Priority for operationalising MRV system depends on political will ▪ Capacity constraints for regular use of an MRV system

Source: Authors' analysis.

The nature of readiness gaps means that addressing these gaps requires commitment and willingness at the highest political level. Without political leadership that prioritises access to climate finance and is serious about improving the enabling the environment for finance, Chad's ability to access climate finance is likely to remain unchanged. The nature of gaps coupled with the extent of lack of capacity mean that external efforts and new initiatives will only bring about marginal changes in an ineffective climate finance landscape. It is unlikely to deliver climate finance at the scale, speed and predictability needed by Chad. Considering this, the main recommendations to improve Chad's readiness to access climate finance are as follows.

Theme 1: Improving readiness and capacity to engage with a complex climate finance landscape

Recommendation 1: Improve enabling environment for access to finance

Chad's readiness gaps are manifold and indicate the need to improve institutional coordination, access and delivery of finance. These gaps arise largely from: a lack of empowered and capacitated institutions; lack of funding for institutions to perform their roles; weak and ineffective institutional coordination mechanisms; poorly governed national institutions; overlapping mandates of institutions, and institutional rivalry.

Improving access to finance means the government must address these gaps as a priority. The following could help improve the enabling environment: (1) strengthen DLCCC; (2) involve the MoF in mobilising climate finance; (3) effectively operationalise coordination mechanisms; (4) depoliticise and improve functioning of domestic mechanisms, such as the FSE; (5) appoint focal points in line ministries; (6) better use the growing knowledge, skills and capacity on climate-related issues within the country; and (7) empower those with technical knowledge of climate-relevant issues to make decisions. Development partners for their part need to engage the government in 'one voice' about the urgent need to improve the enabling environment.

The government could draw upon the experience of other countries that have taken steps to improve the enabling environment to coordinate the access and delivery of climate finance. These countries include Senegal and Somalia. Senegal is among a list of countries in Africa that are well placed to access climate finance and was also one of the first to have an accredited entity to the GCF and an approved project with the GCF. Somalia on the other hand has made strides in improving the enabling environment to access climate finance. FCDO is well placed to support this peer-to-peer learning.

Recommendation 2: Prepare a climate finance strategy based on a comprehensive assessment of climate finance needs

Findings of this study underscore the need for a comprehensive needs-based climate finance strategy that clearly articulates the financing needs and provides an integrated and strategic approach to accessing resources. A financing plan is being finalised for the NDC, although it has limitations. It is unclear for example, if a detailed finance needs assessment is being undertaken for the adaptation measures prioritised under the NDC and NAP. The DLCCC, responsible both for the climate change agenda as well as for mobilising climate finance, needs to take the lead in this regard. All structures within the government should be guided by this strategy rather than pursuing their own agendas. In that sense, the strategy should be used to address issues such as institutional overlaps and rivalry, and coordination between the various entities accessing climate finance.

Recommendation 3: Develop an integrated approach for planning and budgeting

Accessing and managing climate finance needs to be done with a whole-of-government approach for planning and budgeting.

Using a needs-based climate finance strategy for coherent planning, and linking it to national budget processes, is essential to ensuring a robust response to climate change in the medium- to long-term. This will also enable the funding of interventions that build climate resilience through sectoral plans and the National Development Plans (NDPs).

Recommendation 4: Build a pipeline of bankable projects

The Government of Chad needs to prioritise the preparation of a pipeline of projects, based on the priorities identified in climate policies and strategies, in particular the NDC and NAP.

An investment-ready or 'bankable' project pipeline is important for mobilising finance. Despite the stated intentions of the NDC implementation roadmap and the partnership plan to put together a pipeline, this remains a gap. The pipeline can be prepared under the NDC implementation roadmap or in partnership with development partners; however, it is critical that this is both government-led and -owned.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen and scale up capacity and systems to access and absorb finance

The government could, with the support of development partners, conduct a capacity assessment exercise focused on what capacities and types of capacities are needed to deliver on Chad's NDC and NAP. This could include:

- an analysis of current structures and teams in the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and other relevant ministries, with a view to determining their appropriateness for delivering on the NDC and NAP
- identification of staffing and capacity gaps
- identification of capacity and training needs, and technical team requirements
- plan of action for possible funding for the capacity gaps
- design of a strategy for implementation of recommendations.

There is a need to improve the systems for managing fiduciary, environmental and social risks across national institutions aiming to access, deliver and implement climate finance.

Enhancing knowledge management through, for example, a knowledge management platform, could be useful. This would allow for the sharing of information across institutions, policy sectors and institutional levels relevant to the landscape of climate finance access, delivery and implementation. This would also address challenges of institutional memory loss that come with change in ministerial teams.

Capacity-strengthening in isolation is unlikely to deliver results. As past and current experience has shown, there are few incentives for people with the requisite skills and capacity to stay in the government. Underfunding also exacerbates understaffing. Therefore, capacity-building initiatives alone are unlikely to solve the problem of access to finance in the absence of high-level political support and a strong vision for increasing capacity to access climate finance.

Development partners can play a role here by:

- impressing on the government that capacitated personnel need to be embedded in relevant ministries for long periods
- urging the government to foster capacity retention
- developing tailored capacity-building activities for domestic stakeholders
- training embedded staff on an ongoing basis on climate-related issues
- promoting the use of regional support networks for peer-to-peer exchange on issues related to access to finance, notably to learn from the experiences of other countries that have been able to do this
- building capacity to explore and mobilise domestic and alternative sources of climate finance, such as bonds and debt-for-climate-and-nature, and improving the enabling environment for these sources of finance.

Development partners could also explore a phased approach that recognises the need for long-term capacity development. This could involve streamlining and simplifying processes to respond to local needs, and strengthening systems alongside broader capacity development to facilitate greater access in the future. Doing so would combine shorter funding cycles of capacity development to achieve short-term gains, and longer, predictable financing to ensure that developed capacity is sustained over time. Beyond these, donors could consider broadening the lens beyond climate change and removing the artificial separation between climate and development activities.

Theme 2: Improving availability of climate information and data

Recommendation 6: Create a comprehensive and reliable database of climate and socioeconomic data to guide the process of integrating adaptation into policies and decision-making

The government needs to consider investments in the hydrometeorological network, and strengthen the capacities of ANAM and DRE to create and maintain a repository of hydrological, environmental, climate and socioeconomic data. This would be critical not only for developing and revising national climate strategies and plans (including NDCs and NAPs), but also for turning broad environmental, mitigation and adaptation measures into financed actions. Without boosting ANAM and DRE and its datasets, it will be very difficult for Chad to track its climate vulnerabilities. Nor will Chad be able to develop more concrete and financeable mitigation, adaptation and environmental protection activities. These are to support the strategic axes of NDPs that purport to want to improve the quality of people's lives in Chad.

Development partners for their part could boost capacity to national statistical systems thereby building sustainability in vulnerability, hydrological, environmental and climate-related data collection and use. Development partners could support building a national database and help plug data gaps. There have been and continue to be a number of externally funded environmental and climate programmes in Chad – e.g. Restoring Ecological Corridors in the Mayo-Kebbi Quest, Chad, to Support Multiple Land and Forests Benefits. Moreover, there are development programmes for agriculture, livestock and fisheries and humanitarian operations.

Such programmes and operations do collect data around human well-being indicators, environmental conditions and other types, which could in turn be fed into a publicly accessible national database. And while it is unlikely to occur, multilateral donor governments could put pressure on certain oil companies, like ExxonMobil, to contribute hydrogeological data that is often collected during oil field explorations. A national database is necessary to conduct baseline climate vulnerability and risk assessments and monitor evolutions in climate resilience as climate extremes like flood and drought occur.

Recommendation 7: Conduct a countrywide, multisectoral baseline climate vulnerability and risk assessment, to be updated every five years

The Government of Chad, with support from appropriate partners, needs to conduct a countrywide, baseline climate vulnerability and risk assessment for multiple sectors.

The Global Goal on Adaptation under the Paris Agreement requires countries to assess adaptation needs and report on progress towards meeting these needs. Adaptation is supposed to be given equal importance to mitigation under the agreement. The assessments also need to be updated regularly to track the effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation measures over time as environmental degradation and climate change progress and Chad's population and economy grow.

For instance, infrastructure-based adaptation measures – building of community water and sanitation, schools or health facilities – need to account for climate change risks in the 2050s or 2060s that could occur within the expected lifetime of the infrastructure. Without a more comprehensive climate vulnerability and risk assessment, any proposed adaptation measures in the NAP and NDC will be continue to be unduly broad and not easy to finance. Sector-specific and countrywide climate vulnerability and risk assessments are necessary for developing more concrete, trackable and financeable adaptation (and mitigation) measures. Such measures may end up being specific to that sector, whereas others will have cross-sector benefits.

Theme 3: Mobilising development cooperation in support of access to finance

Recommendation 8: Increase coordination of development partners to support access to finance

Development partners need to increase coherence and coordination, from strategic to operational to technical levels, to ensure not only greater levels of funding but also that climate finance is better targeted. To begin with, development partners could collectively map their projects, activities and pipelines to build understanding of the support being given to stakeholders in Chad to improve access to finance as well as build climate resilience. In building future projects, development partners must consider capitalising on, building and scaling up what already exists.

Recommendation 9: Develop national systems and capacity of local actors for sustainable results

Development partners need to work through national systems and local structures as much as possible. This would enable a wide range of national and local stakeholders to develop project management and risk management capabilities to scale up the design and funding of climate projects and programmes. It could also be used as an approach to put pressure on the government to improve the enabling environment for access to climate finance and provide greater ownership and commitment.

Moreover, using local structures that are familiar with the local context and sociocultural nuances would help development partners to know what will work with local participants, ensuring that assistance and support is appropriate to context. Local actors that could be engaged by development partners could include cooperatives, industry groups or the chamber of commerce.

This would also provide the opportunity for climate-related capacity development beyond government structures. At the same time, it would enable the integration of climate risk and resilience into business planning processes, scale up and leverage financial instruments and mechanisms for climate-resilient investments, and enable learning-by-doing for these actors. This could also leverage greater private sector contributions to mobilising climate finance and building climate resilience in the long term.


ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES' ORGANISATIONS

Organisation
MoEFSD (Directorate of Climate Change)
Chad's NDA to the GCF (focal point)
FNE
FSE
Great Green Wall Agency, Chad
UNHCR
IOM
AMCC+
Delegation of the European Union to Chad
WFP
ICAT Secretariat

ANNEX 2: OVERVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED BY INTERVIEWEES

Interviews conducted for this study show a certain homogeneity in terms of the perceived reasons for Chad's limited access to climate financing (see Figure 4). Stakeholders tend to agree on the underlying factors, in particular the barriers that stem from: Chad's lack of technical and institutional capacity; weak coordination between national institutional actors; and the inability of national entities to gain accreditation. In interpreting the findings, it is worth noting that they are not based on a statistically significant sample size. Moreover, interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires by different individuals, with discussions and follow-up questions determined by the responses of interviewees.

FIGURE 4: BARRIERS HIGHLIGHTED BY INTERVIEWEES FOR ACCESS TO CLIMATE FINANCE BY CHAD



Note: Percentages of responses falling into the category.

Source: Authors' compilation based on interviews with stakeholders.

ANNEX 3: SELECT CLIMATE-RELEVANT STRATEGIES AND POLICIES IN CHAD

National Action Programme for Adaptation to Climate Change

The NAPA or PANA prioritised 10 adaptation actions based on a calculation of the potential benefits and costs, although the formula used to calculate these is not detailed in the plan.

The 10 actions are as follows:

- water control and management
- development of intensive and diversified crops
- setting up, distributing and maintaining crop calendars
- information, education and communication on adapting to climate change
- creation of soil protection and restoration works for the development of agricultural activities
- improvement of intercommunal grazing areas
- improved seasonal forecasting of precipitation and surface water runoff
- creation of an observatory for climate change adaptation policies
- creation and dissemination of fodder banks
- climate risk management.

The PANA further recognised the political and institutional obstacles to its implementation. These obstacles included the following:

- gaps or inconsistencies in the legal or policy regime
- institutional, financial, social, economic and cultural problems
- lack of awareness of the problems associated with climate change on the part of coordination mechanisms.

It also highlighted the general lack of knowledge on climate change but offered no solution for overcoming any of these obstacles.

National Strategy for Gender and Climate Change 2024–2030 (draft)

This strategy offers a framework to analyse the intersecting vulnerabilities from climate change for women, who have unequal access to resources in the context of socioeconomic norms and customs that infringe on their rights. It considers how adaptation capacity is influenced by underlying vulnerabilities such as gender, age, poverty, social status, livelihood, ethnic origin and disability (see Table 9).

The strategy aims to bring together other sectoral initiatives around gender such as those in agricultural policy and food security. It will be coordinated by the DLCCC and the department in charge of gender equality within the Ministry of Women.

TABLE 9: OBJECTIVES AND SUB-OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY

	Overall objective	Sub-objectives
1	Improve governance, coordination and funding to ensure effective gender mainstreaming in climate change initiatives in Chad, by overcoming existing barriers and strengthening cooperation between the various stakeholders.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthen coordination between actors working in the field of gender and that of climate change and in particular the Ministry of Gender Promotion and Protection of Women, the Family and Children and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development. ▪ Ensure that gender is considered in policy and legislative reforms relating to climate change, and vice versa. ▪ Increase the share of financing for adaptation and mitigation measures that takes gender and social inclusion into account. ▪ Improve the system for monitoring, evaluating and learning from climate policies so that it responds to gender issues.
2	Integrate the gender approach into the design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and learning of adaptation and mitigation programmes and projects in priority sectors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Integrate gender into agriculture programmes and projects. ▪ Integrate gender into livestock programmes and projects. ▪ Integrate gender into environment and forestry programmes and projects. ▪ Mainstreaming gender in water and sanitation programmes and projects. ▪ Integrate gender in renewable energy programmes and projects. ▪ Integrate gender in fisheries and aquaculture programmes and projects. ▪ Mainstreaming gender in education and communication programmes and projects.

	Overall objective	Sub-objectives
3	Raise awareness, provide training and generate knowledge on the links between gender and climate change in order to promote a better understanding of the differentiated impacts and varied capacities of all stakeholders, ensuring that women and vulnerable groups benefit from and actively participate in resilient and environmentally friendly development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identify and assess the training needs of institutional and civil society players on gender, social inclusion and climate change and develop the content of the associated training courses. ▪ Strengthen the gender and climate change capacities of stakeholders involved in climate change responses. ▪ Develop a pool of experts on gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) and climate change capable of supporting the integration of GESI into climate programmes, projects and policies. ▪ Communicate, raise awareness and inform people about gender issues, social inclusion and climate change. ▪ Promote knowledge of the SNGCC among state actors at national and local level and their roles in implementing the action plan. ▪ Develop specific tools for gender mainstreaming in the NDC and the NAP. ▪ Improve knowledge and understanding of the interrelationships between climate change and gender by state actors and communities at national and provincial levels.
4	Promote the empowerment and leadership of women, girls, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups in the fight against climate change, by providing them with adequate support and creating opportunities for their active participation in the design and implementation of sustainable solutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improve and strengthen the participation of young people, women and indigenous peoples in decision-making bodies relating to climate change. ▪ Increase the financial and material resources allocated to women and vulnerable groups to enable them to take charge of their own lives and participate in the fight against climate change.

Source: Government of Chad (2024a).

The strategy breaks down sub-objectives into many measures, each accompanied by specific indicators. It also allocates responsibilities for implementation. It proposes the allocation of resources from national sources such as the national budget and the eco-tax for implementation. It also proposes the mobilisation of bilateral and multilateral sources of finance but it provides no details on the amount of funding to be solicited from different entities.

ANNEX 4: OVERVIEW OF CHAD'S NDC

Adaptation component of NDC


Adaptation goal

- According to the ND-Gain Index, which measures countries' vulnerability to climate change and readiness to improve resilience, Chad ranks amongst the countries that are most vulnerable. In 2021, Chad ranked 184 out of 185 countries in terms of vulnerability to climate change and 190 out of 192 countries in terms of readiness to cope and adapt.
- Chad's NDC adequately recognises the country's extreme vulnerability to climate change, resulting from the combination of huge poverty among the majority of the population, high risks of drought and flooding, and frequent conflicts.
- The NDC notes that the overall goal for adaptation, in line with existing policies and strategies in the country, is to establish an economy and society more resilient to climate change.

Adaptation priorities

- The NDC prioritises adaptation across eight sectors (see Figure 5).
- The adaptation priorities take descriptive forms and are presented as measures, for example promoting improved crop varieties and restoration of forests. The priorities make no reference to quantitative targets or goals.
- The absence of targets or goals could be attributed to the non-availability of data, including the lack of sector- and region-specific studies to support the identification of baselines and targets. The NDC notes that the NAP process will prioritise improved data collection and references the enhancement of data collection facilities as essential for the development of future NAPs and other development planning.
- The NDC briefly notes that adaptation measures will deliver benefits of reduction or capturing of GHG emissions.

FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF ADAPTATION PRIORITIES IN EACH SECTOR



Source: Government of Chad (2021).

Mitigation component of NDC

Targets, scope and coverage

- The NDC sets a target of a reduction of GHG emissions by 19.3% in 2021–2030 (see Table 10). This is based on a reference scenario developed for the purpose of the NDC update (see Box 11), using the year 2018 as the baseline.
- Of this target, a 0.5% GHG reduction is binding and committed to be achieved through domestic efforts.
- The additional 18.8% GHG reduction by 2030 is conditional on the international community providing finance, capacity-building assistance and technology transfer.
- GHG reduction in the conditional scenario is expected to come from interventions in the energy and land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sectors.
- The NDC covers CO₂, fugitive emissions, CH₄ and N₂O emissions.
- Sectors covered within the scope of the NDC are energy, agriculture, waste and LULUCF. Emissions from industrial processes and product use (IPPU) are not covered within the NDC since they are marginal.

BOX 11: GHG EMISSIONS IN CHAD

The revision of Chad's NDC was based on a review of GHG emissions inventory over the 2010–2018 time series by applying the latest IPCC guidelines on the basis of available statistics. The updated inventory estimates that GHG emissions including sinks rose from 49,320 kt CO₂eq to 74,090 kt CO₂eq between 2010 and 2018, an increase of 50%. The agriculture sector contributed the majority of GHG emissions in 2018 (95%), followed by energy and waste. Projections developed for the NDC using the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Model suggest that total emissions will increase from 74,090 kt CO₂eq in 2018 to 84,960 kt CO₂eq in 2030. While agriculture will continue to be the largest contributor to GHG emissions in 2030, the energy and waste sectors are expected to have the fastest growth in GHG emission. Emissions are projected to grow by over 50% in both sectors between 2018 and 2030.

TABLE 10: GHG PROJECTIONS TO 2030

Sector	2018	2025	2030
Energy	2,834	3,605	4,299
Agriculture	71,019	76,140	80,024
LULUCF	641	687	722
Waste	878	1,157	1,360
Total	74,090	80,214	84,960

Source: Government of Chad (2021).

Mitigation measures

Energy

- The NDC elaborates extensively on the mitigation measures proposed for the energy sector (see Table 11). This sector is prioritised not only for reducing GHG emissions but also because of the co-benefits for adaptation. The measures proposed in the NDC not only reduce methane and nitrous oxide emissions, but also reduce wood consumption in residential and industrial areas. In particular, these include increase in electrification, access to clean cooking, and diversification of energy sources towards renewable energy. This in turn could reduce deforestation.

TABLE 11: MITIGATION MEASURES FOR ENERGY SECTOR

	Unconditional emissions reduction scenario	Conditional emissions reduction scenario
Power generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 210 MW gas-fired turbine power plant located in N’Gouri in the Lac Province ▪ 2.2 MW of wind turbines ▪ Improved drying ovens for the fishing sector (150 type ovens chokor and 200 improved drying racks) allowing savings of 30% to 40% in wood consumption compared to a traditional oven for smoking fish 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Two power plants (2x15 MW each) powered by biomass in Moundou and Sarh ▪ Large-scale solar photovoltaic power plants: 240 MW by 2025 and 400 MW by 2030 ▪ Solar–diesel hybrid power plants for a total of 60 MW ▪ Solar power plant with storage with a capacity of 65 MW in the city of N’Djamena ▪ 100 MW wind power plants (in Bol, Mao, Amdjarass, Faya, Biltine, Fada, Guéréfa, Iriba, Kalaite and Arada) ▪ Extension of the use of improved ovens and drying racks for the fishing sector (1500 chokor type ovens and 2000 improved drying racks) ▪ Installation of 10,000 digesters on farms to reduce fossil fuel consumption
Electricity grid infrastructure		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implementation of electricity network interconnection project between Chad and Cameroon to allow the use of hydropower (40 MW)
Energy efficiency		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Distribution of 3 million LED lamps to homes and 100,000 LED bulbs to offices ▪ Distribute 30 million improved wood stoves and 1.5 million improved charcoal stoves ▪ Efficient production of 300,000 tonnes of charcoal making

Source: Government of Chad (2021).

Agriculture

- Although agriculture accounts for the majority of GHG emissions in Chad, no measures are proposed to reduce emissions in this sector.
- Reduction of emissions in agriculture is expected to be a co-benefit from adaptation measures in the sector. The NDC notes that interventions such as climate-smart agriculture, agroforestry, and conservation agriculture offer a significant mitigation return besides adaptation benefits.
- As such, the mitigation-relevant priority for agriculture is to boost data collection with the objective of refining the GHG emissions inventory and developing action plans in line with priorities defined for the sector at the national level. The NDC notes that a key priority at the national level is to improve agricultural productivity to ensure food security.

Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)

- In the case of LULUCF, the NDC notes Chad's commitment to reforesting a total of 5 million hectares (ha) by 2030. An action plan for 2030 has been developed to this end. The action plan includes actions to avoid deforestation of 877,000 ha and restoration of 50,000 ha in the action plan for 2030. The NDC also notes that reforestation actions are underway or planned to enable forests to act as a carbon sink by 2030. However, the NDC does not elaborate on these actions.

Waste management

Mitigation measures proposed in the NDC include the following:

- Develop a national waste management policy,
- Implement effective waste collection and treatment actions such as the recovery of methane generated in managed landfills,
- Examine options for treatment of wastewater, particularly in urban areas, and for implementation of waste composting,
- Establish waste treatment plants in large urban centres in the conditional emissions reduction scenario, and
- Improve overall knowledge of the sector.

Cross-cutting priorities of the NDC

Gender equality

- Gender responsiveness is an integral dimension of Chad's NDC.
- The NDC recognises the limited understanding of the concept of gender by the different actors (national decision-makers, and certain women themselves) and the linkages between gender and climate change. This can be attributed to factors such as lack of training on inclusive development approaches and the lack of development initiatives that are based on the systematic collection of data disaggregated by sex and age.
- The NDC notes the need to mainstream gender issues into design of climate change-relevant programmes, as women often play an important role in environmental management but are subject to deep inequalities in terms of access to resources.
- The NDC prioritises inclusion of gender considerations in the implementation of mitigation and adaptation interventions through:
 - strengthening the capacity of the ministry in charge of gender and other relevant ministries for gender-sensitive adaptation planning and budgeting
 - mainstreaming gender in climate policies, sustainable development strategies, and climate change-relevant interventions
 - guarantee women's access to decision-making through education, information and economic empowerment.

Land use planning


- The NDC notes land use planning as a key element for the effective planning and implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures.
- It recognises the importance of land use planning in: (1) delivering cost effective climate change interventions; and (2) delivering dual benefits for adaptation and mitigation. It also notes the risks of lock-in to future physical climate risks if planning for infrastructure and housing does not take climate risks into consideration.
- As such, the NDC presents the following two priorities for integrating land use planning in its implementation:
 - need to integrate climate risk considerations into land use and infrastructure planning decisions, particularly in urban areas, and
 - need to integrate land use planning in urban settlements through risk mapping of urban areas to impacts of extreme climate events, climate-resilient building codes and infrastructure upgrades.
- The NDC emphasises the need for early warning systems for floods and droughts to improve community preparedness.

Support needs

Finance

- Chad's NDC provides an estimate of the financing required to implement the adaptation and mitigation measures noted in the NDC: \$5 billion and \$6.7 billion until 2030, respectively (see Figure 6).
- The financing requirements for mitigation are aligned with the unconditional and conditional GHG emissions reduction targets of the NDC. In line with the mitigation actions proposed in the NDC, the financing requirements for unconditional GHG emissions reduction are almost entirely for the energy sector. Financing requirements for conditional GHG emissions reduction are proposed for investments in forestry (51% of investments) and energy sectors (46% of investments).
- The financing requirements for mitigation measures in the energy sector estimate \$111.2 million towards the electricity grid infrastructure in the unconditional scenario even though no mitigation measures are proposed for the improvement or expansion of the electricity grid in this scenario.
- The NDC does not specify if the adaptation component depends entirely on international financing or if some measures will be delivered with domestic financing.
- The NDC also does not explain how the \$5 billion sought for the implementation of the adaptation component will be allocated across the adaptation measures.
- Financing needs for adaptation are not based in the costing of adaptation options listed in the NDC. Instead, the financing needs are estimated as a share of annual GDP (see Box 12).
- Financing needs for mitigation (57% of total financing needs) are larger than those for adaptation measures (43% of total financing needs) (see Figure 6). However, as the NDC notes, there will be co-benefits from investments in the energy and forestry sector for adaptation.
- The NDC notes that the complex and challenging conditions in the country adversely affect the country's ability to attract private sector investment. It acknowledges that the country's ability to attract private sector investment is particularly low.
- The NDC notes that the climate finance landscape specifically has the potential to act as a lever for financing development.

FIGURE 6: FINANCING REQUIREMENT FOR CHAD'S NDC (\$ MILLION)



Source: Government of Chad (2021).

BOX 12: ESTIMATION OF FINANCING NEEDS FOR ADAPTATION IN CHAD'S NDC

The financing needs for adaptation are estimated using a 'top-down' approach, with adaptation needs being a percentage of annual GDP. The NDC notes that this approach is based on global simulations of adaptation needs developed by the UNEP (top-down approach taken from the Adaptation Gap Report), as well as several reports and studies that estimate that the costs of adaptation could be equivalent to an annual loss of between 1.5% and 3% of GDP in Africa by 2030.

The NDC notes that since Chad is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, a share of 3% of GDP has been considered as the annual cost of adaptation. Further, IMF predictions and an annual growth rate of 6% has been used to project GDP until 2030.

TABLE 12: APPROACH FOR ESTIMATION OF ADAPTATION FUNDING REQUIREMENT IN CHAD'S NDC

	Annual GDP growth	GDP (USD billion)	Adaptation finance needs at 3% of GDP (USD million)
2021	IMF estimation	12.531	375.9
2022	IMF estimation	13.269	398.1
2023	IMF estimation	13.98	419.4
2024	IMF estimation	14.96	448.8
2025	IMF estimation	16.01	480.3
2026	IMF estimation	17.03	510.9
2027	6%	18.05	541.5
2028	6%	19.13	573.9
2029	6%	20.28	608.4
2030	6%	21.50	645
Total			5,002.2

Source: Government of Chad (2021).

Capacity-building and technology transfer

- The NDC notes an array of areas where Chad needs capacity-building support to support NDC implementation (see Figure 7).
- Overarching capacity-building needs are:
 - establishment of a National MRV Agency with the objective of establishing a system for regular updates of GHG inventories, definition and reporting of indicators for monitoring mitigation actions, tracking of international support needed and received
 - capacity-building in the field of national statistics and the definition of mitigation actions at the sectoral level
 - capacity-building to mobilise financial resources
 - capacity-building of ministries on climate change.
- In the context of mitigation, capacity-building needs cited in the NDC focus entirely on Chad's capacity needs for delivering reforms and measures for the development of a sustainable energy sector.

- Specific capacity-building needs highlighted in the context of energy reforms and measures are as follows:
 - capacity to deliver electricity sector reforms, increase access to energy and diversify energy sources towards renewable energy
 - institutional capacity-building to facilitate an efficient energy market
 - strengthening local technical skills on renewable energy and energy efficiency
 - improving technical skills for management of energy markets.
- The NDC posits the cost of capacity-building measures for the development of a sustainable energy sector as \$20 million to \$30 million, and notes that capacity-building will be financed through international support.
- No capacity-building needs are indicated for the forestry sector. This calls into question Chad’s capacity to meet the significant amount of climate finance needs indicated for this sector.
- Capacity-building needs for the adaptation component of the NDC are centred largely around building human, institutional, technical and research and development capacity (see Figure 8).

FIGURE 7: REFORMS AND MEASURES NEEDED IN CHAD TO DELIVER THE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SECTOR IN LINE WITH THE MITIGATION COMPONENT OF THE NDC

Electricity sector reforms and infrastructure	Access to energy	Diversification of energy sources	Energy Efficiency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the legal and regulatory framework for the electricity sector • Restructuring of the SNE and review of electricity pricing policy • Reducing the cost of electricity production • Developing and improving electricity distribution and transmission networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrification in cities • Rural electrification through decentralised solutions such as mini-grids or solar kits • Developing alternative solutions to fuelwood for cooking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diversifying electricity generation towards renewable energy • Renewable energy solutions for rural electrification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing a domestic energy efficiency market with focus on domestic and industrial sectors • Improved cookstoves and clean cooking solutions

Source: Authors’ analysis of Chad’s NDC, Government of Chad (2021).


FIGURE 8: CHAD’S CAPACITY-BUILDING NEEDS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ADAPTATION COMPONENT OF NDC

Individual capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skills strengthening (especially for women and farmers) on options for intensified and sustainable production methods • Technology transfer between research organisations and agro-sylvo-pastoral stakeholders
Institutional capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities to address concerns of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, and to mobilise and manage resources
Technical capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of early warning and disaster prevention systems • Construction of protective structures against the impacts of climate change • Capacity of local authorities for participatory development and implementation of adaptation strategies and programmes, and mainstreaming adaptation into municipal plans
Research and Development capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop voluntary carbon trading schemes, mobilise resulting financing, and transparent and equitable profit-sharing mechanisms

Source: Authors’ analysis of Chad’s NDC, Government of Chad (2021).


ANNEX 5: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE IN CHAD

FIGURE 9: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, FISHERIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (MINISTÈRE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DE LA PÊCHE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE)



Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop research and interviews.

FIGURE 10: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE (LA DIRECTION DE LA LUTTE CONTRE LES CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES)



Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop research and interviews.

TABLE 13: OVERVIEW OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPECIFIC DEPARTMENTS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, FISHERIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (MINISTÈRE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DE LA PÊCHE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE)

Responsibilities	
Direction Générale des Services de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable	
La Direction de Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall implementation of climate change policies ▪ Develop national policy, strategies and action plans on climate change ▪ Develop and implement research and capacity-building programmes related to climate in collaboration with relevant government departments ▪ Implement national regulations, agreements, protocols, treaties, and subregional, regional and international conventions relating to climate change
La Direction des Évaluations Environnementales et de la lutte contre les Pollutions et les Nuisances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall implementation of policies on environmental assessments and pollution and nuisance control ▪ Develop, implement and monitor policies and action plans on pollution and nuisance control ▪ Validate strategic environmental assessments, regional or sectoral development plans in collaboration with relevant government departments ▪ Guide promoters in the development of terms of reference for environmental assessments ▪ Organise relief in the event of ecological disasters ▪ Monitor the activities of the organisations relating to pollution and nuisances ▪ Develop and implement research and capacity-building programmes related to environmental assessments and the fight against pollution and nuisances as well as the prevention of ecological risks, in collaboration with relevant government departments ▪ Implement national regulations, agreements, protocols, treaties, and subregional, regional and international conventions relating to environmental assessments, the fight against pollution and nuisances as well as the prevention of ecological risks and disasters

Responsibilities

Direction de la Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques

La Division l'Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques

- Implement national regulations, subregional, regional and international agreements, protocols, treaties and conventions relating to adaptation to the effects of climate change; and climate change
- Draw up and implement strategies, action plans, programmes and projects for adapting to climate change in consultation with the departments concerned
- Establish the country's climate vulnerability on a regular basis, in consultation with the relevant departments
- Identify and disseminate technologies to promote the resilience of populations and ecosystems to climate change
- Design and disseminate tools for scaling up adaptation practices, particularly around climate-smart agriculture
- Supporting climate fund focal points in the selection of bankable climate projects relating to adaptation
- Contributing to the drafting of documents for the NAP, the NDC and national communication
- Participating in the implementation and monitoring of the NAP, the NDC and national communications
- Capitalising on and promoting good practice in adapting to climate change
- Implementing national regulations, agreements, protocols, treaties and subregional, regional and international conventions relating to adaptation to climate change

La Division d'Atténuation des Emissions des Gaz à Effet de Serre

- Implement national regulations, agreements, protocols, treaties and subregional, regional and international conventions relating to the mitigation of the effects of climate change
- Update and monitor the implementation of the national strategy to combat climate change
- Develop and implement the Low Carbon Strategy
- Contribute to the protection of the ozone layer by participating in all initiatives aimed at phasing out ozone depleting substances
- Support the focal structures in the selection of bankable climate projects relating to mitigation
- Draw up an inventory of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and mitigation measures in the country's various bioclimatic zones
- Monitor GHG elimination measures in collaboration with the departments concerned
- Coordinate GHG inventories in collaboration with the departments concerned
- Monitor the activities of all the NDAs for the clean development mechanism (CDM) and climate funds
- Coordinating the preparation and dissemination of National Communications, Biennial Update Reports, etc
- Coordinate the development and implementation of the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) project
- Developing research and capacity-building programmes in the field of GHG mitigation

Responsibilities	
Direction de la Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques (cont.)	
La Division des Etudes de la Formation et de Développement des Projets, Suivi et Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identify and capitalise on best practice techniques for mitigating greenhouse gases and adapting to climate change ▪ Develop and validate innovative projects to combat climate change ▪ Monitor and evaluate the activities implemented by the DLCCC ▪ Research and propose topics and training modules related to climate change to be incorporated into school and university curricula in collaboration with the departments concerned
La Division de Services Généraux	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Administrative management ▪ Personnel and equipment management ▪ Centralise and archive documentation ▪ Draw up, implement and monitor the Directorate's budget ▪ Promote the mobilisation of climatic financial resources ▪ Produce activity reports
La Division des Statistiques Climatiques et de la Base des Données	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Administer the Climate Change Database ▪ Coordinate the collection, processing and communication of sectoral statistical data relating to climate change, in collaboration with the departments concerned ▪ Draw up a guide to climate statistics ▪ Maintain and update the Climate Change Database

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

National Committee on Climate Change

The National Committee on Climate Change is a committee designed to oversee the implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It is in charge of:

- putting forward options and recommendations on the definition and the implementation of national policies on climate change
- following the implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol
- making recommendations and participating to a certain extent in activities to raise awareness, inform and educate the public on climate change.

The committee includes representatives of public institutions, private and civil society. This includes the President (Secretary-General of the Ministry of Environment and Fishing), Vice-Presidents (VPs) (Secretary-General Joint of the Minister of Agriculture, the Director of the National Meteorology and Civil Aviation Ministry, Director of the Ministry of Petrol and Energy). Rapporteurs include the Director-General of the Environment for the DLCCC, and the Secretary-General of the Environment.

The committee is drawn from a wide variety of ministerial representatives, as well as representatives from key climate projects (Coordinator of the Global Alliance Against Climate Change, Director of the FSE), civil society (a representative from the Chamber of Commerce of Industry, Agriculture, Mines and Artisans), and NGOs (Association for Fulani Women in Tchad, a representative from the Association for the Protection and Conservation of Flora and Fauna).

The committee is expected to meet every time it is necessary but certainly one month before and two weeks after each COP meeting to first prepare the participation of Chad on the COP agenda and after to assess the implications of the decisions taken at the COP.

Permanent Committee on COP

This committee oversees the preparation and participation of Chad at the COP. It has the mandate to:

- coordinate and supervise all activities relevant to participation, and validating the work programme elaborated by the committee of experts for the preparation of the COP
- identify and document Chad's position on agenda items for the COP and in forums
- coordinate and orient negotiations on the different conventions
- evaluate and propose financial resources necessary for the activities of preparation
- advocate to partners and financiers
- follow up and implement recommendations from the COP and forums, including production of a technical and financial report on Chad's preparation for and participation in these.

The committee includes a president, three VPs and four rapporteurs. These are mainly from the Ministry of Environment (MoE) (one VP is the technical advisor in charge of the environment for the President). Other committee members include the Minister of Energy, and focal points for the UNFCCC, and the Conventions on Biological Diversity and the Fight against Desertification. Members also include representatives from the Ministries of Livestock, Water, the National Transition Council, as well as two NGO civil society representatives. Regulations do not give any detail on how often the committee meets, only mandating that the government keeps up to date with its work.

TABLE 14: CHAD'S NDA TO GCF

Structure	Composition	Mandate	Frequency of meeting
Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ President: The Minister of Planning ▪ First Vice-President: Ministry of Environment (Le Ministre en charge de l' Environnement) ▪ Second Vice-President: Minister of Finance ▪ Minister of Agriculture ▪ Minister of Livestock ▪ Minister for Meteorology ▪ Minister for International Cooperation ▪ Minister of Land Planning ▪ Minister of Energy ▪ Minister of Water ▪ Minister Secretary-General of Government ▪ Environment Adviser to the President of the Republic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adopt the work plans, annual budgets and activity reports of the NDA ▪ Adopt the guidelines and procedures for selecting projects to submit to the GCF ▪ Supervise the implementation of the activities of the NDA and stakeholders ▪ Ensure synergy and complementarity of other projects in environmental and sustainable development matters, subject to technical and financial oversight ▪ Check the consistency of project documents submitted with national strategies and the requirements and areas of intervention due to the GCF ▪ Arbitrate conflicts between stakeholders in the GCF process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Twice a year in ordinary session upon convocation by its President ▪ May meet in extraordinary session on summoning of its President (if necessary)
Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal point for the GCF acts as Secretariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prepare the organisation of materials for the steering committee, producing notes for the meetings ▪ Prepare the budget for the NDA ▪ Notify relevant structures of the Steering Committee's decisions 	(Not applicable)

Structure	Composition	Mandate	Frequency of meeting
Technical Committee for the Examination and Evaluation of Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ President: Director-General of the Environment ▪ First VP: representative from the Ministry of the Economy ▪ Second VP: civil society representative ▪ Rapporteur: focal point for vertical climate funds (VCFs) ▪ Members include representatives from the Ministries of Environment, Agriculture, Livestock, Energy, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Women, and Public Health. Representatives from within the various branches of the Ministry of Environment (the branches of sustainable development, environmental evaluations, water resources and GGW) also sit on the committee ▪ The committee includes a range of NGO representatives: Cellule de Liaison et d'Information des Associations Féminines (CELIAF), LEAD Tchad, L'Agence de Développement Économique et Social (ADES), Coordination des associations de la Société Civile et de Défense de Droits de l'Homme (CASCIDHO), Conseil National des Femmes Leaders du Tchad (CONAF), and Espace Vert du Sahel ▪ Private sector representatives will be drawn from the Chamber of Commerce and Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure compliance with the GCF's eligibility guidelines, social, gender and environmental protection aspects in project selection ▪ Apply the guidelines and procedures for the evolution and selection of projects to be submitted to the GCF ▪ Implement the project development and selection grid ▪ Select the projects to be submitted to the Steering Committee for approval 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Once a trimester in ordinary session ▪ May meet in extraordinary session on the summoning of the President

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

TABLE 15: CHAD'S NATIONAL DESIGNATED AUTHORITY FOR THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (AND-MDP)

Structure	Composition	Mandate	Frequency of meeting
Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ President: Director-General of the Ministry of Environment ▪ VPs: Director General of Ministry of Planning, General Director of the Ministry of Energy ▪ Ministry of Water ▪ Ministry of International Cooperation ▪ Ministry of Finance ▪ Ministry of Land Planning ▪ Ministry of Agriculture ▪ Ministry of Meteorology ▪ Ministry of Livestock ▪ Director of the Combatting Climate Change Department, Ministry of Environment ▪ The Focal Point for the UNFCCC ▪ A private sector representative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordinate the creation and diffusion of texts and tools for the function of the NDA ▪ Receive the projects submitted to the NDA, coordinate the assessment and deliver results to the promoters of the projects ▪ Ensure the follow-up and implementation of the MDP and the financialisation of carbon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Officially meeting twice a year; this can happen more if the President wishes
Technical Committee for the Examination and Evaluation of Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A wide range of ministerial representatives (including from Ministries of Environment, Mining, Higher Education, Women, and Public Health) ▪ Representatives from specific projects including the FNE and the GGW ▪ Representatives from NGOs (CELLIAF,¹⁷ LEAD Tchad, CASCIDHO,¹⁸ ADESKA, CONAF¹⁹) ▪ Representative from the private sector from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Examine and issue technical and reasoned opinions on project applications forwarded to it by the Executive Secretariat ▪ Participate in the drafting and validation of texts and tools relating to the functioning of the AND-MDP in Chad ▪ Prepare and submit reports and programmes of activities to the Steering Committee of the AND-MDP in Chad ▪ Participate in the dissemination of information on the AND-MDP in Chad ▪ Contribute to the capitalisation of the interventions of the actors in the field of the AND-MDP in Chad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Twice a year

Source: Authors' analysis based on desktop review and interviews.

17 CELLIAF: Cellule de Liaison et d'Information des Associations Feminines

18 CASCIDHO: Coordination des Associations de la Société Civile et de Défense de Droits de l'Homme

19 CONAF: Conseil National des Femmes Leaders du Tchad

ANNEX 6: ACTIVITIES OF SELECT DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND ORGANISATIONS

This annex presents the activities of select development partners as gathered during interviews.

European Union (EU)

EU cooperation in Chad is governed by the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Chad for 2021–2024. This covers three priority areas. They are linked to the EU's Global Gateway Strategy: Governance, Democratisation, Peace and Security; inclusive human development; and the Green Pact.

The Green Pact involves support for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems, and sustainable rural development. Latter support targets the promotion of modernised agriculture, and accessible agri-business. Team Europe in Chad includes the EU, the European Investment Bank (EIB) (through bilateral partnerships with the EU), France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain.

By way of specific activities, EU support in Chad comprises contributions to the Great Green Wall (GGW) flagship initiative through actions around the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems and the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative (GCCA+) (Alliance Mondiale Contre le Changement Climatique or AMCC+ in CHAD project).

Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative (GCCA+) in Chad

The first phase of AMCC+ ran from 2013 to 2019. The main activities during this phase were as follows:

- support for the development of the planned nationally determined contribution for COP21
- support for the integration of adaptation and mitigation issues into the National Development Plan of Chad 2017–2021
- calculation of the CO₂ emission factor of the national electricity network
- development of master plans for the deployment of renewable energy
- support for the development of the national strategy to combat climate change
- facilitation of the accreditation process of the FSE to the Adaptation Fund (AF)

- development of a concept note for a project on the resilience of communities and ecosystems worth €8 million to be submitted to the GCF
- establishment of a monitoring system for the implementation of the PANA or NAPA
- collaborative development of a climate change education guide for sustainable development in Chad
- coaching and support for Chad's climate negotiators and support for Chad's participation in COP21 to COP24.

Phase 2 of the AMCC+ is running from 2020 to 2024, with support due to conclude in May 2024. The objectives of this phase are as follows:

- Strengthening institutions in charge of climate change responses to mobilise climate finance, and coordinate, implement and monitor policies, strategies and plans for adaptation and climate change mitigation in the context of the Paris Climate Agreement, the 2030 Agenda and the climate negotiation process.
- Supporting mobilisation of innovative financing through public–private partnerships for strengthening climate resilience at the local level.

Specific activities included in this phase are as follows:

- Facilitate coordination, consultation and advocacy around the NDC.
- Write proposals to mobilise international climate funds.
- Support the Ministry of Energy in the operationalisation of the national agency 'ADERME' for the establishment of a regulatory framework and fiscal and financial incentives favourable to private sector investment in renewable energy.
- Strengthen monitoring and evaluation capacities of the administration staff in charge of education on environmental and climate change issues.
- Strengthen institutional and legal instruments at the local level for adaptation to climate change and sustainable natural resource management.
- Support the integration of a climate resilience dimension into planning, budgeting and monitoring systems in the three pilot local authorities.
- Strengthen youth and women's capacity to access adaptation financing and build local climate resilience.
- Implement funding schemes for pilot community-based climate adaptation and resilience projects.

The field projects being supported by AMCC+ are as follows:

- Support for climate governance, agricultural production adapted to climate change, and the empowerment of women and young people in the Lac Province being implemented by SOS Sahel International Chad and the Association for the Promotion of Women and Girls of Grand Kanem.
- 'Dynamisation' of innovative practices of intelligent agriculture resilient to climate change in the Mandoul Province, being implemented by MORIJA, RAPS-Development and APROFIKA. Consolidate intelligent breeding practices adapted to climate shocks while promoting the processing, conservation and marketing of products of animal origin in the Salamat Province being implemented by SAHEL-ECODEV, INADES Formation and FORES.

AMCC+ is supporting the mapping of programmes and projects linked to mitigation and adaptation to climate change, with the objective to constitute a database and information on actions implemented in the field of mitigation, adaptation and past and current climate support in Chad. This study includes the following:

- An inventory and evaluation of low-carbon solutions developed by these programmes and projects in the priority sectors identified by the NDC.
- An inventory and analysis of adaptation actions that contribute to strengthen the resilience of communities and ecosystems and the level of achievement of adaptation objectives.
- An inventory and analysis of forms of financial and technical support as well as support in terms of capacity-building and technology transfer received by Chad.

UNHCR

UNHCR activities in the context of climate resilience include the following:

- Collaboration with the Ministries of: Water (focused on improving access to water); Agriculture (Rural Engineering Department); and Environment (focused on reforestation and clean cooking).
- Collaboration with ADES on issues of reforestation and cooking energy.
- Collaboration with GIZ on surface water mobilisation, amongst other issues.

UNHCR is also understood to be engaged in discussions with the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UNDP on various projects and activities within the remit of climate action.

WFP

WFP activities in the context of climate resilience include the following:

- The Agina project (meaning 'it's ours' in Chadian Arabic) that is working to empower refugee and host populations in 9 out of 11 provinces that are home to refugees in Chad.²⁰ An agricultural programme with a land rehabilitation component targeting 100,000 ha to support agriculture for refugees and subsequently access to markets. Activities include spreading weirs, dikes, drilling and wells, land rehabilitation activities, reforestation, and co-generative activities, such as production of beehives and fish farming where access to land is not necessarily possible.
- Social protection measures to support the government's capacity and to build a more integrated approach to land restoration.
- Support access to climate finance, although WFP is covering Chad under multi-country projects.

IOM

IOM activities in the context of climate resilience include research on the link between migration and climate change, and facilitating the inclusion of human mobility in development policies and response strategies. This research is gaining traction with the government, which is placing emphasis on the growing number of refugees in Chad and implications for food safety.

²⁰ WFP noted that it was not possible to work in the other two provinces due to donor restrictions.

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Cover: Guelta d'Archei waterhole near oasis, Ennedi Plateau, Chad, Africa.
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