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EXPLORING CONFLICT BLIND SPOTS IN CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE IN THE SAHEL AND HORN OF AFRICA

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ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
AEDD	Agence de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (Mali)
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFD	Agence française de développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANICT	Agence Nationale d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (Mali)
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Mali)
AS	al-Shabab
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid land
BOAD	Banque Ouest-Africaines de Développement
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
BZ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands)
CAF	Conflict analysis framework
CCA	Climate change adaptation
CSCRIP	Cadre Stratégique pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté
CFU	Climate Funds Update
CMDT	Compagnie Malienne de Développement du Textile (Mali)
CPC	Crop Protection Committees (Sudan)
CSO	civil society organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Papers
DCF	Decentralised Climate Finance
EbA	ecosystem-based adaptation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EWS	early warning system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)
FCAS	fragile and conflict-affected situations
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
G7	Group of Seven
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEF IEO	Global Environmental Agency Independent Evaluation Office
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission (Sudan)
HCENR	Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (Sudan)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association

IDP	Internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITCZ	Intertropical Convergence Zone
IWRM	Integrated water resources management
KII	Key informant interview
LDC	least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
MCF	Mali Climate Fund
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MET	Meteorological
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Netherlands)
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali)
NAP	National adaptation plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCCD	National Council for Combating Desertification (Sudan)
NCE	National Council for Environment (Sudan)
NDA	National Designated Authorities (GCF)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	non-governmental organisation
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	The Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
PFM	Public finance management
PNCC	National Policy on Climate Change (Mali)
PRC	peace and reconciliation committee (Sudan)
PVE	Prevent violent extremism
RED	Research and Evidence Division
RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
RW4S	Rural Water for Sudan
SAP	state adaptation plan (Sudan)
SAVE	Save the Children
SDR	Stratégie de Développement Rural
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPARC	Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crisis
SSNRMP	Sudan Sustainable Natural Resources Management Project
STAR	System for Transparent Allocation of Resources
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TOC	Theory of change

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WMC	Water management committee
YPAG	Youth peace ambassador group

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This working paper, conducted under the Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crisis (SPARC) programme funded by the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), explores two areas:

1. Whether and how climate adaptation programmes have been conflict-sensitive in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS).
2. The barriers and enablers to increasing adaptation finance in these contexts.

The paper is based on an analysis of donor approaches to conflict sensitivity in the Sahel and Horn of Africa – a region with a large concentration of highly climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected countries – and a deep dive of findings from the application of such approaches to climate adaptation investments in Mali, Somalia and Sudan.

This is a companion piece to the report *Exploring the conflict blind spots in climate adaptation finance – synthesis report* (Cao et al., 2021), which provides key insights and recommendations based on the comprehensive findings presented in this working paper.

The problem this working paper addresses

In many FCAS, climate change and conflict tend to interact with each other, compounding risks and challenges for sustainable development. While not directly causing conflict, climate impacts can exacerbate issues that drive conflict, such as the degradation of natural capital and livelihood assets, infrastructure damage, food insecurity and migration. Conflict, in turn, can amplify the impacts of climate change by increasing the exposure and vulnerability of communities and institutions to climate-related hazards and lowering their capacity to adapt.

Despite this relationship, there is limited evidence to date that climate adaptation programmes are being implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner. Additionally, multilateral climate funds and some bilateral donors tend not to allocate funds in FCAS, seemingly due to the perceived higher risks and challenges. This results in what amounts to 'blind spots' that both increase the risk of ill-designed adaptation programmes which precipitate grievances and conflict situations, causing unintended harm, and prevent adaptation finance from reaching those who are arguably most in need of support.

Findings

The study finds that there remains a lack of donor strategies and policies linking climate change to conflict and fragility, as well as a lack of expertise and incentives to cultivate human resources to support work at this nexus. Learnings from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the World Bank (WB) clearly illustrate the negative impacts of a lack of conflict-sensitivity guidance for climate and environmental projects in FCAS, and the need for strategies that put conflict and fragility front and centre in these contexts to be impactful and sustained (GEF IEO, 2020; WB, 2020a).

Within countries, donors have tended to approach conflict sensitivity by avoiding militia-controlled areas and those areas where insecurity and conflict levels have been deemed too high. While climate finance is not intended to directly address the complex dynamics of insecurity or political conflict involving jihadist and terrorist armed groups, avoiding such areas has resulted in highly vulnerable populations not being reached by adaptation projects. This tendency is influenced by donors' risk perceptions and risk-management processes, with some seemingly more comfortable operating in less secure areas or continuing engagement when the security context worsens.

The lack of dedicated strategies and policies that address the nexus of climate change and conflict and fragility among donors has also resulted in requirements for accessing climate finance to be too complex and rigid for national institutions. This is especially the case for the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Despite different measures to address access problems – including the Readiness Programme, a dedicated funding stream to enhance direct access for national organisations and a 'simplified approval process' pilot – considerable obstacles persist.

The analysis of adaptation programmes in Mali, Somalia and Sudan produced weak evidence of conflict-sensitive practices. Programme proposals did not provide consistent evidence that conflict analyses informed project design and implementation throughout the programme duration. When projects carried out conflict analyses, the quality of these assessments – especially in considering the climate and conflict nexus – needed improvement, as local power dynamics were often missed.

Conflict risk analyses also tended to focus more on the operational hazards – what an escalation in conflict might cause to an adaptation intervention – and less on the potential impacts of the intervention on conflict dynamics. In other words, most projects focused on being 'security aware'. Addressing security challenges involved relocating project activities where possible or avoiding certain areas in the country, plus contingency plans for outbreaks of conflict in conjunction with local conflict resolution mechanisms, including continuously updating site security, regularly training staff and beneficiaries, and accounting for cultural norms and internal dynamics in investment areas.

Mali

Mali experiences complex, overlapping conflict dynamics between widespread banditry, historic communal rivalries and tensions, targeted rebel attacks on civilians and the Malian army, and overly militarised anti-terrorism responses from the Malian government and international allies. Given this context, access to certain areas that are under control by jihadist groups is severely limited for both adaptation and development programmes. Climate change is viewed as an accelerator of communal conflict dynamics, and jihadist and political conflict tend to overlay and draw upon communal conflict for their political objectives. Reducing inter-communal land-use disputes, therefore, has been seen as an opportunity and entry point for several climate adaptation programmes to contribute towards creating sustainable development (addressing the consequences of displacement and pressures on public services in the south) and to reducing poverty in rural areas by enhancing the resilience of landscapes and the natural resource base. Simultaneously, adaptation efforts attempt to stimulate employment creation and improvements in living conditions, which make joining rebel or armed groups less desirable.

Somalia

Climate adaptation finance is primarily programmed for development and humanitarian activities that align with Somalia's National Development Plan (NDP) (version 9) (Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2020). The GCF and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) programmes focus on the country's environmental and disaster risks around water, agriculture and natural resource management. Among funding packages, significant attention is increasingly paid to capacity-building and governance coordination. Among bilateral and multilateral donors, with exceptions, climate and conflict are usually addressed as cross-cutting issues, recognised yet not described explicitly and addressed systematically. When conflict concerns territorial control by al-Shabab or other militia groups, adaptation finance has no possibility of being allocated. If a project is working in an area that a militant group overruns, the work stops. When conflict is between rival clans or other groups, projects proceed, and conflict mitigation is usually based on in-house tools and processes among donors and implementing agencies. These involve local knowledge, community authorities, and consultation to solve problems and allow work to continue. Capacity in government and civil society is rising, urbanisation is increasing, and a diaspora is returning to Somalia with funds and technical resources. A foundation is being built that can be harnessed to develop a cohesive, system-based approach to climate adaptation across Somalia.

Sudan

In Sudan, climate adaptation investments have primarily focused on addressing food insecurity, which is one of the country's contextual approaches to building climate resilience. Across the agriculture, water and land-use sectors, adaptation investments have included locations prone to flairs in communal conflict due to the strong linkage between climate, conflict and forced displacement. Natural resource management and climate-smart agriculture have shown to be key entry points to address the intertwined threats that local communities face. Bilateral and multilateral entities, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have been heavily supporting the Government of Sudan to access and implement adaptation finance or adaptation-related activities. These supporting parties have mainly acted as the implementing and executing entities of projects in close collaboration with the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) and other relevant ministries. Government institutions responsible for environmental management suffer from instability, underfunding, a lack of staffing and training, poor coordination, overlapping roles and the loss of skilled personnel to brain drain. Even though Sudan's government may have low capacity, it has shown to be iteratively improving climate policy and plans – through its nationally determined contribution (NDC), a national adaptation plan (NAP) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). The new HCENR has meant that the climate agenda is now chaired by the Prime Minister. However, despite being championed centrally, it is unclear how much attention the agenda is getting and will have across federal and state government and, in turn, how this will influence the effectiveness of future climate investments, including those for adaptation.

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION



This working paper forms a part of the SPARC programme that aims to generate evidence and address knowledge gaps to build the resilience of millions of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. It is a companion piece to the report *Exploring the conflict blind spots in climate adaptation finance – synthesis report* (Cao et al., 2021), which provides key insights and recommendations based on the comprehensive findings presented in this working paper. Together, both studies seek to address two primary research questions:

1. How can the design and delivery of climate adaptation programmes be improved so that they help reduce risk related to both climate and conflict?

2. How can climate adaptation finance for FCAS be increased?

This paper documents a regional analysis of donor approaches to implement adaptation finance in FCAS in the Sahel and East Africa. This is followed by three country case studies on Mali, Somalia and Sudan that offer a brief yet focused introduction to climate change adaptation (CCA)-financed programmes and their level of conflict sensitivity, as well as the barriers and enablers for adaptation financing in these contexts. The sections can be read as stand-alone analyses or the working paper can be read in its entirety. For a full synthesis of findings, we refer the reader to the companion report.

1.1 THE CHALLENGE

Climate change is ‘a “threat multiplier”, accelerating pressures on fragile states and challenging their capacity to manage change’ (DFID, 2016: 16). Whilst the objective of climate adaptation finance is to build climate resilience in climate-vulnerable areas, and it is not mandated to deal with conflict nor peace-building, climate adaptation finance *is* mandated to target the most climate-vulnerable populations – many of which are living in contexts affected by, or at risk of, conflict. Between 2004 and 2014, 58% of disaster deaths took place in the world’s 30 most fragile states, and figures of people affected are often unreported or vastly underreported, which suggests that the real impact is much greater (Peters and Budimir, 2016). Given climate change is a risk multiplier in FCAS, climate finance allocation to such countries needs to be conflict-sensitive.

1.2 WHAT KIND OF CONFLICT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

Conflict exists on a spectrum, across which actual violence ranges from high intensity to invisible. It is also contextual, affected by the nature of states and those engaged in, and affected by, conflict. Yet conflict is largely absent from CCA programming approaches, and the mechanisms set up to access climate finance may dissuade spending in contexts that include weak governance, insecurity, ongoing crisis, contested politics and otherwise divided societies.


1.3 WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘CONFLICT SENSITIVITY’?

In general, conflict sensitivity comprises three essential components (Saferworld, 2008):

- a comprehensive understanding of the operational context
- a holistic understanding of the two-way interaction between interventions and the conflict context
- a commitment both to avoid reinforcing conflict dynamics and to maximise opportunities for positive impacts.

Little research exists on whether climate adaptation finance has been conflict-sensitive. To our knowledge, the only review to date that assesses the application of conflict sensitivity to environmental and climate adaptation programmes has been the *Evaluation of GEF support in fragile and conflict-affected situations* (Cao et al., 2021). The findings presented in this working paper therefore offer a first exploration of conflict sensitivity via three case study countries in the Sahel and East Africa. In turn, the composite findings are considered alongside the perspectives of donors in the region.

SECTION 2
METHODOLOGY



A mixed-method research approach was used for this study that combined:

1. a brief literature review of the climate-conflict nexus and established conflict-sensitive programming approaches
2. descriptive analyses of climate adaptation finance flows both at the regional and country levels
3. an in-depth qualitative assessment of conflict sensitivity in climate adaptation programme design documentation accompanied by key informant interviews (KIIs).

The following 12 countries were selected for regional-level analysis: Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. These countries are among the most climate-vulnerable¹ and fragile states² in the world and fall within SPARC's geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa.

Country selection for the case studies (Mali, Somalia and Sudan) was based on climate adaptation finance volumes committed to each country, to maximise the chances of capturing existing experience and learnings, and on different categorisations of conflict, to have a representative range of conflict contexts.

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review provided in the synthesis report (Cao et al., 2021) was based on a search for academic and grey literature utilising a combination of the following keywords in search strings on Google Scholar: 'conflict sensitivity', 'climate finance', 'climate adaptation' and 'adaptation finance'. The results were filtered manually to include studies on the adoption of conflict sensitivity in climate adaptation programmes and finance.

2.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE FINANCE AND CONFLICT DATA

Analysis of climate finance flows

Publicly available data on adaptation flows between 2010 and 2018 for bilateral donors and multilateral development banks were taken from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) database³ and

the Climate Funds Update (CFU) database.⁴ Only climate adaptation finance flows tagged as 'principal' were included in the analysis. 'Committed' adaptation flows from multilateral climate funds from 2010 to 2018 were taken from the CFU database.

Conflict data

Publicly available conflict data were obtained from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project's (ACLED) database to calculate the number of fatalities per conflict event.

2.3 QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS OF ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES

Selection of programmes

A list of historic (from 2016) or ongoing adaptation programmes for Mali, Somalia and Sudan was obtained from the OECD and CFU websites. The following inclusion criteria were used to select a variety of adaptation programmes:

- funding must have been received (or committed, not pledged)
- 2016 – onwards
- national programmes, not multi-country or transboundary
- must be CCA-focused.

Duplicates were identified and removed. Programmes were sorted according to volume of investment. Approximately 10 programmes, with the largest investments (in volume), from a variety of donors were selected for each of the case study countries.

Detailed adaptation project data were then obtained by scanning the following multilateral and bilateral donor websites:⁵

- The GEF
- The GCF
- The Adaptation Fund (AF)
- The LDCF

- The WB
- The FCDO DevTracker
- The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
- L'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) (the French Development Agency)
- The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ) (the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Documentation was additionally received and reviewed as a result of the KIIs, including concept notes or proposals for programmes planned to begin in 2021.

Project proposals, concept notes, logical frameworks, social and environmental assessments, gender assessments, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports (where available) were analysed according to a coding framework developed to capture information on conflict sensitivity, barriers and enablers, and other categories of information structured around the two overarching research questions. Information from these documents was used to inform the direction and content of the KIIs where relevant.

2.4 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KIIs)

KIIs were held at two levels: with donors at the regional or headquarters level and with stakeholders at the country level (this includes donors, accredited entities, implementing entities, executing entities – see Table 1 for a description).

TABLE 1: TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN CLIMATE FUND ADAPTATION FINANCE PROJECTS

Entity	Description
Accredited entity ^a	Climate funds channel funding for climate actions in developing countries through accredited entities. Accredited entities can be international, regional, national and sub-national entities, including public and commercial banks; international and bilateral development agencies; ministries or other government agencies; private sector actors; and other NGOs. They have to apply for accreditation and fulfil accreditation requirements set by the climate fund, such as environmental, social and gender safeguards and financial and project management principles and standards.
Implementing entity ^b	Entities that manage investments and usually have the following functions (can include accredited entity): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ identification of projects ▪ preparation of project concepts ▪ appraisal of project concepts ▪ preparation of project documents ▪ approvals and start-up of projects ▪ supervision of projects ▪ evaluation of projects ▪ accountability to decision-maker for use of funds
Executing entity ^c	Entities that carry out activities of the investment and usually have the following functions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ management and administration of day-to-day project activities ▪ procurement and contracting of goods and services ▪ accountability to implementing body for use of funds

Source: a) WB (2021a); b) ODI authors; c) ODI authors.



Women and children carrying jerrycans filled with water on their backs-Melbana Village-Oromia Region.
Photo: ©UNICEF Ethiopia/2011/Lemma | CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

2.5 SELECTION OF REGIONAL DONORS

Initial analysis from the OECD bilateral climate funding and CFU showed the following funders contributed the most to climate adaptation investments across the countries of focus from 2016 to 2018: two international climate funds (the GCF and LDCF), three bilateral donors (the UK, Germany and France) and one multilateral donor (WB). In the end, interviews were secured with the UK, France, the Netherlands and the WB, as well as two regional donor organisations – the Sahel Alliance and the Sahara and Sahel Observatory – while relying on in-depth studies to document the experience of the LDCF (managed by the GEF).

2.6 SELECTION OF COUNTRY-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS

Relevant programme staff were identified during the review of programme documents, and snowball sampling from key in-country contacts was used to reach a variety of country-level stakeholders. Interviews were semi-structured, lasting approximately 40–60 minutes, held in English for Somalia, Sudan and regionally; and held in French or English for Mali.

TABLE 2: INTERVIEWEES

Perspective	Number of key informants interviewed	Number of key informants contacted	Stakeholders involved
Regional	11	15	Donors, alliance members
Mali	8	29	Donor country office staff; accredited entity; executing entity; implementing agency
Somalia	9	14	Donor country office staff; accredited entity; executing entity; implementing agency
Sudan	13	15	Donor country office staff; accredited entity; executing entity; implementing agency

2.7 OVERALL ANALYSIS

Programme documentation and transcripts from KIIs were analysed according to the coding framework (see approach in report 'references'). The regional analysis and literature review enabled a composite evaluation of relevant themes extracted from the three country case studies. This is represented in the conclusions section of this study.

2.8 LIMITATIONS

Whilst a substantial number of key informants were contacted to participate in interviews, the final number of interviewees was more limited. Although perspectives were sought from government and local NGOs in Mali and Somalia, their participation could not be secured due to limited availability of the respective staff, whom had other pressing concerns. Some perspectives from government were gathered for Sudan. Therefore, overall findings on barriers and enablers do not necessarily represent the perspectives of the government nor local NGOs.

The project documentation review was not exhaustive as there was limited, inconsistent publicly available access to documents; however, project proposals and concept notes were consistently available and analysed across all case study countries. Project M&E reporting, logical frameworks, theories of change (TOC) and impact assessments were largely unavailable publicly and could not be obtained within the timeframe of this study. Also, this study could not analyse the effectiveness of different adaptation programmes in conflict contexts.

SECTION 3
**FINDINGS:
REGIONAL DONORS**



The following section presents the findings from the KII and the review of donor strategies and guidelines and the limited project documentation for the five main regional donors: the FCDO, GEF, AFD, BZ and WB. The analysis describes how each donor is adopting conflict sensitivity in climate programmes *on paper*; this is not an assessment of whether these approaches have been systematically implemented in project portfolios, due to the limited documentation available publicly.

3.1 DONOR APPROACHES TO CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

The five donors analysed in this section have adopted diverse approaches to conflict sensitivity. The BZ and FCDO do not have formal mechanisms to render initiatives conflict-sensitive, but they have established informal processes to consider the country and local conflict context through part of or the entirety of programmes. The BZ relies on the availability and interest of policy officers, advisers and implementing partners, while the FCDO has established central rules around 'do no harm' and risk management, as well as guidance to integrate conflict sensitivity in programming to complement its implicit system. The GEF mainly relies upon the regulations and policies of implementing partners where they exist. The WB has created a new strategy targeting FCAS to pursue its dual objective of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity (WB, 2020a). The AFD has created a dedicated fund, the Peace and Resilience Fund – 'Minka' – to mainstream conflict sensitivity across its portfolio of programmes and projects in the Sahel, countries around Lake Chad, the Central African Republic and the Middle East .

All five donors have established minimum standards to avoid causing harm (the 'do no harm' principle), while the WB and the AFD go beyond this by addressing the drivers of conflict to proactively build peace. The BZ takes yet another step further towards stabilisation activities by pursuing opportunities to prevent violent extremism (PVE) through development interventions.

The approaches have been developed to support wider development programming and are not necessarily specific to CCA (or mitigation). For several institutions, both conflict and climate change are cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed into programmes, and mechanisms have been set up accordingly for each. Depending on how these mechanisms interact in programme design and delivery, the resulting level of conflict sensitivity in adaptation projects may vary.

3.2 THE FCDO

The UK's FCDO adopts an implicit system to conflict sensitivity, relying on praxis that is based on the expertise of FCDO thematic advisors. The approach is generally minimalist (i.e., 'do no harm'), though there are projects specifically designed for peace-building (where it is a key outcome or impact) when opportunities exist. For instance, the water catchment community groups created to manage water access tensions between settled farmers and nomadic pastoralists in the Rural Water for Sudan (RW4S) project⁶ (2015–2020) led to communities using the platform for broader conflict discussions. In this case, the fact that water is a less contentious entry point than land helped to create the necessary trust to address conflict (KII1 Donor, 2021). In general, the UK recognises the climate, natural resources and conflict nexus in its aid programming and has identified five entry points to prevent conflict (DFID, 2016):

1. fair power structures
2. inclusive economic development
3. conflict resolution mechanisms
4. effective and legitimate institutions
5. resilience to transnational stresses.

Programme ideas are initiated and led by FCDO advisors based on their technical expertise (e.g., climate, governance, livelihoods and conflict) and through interactions with stakeholders. Once an initial concept note is approved, the business case development stage offers an opportunity to bring in other thematic advisors to consider cross-cutting issues, including climate, conflict or gender. This stage allows a more in-depth analysis of operations and intended impact, where, for example, there can be a proposal of conflict-sensitive delivery mechanisms for the conflict context. The business case is then reviewed by the Quality Assurance Unit, which has the option to reach out to its own networks, including conflict experts, and request amendments (which it would usually do if the proposed business case is in a FCAS country and there is no mention of the conflict context) (KII1 Donor, 2021).

After approval of the business case, several workshops are run at the regional, sub-regional or thematic level to create a TOC, incorporating thematic (conflict) expertise. At this stage, evidence reviews can be commissioned to inform the TOC, including conflict analyses. Throughout implementation, FCDO programmes seek to maintain flexibility to adapt to changes in the operational context by, for instance, the flexible use of budget within activity codes and revising financing agreements with the implementer (KII1 Donor, 2021). Projects can also have contingency budget lines by design – a practice that has been piloted in the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme (2014–2019) with positive results and learning (Peters and Pichon, 2017). For example, RW4S has a contingency line for emergency response that constitutes 12% of the overall budget. The level of flexibility in the project depends on the implementing partner; due to its need to work with other donors, a multi-donor trust fund is less flexible than a bilateral implementer (KII1 Donor, 2021). While working with the former, FCDO tries to engage more with conflict sensitivity at the policy level.

Conflict risks are considered in the FCDO Programme Risk Registry and updated during annual reviews against the changing operational context, though there is no explicit requirement to consider conflict risks in all projects. Once interventions begin, the annual review process provides an opportunity to involve thematic advisors and to account for ongoing conflict sensitivities and make adjustments where required. Operational changes can also happen throughout the year based on the regular reporting from the implementer. As a donor, the FCDO also relies on the safeguards of implementing partners, while seeking to influence them to consider conflict issues or improve conflict-sensitive policies.

While this FCDO system has implicit checks and balances arising from the professional ethos of the civil service, it is nonetheless limited by the availability of thematic advisors who may have competing priorities. The system is supported by a career incentive policy where 30% of advisors' individual performance is gained through courses and training (which would include courses on conflict sensitivity) and 10% on duties outside one's direct role, such as reviewing concept notes and programmes from other thematic areas (KII1 Donor, 2021). Learning is generally supported by events open to cadres at different levels (managing director and thematic areas), including new areas such as climate and conflict. Additionally, the Research and Evidence Division (RED) also supports knowledge generation on these issues by funding research initiatives and sitting on the boards of research councils such as the UK Research and Innovation and Natural Environment Research Council – although the level of influence that RED has is limited due to the separation from projects on the ground. In spite of all this, however, courses and training alone may not be enough to incentivise a deep understanding of context without substantive and nuanced analysis of the complexities at the national and sub-national levels to inform programme design.

3.3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF)

The GEF approach to conflict sensitivity has almost entirely relied on the policies and safeguards of its implementing partners. In 2020, the GEF did not yet have its own definition, policies or procedures to support the programming and implementation of projects in FCAS despite having 35% of its project portfolio implemented in countries affected by major armed conflict⁷ (GEF IEO, 2020). However, when reviewing project proposals in FCAS from the LDCF and Special Climate Change Fund, the GEF Secretariat pays close attention to conflict-related risks with the expectation that mitigation strategies have been considered (ibid.). GEF implementing partners have adopted a mix of strategies to manage conflict and fragility risks, that can be grouped in five categories (ibid.):

1. Acknowledge the existence of conflict, but not proactively manage the associated risks in projects.
2. Reduce the level of risk by targeting in-country areas unaffected by conflict.
3. Deploy conflict-sensitive activities to manage risks.
4. Actively seek to build peace.
5. Focus on learning during project implementation and M&E.

The conflict-sensitivity mechanisms that the GEF has adopted throughout the lifecycle of its programmes have been evaluated in the *Evaluation of GEF support in fragile and conflict-affected situations* (GEF IEO, 2020):

GEF projects that develop conflict-sensitive interventions have generally done so through five broad programming measures:

1. Set moderate objectives.
2. Adopt a conservative approach to project site selections.
3. Consult stakeholders during project design or using participatory processes to co-design.
4. Actively broker existing dispute resolutions.
5. Engage local customary norms and institutions.

That said, while stakeholder analysis and environmental and social impact assessments (which include gender analyses) are always carried out during design, conflict analyses are less common. Also, GEF project identification forms do not explicitly require project proponents to consider conflict- or fragility-related risks and do not provide potential mitigation measures.

The GEF does not allow budget lines for contingency costs. This makes budgeting for conflict risks (which may or may not materialise) challenging at the programming stage. Some projects have circumvented this problem by including zero-based budgeting, as it is easier to move funds between budget lines than requesting a new line entirely – any new budget line must be approved by the GEF Council (which meets only twice annually). In general, GEF project budgets have tended to underestimate the higher costs of working in conflict-affected settings and often have not sufficiently covered these additional costs.

Ongoing conflict sensitivity during project implementation is considered in GEF projects by paying attention to hiring processes, seeking to hire local staff whenever possible while building the capacity of local staff for higher-value jobs, and being sensitive to social conflict along ethnic or identity lines in hiring staff. Projects have also fostered transparency and two-way communication to help stakeholders understand the project and to raise concerns for the project before these can have the chance to escalate. To do this, some projects have managed unexpected conflict by bringing in new partners. Nevertheless, these efforts are thwarted by difficulties in adjusting operations when violence or armed conflict escalates during implementation. This is caused by the need to seek permissions from the GEF Council to change project objectives or revise substantial portions of activities. As a result, there is a tendency not to consult the GEF Council for any reason, leading often to inadequate management of the heightened risks and to delays and additional costs.

GEF projects do not have standardised protocols and tools for monitoring projects in FCAS, resulting in often ad hoc approaches. Some projects have relied on third-party conflict early warning systems (EWS) while others have piloted real-time monitoring systems to manage evolving risks. In general, the degree to which conflict criteria are considered in project M&E reporting is uneven, and without coded norms projects tend not to feel comfortable with changing monitoring criteria to reflect new conflict dynamics or knowledge. This helps to explain why monitoring of unintended consequences is limited in GEF projects – a problem

that also affects project evaluations. Evaluations in fragile and conflict-affected environments can be challenging due to the rapidly changing contexts and where larger impacts may be observed after some time lag.

The *Evaluation of GEF support in fragile and conflict-affected situations* is an important learning resource, providing policy recommendations that have been endorsed by the GEF Council (GEF IEO, 2020). Increasingly GEF implementing partners are publishing guidance based on their experience, including in GEF projects, on delivering environmental projects in FCAS; some partners, such as the WB and Conservation International, have also established centres to provide training and technical assistance on conflict-sensitive programming (ibid.).

3.4 L'AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT (AFD)

France's AFD has created a dedicated fund – the Peace and Resilience Fund, or 'Minka' – to mainstream peace-building in its development initiatives. It also has a dedicated mechanism to mainstream CCA in small island developing states (SIDS) and African least developed countries (LDCs), called Adapt'Action. Minka focuses on tackling fragility in four water basins – the Sahel, Lake Chad, the Central African Republic and the Middle East – and each has specific peace-building goals. The fund does not lead programming, which is initiated by sectoral and geographic teams in AFD, but instead acts as a facility that provides support on how to mainstream conflict context and associated risks, specifically:

1. 'do no harm' and conflict sensitivity analysis of the context
2. stakeholder mapping and mobilisation of alternative financing tools
3. adapted flexible implementation mechanisms (e.g., contingency budget, flexible delivery plans)
4. adapted M&E frameworks
5. operational security measures related to project implementation.

Projects must meet several criteria to qualify for Minka, and those that do incorporate peace-building as a key objective enjoy expedited processes through various approval committees, with the aim of starting implementation activities within six months of project approval. It does so in part by mainly working with NGOs, as opposed to the AFD's standard approach of working with governments first. In the Sahel, the AFD's climate and conflict work do overlap, but there are currently fewer than 10 climate projects being delivered through Minka – there is not yet a strategy nor programming that systematically link climate adaptation and conflict. However, as Minka is only in its infancy having been established in 2017, this does not mean that other sectoral or Adapt'Action projects have not adopted conflict-sensitive approaches.

Ethiopia's worst El Niño induced drought in 50 years.
Photo: ©EU/ECHO/Anouk Delafortrie | CC BY-NC-ND 2.0



3.5 THE DUTCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)

The Dutch MFA's method for conflict sensitivity is delivered as part of its countering violence and extremism approach. Concerns about climate security drive the Netherlands' foreign policy and development cooperation. The *Integrated International Security Strategy (2018–2022)* establishes the link between climate change and conflict, where the effects of climate change, together with resource and water scarcity, and population growth and inequality, are among the root causes of conflict (MFA, 2018a). In response to this, pursuing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is the ultimate conflict-prevention agenda, but the key objective of activities within the integrated strategy is PVE and stabilisation. The 2018 policy document *Investing in Global Prospects, For the World, For the Netherlands* reiterates this approach and identifies the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions as focus areas (MFA, 2018b).

A PVE-sensitivity toolkit has been created to support programme inception and/or design. This toolkit assists development interventions to understand the risks and opportunities to work *around*, work *in* or work *on* violent extremism (with the latter two modalities actively working in violent conflict locations). A conflict-sensitive analysis that aims to 'do no harm' and prevent adverse effects on existing conflicts is carried out as part of the process, and includes gender-specific considerations (MFA, 2019a). Use of the toolkit is largely voluntary, but it is encouraged for policy officers in embassies and at headquarters in the Hague who are responsible for programmes; this is reflective of 'the preference for persuasion rather than formal rules' (KII2 Donor, 2021). Training is being rolled out for staff and partners – for instance in conflict- and violent extremism-prone counties in Kenya.

During implementation of programmes and projects, the MFA maintains an approach that was described as 'flexible' by a key informant during discussions about uncertainties and unforeseeable project risks due to conflict and fragile situations that may hinder or delay efforts on the ground (KII2 Donor, 2021). This is possible because the MFA cultivates a small group of trusted implementation delivery partners (with whom they have long-standing relationships) and through the absence of rigid results frameworks (though results metrics for conflict are tracked, e.g., conciliation agreements). Programmes, for instance in Mali, continuously monitor the evolving conflict landscape and report the situation through activity reports, fact sheets, surveys, conflict management reports and capitalisation reports. Communities are engaged heavily throughout.

The flexible approach has been applied to water, energy and natural resource management projects, as there is no specific country climate project in the Sahel nor East Africa yet, although climate change is being integrated into project TOCs. In parallel, the MFA is actively looking to further invest in climate adaptation-related projects in the region.

3.6 THE WORLD BANK (WB)

As the biggest donor in the Sahel region, the WB published the new *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025*, which draws from its positive and negative experiences working in FCAS throughout the last decade. The strategy puts work in FCAS at the front and centre of the WB’s dual objective of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity (WB, 2020a), and it will be applied to all types of sectoral programming.

Both conflict and climate change are considered cross-cutting issues within the WB, to be mainstreamed into programmes that are usually started by sectoral or geographical teams. While the WB has a tried and tested methodology to calculate co-benefits for climate mitigation interventions (WB, 2021a), it has only recently been developing a methodology to assess the resilience of investments to climate impacts in the form of a resilience rating. The rating assesses the level of analysis and measures deployed to address climate impacts, where a rate of A indicates extensive modelling and analysis of future climate risks and uncertainty, B indicates a less comprehensive process, and C indicates a basic assessment (mostly using regional climate information) (KII3 Donor, 2021). Under this new system, most WB projects would fall into category C currently (KII3 Donor, 2021).

The new WB conflict strategy makes a long-term commitment to providing support around four pillars:

1. Prevent violent conflict and interpersonal violence by tackling risks and grievances early on and strengthening sources of resilience before tensions turn into crises.
2. Remain engaged during conflicts and crisis situations by building resilience, protecting essential institutions and delivering critical services.
3. Help countries transition out of fragility by strengthening the capacity and legitimacy of core institutions, renewing the social contract and supporting private sector development.
4. Mitigate the spill over of fragility, conflict and violence, such as forced displacement, and of shocks resulting from climate and environmental changes.

The strategy outlines an action plan with a comprehensive list of reforms across policies and practices; financing modalities; programming; partnerships; personnel; risk management; and monitoring and reporting to change how the WB operates in FCAS.

Under the International Development Association (IDA) 19 replenishment, country allocations to FCAS have increased by 23% to \$18.7 billion, from \$14.4 billion from the IDA 18 replenishment. In addition, a dedicated FCAS envelope has been introduced to provide top-up resources of around \$2 billion per country; an extra \$2.2 billion will be available to support refugees and host communities; and \$2.5 billion to catalyse private sector investment in fragile countries (WB, 2020a). Additional resources will be provided by the IDA Regional Window, the Crisis Response Window and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

During programming, the WB will systematically carry out a Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) and other types of assessments, including conflict and gender analysis, to understand key drivers of fragility and multiple dimensions of grievances. These assessments will feed into Country Partnership Frameworks, Country Engagement Notes and Performance and Learning Reviews in order to outline how programmes will address the drivers. For individual programmes, the Environmental and Social Framework mandates the due diligence process to take into account threats to human security in the form of personal, communal or inter-state conflict, crime or violence (WB, 2020a). Moreover, regional RRAs will be conducted on informal regional programming, and portfolio reviews with a conflict lens will be promoted to increase learning.

The WB has several existing mechanisms to maintain flexibility during operations. These have included contingency financing mechanisms that can be accessed quickly, such as the Contingency Emergency Response Component, the Catastrophe-Deferred Drawdown Option and regional insurance programmes. It has introduced support for alternative procurement mechanisms to speed up timing, and it has experimented with alternative arrangements for financial management supervision through third-party monitoring, remote supervision technology, in-country United Nations (UN) agencies and independent verification agents. The use of the Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision and remote sensing have also been employed to improve M&E frameworks in reflecting the challenges of operating in FCAS. The WB's willingness to accept risks will be higher for some operational areas, including country, macroeconomic, operational design, and client implementation capacity risk, in FCAS than in non-FCAS. Whereas, the willingness to accept risks will be lower for procurement, financial management and environmental and social safeguards.

To support the uptake of these measures, the WB will update its Operational Policy 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict on how it will operate in humanitarian crises, with refugees and forced displacements and when dealing with security and military actors. It will pursue partnerships with humanitarian, development, security and peace-building actors at country level in order to conduct joint diagnostics and to deepen coordination, peer learning and joint reporting. The WB will also increase on-the-ground personnel and provide career development incentives and training for employees to work in and on FCAS.

The new strategy, whilst not implemented yet, seems a shift from the WB's old approach, which has been criticised as 'overly technical and pays insufficient attention to informal institutions, power relations and social dynamics' and focused on "doing things differently" rather than "doing different things" ... partly due to a continued reluctance to overtly work on political issues' (McDevitt, 2010: 1–2).

SECTION 4

**COUNTRY CASE
STUDY: MALI**



The following section provides a deep dive into the climate adaptation finance landscape of Mali. The findings of this case study have been compiled from a review of limited project documentation (largely proposals) and seven key stakeholder interviews. This section addresses the core research questions of the extent to which historic adaptation programmes have been conflict-sensitive in Mali, and the barriers and enablers for impactful climate adaptation financing from the Malian experience.

4.1 BACKGROUND

Country context

Mali is a large arid and semi-arid landlocked country in West Africa, stretching from the harsh, arid Sahara Desert and semi-arid Sahel in the north and centre of the country, to the more fertile lands in the south. The country can be divided along a north–south axis, with most of the population, agricultural production and economic activity concentrated in southern regions that are traversed by West Africa’s two biggest rivers – the Niger and Senegal (République du Mali, 2007). Low rainfall and other weather- and climate-related hazards are a key constraint to gross domestic product (GDP) growth as most Malian households rely on rainfed agriculture or pastureland for livestock (ibid.).

Mali consistently ranks among the 10 poorest countries in the world, and 78% of the population live in multidimensional poverty (Giovetti, 2019). Just under half (42%) of the 20.2 million population live in extreme poverty (on less than \$1.90/day) and 98% live below the ethical poverty line (of \$7.40/day) (WB, 2021b). The economy is dependent on the primary sector, which employs 83.4% of the workforce – predominantly in agriculture, livestock and cotton – but only contributes around 36% to GDP (République du Mali, 2007). Population growth rates are amongst the highest in the world (with a fertility rate of 5.88 children per woman) (Nagarajan, 2020; WB, 2021b). Mali is comprised of eight *régions*, subdivided into 49 *cercles* that are further subdivided into 703 *communes*, plus the capital district of Bamako (République du Mali, 2007). The decentralised reform, passed in 1992, devolved planning and land-use management to local authorities (OECD, 2018).


Conflict

Mali has been in near perpetual conflict for decades. More than 11 million people are affected, nearly half a million are displaced, and nearly 6 million are in need (Humanitarian response, 2021), and this is across a total population of approximately 20.2 million in 2020 (WB, database). The complex conflict dynamics have evolved over time, but can largely be divided into three principal phases (Wiggins et al., 2021):

- 1. The Tuareg-jihadist insurgency (2012):** This rebellion had its roots in the colonial occupation that divided land into nation states and which disregarded the Tuareg's traditional territories. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) demanded regional autonomy for the independent state of Azawad in the north of Mali, which led to the first coup d'état. The MNLA was supported by radical Islamist groups, such as Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who included fighters returning from foreign wars to neighbouring countries and/or existing fighters from these respective countries (Aly Diallo, 2017; Nagarajan, 2020). These jihadist groups subsequently took over the northern cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao and imposed sharia law.
- 2. Military pacification (2013–2015):** Malian forces, with support from France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regained control of northern Mali. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over from ECOWAS (Wiggins et al., 2021). A peace agreement was signed in Algiers in 2015 between the Tuareg and the Malian government.
- 3. Resurgence of conflict (2015-present):** Historically, regions such as Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, located in the north of Mali, have been most affected by conflict. But as instability and violence have escalated, conflict has swept southwards towards the central regions, including Mopti, Ségou, Koulikoro and the capital Bamako (ICG, 2016; Nagarajan, 2020). A coalition of radical Islamist groups has carried out attacks against the military and civilians (Wiggins et al., 2021) and subsequently the government is implicated in overly militarised and brutal reprisals against terrorism, which have i) harmed civilian populations (especially the Fulani who are often associated with terrorism by authorities; and ii) caused a breakdown in government–citizen relations. The overall increase in insecurity, as well as banditry, has led to the formation of 'community self-defence militias', as arms are more readily available in central Mali (ibid.). In 2020, a second coup d'état led to the resignation of President Keita who, before he was ousted, was forced to dissolve the government for a military junta that acted as a transitional government.

In addition to these conflicts, there is a long history of clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Mali, as different livelihoods and ethnic groups have overlapped and co-existed for centuries. Recently these inter-communal clashes have become deadlier as land and resources become scarcer, access to arms becomes easier, and government policies favour agricultural over pastoralist livelihoods (ICG, 2016). The Fulani and Tuareg are typically pastoralists, whilst the Dogon and Bambara are farmers, and the Bozo and Somono are fishers (Nagarajan, 2020). Conflict exists intra-ethnically (e.g., amongst the Fulani); inter-ethnically between different pastoral groups (e.g., the Fulani and Tuareg) or farmer groups (e.g., the Dogon and Bambara); and inter-ethnically between pastoralists, farmers and/or fishers (ibid.). Armed groups and militias capitalise on these social tensions and volatility to foment disputes, gather recruits and create insecurity for political ends. Figure 1 shows the geographic concentration of conflict events between 2018 and 2021.

FIGURE 1: GEOLOCALISED CONFLICT IN MALI (2018–2021)



Sources: Administrative boundaries – OCHA database; conflict data – ACLED database.

Overall climate

Mali has four main agroclimatic zones based on average annual rainfall: the northern Saharan desert ecosystem covering 51% of the country; the northern Sahelian arid and semi-arid ecosystem covering 26% of the country; the central Sudanian savannah ecosystem covering 17% of the country; and the southern Sudano-Guinean sub-humid forest ecosystem covering 6% of the country (République du Mali, 2007). There is irregular and poorly distributed rainfall that increases along the southward gradient (WB, 2021c). Temperatures are hot year-round, ranging from warm lows of 21°C to intense heats of 37°C. Mali only has two seasons: the dry winter and the rainy summer (République du Mali, 2007). The rainy summer season typically lasts for six months in the south (June to October), but only two months in the north (July to September) (WB, 2021b).

Climate variability and extreme weather

Mali experiences strong intra-annual and inter-annual variability, especially with regards to rainfall (WB, 2021d). Extreme weather events include frequent drought, heavy rains and flash floods, strong winds (especially in the Sahel and Sahara regions), bushfires and destabilised rainfall patterns (République du Mali, 2007; République du Mali, 2016). However, 'there is lack of up-to-date, country-specific, and sub-national climate data on Mali, and much of what exists considers the Sahel as a whole. Particularly given this variability across the nation, climate data for the different climate zones would be of significant value and is a particular gap' (Nagarajan, 2020: 13).

Observed and projected climate change


Temperatures have been increasing steadily throughout the decades (0.15°C per decade), and are felt most acutely in the hot, dry season (April to June) (WB, 2021d). Rainfall trends since the 1960s are difficult to categorise across the Sahel, as there is high variability year to year as well as across decades (some particularly dry and others particularly wet) (ibid.). Droughts have become more frequent, especially in northern areas (ibid.).

Temperatures are projected to continue rising by as much as 3°C over the baseline by 2060 (République du Mali, 2016; WB, 2021d). There is substantial uncertainty on the direction of future rainfall projections and potential increases in dry spells (WB, 2021d). Rainfall variability is likely to increase. More frequent El Niño events predicted under climate change scenarios are likely to further increase the regularity and intensity of what are already severe droughts across Mali (ibid.).

Climate change impacts

Five priority sectors have been highlighted as most vulnerable to climate change: agriculture, energy, health, housing and transport infrastructure, water and forest resources (GCF, 2018a). High temperatures, rainfall variability (including extremely low and high rainfall), irregular seasons, repeated droughts and changing ecosystems are affecting seasonal calendars for planting, harvesting and grazing, as well as increasing livestock mortality, destabilising food security and nutrition, reducing water availability and quality, increasing risks to human health from infectious disease transmission, damaging assets and infrastructure, and causing land erosion and degradation (USAID, 2012; IPCC, 2019; Nagarajan, 2020). The results are livelihood precarity, increased poverty, inequality and social vulnerability, food insecurity, breakdowns in social cohesion, and increased polarisation between groups co-existing and competing over natural resources (Nagarajan, 2020). Figure 2 shows climate vulnerability in Mali (de Sherbinin et al., 2014).

FIGURE 2: CLIMATE VULNERABILITY IN MALI



Source: de Sherbinin et al. (2014: 41).

Note: The vulnerability index is divided into quintiles where each category contains an equal number of pixels; the colour scale goes from blue (least vulnerable to climate change) to red (most vulnerable to climate change). For the full methodology, see de Sherbinin et al. (2014).

4.2 HOW MUCH ADAPTATION FINANCE IS GOING TO WHOM, WHERE AND WHAT PROGRAMMES?


Climate change policy landscape

Several climate change policies exist in Mali. The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) was developed in 2007 and is closely linked to the development objectives in the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCR) and the Rural Development Strategy (SDR). The National Policy on Climate Change (PNCC) 2025 was passed in 2011 and serves as a reference framework for the different interventions related to climate change in Mali (République du Mali, 2011). Its objective is to contribute to both the fight against poverty and sustainable development, by providing appropriate solutions to the challenges of climate change so that they do not become limiting factors of socioeconomic development. Mali submitted its first NDC in 2016 and a second NDC has not yet been submitted, though workshops on its elaboration are ongoing.

Historical climate financing

Mali has received climate change adaptation financing as both loans and grants. Both loans and grants funding programmes and projects tagged as climate adaptation finance from the OECD database have been variable since 2010, with a general increase in value. The highest volume grant was received in 2018 at \$88.8 million and the lowest in 2010 at \$16.4 million. Mali has received \$177.7 million in grants for CCA between 2016 and 2018 (the latest available figures) and \$134.2 million in loans across the same time-period. The NDC calculated that \$1.062 billion would have been required to cover climate adaptation in Mali between 2015 and 2020. The main multilateral donors are the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the WB, whilst the main bilateral donors include the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (German Agency for International Cooperation), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Sida, Norad and Belgium development agency. All these financial providers tend to finance programmes on agriculture, forestry and fishing; water supply and sanitation; and transport and storage. A review of the programmes selected for this case study indicates that average programme length varies between three to six years; this finding is supported by a programme mapping exercise that was conducted by GIZ across 2014–2017 that shows that more than half of the projects lasted between three and six years (GIZ, 2019).

FIGURE 3: CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE RECEIVED BY MALI (2010–2018)



Source: OECD-DAC database and CFU database.

Institutional mapping – who can access climate finance?

The Government of Mali has made considerable progress and effort in setting a foundation for CCA policies, strategies and priorities. Nevertheless, there are no nationally accredited organisations to the GCF nor GEF.

L'Agence de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (AEDD) (the Environment and Sustainable Development Agency), a government institution created in 2010, is responsible for the coordination of activities to respond to climate change and acts as the National Designated Authority (NDA) for the GCF since approval in 2015. L'Agence Nationale d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (ANICT) (the National Investment Agency of Territorial Collectivities) was nominated as an accredited entity and applied for GCF accreditation in 2017 as part of the BRACED-funded Decentralised Climate Funds programme (DCF). As of 2021, the application is still in process (GCF Project Portal Mali). Mali-Folkecenter, a civil society organisation (CSO), also submitted a proposal for accreditation in 2018 that is still in process (Readiness Proposal). La Banque du Développement du Mali (the Development Bank of Mali) and la Compagnie Malienne de Développement du Textile (CMDT) (the Malian Textile and Development Company) were also nominated, but are still undergoing institutional audits (Coulibaly, 2019). The only GCF-accredited organisations in the country are international multilateral and bilateral organisations; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), La Banque Ouest-Africaines de Développement (BOAD) (the West African Development Bank), AfDB, GIZ, AFD and Sida (GCF Project Portal Mali; Republic of Mali, 2018). Typically, multilateral climate finance flows via the UNDP (which acts as the implementing agency) and execution may be shared with AEDD. Bilateral funds (e.g., via the FCDO) can go directly to AEDD as they have strong fiduciary procedures (KII5 Mali, 2021).

The **Mali Climate Fund (MCF)**, financed via Sida and Norad, acts as a mechanism for national adaptation investment; however, neither the government nor NGOs have yet to access financing directly from the MCF. Instead, they have continued to pass via a UN agency (the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Food Programme (WFP), UN Women, UNDP) that acts as the implementing organisation (KII1 Mali, 2021). The MCF is administratively managed by the UNDP, housed in AEDD, and led by a Steering Committee chaired by the Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Assainissement (the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation).

4.3 HOW CONFLICT-SENSITIVE HAVE CCA PROGRAMMES BEEN?

Conflict defined in national climate policies

National climate policies such as the NAPA (République du Mali, 2007), NDC (République du Mali, 2016) and the Green Investment Plan (Republic of Mali, 2018) explicitly recognise the interplay between climatic variability, extreme weather, land-use pressures, transhumance and the potential for communal conflict. For example, the NDC states that improving and protecting the natural resource base may help to reduce the conflict between farmers and pastoralists (République du Mali, 2016). The NAPA recognises that changes in natural flood systems and frequent droughts are weakening and degrading ecosystems, as well as driving migration, all of which may result in land disputes and conflict. As these are national strategies that pertain to national plans, politics and frameworks, localised political conflicts are not considered (KII1 Donor, 2021).

Where has most CCA money been channelled?


As insecurity has spread, almost all regions in Mali experience armed violence. The areas most affected by the current phase of conflict are the regions of Ménaka, Gao and Mopti, especially near the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger (ACLED database ; Higgins et al., 2021).

A GIZ exercise that mapped climate adaptation projects between 2014 and 2017 found that most were in the following five regions (out of eight) in Mali: Kayes (25), Koulikoro (32), Sikasso (35), Ségou (35) and Mopti (25).⁸ This is shown at district level in Figure 4 (GIZ, 2019).

Based on this present study's search criteria, programmes from 2016 onwards were analysed and found to be implemented in Mopti, Koulikoro, Ségou, Kayes, Sikasso, Timbuktu and Bamako. Adaptation programmes were therefore being implemented within a conflict-affected region (such as Mopti), but were restricted to more stable areas, targeting cercles with 'security permits' and not in 'disputed areas' (WB, 2018a; WB, 2018b; IFAD, 2017).

Access to certain areas under control by jihadist groups is severely limited. For example, Macina, located in the Ségou region, has limited government presence as the cercle is controlled by the Islamist leader Amadou Koufa (the founder of the Macina Liberation Front with links to AQIM) (KII2 Mali, 2021). Key informants highlighted that jihadist groups move quickly, and numerous areas exist outside of government control as escalating conflict forces the retreat of government apparatus. Where the government is not present or welcomed by communities, adaptation programmes – like development programmes – would be executed by locally accepted NGOs (KII2 Mali, 2021; KII4 Mali, 2021).

FIGURE 4: GEOLOCALISED CLIMATE ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES IN MALI



Source: Data compiled from AEDD project lists from 2014 to 2017.

Conflict sensitivity in CCA programme design

Project proposals do not provide consistent evidence that conflict analyses were undertaken to inform project design. It is unclear if conflict analyses were systematically carried out as part of the proposal design. There is no evidence in the documentation available for any of the projects that partnership strategies were analysed for conflict risks, nor that conflict-sensitivity training was planned and provided to staff. This does not necessarily mean that these activities were not planned but, rather, that they were not presented clearly at the proposal stage despite operating in a conflict-affected country.

Some proposals also lack clear plans on future conflict analyses, which could have been used to inform and adapt implementation throughout the programme duration. WB projects, for example, planned yearly conflict analyses by an independent third party, and had a conflict and fragility specialist who was based in Washington DC and would visit Mali only once per year. In response to a reviewer's comment that was made concerning its endorsement stage, the GEF-funded AfDB project *Scaling up a Multiple Benefits Approach to Enhance Resilience in Agro- and Forest Landscapes of Mali's Sahel Regions (Kayes, Koulikoro and Ségou)* only indicated in an annex that a conflict resolution expert would be mobilised.

As climate finance is not intended to directly address the complex dynamics of insecurity or political conflict, the adaptation projects analysed tended to focus their aims or objectives on reducing inter-community tensions over access to shared natural resources (land, water and grazing). For example, a water infrastructure project by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) implemented along transhumance corridors (which were

not experiencing outright conflict) sought to improve the resilience of herders and farmers to hydrological shocks that could otherwise trigger escalations of tension between these groups. The PASARC II programme⁹ explicitly highlights that conflict is a major driver of food insecurity and contains two objectives: i) improving the socioeconomic prospects of households through the development of value chains and businesses; and ii) integrating the management of natural resources and conflict reduction. Activities have focused on improving the governance of natural resources and developing formal resource use and conflict resolution agreements between communities. The GIZ-funded Frexus programme aims to achieve peaceful resolution of social tensions/conflicts between population groups that are caused or exacerbated by climate change in fragile areas with outcomes to provide more conflict-sensitive and climate-sensitive management of land and natural resources and ecosystems. The GEF-funded AfDB project have used landscape approaches, which attempt to reconcile various stakeholder needs, priorities and objectives to break cycles of vulnerability.

To achieve these aims the projects proposed typical participatory activities focused on increasing local actor capacity through conflict resolution training. This has included: emphasising the use of community dialogues and establishing community committees; and conventions and pre-agreed complaints procedures, which are monitored via regular or periodic visits to the communities.

4.4 BARRIERS AND ENABLERS FOR IMPACTFUL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCING

Barriers to accessing climate funding

Fundamental barriers to accessing international multilateral climate financing – which are not unique to conflict settings – exist in Mali. For example, national governments not being accredited for international climate finance is a challenge that extends beyond conflict-affected countries. The lengthy paperwork required in English for GEF and GCF proposals is a linguistic challenge for francophone countries such as Mali (KII2 Mali, 2021; KII5 Mali, 2021). There is a limited number of country experts familiar with GCF and GEF standards, whom face extensive portfolio of projects, and, in turn, face constraints from the disconnect of local to national processes (KII1 Mali, 2021; KII4 Mali, 2021; KII8 Mali, 2021; Coulibaly, 2019). The public sector is underfinanced, and the technical capacity to manage the funds at the regional or local level is considered low, which limits the government's ability to access financing, then subsequently manage adaptation programmes and strategies (KII2 Mali, 2021; KII4 Mali, 2021). The significant brain drain overseas, or to international organisations where salaries are higher, means that the technical expertise, skills and capacity required to prove the ability to implement such funds is lacking across all scales (national, regional, and local) in the public sector. These factors create a cycle of need, in that Mali needs the funding to be able to properly apply for the very funding it needs. The lack of access, due to the government's low capacity, is precisely what the four grants that were received from the GCF's Readiness Programme since 2015 are attempting to break.

Several factors that are associated with the conflict context also have provided barriers to access adaptation finance.

The rapidly changing conflict dynamics in Mali are not compatible with the heavy bureaucracy of the GCF and GEF. The process of developing projects via GEF is heavy, linguistically challenging and considered to be incompatible with a rapidly changing landscape of conflict and humanitarian needs (KII5 Mali, 2021).

The minimum data required for proposals is lacking in certain conflict-affected zones. Data of the granularity and specificity required in GEF or GCF proposals is not available for certain areas of Mali, notably those with historic and ongoing conflict. For example, data on climate observations and projections (rainfall or temperature measures) or the amount of carbon a given project will sequester are not available at the local level for many regions, especially those that have had high levels of insecurity (KII2 Mali, 2021; KII3 Mali, 2021). Armed opposition groups routinely prevent teams from accessing areas to conduct participatory or gender assessments, which are a key component of many of the climate finance mechanisms (KII5 Mali, 2021).

Without UN partnerships, Malian institutions are unable to access national financing mechanisms directly. Whilst the MCF exists as a direct national financing mechanism for Malian institutions (NGOs and the government), not one national institution has yet accessed this money unless in partnership with a UN agency (the WFP, UNEP, UN Women) (KII1 Mali, 2021). A key informant explained 'the fund that national organisations are supposed to be able to access without lengthy accreditation to the GCF is rendered, in effect, inaccessible to Malian actors without an intermediary' (KII1 Mali, 2021).

Enablers for accessing climate funding

Dedicated and strong institutional partners could support the technical and institutional capacity development of Malian institutions to access international financing. Whilst the AEDD is generally considered to have strong fiduciary processes, donors and institutional partners could work much more closely with AEDD to slowly invest funds in local authorities, with guidance on use and management, to help gradually build local authority capacity to handle climate finance (KII2 Mali, 2021).

Mali's decentralised architecture should be used to channel funds via local authorities to local populations. The BRACED DCF programme has highlighted the importance of funds reaching the local populations that are best placed to create locally appropriate governance and adaptation plans (KII1 Mali, 2021). The DCF programme has proved that it is possible to route the climate fund through the decentralised system in place in Mali, whereby the local authorities can act as a gateway for all resilience and climate fund management planning.

Barriers to implementing climate finance in conflict settings

The conflict context in Mali presents challenges common to both development and adaptation financing. The challenging, insecure operating environment is a deterrent to donor investment. Donors are hesitant to fund projects in areas where investments may be destroyed by the activity of armed groups (KII5 Mali, 2021). As donors are highly risk-averse and security-aware, security protocols require the use of expensive armoured vehicles or security personnel

for the protection of staff, all of which reduces the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of running a programme or project in a conflict-affected area (KII3 Mali, 2021; KII5 Mali 2021). Most organisations only directly work where security protocols permit or where there are local NGOs to partner with, and thus they often omit the most conflict-affected zones and some of the people who are most vulnerable to climate change (KII7). Access to communities in highly insecure areas is a challenge as roads may be targeted for hijacking or studded with mines, which must be removed and monitored (KII5 Mali, 2021). Few highly qualified professionals (national and international) with the level of expertise required are willing to work in such insecure areas (KII3 Mali, 2021; KII4, 2021).

The extent to which adaptation programmes could be flexible or adapt to flairs in conflict appears to have been limited. If an escalation in conflict touched the original intervention area, substantial time and bureaucratic procedures were required to change that area. This was a factor in choosing the more 'secure' areas for interventions (KII3 Mali, 2021). For programmes with annual planning in which general areas were specified for intervention, there was more flexibility to adapt intervention areas to changing circumstances (KII3 Mali, 2021). This represents another shared challenge between adaptation programmes and development programmes that requires donors to provide greater room for flexibility and adaptability in programme implementation.

Some donors prefer to operate where the government is still present in order to align adaptation finance with government development plans to maximise the possibility that interventions are sustained (KII2 Mali, 2021). When this is the case, huge swathes of the country where the government is absent will not have the possibility of accessing climate finance.

Enablers for implementation of adaptation finance in conflict settings

Strong donor coordination is needed that focuses on aligning projects. GIZ conducted research that mapped the different CCA programmes in Mali in 2014–2017. These types of mapping exercises are important to identify areas in which multiple actors are operating and should be working synergistically; conversely, such exercises also identify those areas in which there is limited investment and presence (KII4 Mali, 2021; KII7 Mali, 2021).

The more control communities have over decision-making on the use and management of adaptation funds, the more likely it is that the programmes are perceived to be relevant, conflict-sensitive and sustainable.

My biggest worry, and I will say it again, it is not about bringing more money [in]to the centralised government. It is mainly about making sure there are channels and mechanisms for money to leave the centralised national level, to descend to the local level, to descend to the level of populations – where the funds are invested in actions or projects identified by collectives and populations who are hit by the effects of climate change. If there is a mechanism that considers local communities' deepest aspirations and gives them the opportunity to manage funds themselves, they will manage the funds better than the Malian government. When we do this, the conflict is naturally appeased. (KII1, Mali, 2021)

4.5 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ADAPTATION FINANCING

Several adaptation programmes had the intention to evaluate progress in Mali towards a reduction in communal conflict. This was to be monitored via the number of community dialogue groups and action plans established, as well as through perception-based and composite indicators on the level and severity of conflict and ecological degradation between the baseline and end line (GIZ, 2019). However, the extent to which programmes could be flexible or adapt to flare ups in conflict appears to have been limited. Substantial time and bureaucratic procedures were required to change the original target intervention area if an escalation in conflict touched that area. This was a factor in choosing more 'secure' areas for interventions, as a way to avoid escalations in conflict (KII3 Mali, 2021). For programmes with annual planning, in which general areas were specified for intervention, there was more flexibility to adapt intervention areas based on changing circumstances (ibid.).

4.6 COUNTRY SUMMARY

Mali experiences complex, overlapping conflict dynamics from widespread banditry to historic communal rivalries and tensions, targeted rebel attacks on civilians and the Malian army, and overly militarised anti-terrorism responses from the Malian government and international allies. Given this context, access to certain areas under control by jihadist groups is severely limited for both adaptation and development programmes.

Climate change is viewed as an accelerator of communal conflict dynamics, and jihadist and political conflict tend to overlay and draw upon communal conflict for their political objectives. Reducing inter-communal land-use disputes, therefore, has been seen as an opportunity and entry point for several climate adaptation programmes to contribute towards creating sustainable development (addressing the consequences of displacement and pressures on public services in the south) and to reducing poverty in rural areas by enhancing the resilience of landscapes and the natural resource base. Simultaneously, adaptation efforts attempt to stimulate employment creation and improvements in the quality of life, which make joining rebel or armed groups less desirable.

SECTION 5

**COUNTRY CASE
STUDY: SOMALIA**



The following section provides a deep dive into the climate adaptation finance landscape of Somalia. The findings of this case study have been compiled from a review of limited project documentation (largely proposals) and nine key stakeholder interviews. This section addresses the core research questions of how conflict-sensitive historic adaptation programmes have been in Somalia, and the barriers and enablers for impactful adaptation financing from the Somali experience.

5.1 BACKGROUND

Country context

Somalia is Africa's easternmost country. This account includes Somaliland, which has operated effectively as a separate country since 1991 although without the backing of the African Union (AU) and international recognition. The country has geographic extremes with a mountainous coastal zone in the north and several pronounced river valleys. Most of the country is extremely flat, with few natural barriers to restrict the mobility of nomads and their livestock (MoPIED, 2020).

Somalia has a federal system, which was established in 2012 (WB, 2020b) following the collapse of the government in the 1990s. Political decentralisation led to a structure of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with six Federal Member States (FMS). The FMS interact with the FGS through a National Development Council and a Finance Ministers Fiscal Forum.

From the population of 14.6 million in 2017, about 69% of Somalis live under the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day (WB, database for 2017). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the rural population, agro-pastoralists and nomads, have the highest rates of monetary poverty among households. Almost 80% of the population is vulnerable to shocks including natural disasters, conflict and economic disruption. The livestock sector contributes 85% of Somalia's export earnings and employs more than 70% of the population. Diaspora remittances are critically important for a large proportion of the population, exceeding the value of international aid flows and foreign direct investment. Remittances in 2018 were estimated at \$1.4 billion; some remittances are invested in residential construction, and most are spent on consumption, education and health services (MoPIED, 2020) Somalia has high annual population growth at 2.9% as at 2020 (WB database for 2020). More than half the population (54%) is urban (WB, 2021e). Most (75%) of the 2.9 million IDPs live in cities. Frequent and intense weather extremes, and conflict and food insecurity drive unplanned, urban displacement. By 2050, it is estimated that the urban population will triple (WB, 2021e).

Conflict


Somalia has long been contested by major Gulf countries, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar engaged in a proxy battle among Somalia's numerous militias (Day, 2020). Al-Shabab, an Islamist extremist group, emerged in 2008 as the leading insurgent group. By 2011

it controlled substantial parts of southern and central Somalia. After multilateral forces pushed back, al-Shabab lost ground, but still maintains significant control in the south of the country (Eklow and Krampe, 2019).

Al-Shabab continues to capitalise on local conflicts and manipulates these to promote its campaign against emerging Somali institutions (MoPIED, 2020). Local conflicts in Somalia usually start with long-standing, low-level communal violence linked to resource competition and clan affiliation. Somalia has the highest concentration of clan-based pastoral communities in Africa. Up to 60% of its population are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). Reduced grazing land and water access points have disrupted historical livestock migration patterns and reduced mobility. Increased competition for natural resources incites violence between pastoralists in southern Somalia and those on the border with Kenya. There are further dimensions to conflict including land disputes after temporary displacement from flooding, climate-induced IDPs (from which more urbanisation results) and disruption to social structures (Eklow and Krampe, 2019). Communal violence can ramp up to the national level and in the 1990s contributed to the outbreak of civil war (Finaz, 2015).

The links between climate and environmental change, cyclical drought, poverty, fragility, severe food insecurity and protracted conflict are pronounced in Somalia. The country has struggled to overcome the impacts of drought from 2016 to 2017 and again in 2019. The combination of drought and protracted armed conflicts have displaced more than 2.6 million people (WB, 2020e), and have brought a further 3.2 million people (about 20% of the population) to the brink of starvation (Ratcliffe, 2019). Grievances linked to group affiliation, including clans, are serious risk factors, affecting conflicts on multiple levels and inhibiting resolution (Eklow and Krampe, 2019).

FIGURE 5: GEOLocalISED CONFLICT IN SOMALIA (2018–2021)



Sources: Administrative boundaries – OCHA database; conflict data – ACLED database.

Drought, flooding, locust swarms and conflict reduce livelihood opportunities, generating further instability and insecurity for the population. These factors, combined with a 67% youth unemployment rate, leaves young people susceptible to persuasion by extremist groups (Finaz, 2015).

Overall climate

Somalia has four climatic zones: a desert zone in the north-east, a central arid area, and semi-arid and humid zones in the south and parts of the north-west (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). Overall, the country is mainly arid and semi-arid with two rainfall seasons. The *Gu* season starts in late March and decreases by June. The *Deyr* season is shorter and less wet, from October to the end of November. Rainfall is low, averaging 200 mm across Somalia, but varying from 50 mm along the northern coast to 600 mm in the south-west. Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) comprise 80% of the country's landmass. They are prone to extreme weather conditions, including high mean surface temperatures, extended drought, erratic rainfall and strong winds (ibid.).

Climate variability and extreme weather

The annual mean temperature across Somalia is roughly 30°C, reaching a maximum between April and June in the north, and December to March in the south (WB, 2021f). Yearly rainfall varies dramatically, with some drought periods lasting years, along with heavy rainfall causing flooding and related damage (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). The dramatic variation from season to season – and variations within seasons – determines the success or failure of agriculture (FAO, 2018). Somalia has experienced multiple severe droughts since 1965 and is still recovering from the 2011 drought that caused 258,000 deaths.

Observed and projected climate change

By the end of the century, projected mean annual temperatures will increase by 3°C, along with increased and erratic rainfall. Extreme precipitation events are likely, leading to increased flood and drought cycles (WB, 2021f).

Climate change impacts

Critical vulnerabilities exist in the agricultural and water sectors, in exposure to cyclone and sea-level rise along the country's extensive coastline, and in health due to vector- and water-borne diseases. Agriculture and water are particular concerns in the short to medium term. Increased temperatures will severely impact the livestock sector via livestock feed intake, mortality, growth and production. With rising temperatures, water consumption will increase but water availability will decrease, causing additional water stress (WB, 2021f). Crops will require more water while being under increased water stress. Water scarcity is worsened by conflict-related destruction of supporting infrastructure and inadequate water management and maintenance (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013).

5.2 HOW MUCH ADAPTATION FINANCE IS GOING TO WHOM, WHERE AND WHAT PROGRAMMES?

Climate change policy landscape


Climate change is addressed in Somalia's 2013 NAPA (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013), the 2015 NDC (Federal Government of Somalia, 2015) and the 2020 NDP (MoPIED, 2020). The NAPA has little recognisable impact on climate policy development and related programme design (KII1 Som., 2021). Climate adaptation programming is more influenced by the NDP, and more recently (and to a lesser extent) the NDC (KII2 Som., 2021). Previous versions of the NDP contain a pillar calling out resilience, including climate change. This pillar has been removed in the 2020 NDP, making climate change a cross-cutting issue (rather than siloed), as is the case for conflict (KII1 Som., 2021).

Historical climate financing

GCF and LDCF flows are limited in Somalia; they fund capacity-building nationwide and within states, with projects implemented in areas free from conflict with militants (Annex 1).

GCF and LDCF funds flow primarily through the accredited UNDP, and to a lesser extent the AfDB. Programmes generally run up to five years. The WB's recently approved Somalia Crisis Recovery Project (WB, 2020b), which directly addresses climate adaptation in part, runs from 2020 to 2024. Implementing agencies are primarily federal and state ministries and international NGOs, with local CSO support. Smaller programmes that support climate adaptation indirectly also receive international funding. Donors including the European Union (EU), the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), USAID, UK Aid and the WB have supported the FAO-implemented Somalia Water and Land Information Management Project (SWALIM) (FAO, 2018) in various phases since 2003. The FCDO supports the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) programme (NRC, 2013), a humanitarian consortium which takes a holistic approach to helping communities resist shocks without undermining poverty alleviation, including CCA. Figure 6 shows adaptation finance flows to Somalia between 2010 and 2018.

FIGURE 6: HISTORICAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE RECEIVED BY SOMALIA (2010–2018)



Sources: OECD-DAC database and CFU database.

Institutional mapping – who can access climate finance

The Office of the Prime Minister functions as the NDA in Somalia for the GCF. The UNDP and AfDB are the only institutions accessing GEF and similar climate finance streams. The GCF has allocated Readiness funding. Save the Children (SAVE) has recently become GCF-accredited via SAVE Australia. SAVE Somalia is now looking to develop GCF concepts based on bottom-up, community-led programming, and complementing the UNDP, which works more directly with high levels of government (KII2 Som., 2021). There are no nationally accredited organisations in Somalia. However, there is dialogue over how national actors and government might access climate funds independently, including becoming accredited, albeit without a clear strategy as yet. Many donors consider the risk of independent access too high, given the low national capacity and the potential for corruption (KII1 Som., 2021).

International institutions (e.g., contractors, NGOs and technical service providers) access climate and other development and humanitarian funding from bilateral and multilateral donors. These donors have varying levels of control over finance flows, project partnerships and implementation (KII1 Som., 2021). The AfDB, which has no office in Somalia because of the security risk, directs funding to other international organisations (KII3 Som., 2021). International NGOs secure funding and make sub-grants to local CSOs, causing them to function as extensions of international partners (KII4 Som., 2021).

In short, only the UNDP and AfDB are currently accessing GEF climate funds. Bilateral and multilateral donors limit climate finance access to international partners only. The FGS can select what programmes to fund, yet, as is the case for civil society, national bodies cannot access funding directly given perceived concerns about capacity and corruption (KII5 Som., 2021).

5.3 HOW CONFLICT-SENSITIVE HAVE CCA PROGRAMMES BEEN?

Conflict defined in national climate policies

The NAPA (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013), the NDC (Federal Government of Somalia, 2015) and the NDP (MoPIED, 2020) each recognise conflict and the different impacts caused by al-Shabab and local conflict drivers. The NDP (MoPIED, 2020) goes farther and acknowledges that al-Shabab builds off local struggles. Yet conflict is not defined, and it appears to be treated as a cross-cutting dynamic in Somalia, causing varying degrees of risk to national development and climate adaptation efforts. None of these national climate-related policies address how conflict sensitivity has or will be integrated into development and related programming in conflict settings.

Identification of adaptation finance programmes

Identifying the main incentives to access adaptation finance in Somalia is complex, given the different objectives amongst the various types of funding. Climate fund mobilisers for the GCF and LDCF are principally UN organisations and the FGS. The Director of Environment and the Office of the Prime Minister consider climate finance an excellent opportunity to support green growth and for the country to emerge from its economic slump, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic (KII5 Som., 2021).

Where has most CCA money been channelled?

Funding from bilateral and multilateral donors supporting climate adaptation is essentially sector-led and predominantly focuses on drought and flood prevention, livestock and other agricultural support, capacity-building and improved weather forecasting. Some activity is tagged explicitly as adaptation and elsewhere adaptation is addressed as a cross-cutting issue. NGOs consider this type of adaptation finance to be a channel to support supplemental programming in both the development and humanitarian sectors (KII5 Som., 2021).

There is increasing national focus on updating emergency response mechanisms for agro-pastoral communities: better weather forecasting and information dissemination, the development of water resource management plans, infrastructure and water storage.

Some agencies attempt to promote CCA without specifically referencing it. This is because government and communities may perceive it to be a long-term investment that diverts attention from the urgency of repeating short-term risks, disasters and conflict stabilisation.

Amongst agencies that downplay specific reference to CCA whilst seeking CCA outcomes, another key entry point to engage people in climate adaptation practice is access to water. Through work on water access, all involved have roles in systematically linked issues, including supply chains, resource management, livestock and sinkholes (KII1 Som., 2021).

At the same time, 'climate change' is used by other groups to address environmental and weather hazards as external drivers of risk. This is used to create common interests among communities experiencing or being otherwise involved in, or impacted by, communal conflict (KII5 Som., 2021).

Conflict sensitivity in CCA programme design

CCA programmes in Somalia appear to be designed to cope with communal conflict – and to avoid political conflict – and to reduce environmental stressors. The GCF, for example, focuses on sectors including livelihoods, water and health.

In general, the GCF directs less funding to conflict-affected contexts, such as Somalia, relative to stable countries. It seeks to channel money to where there is vulnerability and low adaptive capacity, yet the GCF has little appetite for investment where there is only a small likelihood of those investments delivering successful programming, for example in areas where there is conflict (KII6 Som., 2021).

Other donors are trying to move from humanitarian to long-term development activity, with CCA programming being directly addressed or included in sector-driven projects and treated as a cross-cutting issue (KII2 Som., 2021; KII5 Som., 2021; KII7 Som., 2021).

Conflict sensitivity takes two forms in Somalia: avoidance of areas controlled by militias such as al-Shabab, and addressing community-based conflict that threatens the sectoral outcomes of projects.

Type of conflict matters: If a militia controls – or is likely to control – territory, funding will not be allocated for climate adaptation, as well as other development priorities, given the high security risks. For example, no CCA programmes are implemented in al-Shabab-held areas. If al-Shabab threatens to encroach upon an area where programming is underway, implementers reduce work before communities and staff security are under threat. Work ceases in locations taken over by a militia, and limited activity may occur in adjacent territories (KII1 Som., 2021). In areas recently cleared of al-Shabab, humanitarian interventions by UN agencies can rapidly begin to start a process of trust-building between communities and the government (KII5 Som., 2021). Conflict risk mitigation in programme design documentation can include statements similar to 'target areas will be well-chosen on the criteria of having a stable security situation' (UNDP, 2014; UNDP 2019). A complementary approach is to make use of the opportunity to access newly recovered areas and work closely and in a consultative manner with elders, clan leaders, civil society and other stakeholders for project selection, implementation and monitoring to mitigate the potential for conflict (UNDP, 2014). An unfavourable outcome of avoiding conflict-affected areas outside of government control is that CCA benefits that arise from individual projects, or indeed those from any other type of development programming, are likely to exclude the most vulnerable populations and increase inequity, especially if government decision-makers and those involved in programme design are not from – or are biased against – communities in conflict-affected areas (KII8 Som., 2021).

In Somalia, conflict sensitivity actively addresses, or copes with, historical communal conflict amongst beneficiaries represented largely by rural communities, including farmers, herders and water-user groups. Tools for mitigating conflict are generally vague, and approaches depend on implementation agency practices, including the use of customary resolution mechanisms to resolve disputes, alongside consultation with local leaders over project implementation decisions (UNDP, 2014). By contrast, UNEP, which has appointed the first UN Environmental Security Advisor in Somalia, emphasises the need to consider the local context to identify appropriate mediation techniques where needed. This emphasis includes approaching communities from environmental and climate change perspectives, treating these as external hazards that all parties agree to mitigate, rather than commencing dialogue over current conflicts (KII5 Som., 2021).

UNDP interventions funded through GCF projects cannot work in al-Shabab-controlled conflict-affected areas, so they have focused on Puntland and Somaliland (KII9 Som., 2021). Moving forward, there is discussion about focusing on southern conflict-affected areas. This is eased by the UNDP having staff in-country; previously programming decisions were made from Nairobi, Kenya. Implementation will be more needs-based and geographically uniform.

The WB approach to conflict sensitivity in Somalia includes conflict as one of a set of compounding risks and crises considered from two perspectives: shock avoidance and preparedness. As in many other countries, the Somali government has been reactive to emergencies like drought – waiting for disaster to strike and then seeking donor support – which is more expensive than paying for preparedness. Drought, climate change, conflict and now COVID-19 have detrimentally compounded for Somalia – and locust swarms have further added to this. It is proving hard to shift government mentality from reaction to anticipatory preparation (KII2 Som., 2021; KII7 Som., 2021).

Donor and other institutional frameworks guide conflict-sensitivity approaches. For example, where there is a conflict or post-conflict situation, the AfDB draws upon its Country Resilience and Fragility Assessments as a diagnostic tool to inform Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and Regional Integration Strategy Papers. A CSP frames the project potential for development, incorporating conflict-related findings and promoting peace-building, stabilisation and similar factors. The objective of the approach is to anticipate what can happen through high-level exercises (KII3 Som., 2021).

Conflict-sensitivity approaches to community-based conflict can be affected by militia activity, when militia interests enhance conflict and involve themselves in development programmes for their material interests (MoPIED, 2020).

5.4 BARRIERS AND ENABLERS FOR IMPACTFUL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCING

Barriers to accessing climate adaptation funding

Territories controlled by militias are excluded from climate investment opportunities.

Threat to life and a lack of any governance accountability or control are obvious barriers, yet this needs to be made explicit. Any development work, climate-related or otherwise, reduces and quickly stops in areas at risk from being overrun by militants (KII1 Som., 2021; KII10 Som., 2021). International institutions that fund CCA are explicit that they will only invest in places that are stable (KII4 Som., 2021) and anticipated to be so for years to come (KII11 Som., 2021), that the CCA funding should not be seen as a substitute for stabilisation²⁶ or humanitarian funding (KII6 Som., 2021), and that they will generally not intervene where there is extreme conflict (KII3 Som., 2021).

The Somali government is uncoordinated and lacks the capacity to develop bankable climate adaptation projects. Most climate adaptation finance is currently accessed through humanitarian relief and is unsustainable (KII8 Som., 2021). The relative ease of access to humanitarian funding for climate-related projects, and community knowledge of what to expect from various donors and implementing agencies, impedes the type of long-term thinking needed for systematic climate adaptation and other sectoral programme design (KII6 Som., 2021). Literature and interviews emphasise governance obstacles, particularly a lack of technical and management capacity in federal and state governments; conflict between federal government and states; competition between ministries and personnel within ministries; staff turnover and a lack of institutional memory; collapsed systems including those needed to demonstrate fiduciary responsibility; and corruption.

There is limited knowledge and capacity to respond to climate change at national and local levels. Ministries active in the environmental sector in all zones of Somalia have limited understanding of climate change and its impact on ecosystem services (KII5 Som., 2021). Other than the 2013 NAPA (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013), there are few policies, strategies and development plans that effectively address adaptation to climate risk. Cross-sectoral and coordinated institutionalisation of climate-risk management is required (UNDP, 2014). The FGS is planning new processes for climate funding to be put through its treasury budget, with the processes supported by the WB. The WB supports this effort through the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project, designed to create confidence in local structures and improve government–citizen trust. The project intends to build cooperation and coordination between the FGS and FMS, and it emphasises building a capable and effective platform to deliver investments and strengthen and reinforce government legitimacy and citizen engagement. For example, funding has been allocated for flood work through the Ministry of Planning.

Multilateral and other international institutions, rather than government, have leading roles in climate programme design, funding access and management. The UNDP and, to a lesser extent, the AfDB and soon-to-be SAVE, are the only accredited agencies able to access GCF funds in Somalia. Regionally, difficulties have been observed aligning UNDP and government interests. Proposals have been developed with insufficient government sectoral input during planning processes, which have been dominated by multilateral partners (KII8 Som., 2021).

It is unclear what is needed to ‘crack the nut’ of how national entities can become accredited to access climate funding (KII5 Som., 2021). Technical expertise to develop and write bankable projects is lacking, as is the institutional capacity to secure accreditation (KII3 Som., 2021). Supporting the development of such capacity would empower Somalia and its institutions to be more self-reliant. It would be a long-term commitment, yet it could usefully link to programmes building fiduciary capacity in the FGS and FMS (such as the WB’s Somalia Crisis Recovery Project). Such commitment might also provide a platform to consolidate emerging environmental/climate interest and capacity in those government institutions that are building capacity and confidence. Meanwhile, the GCF accreditation mechanism comes under heavy criticism from many non-accredited agencies (KII10 Som., 2021). Becoming accredited is out of reach for most institutions, given the need for substantial internal reorganisation. For many institutions, such as NGOs, GCF funding requires an entirely different approach to their normal ways of working with donor funding, because project design aligns with the government, NDC targets, and NDC Paris Agreement sectors (e.g. agriculture, integrated water resources management, enhanced government capacity and coastal livelihoods) (KII6 Som., 2021). Proposal development requires one to two years of work and is funded entirely by the applicant without any guarantee of producing a bankable project (KII SAVE). Even globally accredited agencies may find it easier to seek funding at national levels through other accredited partners (KII10 Som., 2021). There is a sense that there is plenty of funding available, but very few ways in which to access it (KII8 Som., 2021).

Finding co-finance for GEF applications is a substantial barrier. The GEF has a co-finance policy (FAO, 2018), indicating a target of \$7 of co-finance for every \$1 of GEF finances (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). Somalia currently has the potential to access up to \$10 million in LDCF STAR (Federal Government of Somalia, 2015) allocation that was earmarked during GEF 7 (July 2018–June 2022). This means there is a need to find \$70 million of co-financing in order for Somalia to access the \$10 million. Yet this finance has not been accessed due to the difficulty in identifying adequate co-financing. Without co-finance, appointing teams and accessing resources to make sure activities proceed is not possible (KII3 Som., 2021).

Language can be a barrier as adaptation finance documents are in English. Linguistically, this is problematic not just for Somalia, but for French and Arabic speakers across the region (KII3 Som., 2021).

Enablers for accessing climate funding

Somalia’s progress toward stabilisation is an increasingly critical enabler. This creates the opportunity to move away from short-term, essentially humanitarian-led, programming to a long-term focus on climate and other development investments. There is increased recognition that development programming needs to move from year-long ‘sandbag and concrete interventions’ to long-term climate adaptation activities, including land restoration through such activities as tree planting and working to recharge aquifers and other related infrastructure (KII12 Som., 2021).

Stabilisation is leading to increases in capacity in certain government institutions that focus on long-term issues, including CCA. There is emerging optimism about state- and federal-level Ministries of Environment with commitment and interest in responding to climate change. Yet Somalia is very fractured, and capacity and absorptive abilities differ. Ministries of the Environment in Somaliland and Puntland are improving. Somaliland and Puntland also have good CSOs, including internationally recognised actors. Yet there are limited capabilities to manage finance overall, particularly in south-west Somalia as it is still engaged in conflict with militant groups (KII11 Som., 2021).

Donors aligning with the NDP is empowering the government to select the programmes it wants to be implemented, even if finance will not flow through government channels.

Somalia's NAPA appears undervalued, and the NDC has limited influence. For example, available Somalia Crisis Recovery Project documentation often refers to the NDP yet has no reference to the NAPA (WB, 2020b).

Barriers to implementing adaptation finance in conflict settings

Political divisions, particularly between the three distinct regions of Federal Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, make programme implementation challenging (UNDP, 2014).

Administrative structures have been set up since the establishment of FMS, and district councils are still being formed in a number of them, completing a process that began in the 1990s in Somaliland and Puntland (WB, 2020b). The NDP highlights complexity in implementing national policy, for example, making clear the contrast between Puntland, considered supportive of the FGS, and Somaliland, with its own constitution and administration and self-declared as a separate state, but unrecognised internationally or by the rest of Somalia (MoPIED, 2020).

Demand for climate funds is low because there are more urgent priorities like water, electricity and vaccines (KII8 Som., 2021). Somalia needs a lot of capacity-building, in order to better understand the risks and opportunities of climate. If vaccines or social protection programming are short-term priorities, other long-term demands may drop away as the capacity to take on more work is lacking.

Policy gaps result in a lack of legal means to promote and enforce sustainable natural resource practices. These gaps compound a lack of institutional capacity needed to create and implement policies in the first place. Policies differ between states, which obstructs national efforts. Existing policies are mainly inadequate in establishing an enabling environment for institutional capacity development. In particular, ministries have not yet developed the capacity to formulate newly appropriate, relevant policies that are needed to address sustainable forestry and watershed and land-use management (UNDP, 2014). As a result, there is difficulty in creating adaptation funding pipelines in which donors can invest.

The UN and other donors do not want to pass money through the government because of a lack of fiduciary capacity and scope for corruption. The WB is attempting to address capacity and other gaps through its Somalia Crisis Recovery Fund. This is done in part by setting up funding tranches managed by the government, as well as introducing a learning-by-doing approach to scale up government responsibility (KII7, Som., 2021).

Finding and keeping sufficient numbers of qualified national staff to work on implementation is challenging. With efforts to build the skills and capacity of staff, there is a high likelihood that individuals will leave projects for a higher salary or seek to emigrate from Somalia (KII11 Som., 2021).

Climate data limitations affect implementation efficiency. Somalia's prolonged civil war caused the collapse of the climate monitoring network, meaning there has been little information available since 1990. Accurate analysis of climate change in Somalia is therefore challenging. A lack of data also means that there is not enough information to develop detailed spatial mapping, which would allow adequate planning for risk reduction (UNDP, 2014). Climate data limitations are compounded by foreign ownership of information plus a lack of national coordination and capacity to manage and distribute timely and appropriate information.

Enablers for adaptation finance implementation in conflict settings

NGOs have achieved success based on small interventions (around \$50,000) at the community level that build up to scale with a grant of \$1 million (KII8 Som., 2021). Umbrella grant mechanisms that permit local group applications for projects or equipment can complement large-scale work, including UNDP infrastructure rehabilitation (KII1 Som., 2021). For example, a large-scale irrigation programme can be supported by numerous small grants to communities in order to support management capacity amongst water-user groups.

Programmes that have the flexibility to change plans and adapt their budgets to changing conflict dynamics are best placed to implement work successfully (KII1 Som., 2021). Flexibility depends on donor regulations and, in this case, it applies both to militia-based conflict (permitting rapid activity to start up in areas recently taken back into government control) and historical clan/community-based conflict. It also applies to responding to hazards including drought, flood and locust swarms.

Reducing tension between clans through built-in conflict intervention increases the likelihood of programme success. For example, when water infrastructure is to be installed in villages where there are competing sub-clans, conflict interventions (including local dispute mechanisms and use of local facilitators and leaders) are important (KII5 Som., 2021).

5.5 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ADAPTATION FINANCING

Efficiency and effectiveness are measured by the operational practices of donors and implementing institutions. These include sectoral goals, numbers of communities and beneficiaries reached, and capacity raised.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has implemented an EWS and crisis monitoring linked to two sets of indicators. One is based on market prices, the other on weather changes measured by rain gauges. Market prices are a proactive indicator of conflict potential; drought and flood-related weather information is more reactive. Both systems are community-led. The EWS is linked to cash transfer mechanisms and complements development work mitigating weather/climate impacts (KII1 Som., 2021). The AfDB also contextualises conflict sensitivity to local conditions. A local facilitator is appointed to resolve conflict in the communities where friction is likely to occur (KII3 Som., 2021).

Even among institutions seeking to reach the most vulnerable, if the vulnerable are within militia-held areas, they cannot receive direct CCA investments (although they may benefit from upstream investment including improvements to water management systems at landscape levels). Elsewhere, an investment may be geographically limited and targeted toward specific communities and sectors. Within these boundaries, gender and vulnerability assessments, when conducted, are again guided by institutional practice. There is no evidence that different streams of finance coordinate approaches.

Given the history of humanitarian programming being focused on the short-term and urgent – especially when it comes to protection and disaster response – there has been little scope to develop long-term, exemplary conflict-sensitive strategies for CCA programmes in Somalia. Yet, as the country becomes more stable in places, government, donors and implementing agencies appear to want to move in this direction.

5.6 COUNTRY SUMMARY

Climate adaptation finance is primarily programmed for development and humanitarian activities aligning with Somalia's NDP (MoPIED, 2020). GCF and LDCF programmes focus on the country's environmental and disaster risks around water, agriculture and natural resource management. Among funding packages, significant attention is increasingly paid to capacity-building and governance coordination. Among bilateral and multilateral donors, with exceptions, climate and conflict are usually treated as cross-cutting issues, addressed systematically and recognised, yet not described explicitly. When conflict concerns territorial control by al-Shabab or other militia groups, adaptation finance has no possibility of being allocated. If a project is working in an area that a militant group overtakes, work stops. When conflict is between rival clans or other groups, projects proceed and conflict mitigation is usually based on in-house tools and processes amongst donors and implementing agencies. These involve local knowledge, community authorities and consultation to solve problems and allow work to continue. Capacity in government and civil society is rising, urbanisation is increasing, and a diaspora is returning to Somalia with funds and technical resources. A foundation is emerging that can be harnessed to build a cohesive, system-based approach to climate adaptation across Somalia.

SECTION 6
**COUNTRY CASE
STUDY: SUDAN**



The following section provides a deep dive into the climate adaptation finance landscape of Sudan. The findings of this case study have been collated from a review of limited project documentation (largely proposals) and 13 key stakeholder interviews. This section addresses the core research questions of how conflict-sensitive historic adaptation programmes have been in Sudan, and the barriers and enablers for impactful adaptation financing from the Somalian experience.

6.1 BACKGROUND

Country context

Sudan, the third-largest African country by area, lies in North East Africa. It neighbours Egypt, Libya, Chad, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The country is mostly desert and semi-arid however, with fertile land, mountains and livestock, natural resources are the backbone of its economy. The agriculture sector generates 39% of the nation's GDP, constitutes 50% of the labour force and is a source of livelihoods for approximately 65% of the population (UNEP, 2020). With a total population of 43.8 million in 2020 (WB database), nearly half of the population (46.5%) is living in poverty, and such poverty results in a higher dependence on the natural environment for livelihoods and resources. Most of the population lives in rural areas, yet the country saw rapid urbanisation in 2020 (increasing by 3.17% from 2019), when 35.3% of the population was reported to be living in urban areas (Index Mundi, 2020). Drivers of this urbanisation include drought and famine in the regions of Kordofan and Darfur.


The secession of South Sudan in 2011, along with prevalent fragility from previous regimes that had a close link with al-Qaeda, has negatively impacted Sudan's economy. From 2015 to 2019, GDP fell 32% (WB database). This has been driven by changes in land use and a reduction in land coverage of 24.7% (UNEP, 2020), economic sanctions imposed by the US, and a loss of 75% of Sudan's oil reserves to South Sudan (IFAD, 2013). The secession also led to an influx of refugees into Sudan, which exacerbated existing population pressures. Sudan now hosts high volumes of refugees from South Sudan, Eritrea, Syria, Yemen and Chad. Lastly, inflation has been continuously increasing, soaring from 11.2% in 2009 to an average of 197.12% in 2021 (Statista, 2021) which has increased fuel prices and triggered violent protests, especially in 2013.

Conflict

Conflict in Sudan is driven by major land-related issues, including degradation and urban encroachment, plus economic shocks. These issues include:

- **land degradation**, mainly in the form of soil erosion, is widespread, causing the siltation of water resources
- **urban encroachment**, including the large expansion of the city of Khartoum (since 1984) and Darfur, where conflicts have continuously soared
- **local conflicts**, in turn, have taken place between pastoralists and sedentary farmers over livestock routes, and over mining rights and mining allotment boundaries (UNEP, 2020).

FIGURE 7: GEOLOCALISED CONFLICTS IN SUDAN (2018–2021)



Sources: Administrative boundaries – OCHA database; conflict data – ACLED database.

Conflict has been – and continues to be – concentrated in three main regions of Sudan: Darfur, South Kordofan and around the Blue Nile (bordering Ethiopia) (see Figure 7). It is most aggressive in Darfur, where there has been armed conflict and where 26 major tribal wars have broken out during the past two decades (Partners for Sustainable Development, 2016). In South Kordofan, there has been a civil war since 2011 but, overall, traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution are still operational and effective (UNEP, 2020). Lastly, in the Blue Nile, there are disagreements between farmers and pastoralists, but the co-existence of different ethnic groups in integrated communities has helped to maintain stability.

Continuous hikes in food prices were a key driver for the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir from power in April 2019, which led to the formation of a transition government in September 2019. The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020 (Government of Sudan, 2020) has brought an optimistic outlook for Sudan’s future. For example, as a key measure to normalise Sudan’s debt status, all fuel subsidies have been gradually removed. However, there has been minimal immediate relief from ongoing conflicts and chronic shortages of basic commodities such as bread and fuel. In turn, impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated such issues, further increasing basic food prices and unemployment, and leading to falling exports.

Sudan hosts one of the largest populations of IDPs and refugees in Africa. There are an estimated 2.4 million IDPs in Sudan, of which 2.1 million have been displaced due to conflict and violence and 0.3 million due to disaster (IDMC, 2019). Most IDPs can be found in Darfur (88%) and Kordofan (9%). Further concerns arise from issues with returnees, in relation to camps on land that is owned by other farmers, unauthorised building on non-owned property, and the rent or sale of non-owned plots (UNEP, 2020).


Overall climate

Sudan has a climate that ranges from hot desert in the north, hot semi-arid conditions towards the south, and tropical wet and dry conditions in the south-east and south-west (Peel et al., 2007). Rainfall in Sudan is driven by the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ): 'a band of convective rainfall that occurs where the surface heating of the Earth is strongest' (Met Office, 2016: 8). This makes the volume of rainfall more limited and volatile, having one rainy season per year. Figure 8 outlines the three climate zones present in Sudan according to latitudinal bands that reflect different rainfall gradients: A represents dry climates in the north with limited rainfall, where most pastoralism occurs; B represents moderate rainfall; and C represents longer and heavier rainy seasons where agricultural activities are concentrated.

Climate variability and extreme weather

Even though observed trends in climate are difficult to assess due to the lack of reliable and consistent meteorological data in Sudan (Met Office, 2016), there is evidence of change in climate variability and climate extremes. In the last century, average temperatures have increased by 1°C (Niang et al., 2014). The variability in both the total amount and timing of rainfall from year to year has changed – total annual rainfall has decreased by 10–30 mm per decade (USAID, 2016). Lastly, there has been an increase in the frequency of extreme climatic events. There have been more droughts in Kordofan, Darfur and central Sudan, as well as highly unpredictable floods from high rainfall variability (Republic of Sudan, 2015; USAID, 2016).

FIGURE 8: CLIMATE ZONES A, B AND C



Source: Met Office (2016).

Observed and projected climate change

Projections from the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) indicate: (i) that by 2050 there will be an increase in average temperature of 1.5–3°C in Sudan; (ii) that there will be an increase in the unpredictability of seasonal rains; (iii) that there will be an increase in incidences of drought; and (iv) that by 2050 there will be a rise in sea level (Red Sea) of between 30cm and 50 cm (Niang et al., 2014; USAID, 2016;). At the same time, it is predicted that the Sahara Desert is expanding southwards at an estimated rate of 1.5 km a year (USAID, 2016).

Climate change impacts

Overall, climate change will continue to increase climate vulnerability for the country's rainfed agriculture and pastoralist systems, upon which most livelihoods depend. Sudan's agricultural climate risks include the loss of productive land, pasture and water due to expanded desertification; a shortened growing season; reduced yields and crop failure; and increased conflict between pastoralists and farmers over limited land and resources. Additionally, the water sector will face increased evaporation from water storage facilities, which will reduce the water supply; decreased river flows from the Nile (up to 20–30% by 2090), which will reduce the availability of water for irrigation, drinking and sanitation; and increased conflict over natural resources, especially given increased pressure on water supply (USAID, 2016).

6.2 HOW MUCH ADAPTATION FINANCE IS GOING TO WHOM, WHERE AND WHAT PROGRAMMES?


Climate change policy landscape

Even though environmental policy development has advanced in Sudan since 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, the policies lack clarity in how to combat land degradation, desertification and climate change. The 2005 Agreement and the Interim National Constitution have had a big impact on Sudan's environmental strategy – they specified the need to develop policies and laws to resolve land-use and tenure problems, which in turn enabled the identification of the root cause of these problems. Since then, the government has produced the 2006 National Action Plan on Desertification Control (Republic of Sudan, 2006), the 2007 NAPA (Republic of the Sudan, 2007), various versions of the Sudan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2015–2019), the 2016 Sudan National Adaptation Plan (NAP) (Republic of the Sudan, 2016), and the 2018 National Drought Plan (Republic of Sudan, 2018). The lack of data, including climate information, affects the quality of these policies and strategies.

Historical climate financing flows and average programme length

In Sudan, the total annual amount of finance allocated to programmes and projects tagged as climate adaptation from the OECD database have varied since 2010: the highest in volume being \$20 million in 2016, and the lowest being \$1.7 million in 2013 (see Figure 9). Since 2016, the main donors financing such activities are the EU, Sida, IFAD, the GEF and the AfDB. Grant financing has primarily targeted the food assistance sector, as well as other sectors including agriculture, water supply and sanitation, and environmental protection. More recently, in 2020, the GCF approved two projects for a total of \$35.6 million: 'Enhancing adaptive capacity of local communities and restoring carbon sink potential of the Gum Arabic belt' and 'Building resilience in the face of climate change within traditional rain fed agricultural and pastoral systems in Sudan'.

FIGURE 9: HISTORICAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE RECEIVED BY SUDAN (2010–2018)



Sources: OECD-DAC database and CFU database.

Institutional mapping – who can access climate finance

New country leadership has restructured Sudan’s political system where the climate agenda is centrally led. The Ministry of Environment was abolished by a presidential decree in September 2018 through the amended Environmental Protection Act of 2001 (Republic of Sudan, 2001). It was replaced with the National Council for the Environment (NCE), but the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), which was part of the ministry, was retained. This led to a period of unclear mandates between the NCE and HCENR that was only resolved in April 2020 by dissolving the NCE and transferring all oversight to the HCENR. Overall, the HCENR is responsible for implementing the NDC and is, in turn, the NDA for the GCF. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, supported by the Secretary General and other heads of ministries.

The National Council for Combating Desertification (NCCD) has also been abolished (UNEP, 2020). However, other current key institutions contributing to addressing climate change include the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests; the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries; the Ministry of Industry and Trade; the Ministry of Investment; the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources; the Ministry of Wildlife Conservation; the Ministry of General Administration; and the National Council for Research. The government is committed to international conventions on climate change; however, it is too early to tell how this new function is effectively driving climate action and improving the known lack of coordination between government bodies at the federal and state levels (UNEP, 2020).

Finance mechanisms for climate adaptation have primarily been channelled through multilateral development banks and UN agencies to support government. They are the only organisations accredited to climate funds in Sudan. Since 2016, the UNEP and AfDB have accessed the LDCF; the WB has accessed the GEF; and the FAO and UNDP have accessed the GCF. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs), such as ZOA and the International Red Cross, have secured finance from bilateral donors (Sweden and the UK, and the EU respectively) to deliver climate adaptation projects. IFAD has been the only organisation to directly fund the government for CCA agriculture-focused projects. Regarding government strengthening, through the GCF Readiness Programme, the UNDP and FAO have both been successful in accessing \$1 million each to support the Government of Sudan, for NDA

strengthening in 2017 and adaptation planning support in 2020, respectively. However, the UNDP readiness programme resulted in the government returning last affiliated finance due to the administrative complexities and misunderstandings (KII1 Sudan, 2021). This warrants further exploration.

6.3 HOW CONFLICT-SENSITIVE HAVE CCA PROGRAMMES BEEN?

Conflict defined in national climate policies

All national climate policies recognise the strong linkage between conflict resolution and climate adaptation. The 2007 NAPA recognises that nature-based conflict is one of the many non-climatic factors contributing to the vulnerability of rural communities in Sudan. Specifically, NAPA highlights key policy gaps that can support conflict resolution between farmers and pastoralists.³ In turn, justifications of all identified suitable adaptation projects for Sudan have explained the strong synergies between climate adaptation and nature-based conflict resolutions. The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2015–2019) also acknowledges that the lack of coordination to manage natural resources and unclear land rights contribute to nature-based conflict. The 2015 NDC states that conflict is one of the various vulnerabilities weakening people's ability to adapt to changes in climate. The 2016 NAP states that the importance of adaptation to climate change needs to be strongly rooted in the overall Sudanese development context. It recognises that nature-based conflict stems from Sudanese communities (farmers and pastoralists) and depends on the natural environment needed for survival, which has contributed to competition and conflict over it. It also recognises the long-running civil conflict in South Kordofan...Overall climate change is exacerbating such issues.

Identification of adaptation finance programmes

The identification of climate adaptation investment opportunities is led by donors, multilaterals and NGOs in close collaboration with the government of Sudan. NAPA has identified adaptation projects relevant for Sudan, and has enabled multilaterals and donors to ensure alignment to this list as a means of country demand. Sudan is the first country in Africa to have developed its NAP for medium- to long-term investment needs. In it, articulating the need to develop state-level NAP institutions in order to strengthen the framework of environmental action in all states, and in turn support the implementation of state adaptation plans (SAPs) across all 18 states. SAPs contain lists of adaptation programmes and activities that are aligned with NAP and its processes, and endorsed by respective state governments (Republic of the Sudan, 2016). A key prospective is that NAP needs to be continuously updated, for example, through the NAP Readiness Project (2021–2022 through FAO–GCF Readiness Programme).

Most funders and implementing entities recognise the value of ensuring that any adaptation investments are demand-led, however, it is recognised that this is also influenced by international political interests. Even though HCENR is relatively new in the climate adaptation space (and are still iteratively learning how to plan and implement such investments), they have more than two decades of experience in land-use investment. These types of investments can now be classified as climate adaptation, which means that experience and learning from these historic investments can be leveraged for future adaptation opportunities.

Addressing and combating climate change and poverty alleviation are seen as interchangeable where these issues exacerbate communal conflict over natural resources.

The HCENR recognises and pushes for this nexus across its portfolio of projects, including those with multilaterals, donors and NGOs; this is done through continuous community consultations to understand local needs (KII2 Sudan, 2021). In turn, it is recognised that this nexus needs to be better understood to improve the identification of relevant adaptation investments and encourage a longer project implementation timeframe. This includes the acquisition and appropriate usage of climate and conflict data. This subsequently supports the movement towards supporting the government to make the shift from 'response mode' to 'anticipatory mode' regarding climate shocks (ibid.), where the latter would complement the principles of adaptation catering not only to climate shocks but also to slow-onset climate hazards.

SAPs from the 2016 NAP have enabled the identification of priority of adaptation investments from socioeconomic and environmental conditions, livelihoods and sharing resources. This has raised awareness and influenced a small number of state government staff to support approval of climate adaptation investments, however, further support is needed for their outreach and communication of associated SAPs. In addition, cost estimates have been identified where the NAP indicates that the national and state governments would provide local contribution from their regular annual budgets. However, it is unclear whether this has actually happened, especially given the lack of climate-related funding in the last few years (GCF, 2020b). The stakeholder engagement that informed these SAPs was not inclusive of all relevant stakeholders, as small-scale farmers and CSOs were mostly not included, and female participation was low (GCF, 2020b). In turn, the adaptation investments identified in SAPs mainly cover urgent, immediate needs rather than set up any long-term strategies for strengthening climate resilience.

Where has most CCA finance been channelled?

Most adaptation investments reviewed have targeted states prone to communal conflict over natural resources (including Darfur and South Kordofan) (see Figure 10 for Darfur), which have a higher degree of stabilisation that favour project succession. Whereas climate-vulnerable areas across the country, where armed conflict is present, have been avoided as operational risks and associated costs are deemed too high, therefore such areas present high levels of uncertainty for project succession. The objective of climate adaptation finance is to build climate resilience in climate-vulnerable areas. In Sudan, this objective is correlated to addressing communal conflict over natural resources that are exposed to climate risks.

Conflict sensitivity in CCA programme design

Locations of climate adaptation projects include those in natural resource-based, conflict-prone states, where activities around natural resource management take centre stage.

Armed-conflict areas are avoided. For example, the Aqua4Darfur Partnership and the 2017 Water for Sustainable Development in Darfur project, funded by the FCDO and the EU and implemented by ZOA, aims to reduce conflict by i) addressing water scarcity through providing safe water points in targeted catchments in order to increase reliability and availability of water for people, animals and crops; and ii) mitigating against the effects of drought. Conflict sensitivity analysis has allowed Aqua4Darfur to learn from years of humanitarian projects that aimed to improve integrated water resources management (IWRM) for conflict resolution in selected catchment areas and build upon their successes. By considering the wider socioeconomic dimensions from upstream and downstream catchment areas, it has been able to determine the programme and sequence of relevant activities, such as taking the first year to focus on building relationships and developing a rapport with and amongst various stakeholders (e.g. direct water users, residents and nomadic households and their animals) in order to gain an overall understanding of their needs. The approach taken to support the implementation of the project concentrated on building upon previous projects in focus areas, community-level interventions and overall keeping a low project profile. It also recognises that dealing with conflict beyond water-related conflict is out of the project's scope.

Other climate adaptation investments listed below are also located in natural resource-based conflict.

All climate adaptation investments reviewed have had strong community participatory processes at the design stage and throughout the project cycle, which ensures inclusivity, relevance and overall ownership, and uptake of investments. Community participatory processes include multi-stakeholder consultations of natural resource end-users (e.g. farmers and pastoralists) as well as existing local committees (e.g. peace and reconciliation committees (PRCs), youth peace ambassador Groups (YPAGs), crop protection committees (CPCs), women's unions, and water management committees (WMCs). And, organisations such as ZOA have not only created new, relevant committees, they have also ensured local leaders, local government ministries and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) are consulted during the selection of particular areas for implementation in order to cover a range of ethnic and racial groups. All adaptation investments reviewed have ensured beneficiary groups are comprised of people from different ethnic, racial, gender and age groups, emphasising the important role each respective actors has upon communities. Lastly, to avoid conflict, after every harvest, investments have been made to facilitate negotiations between farmers and pastoralists. It is, however, unclear how successful these processes have been in capturing local priorities, where in some areas not all relevant committees and beneficiaries were invited or attended meetings/workshops, and, in turn, it is not clear on the level of participation for those who did attend.¹⁰

Climate fund reviewing processes of project proposals together with NGOs that have long-standing experience in a particular state have ensured the acknowledgement of project operational risks in conflict-prone areas and, in turn, the 'do no harm' aspect of the project itself.

- **The GEF-funded Sudan Sustainable Natural Resources Management Project (SSNRMP)** in 2018 is being expanded to three new states: Northern (in the Al Seleim Basin), River Nile and North Kordofan. Even though it acknowledges that “the interaction of high levels of poverty, social exclusion, spatial inequality and fragile social cohesion underpin ongoing rivalry over scarce resources, mass group mobilization and conflict”, the project document states that the proposal fails to describe a clear operational approach to addressing the list of activities. In addition, the operational risks for this project are not listed. Instead, the project document merely states that “implementation risks are minimised overall due to the existing well-established institutional arrangements and capacities built under the SSNRMP”. This is not supported by facts, metrics, lessons learnt or any technical information. GEF technical reviewers have outlined that the lack of clarity on the TOC, the lack of risk identification, and the failure to define the ‘global environmental benefits’ has put the feasibility of the project into question. Therefore, they have suggested that conflict assessments should be conducted to increase the likelihood of project success, and have specifically pointed to existing tools used in projects in conflict-prone areas: the USAID conflict assessment and analysis tools, the UNDP methods for analysing projects with conflict dimensions, and the WB’s ‘The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-Related Obstacles to Development’ (Shardesai and Wam, 2002).
- **The GCF ‘Building resilience in the face of climate change within traditional rain fed agricultural and pastoral systems in Sudan’ project proposal**, approved to the UNDP towards the end of 2020, with HCENR as the executing entity, has been subject to a conflict analysis across nine states (including the most conflict-prone areas of South Kordofan and Darfur). The conflict analysis used the classifications of ‘most’, ‘modestly’ and ‘least’ serious regarding conflict situations, and concluded that the likelihood of conflict during project implementation is low. Additionally, the conflict analysis had highlighted where project activities can complement recommended conflict mitigation measures: mainly through capacity-building, awareness-raising and cooperative management. This has supported the case that the project will not create nor exacerbate conflict over natural resources, and rather, reduce the risk of conflict by improving natural resource management, and incorporating good practices, lessons learnt and conflict resolution strategies into the project design. This has highlighted the importance of actors of local communities to have direct involvement in project implementation because of the **established conflict-resolution strategies based on traditional norms and native administration systems that have already proven capable in addressing conflict situations**. The project includes a grievance redress mechanism in which affected parties can resolve conflict-related issues, amongst others, in a cordial manner with project personnel in an efficient, unbiased, transparent, timely and cost-effective way (GCF, 2020c: Section 4.2).
- The 2018 Sida-funded project **Sustainable Integrated Development Approach**, which is managed by a consortium of ZOA, SOS Sahel Sudan and World Relief, aims to “contribute to sustainable peace, improved conditions for good public service delivery, and strengthened resilience” by focusing on sustainable peace, the environment, climate and agriculture in the state of Darfur. ZOA, which has experience in more than 10 FCAS countries, has developed an organisation-wide peace-building policy that includes instructions for conflict-sensitive working. In Darfur, they partnered with other NGOs – World Relief and SOS Sahel – that have expertise and experience working in a FCAS context for peace-building, natural resource management, improvements in livelihoods, capacity-building, conflict reduction and emergency response. ZOA provides training on conflict sensitivity, specifically regarding ‘do no harm’, for ZOA staff as well as partner organisations to identify ‘connectors’ and dividers’


BOX 1: GCF ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT “BUILDING RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN TRADITIONAL RAIN FED AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL SYSTEMS IN SUDAN”

Stakeholder consultations undertaken during the conflict analysis provided additional recommendations to ensure conflict risks are managed effectively:

- “Ensure good communication between project and all types of direct and indirect beneficiaries;
- Engage village leadership in awareness-raising of project’s conflict reduction benefits;
- Develop a rapid conflict response plan to implement if potential conflict situations arise;
- Ensure all tribal groups are represented in capacity building initiatives in project localities; and
- Ensure project activities respect the demarcation of animal migration routes and communal areas”

Source: GCF (2020c: 40).

FIGURE 10: MAP OF DARFUR STATE IN SUDAN, WHERE THE CONSORTIUM OF ZOA, WORLD RELIEF AND SOS SAHEL WORK



Source: ZOA (2017).

in particular contexts. They have a set of conflict analysis tools (e.g. actor mapping, force field analysis, conflict triangle) for project design and implementation phases.

The quality of risk assessments of adaptation investments can be improved, especially for those that consider the climate and conflict nexus (KII3 Sudan, 2021). Most adaptation investments reviewed have carried out vulnerability assessments to identify the most prominent issues on the ground. In addition, there are environmental and social safeguards to be met from multiple actors (e.g. funder, implementing entity and executing entity). Operational risks and 'do no harm' of investments is particularly more sensitive in conflict-prone areas, especially given the multitude of different types of conflict, therefore specialised guidance is needed. Even though assessment and analysis tools exist¹¹ and are referred to, there is a recognition across a multitude of actors that the nexus of climate change and conflict can be better understood and therefore better addressed. Stemming from a 2015 independent Adelphi report, *A New Climate for Peace* that was commissioned by the G7,¹² Adelphi is now developing a set of assessment tools to better capture the nexus of climate change risks and conflict fragility, and the state of Darfur is one of the pilot areas for tools being tested.

6.4 BARRIERS AND ENABLERS FOR IMPACTFUL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCING

Barriers to accessing adaptation finance in conflict-affected areas

The Government of Sudan lacks the capacity to directly access climate funds such as the GCF. Multilaterals are accessing climate finance with oversight from the GCF NDA, the HCENR. The FAO successfully accessed the \$1 million GCF Readiness fund on June 2020 to address gaps of the 2016 NAP focusing on the agriculture and water sectors, and overall support to increase government capacity. This includes addressing the lack of (i) climate change data and information and impact assessments, (ii) well-designed training opportunities for climate change impact modelling at the state and federal levels, and (iii) capacity of state-level technical committees for climate change adaptation planning and implementation. This is a reflection of the capacity needed to be developed. The previous Readiness Programme aims to support the NDA, HCENR, implemented by UNDP is said to have had administrative misunderstandings of the scope of programme, resulting in HCENR returning some of the funding back. Overall, the combination of the GCF's complex and rigid guidelines, criteria and accreditation process, along with low government capacity deters the government in directly accessing such funding opportunities, including those directed towards capacity-building, where UN agencies are better placed to support access. Amongst many functions of HCENR, they have executed adaptation investments from GEF and more recently have been appointed the executing entity for the GCF UNDP project. It is however unclear the capacity and transparency levels of current public finance management (PFM) systems in place and in turn what this means for the absorption capacity of adaptation finance in general.

The process needed to access adaptation finance takes years to get approval. The initial proposal for the GCF, UNDP project was submitted in 2017 and approved in June 2020: period lastly up to 3.5 years. Given this large-scale project, approval, inputs and commitment was needed across nine different states and, in turn, further assessments were requested from the GCF, including a detailed conflict risk assessment. This questions the quality of general proposal guidance and technical assistance from the GCF to accredited entities, where in the interest of this research, guidance about conducting conflict risk assessments should be given from the beginning of proposal writing. Given the urgency of local issues, including communal conflicts of natural resources, the long-time taken to approve this project deters support for conflict resolutions in a timely fashion and therefore more livelihoods are affected.

Climate data is scarce, which has an impact on effectively allocating adaptation finance to the most vulnerable areas. For the NAP 2016, six MET stations used to conduct historical climate assessment and future projections for different climate scenarios. However, these stations do not cover the whole country. The analysis is not a representation of the different climatic zones in the Sudan, across the 18 different states. There is also insufficient data for assessing mid- and long- term climate impacts and climate-related risks to the agriculture and water sectors. This emphasises the need for the NAP–GCF Readiness programme, approved in 2020, which specifically aims to address these gaps: with objectives for the (i) improved evidence base of climatic impacts in the agriculture and water sectors, (ii) strengthened technical and institutional capacity in order to assess and prioritise adaptation options in agriculture and water, and (iii) reactivated state-level Technical Committees for climate adaptation that revise state-level adaptation plans. Phase 1 of programme is due to be finished (mid 2021).

Enablers for accessing adaptation finance

The ‘enabling environment’ has been improved, especially regarding Sudan’s climate policies and plans. This has increased international interest to support the government of Sudan to benefit from adaptation finance (KII4 Sudan, 2021). At the national level, the recently established HCENR puts the climate agenda at centre stage, being led by the prime minister and drawing on ministers across the government to join as committee members. Even though it is too early to ascertain its effectiveness, this is a positive example of breaking the ‘climate’ institutional silo. Combating the threat of climate change needs multi-sectoral collaboration to combat multi-sectoral issues. The UNEP is specifically supporting integrated adaptation priorities across government by anchoring the Ministry of Finance and planning (KII3 Sudan, 2021). Overall, there is a greater appetite to access adaptation finance where support is needed, not only to increase government capacity, but also to implement plans (KII5 Sudan, 2021).

There are various coordination mechanisms between climate actors, including government entities, multilaterals and NGOs, that help avoid the duplication of efforts and encourage partnerships. This includes the climate change working group led by the UNEP, but it has recently been inactive and it is unclear why. However, the voluntary platform set up by ZOA, which spans across all 18 states, has been active for three years. There are also many humanitarian actors and peace-keeping missions that are involved in climate discussions, however, their interests do not always align (KII5 Sudan, 2021). Even though this has enabled good knowledge sharing across actors, its transparency is questionable where competition for climate finance amongst the international organisations exists and is said to be inevitable (KII2 Sudan, 2021).

Barriers to implementing adaptation finance in conflict settings

The type of conflict matters when determining the degree of stability for climate adaptation project implementation. Project implementing and executing entities ensure that there are community facilitators at the location of each project who support nature-based conflict resolutions. In turn, they actively use UN conflict data to determine whether armed conflict arises in areas of project implementation. If armed conflict does arise, then project implementation is either paused or changed so it can still meet its objectives. Overall, most projects recognise the strong synergies between nature-based conflict and building climate resilience for conflict resolution, and there are procedures that the government has already put in place to resolve these types of conflict. Exploring whether these are effectively delivered by government warrants further exploration. Overall, where known, conflict mitigating methods reduce the likelihood of investment failure, which positively influences investors risk perception. Given that the roots causes of nature-based conflict are better understood and potentially more feasibly mitigated, it presents as strategic entry points for climate adaptation investments.

Flexibility to project changes is heavily dependent on donor requirements: levels of adaptive programming. Some implementing entities have internal processes that incentivise project managers to meet management rating system goals. If it is below a threshold, then it is flagged and larger levels of changes are therefore considered. Due to unforeseen issues, most funders offer adaptive programming to changes in project implementation, however, it is recognised that there is a need to further anticipate operational risks at the project design stage. In turn, implementing and executing entities have found that climate finance administrative procedures (from the GCF and GEF) are too complex and rigid to comply with the level of on-the-ground conflict that may warrant changes. This includes the lengthy amount of time it takes to get a change approved, which further costs the project in time and money.

Enablers for implementation of adaptation finance in conflict settings

Activities catered to meet local needs and rights has positively influenced community uptake and participation of investment implementation (KII4 Sudan, 2021; KII 6 Sudan, 2021; KII7 Sudan, 2021). The HCENR ensures that stakeholder consultations not only shed light onto local issues, but that they also ensure the involvement of direct and indirect beneficiaries, along with community leaders, for project implementation. This has been evident throughout adaptation investments explored in this study, along with KIIs, especially through the 'do no harm' approaches taken. However, there is a need to further explore how the scale and purpose of other relevant investments affect local needs and rights. According to a 2020 UNEP report (UNEP, 2020), large-scale investments for natural resource management have failed to consider local needs and rights, which has contributed to local conflicts. For example, infrastructure efforts that supported mechanised agriculture neglected to consider any negative implications to traditional farming communities and pastoralists.

Natural resource management adaptation projects have included relevant trainings for local project facilitators and leaders (KII8 Sudan, 2021). Training topics often covered include participatory decision-making, the management of conflicts over natural resources, understanding basic concepts related to resource management, gender issues related to resource management and how to develop participatory action plans during a project's implementation phase (ZOA, 2017).

Several adaptation investments have contained contingency plans for when conflict breaks out which is aligned to existing local conflict resolution mechanisms. This includes continuously updated site security and contingency plans as well as regular training for staff and beneficiaries (KII7 Sudan, 2021). Ensuring that conflict sensitivity training gets to direct and indirect beneficiaries, especially those in migratory routes, has shown to increase the awareness of investment benefits (KII2 Sudan, 2021; KII7 Sudan, 2021). Finally, taking into account the cultural norms and internal dynamics of the area in which the investment is operational has been crucial to satisfy ‘do no harm’ frameworks (KII2 Sudan, 2021; KII 3 Sudan, 2021; KII9 Sudan, 2021).

6.5 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ADAPTATION FINANCING

Low capacity within government institutions impacts the effective transfer of knowledge.

Even though there have been nature-based interventions for more than 20 years – they were not specifically classified as climate adaptation efforts – there is a lack of institutional memory amongst federal and state governments, especially due to high staff turnover (KII1 Sudan, 2021; KII8 Sudan, 2021; KII9 Sudan, 2021). This impacts the effectiveness of future investments and puts unnecessary pressure on limited resources, such as staff time (KII8 Sudan, 2021; KII10 Sudan, 2021).

Ensuring local communities are sensitised to the benefits of restoring natural resources has influenced the likelihood of sustainability of interventions. Pilot demonstrations of tangible adaptation investments and demonstrable benefits have been deemed key to sensitising local communities (KII2 Sudan, 2021; KII8 Sudan, 2021; KII10 Sudan, 2021). This has also minimised operational risks, ensured increased uptake of project activities and reduced likelihood of communal conflicts, especially when scaled across to other communities (KII10 Sudan, 2021; KII11 Sudan, 2021). This is particularly important when considering new adaptation measures, such as the GEF-funded ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) project, implemented by UNEP (2017): EbA measures were piloted in order to sensitise local communities to this new approach and, to mitigate risks to existing communal conflicts (UNEP, 2019; KII11 Sudan, 2021).

The varying M&E methods of climate adaptation projects from different funders and implementing entities puts further strain on government capacity. Different funders, and implementing and executing entities, each have their own definition of climate adaptation and resilience: all operational interpretations of the conceptual definition of adaptation set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response” Paris Agreement, Article 7.1: Adaptation (United Nations, 2015). Putting this overarching, complex definition into practice has led to different M&E approaches for measuring adaptation (KII10 Sudan, 2021). Therefore, the associated multitude of conditions that need to be met has

meant that the already scarce government staff are even further stretched and continuously need to build their technical expertise to understand the associated requirements (KII2 Sudan, 2021; KII5 Sudan, 2021; KII9 Sudan, 2021; KII10 Sudan, 2021). This emphasises the need to build capacity within the federal and state government and, in turn, improve coordination and collaboration across funders and implementers to standardise what climate adaptation means for Sudan (KII11 Sudan, 2021; KII12 Sudan, 2021). This includes a better understanding of the conflict and climate nexus, and how it links to international policy.

The rising inflation rate in Sudan that has caused the price of goods and services to rise has also affected the cost of project activities, which has led to budgets overrunning (KII2 Sudan, 2021; KII12 Sudan, 2021; KII13 Sudan, 2021). Due to the lack of access to adaptation investment evaluation reports, it has been difficult to capture the magnitude of these changes and the effects that they have had on projects.

6.6 COUNTRY SUMMARY

In Sudan, climate adaptation investments have primarily focused on addressing food insecurity – one of the country's contextual approaches to building climate resilience. Across the agriculture, water and land-use sectors, adaptation investments have included locations prone to flairs in communal conflict due to the strong linkage between climate, conflict and forced displacement. Natural resource management and climate-smart agriculture have shown to be key entry points to address the intertwined threats that local communities face. NGOs and bilateral and multilateral entities have been heavily supporting the Government of Sudan's access to and implementation of adaptation finance or adaptation-related activities. In close collaboration with the HCENR and relevant ministries, they have mainly acted as the implementing and executing entities of projects. Government institutions that are responsible for environmental management suffer from instability, underfunding, a lack of staff and training, poor coordination, overlapping roles and the loss of skilled personnel to 'brain drain'. Even though the Government of Sudan may have low capacity, it has iteratively improved climate policy and plans (through the NDC, NAP and NAPAs); and the new HCENR means that the climate agenda is now chaired by the Prime Minister. Now centrally championed, it is unclear how much attention the climate agenda is getting or will get across federal and state governments and, in turn, what impact it will have on the effectiveness of future climate investments, including those for adaptation.

SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS



Given the interrelationship between climate change and conflict in fragile countries, climate adaptation finance allocation to such countries needs to be conflict-sensitive. This study's exploration of conflict sensitivity across climate donors and contributors in the Sahel and East Africa, with country deep dives of Mali, Somalia and Sudan, has sought to understand how the climate and conflict nexus is being addressed on the ground.

The objective of climate adaptation finance is to build climate resilience in climate-vulnerable areas. This is particularly challenging in conflict-affected countries in the Sahel and East Africa, which are some of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world whilst simultaneously being highly insecure and challenging operational environments.

Within their adaptation programming, the donors analysed in this paper have adopted diverse approaches to conflict sensitivity that establish minimum standards to avoid causing harm (the 'do no harm' principle), and they drew heavily upon lessons learnt from development programmes. Improving inter-communal relations over shared natural resources was seen as an opportunity to potentially reduce tension and conflict, improve livelihood opportunities, and potentially deter youth from joining armed groups in Mali and Sudan (and to a lesser extent in Somalia). Sudan and Mali highlighted community participatory processes as key parts of projects that had conflict resolution elements in-built. However, due to the lack of M&E reports and impact assessments, this study was not able to assess the mechanisms of these activities.

Across all three case studies, the distinction between adaptation investments and development investments was blurred. Adaptation programmes face many of the same issues as other development programmes in conflict settings. As previous studies have found: "If the underlying drivers of vulnerability are not addressed, then people are not likely to be able to adapt to climate change anyway" (Pravalprukskul, 2013). Adaptation in certain contexts is difficult to distinguish from development when the basic development foundation is still weak and climatic and ecological conditions are rapidly changing.

Additionally, accessing and implementing adaptation finance faces unique challenges in conflict contexts. These challenges include:

- **Limited information on conflict analyses that inform adaptation:** project proposals analysed across the three countries did not provide consistent evidence that conflict analyses had been undertaken to inform project design.
- **Conflict analyses tend to neglect the two-way interaction between intervention and the conflict context:** in those circumstances where conflict analyses have been carried out, the most consistent focus was given to operational hazards – how an escalation in conflict might affect an intervention – and less attention was given to the potential impact of the intervention on conflict (i.e. 'do no harm').
- **Investment often avoids armed-conflict areas, leaving behind vulnerable people:** where insecurity and conflict levels were deemed too high, donors' commitment to avoid reinforcing conflict dynamics often manifested as active decisions to not invest in areas under the control of non-state groups. Whilst climate finance is not intended to directly address the complex dynamics of insecurity nor political conflict that involves jihadist and terrorist armed groups, avoiding such areas means that the highly vulnerable populations living under militia control cannot be directly reached. The type of conflict also determines

where adaptation projects are implemented; across the three country case studies, most investments targeted areas prone to communal conflict over natural resources.

- **Adaptation programmes miss opportunities to support conflict prevention:** the reviewed adaptation programmes have not consistently provided evidence of an intention to maximise opportunities for positive impact on conflict prevention or resolution, despite these opportunities existing to address communal conflict.
- **Conflict worsens the problems of accessing climate finance:** some development challenges that are further exacerbated by conflict dynamics are a lack of access to historic or current data required for GEF and GCF proposals; rigid and complex donor requirements to demonstrate climate additionality from development programmes that do not account for the rapidly changing contexts of fragility, crises and conflict; and weak institutional capacity to meet fiduciary, social and environmental standards.

These challenges are compounded by a low-risk appetite and a low tolerance for project loss amongst donors and climate contributors that operate in FCAS contexts. This, in a time where there is a growing need for climate adaptation finance, to especially reach and support the most vulnerable communities. These issues are further analysed in the synthesis report.

Despite such challenges, adaptation in fragile states is possible. Finding ways to promote resilience – for example through regenerative natural resource management, rehabilitating degraded land and building livelihoods opportunities – is seen as an entry point to reduce communal conflict, usher in greater stability and improve the living conditions of populations so that shocks do not trigger escalations in violence or conflict.

It is hoped that the findings from this study, and the synthesis report, prompt further guidance and future areas of research, as well as stimulate the sharing of best practices, ways to ensure conflict sensitivity and flexibility in all engagements with FCAS, and stronger articulation of the climate adaptation and conflict nexus amongst donors, climate contributors, governments and implementing partners.

ENDNOTES

- 1 According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND GAIN) Country Index, which can be found here: <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/>.
- 2 According to Fund for Peace (2020), OECD (2020) and WB (2021a).
- 3 See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/>.
- 4 See <https://climatefundsupdate.org/>.
- 5 The websites are as follows: GEF <https://www.thegef.org/projects-operations/database>; GCF <https://www.greenclimate.fund/>; AF <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/documents-publications/>; LDCF <https://www.thegef.org/what-we-do/topics/least-developed-countries-fund-ldcf>; WB <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports>; FCDO's DevTracker <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/>; Norad <https://resultater.norad.no/geography/africa>; AFD <https://www.afd.fr/en/page-region-pays/mali>; Sida <https://openaid.se/en>; BZ <https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs>.
- 6 https://iati.fcdo.gov.uk/iati_documents/45456966.odt.
- 7 Defined as having more than 1,000 deaths from armed conflict.
- 8 Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are the other three regions; and Bamako is the capital district.
- 9 PASARC II – Support Program for Food Security and the Resilience of Populations to Climate and Social Crisis in the Mopti Region.
- 10 As per the lack of evaluation documents of adaptation investments reviewed.
- 11 Such as the aforementioned USAID conflict assessment and analysis tools, the UNDP methods for analysing projects with conflict dimensions, and the WB's 'The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-Related Obstacles to Development' (Shardesai, and Wam 2002).
- 12 The G7 (Group of Seven) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.

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References for Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

The KIIs are not named because keeping ‘anonymous’ status of interview results was a precondition of this research approach.

Regional	Mali	Somalia	Sudan
KII1 Donor (2021) key informant interview 1.	KII1 Mali (2021) key informant interview 1.	KII1 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 1.	KII1 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 1.
KII2 Donor (2021) key informant interview 1.	KII2 Mali (2021) key informant interview 2.	KII2 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 2.	KII2 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 2.
KII3 Donor (2021) key informant interview 2.	KII3 Mali (2021) key informant interview 3.	KII3 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 3.	KII3 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 3.
KII4 Donor (2021) key informant interview 2.	KII4 Mali (2021) key informant interview 4.	KII4 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 4.	KII4 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 4.
KII5 Donor (2021) key informant interview 3.	KII5 Mali (2021) key informant interview 5.	KII5 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 5.	KII5 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 5.
KII6 Donor (2021) key informant interview 4.	KII6 Mali (2021) key informant interview 6.	KII6 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 6.	KII6 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 6.
	KII7 Mali (2021) key informant interview 7.	KII7 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 7.	KII7 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 7.
		KII8 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 8.	KII8 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 8.
		KII9 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 9.	KII9 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 9.
		KII10 Som. (2021) Somalia key informant interview 10.	KII10 Sudan (2021) key informant interview 10.

ANNEX



ANALYSED ADAPTATION PROJECTS

TABLE A1: MALI

Donor	Implementing agency	Programme	Timeframe	US\$ million
AfDB	MEADD	Projet d'assainissement de Bamako	2017–2020	30
BMZ	GIZ	PASSIP – Appui Au Programme National De l'Irrigation De Proximité	2017–2019 (Phase III)	20.6 EUR
BMZ and Director General DEVCO	GIZ	FREXUS: Improving security and climate resilience in a fragile context through the Water-Energy-Food Nexus	2019–2021	--
GCF	IFAD	INCLUSIF	2018–2024	105.5
GCF	IFAD	Programme de Gestion Intégrée des Risques Climatiques en Afrique – Cadre de Gestion Environnementale et Sociale (CGES)	2021	
FCDO	IIED, NEF, IED	BRACED – DCF		
MFA (Netherlands)	Near East Foundation	Sécurité Alimentaire Résilience A' Mopti (PASARC-II)	2018–2023	6,778,278,405 XOF*
WB	Minister of Equipment and Accessibility	Mali – Rural Mobility And Connectivity Project – P160505	2017–2022	70
WB	Ministry of Agriculture	Mali Drylands Development Project	2018–2023	30
WB	Ministry for Livestock and Fisheries Development	Mali Livestock Sector Development Support Project (PADELI-M)	2018–2024	30
GCF	WB	(FP012) Africa Hydromet Program: Strengthening climate resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali country project	2017–2020	22.75 from GCF 29.50 total
GEF	AfDB	9293 P2RS Scaling up a Multiple Benefits Approach to Enhance Resilience In Agro- and Forest Landscapes of Mali's Sahel Regions (Kayes, Koulikoro and Ségou)	2016–2021	8,605,023 total GEF project cost 59,452,886 Co-financed

*XOF = West African CFA francs

TABLE A2: MAJOR CLIMATE FINANCING FLOWS TO SOMALIA SINCE 2016

Donor	Status	Programme	Who	End	US\$ million
GCF	Funded		UNDP	2019	2.96
GCF	Concept note	Strengthening Climate Information Systems for Climate Change Adaptation in the Greater Horn of Africa through regional cooperation	UNDP	2020 sub	9.46
GCF	Approved readiness proposal	Adaptation planning support for Somalia through UNDP	UNDP	2019 sub	3
GCF	Concept note	Improving the climate-risk preparedness and adaptive capacities of pastoralists throughout Somalia	UNDP	2017 sub	45
LDCF	Funded	Enhancing Climate Resilience of the Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in Somalia	UNDP	2014–2017	8
LDCF	Funded	Support for Integrated Water Resources Management to Ensure Water Access and Disaster Reduction for Somalia's Pastoralists	UNDP	2019–2021	8.83
LDCF	Funded	Preparations of National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) in response to Climate Change for Somalia	UNDP	2017	0.20
LDCF	Funded	Rural Livelihoods' Adaptation to Climate Change in the Horn of Africa – Phase II (RLACC II)	AfDB	2016–2021	9.99
WB	Funded	Somalia Crisis Recovery Project	FGS	2020–2024	137.5

TABLE A3: TARGET AREAS FOR MAJOR CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS TO SOMALIA

Donor	Programme	Where
GCF	Readiness program support	n/a
GCF	Strengthening Climate Information Systems for Climate Change Adaptation in the Greater Horn of Africa through regional cooperation	Multinational / nationwide systems
GCF	Adaptation planning support for Somalia through UNDP	n/a
GCF	Improving the climate-risk preparedness and adaptive capacities of pastoralists throughout Somalia	The proposed project is designed as a highly inclusive and participatory process with extensive engagement in all six states. Puntland – Nugaal and Bari;
LDCF	Enhancing Climate Resilience of the Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in Somalia	Somaliland – Toghddeer and Wooqyi Galbeed; South Central – Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle
LDCF	Support for Integrated Water Resources Management to Ensure Water Access and Disaster Reduction for Somalia's Pastoralists	Baidoa, Luuq, Baletweyn, Ba'ad wayn, Guriel, Waajid, Kobdhaxad , Gardo, Dhahar, Bayla, Dangorayo, Libaaho, Celbilcinle, Beer, Habariheshay (the states Galmudug, Puntland, Jubaland, Hirshabelle and South West)
LDCF	Preparations of National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) in response to Climate Change for Somalia	n/a
LDCF	Rural Livelihoods' Adaptation to Climate Change in the Horn of Africa – Phase II (RLACC II)	South Central Somalia – the states Hiiraan and Galuduud, the localities Beledweyn and Guriceel; Somaliland – the region Awdal, the villages Quljeed, Ton and Salawley-Cheikh Hared;
WB	Somalia Crisis Recovery Project	Puntland – the regions Bari and Nugaal The project targets the flood-affected states of Hirshabelle, South West and Jubaland, whilst advancing a national approach to the locust response, longer-term resilience building, and the Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC).

TABLE A4: MAJOR CLIMATE FINANCING FLOWS TO SUDAN SINCE 2016

Donor	Implementing agency	Programme	Year
IFAD's Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)	Government	Butana Integrated Rural Development Programme (BIRDP)	2016
LDCF	AfDB	Rural Livelihoods' Adaptation to Climate Change in the Horn of Africa – Phase II (RLACC II)	2016
LDCF	UNEP	Enhancing the Resilience of Communities Living in Climate Change Vulnerable Areas of Sudan Using Ecosystem-Based Approaches to Adaptation (EbA)	2016
EU		Special support measure in favour of the people of the Republic of Sudan to be financed from the reserve of the European Development Fund	2016
Sweden	UNICEF	UNICEF 2018–2021 Country Programme – Sudan	2018
IFAD	Government	Integrated Agriculture and Marketing Development Project (IAMDP)	2017
Sweden	ZOA	Sustainable Integrated Development Approach (Sudan)	
Germany		Food Security for Refugees and Adjacent Communities in Gedaref and Kassala States	2017
GEF	WB (IBRD)	Sudan Sustainable Natural Resources Management Project (SSNRMP) – Additional Financing	2018
EU GCCA	Red Cross	Strengthening Local Communities Resilience to Climate Change in Sudan	2016
AfDB		Sustainable Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in North and South Kordofan	2019

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Cover: MHNT in Somali drought 2017 –
The MHNT in full operation with MHNT
team leader Mohammed Miyir at its
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